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J. C. Kozlov

Pastor



THE GRIM SAGA

By the same Author:

THE GRAND HYPOCRICY

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by

S. N. SHIVAPURI

DAS GUPTA & CO., LIMITED

BOOK-SELLERS & PUBLISHERS

54-3, College Street, Calcutta

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I should like to thank those—including many Kashmiris—who tried, in their own ways, to lead me on the journey to Truth, and without whose helping-hands this task could hardly have been accomplished.

Much obligation is due, of course, to the authors and the publishers of the many books on this subject which have given me a host of facts; the interpretation of those facts is solely mine.

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S. N. S.

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I should like to thank those who have helped me in the preparation of this book. In the first place, I am indebted to the many friends and colleagues who have helped me in the preparation of this book. In the first place, I am indebted to the many friends and colleagues who have helped me in the preparation of this book.

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KASHMIR, INDIA & PAKISTAN

AUGUST 15, 1947

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
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
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INTRODUCTION

Six years from to-day, Kashmir shot into the world news. On that historic morn, this land of scenic beauty and mystic charm, this play-ground of love and romance, was transformed, once more, into a battle-field where armies clashed by day and night. Since then this luckless country has had little surcease from sorrow.

Some evil fairy had, it seems, presided over the birth of Kashmir. For, centuries of her struggle against Man and Nature have failed to wipe her blood, and sweat, and tears. Not only that, but for the last few years, she has had to shed more, and more of them. Why is it that this darling of Himalayas, meant for love and adoration, continues to drudge, and no prince charming comes along to lead her to the magic ball? And if, perchance, some 'prince' knocks at her door, why does he come as a slave-owner, or soon turn into one?

Long and far I wandered seeking answer to this riddle, but no satisfaction did I find; from town to town I drifted eagerly hearing what the 'leaders' pronounced or denounced, but their's was more of a demagogy. I sought wisdom from the 'experts', but their cures were merely quackery. In the Tower of Babel, everyone shouted a different slogan, and each louder than the other—Abdullah and Hari Singh, Secularism and Communalism, Communist expansion and Anglo-American imperialism, and a numberless this and a numberless that; in the end there was more of confusion than clarity.

Then I went seek knowledge from the afflicted themselves.—But (their mouth was shut, or they spoke in an incoherent mumble. Bowed by the weight of centuries, they appeared to be dead to rapture and despair alike. My journey to 'discover' Kashmir seemed to end in a fiasco.

Tired and perplexed, I arrived at a little mountain

chalet one evening. Two typical Kashmiri streams flowed past on either side, each babbling along : "For men may come and men may go, but I go on for ever."—Bemused, I followed the two rivulets, till they tumbled into a gurgling pool together. Their embrace burst into a multitude of sparkling eddies and it was difficult to tell which sheen belonged to which current. But beyond the silvery spray-cloud, the two had broken asunder, and lo ! they were again gliding along separately, each chattering once more : "For men may come and men may go, but I go on for ever."

Then the miracle happened ; the light of knowledge dawned. The enigma of Kashmir is, after all, not one algebraic equation which some clever student may resolve into a single answer. It reveals itself as three problems, often posed separately, but also as a single proposition some times. The three political 'currents', like the Kashmiri streams, would often take independent courses, but ere long they would join in maelstroms—big or small, and then they influenced each other. It is this *melée* of interaction that generates the fog of confusion.

The tragedy besetting Kashmir becomes more understandable when analysed into its three separable components. I shall, for the sake of brevity, classify them into local, sub-continental and international. Correspondingly, and in equal measure, her pain becomes more alleviable, if each wound is treated in accordance with its nature. I have, therefore, tried to reduce the pattern of Kashmir politics into its constituent threads ; though I feel that their intermingling and involution have imparted to my narration an air of repetitiveness and redundancy.

Still if my Reader will bear with me, I shall guide him along the century-old three 'currents', till we reach the roaring whirlpool of 'invasion'. Pushing ahead, we shall then trace their separate courses again, till we arrive at the milestone, named To-day. But we shall not rest even there ; for, ultimately, nothing goes on for ever, not even the Kashmiri streams. Every river 'winds somewhere home to sea' ; or, alternatively, loses itself in the arid sands of some desert.

Whether Kashmir politics will ever reach the 'ocean of peace,' or it will allow itself to be sucked into the quicksands of an exasperating *status quo*, depends on many factors, some ponderable and others imponderable. But by understanding its dynamics correctly, we can at least equip ourselves sufficiently to canalize the diverse 'currents' towards the happier destination. It is on the firm faith that right steps must take us to a right end that I venture to lead my Reader into the unexplored future.

Mountaineering is an exhaustive exercise ; those of weak hearts and feeble constitutions are advised to stick to the plains. Our Odyssey will be equally hard, for often we may encounter the pitfalls of political terminology, and be required to make long detours to arrive at a correct vantage point. In the upper reaches of our climb we shall come across boulders—in the shape of 'foot-notes', very serviceable as 'footholds' but exasperatingly frequent. So those, who take their constitutional in light literature and arm-chair reading, ought better not join us. But, to those made of sterner stuff, I promise a joy of high adventure.

—Weep then no more, thou mountain-daughter, though the world even now remains unmoved by thy plight. Thy Grim Saga, sung so loud and so long, will some day make even the deaf take notice. And when peace doth descend upon thine fastness, I shall return, to hold once more "the hands I held beside the Shalimar."

S. N. S.

October 23, 1953

THE BACKGROUND

The State of Jammu and Kashmir, more (though erroneously) known as Kashmir, lies between 32.11° and 36.58° North Latitude and 77.26° and 80.3° East Longitude. 350 miles long and 275 miles broad, and covering 84,471 square miles, it is the homeland of 40,21,616 * people. In area it was the biggest single princely State in the pre-partition India; though, being mostly mountainous, it ranked a low fourth in population.

The above narration of dry geographical facts, however, does not reveal the true feature of the State, that physically, culturally, even politically, it is not a homogeneous unit. As in Switzerland, so in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, a number of heterogeneous elements have been brought under one political set-up by the accidents of history, resulting, on one hand, in the emergence of certain cohesive forces; and, on the other, in the generation of equally powerful disruptive tendencies. This fundamental fact is of the utmost importance for the comprehension of the current political and socio-economic problems of the State. It also gives a correct perspective to many unsolved and apparently insoluble enigmas that have recently been taxing the intelligence, not only of the inhabitants of the State and the Indian sub-continent, but also of the United Nations Organization.

For administrative purposes, the State has been divided into three regions: (i) Jammu Province; (ii) Kashmir Province; (iii) Frontier Ilaqas of Gilgit and Ladakh. This division is in rough parallel to the topographical demarcations, as also to the cultural compartments which, only when they are put together, form a composite whole.

(i) *Jammu Province*:—This region, lying between the territorial boundary of the un-divided Punjab and the sub-

* 1941 census figure, slightly altered since then.

Himalayan Pir Panchal range, includes the districts of Jammu, Kathua, Udhampur, Reasi and Mirpur, and the Jagirs (feudatory estates) of Poonch and Chenani. Physically, it is an extension of the Indo-Gangetic plain, having a similar tropical climate; with the exception of the mountainous north, and the north-eastern fringe connected with the Kangra valley of East Punjab. Two rivers, Chenab and Ravi, together with their tributories, try to lessen the rigours of the climate and terrain—not with much success, though.

The population of the province is 19,81,433, which may be sub-divided on the basis of religion into 7,23,922 Hindus; 12,15,676 Muslims, 38,566 Sikhs, 522 Buddhists, and 2,737 Christians. Though it gives an over-all preponderance to the Muslims, it must, nevertheless, be borne in mind that the Hindus form a majority in the three districts of Jammu, Kathua and Udhampur, and in the Jagir of Chenani.

Ethnically, the inhabitants of this sub-area trace their origin from the Sakas and the Scythians who descended from Central Asia in the 5th and 6th centuries, and whose purest strain is now met in the deserts of Rajasthan only. They are known as Dogra, from the language they speak. The last hereditary ruling dynasty of the State had its original home in this region; and, naturally, the Dogra, whether a Hindu or a Muslim (the Muslim being a convert from Hinduism), always used to carry a superior air round him—bordering on conceit—in his social exchanges with the inhabitants of the other regions, which he now misses.

Though Dogri is the most prevalent tongue, constant intermixture with the virile Punjabis has resulted in a considerable importation of Urdu and Hindi in this region.

Many non-Dogra families have spilled over from the Punjab, and Hazara district of the North-West Frontier Province, among which the Sikh and the Punjabi Muslim predominate. Though the Sikh-rule over Kashmir ended more than a hundred years ago when the Dogras took over, yet a sect, whose history is only four century old, can hardly be supposed to forget its past glory

so soon. It is not surprising, therefore, that while many Dogras are genuinely loyal to the country of their adoption, a sizable section casts nostalgic eyes at the Punjab and the modern Pepsu (Punjab and East Punjab States Union), especially when their co-religionist leaders there evoke a vision of Khalistan or Sikhistan, and put emphasis on the extra-territorial loyalty of the Panth (Sikh religious brotherhood).

The Punjabi Muslim has, in a like fashion, imported the political and sectarian prejudices of the province of his origin; he has thus become another potent centrifugal force. Not only the Sikh is his traditional foe, but the Dogra and other Hindu castes also are mere interlopers in the country which, by virtue of his religion and earlier over-lordship, should be his patrimony. Therefore, in his struggle to regain what he considers his birth-right, all non-Muslims belong automatically to the opposite camp, and a co-religionist who hesitates to throw in his lot with him is a renegade.

(ii) *Kashmir Province* :—This territorial region lies between the sub-Himalayan Pir Panchal range in the south and the scattered Himalayan folds in the north, forming a saucer-like valley watered by the two rivers, Jhelum and Sindh. The nature's beauty, for which the State is reputed, resides in the side-valleys and the over-hanging mountain-walls. This region is subdivided for administrative purposes into three districts of Anantnag, Baramulla and Muzaffarabad, with Srinagar, the State capital, nestling on the banks of the Jhelum, almost at the centre.

The population comprises of 85,000 Hindus (almost all Brahmins or Pandits), 16,15,478 Muslims, 27,034 Sikhs, and an insignificant number of Buddhists and Christians; giving a total of 17,28,705. Muslims, practically all converts like their co-religionists in the Jammu province, form an overwhelming majority in every district; but there is an effective concentration of the Pandits in the town of Srinagar and, being one hundred per cent literate, they wield influence out of proportion to their strength.

People residing in this province are the true Kashmiris, and their mother-tongue is also known by that name. They form the purest strain of the original Aryan racial stock, with the least inter-mixture with other ethnic groups. A small number of Gujars reside with their herds of goats and sheep on the higher slopes of the mountains; but they come from a different racial stock, and are generally at logger-heads with the people inhabiting the lower regions. Their habitat being less fertile than the valley, they are poorer and, consequently, envious of their richer brethren on the lower slopes. The valley people call them "Kabaalis"—dwellers of the mountains, but the way the word is intonated betrays the amount of derision and hate which the former have for the latter.

Kashmiri language, like many others of the sub-continent, is mostly derived from the ancient Sanskrit, modified, in the course of time, by the dialects of the people who either ruled the country or came in cultural and commercial contact with it.* Thus, modern Kashmiri has a Sanskrit base, on which Persian and Arabic, Punjabi and Dogri, Tibetan and Turki have been grafted to a more or less extent. Further, it is a spoken tongue only, with no written characters of its own; though the Pandits make a private use of a script known as *Sarda*, peculiarly suited to the characteristic Kashmiri phonetics. Nevertheless, as the Persian or Urdu has been the language of the successive courts and the elite—Moghul, Pathan, Sikh and Dogra, there has always been a movement to super-impose it on the Kashmiris, thus exposing the administrators, partly justifiably, to the charge of 'linguistic imperialism.'

Enclosed by high mountain ranges towering at places to 15,000 ft. above sea-level, the people of this region have developed a distinct cultural tradition of their own, dating from the pre-historic Vedic period; and, though dark ages and vicissitudes had overwhelmed them from time to time, they had managed to regain their independent status, till they were conquered, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, by

* Appendix I.

Maharaja Ranjit Singh, and Kashmir became a mere province of the vast Sikh kingdom. A subsequent accident of history in 1846 transferred that over-lordship to the Dogra chieftains of Jammu; and it was only in 1947 that the Kashmiris could throw off their yoke. But, in the interval, their grudge, against the tricks of fate and a justifiable pride for their homeland—endowed, as it certainly is with incomparable beauty and abundance—have developed in them a spirit of artless jealousy; tinged with a sub-conscious animosity, for their compatriots of the Dogri-speaking Jammu Province—the homeland of their last subjugators.

In contrast to their common unfriendliness towards the Dogras, the Pandits and the Muslims of the Kashmir Province have developed a peculiar happy bond of comradeship, arising from the feeling that they are joint-owners of the land of their birth. And it should be so, for barring a few families which came with the Moghul and Afghan conquerors, or as independent adventurers, all Muslims trace their descent from the Pandits. "The Truth is", observes Prem Nath Bazaz, 'that change of religion has not largely affected the ties of blood, and the Muslims of Kashmir continue to have an affinity of race with their Hindu compatriots. They are equally descendents of the old Aryans who first settled in the valley in pre-historic days'.* Moreover, both the Hindu and the Muslim were partners in slavery, first during the Sikh rule and, subsequently, under the Dogra dynasty; adversity has, therefore, generated a sense of brotherhood.† This non-sectarian outlook is resented by the Muslim immigrants from the communal-ridden Punjab.

Lest one should mistakenly believe that the coalescence of the Kashmiri Muslim and the Pandit is so complete that no

* Prem Nath Bazaz : *Inside Kashmir* :

† A historic example was the joint Hindu-Muslim invitation to Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1819, for help against their Afghan persecutors. When the Pandits, under the leadership of Pandit Birbal Dar, escaped to Lahore on their mission under cover of the night and in disguise, they were actively helped by their Muslim countrymen, though it meant the replacement of the Muslim rule by the Sikh.

political storm—however strong—could ever smash that unity, it must be recorded that alongside the leaven of coagulation there have been in existence other social forces which tend to polarize the people according to their religious beliefs. While, therefore, it is not uncommon that single Hindu families live happily in predominantly Muslim rural areas even today, there have been occasions when sectarian prejudices have burst out in ugly demonstrations.

It would, nevertheless, be improper to conclude that the communal distemper arises from any religious antagonism. It actually is a consequence of an unequal development, particularly in education, of the different sections of the Kashmiri society. While the Pandits boast of their universal literacy (which no other group in the world can claim), the Muslims almost to this day stagnate in the slush of ignorance. Though the rulers must take a share of censure for this state of affairs, the Kashmiri Muslim is not blameless himself, because he has allowed himself to be ridden by the *Mullah* (Muslim religious divine), to whom mass-illiteracy is an aid for exploitation. Thus handicapped, the Kashmiri Muslims have fallen behind the Pandits in the race for economic betterment; so that to be a Muslim is synonymous with the menial, and low-paid worker, while the posts of honour are, more often than not, occupied by the Hindus. It is quite natural therefore, that this social disparity sometimes does burst out as a communal disorder, however reprehensible that may be.

Another fact, which generally remains unnoticed but is worth mention, is that though Islam has given a sense of common destiny to $1\frac{1}{2}$ million Kashmiri Muslims, that unity of outlook is itself vitiated by their own sectarian differences and also by the personal jealousies of their religious divines. For instance, the 1872 riots in Srinagar and the countryside between the Shias and the Sunnis—the two main sub-divisions in the Islamic brotherhood—in which the Shia minority lost heavily in life and property, have left a bitter memory and an estrangement which persist to this day. Then, again, the

two *Mir Waizes*, the heads of the Jammu Masjid and of Khanaqi-Mualla, though professing spiritual sovereignty over their lay followers, would often fall out between themselves when the temporal rulers did not distribute their favours equally.

(iii) *Frontier Ilaqas* ;—This region extends almost as a rectangle with the Himalayan ranges of the Kashmir province in the south, and the Pamirs, Karakoram and Hindukush mountains on the north and west ; while, on the east, it merges almost imperceptibly into Tibet. As the name suggests, this region forms the boundary of the State, at places still unmarked and often inaccessible. Its strategic importance can be gauged from the remark made by E. F. Knight as far back as in 1865 : "This is the place where the borders of three empires of Russia, China and Tibet meet".* This fact would appear all the more glaring, if it were noted that not only the three 'empires' listed by Mr. Knight meet there, but a narrow tongue from the independent kingdom of Afghanistan licks its north-western flank and, till recently, this area also formed a vital outpost of Great Britain's Empire of India.

Administratively, the Frontier Ilaqas are divided into four districts—Astora, Gilgit, the Gilgit Agency and Ladakh. But culturally and for certain other significant political reasons, the last should be considered as a distinct unit.

The population of the Frontier Ilaqas (excluding Ladakh) is 1,16,196. Though Muslims are 99%, yet they do not exhibit cultural or sectarian homogeneity. Firstly, the region as a whole has only recently been brought under subjugation, and the Rajas of Hunza, Nagir, Yasin and Punnial retain a sort of semi-independent status ; and, to add confusion to the chaotic administrative conditions, these chieftains would, from time to time, go out on vendettas against not only their Kashmiri overlords (which is understandable), but against each other as well.

Secondly, the number of languages spoken in this region is many and the dialects even more—though Dardi predominates in the Indus valley and Shina is the chief language of Gilgit,

* E. F. Knight : *Where Three Empires Meet*,

Astore and Punial. Phonetically these tongues, and the many dialects which trace origin from them, have nothing in common with the languages prevalent in the Jammu and Kashmir Provinces.

Thirdly, while the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir Provinces are, by and large, Sunnis and therefore orthodox, a preponderating majority of the people of this region belong to the Shia sect, with a fair sprinkling of Ismailis—the followers of His Highness, the Aga Khan. It is not surprising, therefore, that they still retain a semblance of caste prejudices and a certain respect for the cow, betraying their Hindu ancestry.

Ladakh:—The district of Ladakh—subdivided into three *tehsils* (administrative sub-divisions) of Kargil, Skardu and Leh, and sheltering 1,95,282 people—is even more heterogeneous than the other frontier districts. Muslims form only 78% of the total population, while the eastern-most *tehsil* of Leh is overwhelmingly Buddhist. Balti is spoken in the first two *tehsils*, and Bodhi—a dialect akin to the Tibetan—is the language of Leh.

The Ladakh Buddhists have nothing in common with the Kashmiri Muslims. Their social pattern is determined by their religious life, which itself revolves round the institution of *Gompa* or monastery, peculiar to this area alone. *Gompas* are maintained by generous endowments of lands, created by the ancient Buddhist rulers for the maintenance of the monks or *Lamas* residing in them. These *lamas* are held in high esteem by all and sundry, and the head of the monastery, or *Kushok*, is regarded almost as a re-incarnated divinity. In the hierarchical order of the monks, and the method for the determination of a successor to the headship, the institution of lamahood is a close parallel to the Tibetan model. In fact, the budding *Kushoks* are sent to Tibet for religious instruction for a duration upto ten years, and the *lamas* of Ladakh regard the Dalai Lama as their spiritual head.* In their lay life, too, the Ladakhis are linked

* As recently as January this year, the 15 year old Stogdam Rinpoche of the Fyang monastery was sent to Lhasa.

with the residents of the Western Tibet by ties of matrimony and economics. Ladakh has often been called 'Little Tibet.'

Religion pulls the Ladakhis towards India too, because it was the land of the Master himself. This fact was high lighted in November last year when their leader, Kushok Bakula went on a pilgrimage to Sanchi, in Central India, and joined the ceremony of re-interring the remains of the two disciples of the Buddha, Sariputra and Mogallana, and also attended the International Buddhist Conference there.

Till lately the Buddhists of Ladakh remained confined within the shell of their religious existence, and took little part in politics ; so much so, that they had no representative of their own on the legislative bodies of the State, and used to be represented by certain Kashmiri Pandits reputed for their scholarship in the Buddhist lore. But the impact of the invasion from the west, and the rumbling of the events in the east, have made them open their eyes and sit up.*

The above survey gives a rough idea of the social jig-saw puzzle that is the modern State of Jammu and Kashmir. Geography has introduced a wide range of diversity, from the acute tropical to the severe arctic ; and from areas only a few hundred feet above sea-level to mountain ranges with an average height of 25,000 ft. (Mt. Godwin-Austen towers majestically from 28,250 ft in the north-west, and is the second highest peak in the world). The State is an ethnic melting-pot, wherein the Aryan from the north-west, the Mongoloid from the east, and the Aryan—proto-Austroloid from the south, are being moulded—more or less successfully—to one racial cast. This cultural inter-mixture has evolved no less than 13 spoken tongues, the most important being Kashmiri, Dogri, Balti, Bodhi, Punjabi, Urdu and Hindi. Hence, too, the failure of every new invading tenet of religious belief completely to obliterate the existing ones. Successive waves of Vedic, Buddhistic, Brahmanical and Islamic cultures

* Justice William O. Douglas of the U., S. Supreme Court, has recently given a very penetrating account of the various aspects of the Ladakhi social and religious life in his travelogue, *Beyond the High Himalayas*.

have stormed into the backwaters of Kashmir ; they have, in turn, overwhelmed the previous cultures, but the latter have always proliferated again.

Political history, going four millennium back, has added its share of medly to the crazy-quilt pattern. Starting with savage communism, Kashmir has seen the rise and fall of successive Hindu dynasties, Muslim Sultanate, Moghul vassalage, Afghan rule, Sikh over-lordship and, finally, the Dogra autocracy till last year. However, modern Kashmir dates from the establishment of the last monarchy in 1846.

The defeat of the Delhi Moghuls, at the hands of the Afghan invader, Ahmad Shah Abdali, at Panipat in 1761, synchronized with the expansion of the Sikh power and the establishment of a strong court at Lahore. The Punjab and the neighbouring districts were soon consolidated under the Sikh kingdom ; and by 1781 the Jammu Dogras were absorbed within its orbit. The Sikhs were quick to realize the soldierly quality of the Dogras and recruited them in large numbers as mercenaries. Gulab Singh, a Dogra chieftain, who had entered the service of Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1812, distinguished himself in valour more than others, for which he was rewarded seven years later with the title of Raja and the fief of Jammu. It was Raja Gulab Singh who led the successful Sikh invasion when, as already narrated, the Pandits had, with the aid and abetment of their Muslim brethren, invited Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1819 to save them from the oppressive Afghan rule.

The golden age of the Sikhs came to a quick close with the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Raja Gulab Singh had made a shrewd guess that the sun of the Lahore court was on the decline, and he set himself busy gathering his own fortune in the chaos existing then. He absorbed many semi-independent chieftainships studded round Jammu, conquered Baltistan and Ladakh, and his general Zorawar Singh led an expedition into Western Tibet in 1841.

The Raja had also the prescience about the coming trial of strength between the declining Sikh power and the rising British.

So, to run with the hare and to hunt with the hound, he continued to owe allegiance to his Sikh sovereign but felt no qualms of conscience in establishing a concord with his British rivals, by helping the latter in their adventurous exploits on the North-Western Frontier. He went to the extent of keeping a regular contact with the British, as is revealed by Hardinge's letter, dated February 20, 1845, to Ellenborough; "Gulab Singh has again written to us, delighted to enter into terms with us."

Therefore, when the Anglo-Sikh hostilities commenced some months later and, after early reverses, Maharaja Dalip Singh made him his Prime Minister in 1846, the Raja not only failed to infuse fresh spirit into the demoralized Sikh army, but instead literally sold the pass to the enemy. Cunningham, in his *History of Sikhs*, records that between the English and Raja Gulab Singh there was "an understanding that the Sikh army should be attacked by the English, and that when beaten it should be openly abandoned by its own Government and, further, that the passage of Sutluj should be unopposed and the road to the capital laid open to the victors."

The fate of the Sikhs was sealed after this shameless treason. They were routed in the battle of Subraon, and the British entered Lahore. In the resultant Treaty of Lahore, which the victors dictated to the vanquished on March 9, 1846, a clause was incorporated by virtue of which Raja Gulab Singh was accepted as an independent ruler of "such territory and the districts in the hills" as would be stipulated in a separate agreement between him and the British. This separate agreement, subsequently known as the Treaty of Amritsar, was signed on March 16, and forms a very interesting and revealing document.

Article 1 of the Treaty reads: "The British Government TRANSFERS and makes over for ever in independent possession to Maharaja Gulab Singh and the heirs male of his body all the hilly or mountainous country with its dependencies situated to the eastward of the River Indus and the westward of the River Ravi including Chamba and excluding Lahul, being part of the territories ceded to the British Government by the Lahore State

according to the provisions of the Article IV of the Treaty of Lahore, dated 9th March, 1846"; and Article 3 says: "In consideration of the transfer made to him and his heirs by the provisions of the foregoing article Maharaja Gulab Singh will pay to the British Government the sum of seventy five lakhs of rupees (Nanakshahi), fifty lakhs to be paid on ratification of this Treaty and twenty-five lakhs on or before the 1st October of the current year, A. D, 1846."

This is how Kashmir became a mere appendage to the Dogra principality of Jammu, and Kashmiris sold as chattels. Baltistan and Ladakh already belonged to the new ruler of Kashmir, by virtue of earlier conquest. He now turned his attention to the subjugation of the rebellious chieftains of Gilgit and the neighbouring frontier districts. On the pretext that the Hunza ruler Akbar had "made a foray on the confines of Gilgit about 1st July, 1847, carried off a few sheep and goats, killed one man and wounded two," Dogra troops occupied Dardistan, whereupon the chieftains accepted a subordinate alliance with the victor. Later, they made several attempts, singly or often jointly, to throw off the Dogra yoke, and repeated punitive expeditions had to be sent by Gulab Singh's son to bring them to submission.

Opportunism and bloodshed, resorted to in the formation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, have aggravated the stresses arising from cultural and ethnic differences. But a century of one government and the experience of adjusting one's life to a single pattern of administrative behaviour have, on the other hand, made amends.

Therefore, the central problem of Kashmir today is how to balance these various divergent pulls. Preference for one antagonistic tendency over the other would lead to either of the two different solutions of the problem, viz, the disruption of the country into the former mutually hostile territorial units, or a greater consolidation of the mutually co-operative people.

FIRST CURRENT

Kashmiris have been luckless with their rulers, particularly since the Afghans snatched their country from the Moghuls. Religious persecution, economic exploitation, and social debasement had, time and again, made them listless during the last two centuries. But in the end, when the oppression became insufferable, they had risen against it, and by the very effort to throw off the yoke they have begun to live again.

Mis-rule, plunder and cruelty of the Afghans drove the Kashmiris to invite Maharaja Ranjit Singh ; but they were soon dis-illusioned. Though the Governors appointed by the Sikh rulers were Muslims, this religious identity did not better the lot of the majority community, not to say anything about the minority. To a certain extent the condition became worse ; for a marriage tax was imposed on the Muslims, and sometimes even mosques were confiscated in lieu of the State dues. Describing the state of the masses during the Sikh rule, an English traveller named Moorecroft, who visited the valley in 1822 says ; "Everywhere the people are in the most abject condition, exorbitantly taxed by the Sikh Government, and subjected to every kind of extortion and oppression by officers. The consequences of this system are the gradual depopulation of the country ; not more than one-sixteenth of the cultivable soil is in cultivation, and the inhabitants, starving at home, are driven in great numbers to the plains of Hindustan."*

The Dogra rulers, who succeeded the Sikhs, formed a non-indigenous ethnic element, coming as they did from the other side of the almost impassable Pir Panchal mountain-wall ; their culture, too, was alien. Coupled to this feeling of separatism was the Kashmiri grievance that their country had been

* W. Moorecroft : *Travels in the Himalayan Provinces*, 1819-35.


'transferred' or 'sold' without their consent. This sensitivity persisted till the last days of the Dogra rule. Nevertheless, it must be conceded that Raja Gulab Singh brought a modicum of orderliness in the chaos left by the Sikhs. But did he treat his Kashmiri subjects better? The testimony, left on record by some eye-witnesses, does not speak in his favour. For instance, says Frederic Drew: "An avariciousness always distinguished him; in the indulgence of the passion he was unable to take the wide view by which his subjects' wealth would be found compatible with the increase of his own".*

Gulab Singh was succeeded by his son, Ranbir Singh, in 1857. Though the new Maharaja was an enlightened ruler, his gratuitous help to the British in quelling the Indian Mutiny and, later, in their war against Afghanistan, and his own repeated attempts to subdue the recalcitrant Dardistan chiefs, emptied his coffers so much that in desperate efforts to refill them he had to impose many new and onerous taxes, like *Zar-i-nakhas* a tax on sale of horses, and octroi duty on rice imported into Srinagar. The method of realization of the taxes was even more obnoxious. According to Prem Nath Bazaz: "Revenue was collected in kind and sepoys were despatched to the villages in advance at the time of harvest to collect it. As the sepoys themselves were not paid their dues which remained in arrears for several months, one can imagine what havoc they must have been creating".†

It was, perhaps, during this time that the Kashmiris coined their proverb: *Hakima ta Hoikama nist racktam Khodayan* (Preserve me, O God, from the Doctor and the Ruler). Such dread of the official was understandable, because in addition to the heavy emasculation the villager was subjected to, he had to undergo even greater hardship in the form of 'begar' or forced labour. How this heartless institution worked, snatching youngmen from their families and fields of labour to die of hunger and cold in hundreds, has been described by the great


* Fredric Drew : *Jammu and Kashmir Territories*.

† Prem Nath Bazaz : *Inside Kashmir*.




"NISHAT BAGH"

The Moghul gardens are the pride of Kashmir—
Nishat Bagh (pleasure garden); Shalamar Bagh
(garden of love); Nasim Bagh (garden of bliss);
Achabal (good garden); Chashma Shahi (royal spring).




A stream near Pahalgam in the Lidar valley—
Kashmir's incomparable beauty resides in her
numerous side-valleys.

"FLOATING LIFE"




A house boat on the Jhelum.
These floating hotels are in great demand by the tourists.

"FROZEN LIFE"




ALPATHAR

A high (11,000 ft.) lake where even life appears to freeze.
Other famous are Shasnag and Konsarnag.



A glacier adjacent to Sonamarg
(Sonamarg = The golden meadow)



Early snows on Gulmarg
(Gulmarg = The rosy meadow)

authority on mid-nineteenth century Kashmir, E. F. Knight : "When a man is seized for this form of beggar, his wives and children hang upon him, weeping, taking it almost for granted that they will never see him more. A gang of these poor creatures, heavily laden with grain, toiling along the desert crags between Astore and Gilgit, on a burning summer day, urged on by a sepoy guard, is perhaps as pitiable a spectacle as any to be seen on the roads of the Siberia. But these are not convicts or criminals they are Mussalman farmers, harmless subjects of the Maharaja."*

Ranbir Singh was followed by his son, Partap Singh, on September 25, 1885. He commenced his rule with a great promise—among other reforms, the octroi duty on rice was abolished, and the system of payment in kind to the army was withdrawn. A proper land revenue settlement was worked out in 1887, though its benefits were largely circumscribed by a peculiar parochialism exhibited by the young Maharaja. In almost the whole of the Jammu Province, whence his fore-fathers came, the land was parcelled out to the tillers who were declared 'occupancy tenants' or proprietors. In contrast, the land in Kashmir Province and the Frontier regions was retained by the Maharaja himself, with the peasants as mere 'tenants-at-will', i. e. they were allowed to cultivate land as long as they paid the revenue without having any proprietary right to sell or mortgage it, and could be ejected at any time. This differential treatment between the inhabitants of the two areas has gone a long way to keep the provincial prejudices alive.†

A Government of India plot divested Maharaja Partap Singh of his ruling power in 1889, and the British Political Resident became the virtual ruler. The lot of the Kashmiri, even then, did not improve. During fifteen years of the Residency raj, a large number of English-educated youngmen were imported from the Punjab to help the new administration. These 'outsiders'

* E. F. Knight : *Where Three Empires Meet*.

† This distinction was abrogated recently, in 1948.

not only ate away the produce of the land and constituted a severe drain on the wealth of the country, but their superiority-complex and stand-offishness were galling to the Kashmiri and Jammu residents alike.

Contact with the 'outsiders', however, and the humiliation felt in their presence, worked as a leaven amongst the State-subjects, and gave the first shape to the consciousness of their rights. But as it was the educated middle-class Pandit whose job was taken away from him, the slogan of 'Down with the outsider' was raised by him alone. The Muslim masses, for whose educational upliftment both Dogra and the British Residency rule cared two hoots, continued to remain *Mullah*-dominated and tax-ridden.

With the restoration of Maharaja Partap Singh to power in 1905, the 'outsider' lost the patronage he had been receiving from the Residency rule. The Pandits intensified their agitation against him, and they were partially successful. In 1912, it was decreed that a State-Subject or *Mulki* was to be given preference over a non-State-Subject; but the definition of the 'State-Subject' was left so vague that anyone who curried favours from the high officials—themselves 'outsiders'—could get himself accepted as one. Though the educated local Hindus could now obtain a greater share of subordinate posts and offices of lesser responsibility, they remained dissatisfied, and continued to press the charter of their demand on the Ruler. Their persistence bore fruit in 1922, when the heir-apparent to the *gaddi*, Raja Hari Singh, as the Senior Member of the Council of Ministers, charged a fully representative committee to evolve a proper definition of the 'state-subject'.

The success of the Hindu agitation stirred the Muslims. Educationally they had been trailing far behind; now in the race for the jobs, too, they had been outstripped. A half-hearted attempt to voice their claims was made by a section of the Muslim landed aristocracy and the two *Mir Waizes*, during the Kashmir visit of Lord Reading, Viceroy of India, in 1924. They submitted a memorial to him, demanding for their

community, (i) a larger share in the State jobs ; (ii) better educational facilities ; (iii) return of all confiscated mosques ; and (iv) restoration of proprietary rights to the peasants. The memorial, however, misfired ; and a punitive action was taken by the Kashmir Government against some of its signatories. The highest dignitary of the sovereign power in India, who had given a spirited rebuff to the Nizam of Hyderabad when the latter tried to challenge the Paramountcy, remained unmoved at the plight of the Muslim masses.

The State Subjects' Definition Committee reported back to Government in 1925. Meanwhile Maharaja Partap Singh expired and was succeeded on the throne by his nephew-heir, Raja Hari Singh. The new Maharaja accepted the recommendations of the committee *in toto*, and a necessary legislation to implement them was passed on January 31, 1927. A subsequent Notification No. 1-L/84 of April 20, 1927, classified the State Subjects under three heads :—

Class I—meaning and including all persons who were born and were residing in the State before the commencement of the reign of Maharaja Gulab Singh ; and also those who have settled and been permanently residing there before the commencement of Sambat 1942 (1885 A.D.).

Class II—meaning and including all persons, other than belonging to Class I, who have settled within the State before the close of the Sambat 1968 (1911 A.D.) ; and also acquired immovable property therein.

Class III—meaning and including all persons permanently residing within the State and who have acquired under a *Rayatnama* any immovable property therein, or who may hereafter acquire such property under an *Izazatnama*, and may execute a *Rayatnama* after ten years continuous residence therein.

Like his predecessor, Maharaja Hari Singh held out great promise in the beginning. Stoppage of further recruitment to

the State service from abroad was obviously a progressive step. But ill-luck, which has always shadowed the lives of the Kashmiris, shattered the short-lived idyll between the ruler and the ruled, and the young prince came under the inept influence of the leaders of his own community, and certain religious charlatans. The Dogra Rajput was himself a hereditary State subject as defined in the Notification of April 20, 1927 ; so, with the ruler taking a personal interest in him, he could lay claim to any job even if he lacked necessary merits of intelligence and integrity. In the condition when the chief qualification for a post was the kinship with the ruling dynasty, nepotism and jobbery became rampant, and efficiency was at a discount.*

The ranks of the army were already closed to the Kashmiris. To that ignominy, Maharaja Hari Singh added an insult by imposing a Dogra-dominated administrative cadre. The scramble for the job became triangular, with the Dogra running away with the lion's share, the remains going to the Hindu, and the Muslim getting next to nothing. To make matters worse, the Maharaja shifted his capital permanently to his home-town Jammu in supercession of his ancestors' practice of alternating the governmental headquarters between Srinagar and Jammu according to the season. The political atmosphere thus became surcharged, not only with communal rancour, but also with regional bitterness.

The first thunderclap, presaging the storm, sounded with the resignation of the Foreign and Political Minister, Sir Albion Banerji. In utter exasperation, he blurted out the truth : "Jammu and Kashmir State is labouring under many disadvantages..... There is no touch between the Government and the people, no

* "The Rajputs were a satisfied community. They were not advanced in education. A large number of the posts, high or low, in the army were open to them. In the Civil administrations many appointments were filled by them though far better qualified and highly educated youngmen belonging to other communities were available. One Rajput, practically illiterate, became the Head of a Department even in the year 1928, when hundreds of graduates were unemployed. In the case of certain Rajputs from outside the condition of being a state subject was relaxed"—P. N. Bazaz : *Inside Kashmir*.

suitable opportunity for representing grievances, and the administrative machinery itself requires overhauling from top to bottom to bring it up to the modern condition of efficiency. It has at present little or no sympathy with the peoples' want and grievances."*

Maharaja Hari Singh appointed Mr. G. E. C. Wakefield in the vacancy created by the departure of Sir Albion Banerji. This appointment was an 'Himalayan miscalculation'; for Wakefield brought with him the British tactics of Divide-and-Rule. Immediately a Muslim deputation was made to wait upon the Maharaja, demanding a larger proportion of the State jobs for the majority community—though nothing positive resulted from it.

The Indian sub-continent was then seething with discontent left as a legacy of the much-boycotted Simon Commission. Mahatma Gandhi's non-violent non-co-operation Satyagraha was in full swing. Kashmir had been a backwater—almost a land-locked lake—till then, ruffled sometimes with its own local currents, but hardly conscious of the ocean's heaving outside. For the first time now, stray spindrifts from the Indian storm leapt over the dividing hills.

And when Maharaja Hari Singh was invited to Great Britain, as a member of the States' delegation to the Round Table Conference, Kashmir became more than a mere geographical name. Before leaving the state in the beginning of 1930, the Maharaja set up a cabinet of three ministers to act for him in the absence. It comprised of the imperialist G. E. C. Wakefield, the conservative P. K. Wattal, and the reactionary Dogra Rajput, Major-General Janak Singh. Another Dogra Rajput, Thakur Kartar Singh acted as the secretary to the cabinet. It is remarkable that no local Kashmiri found a place in the cabinet, nor was any Muslim included. A second, and a more serious indiscretion was committed by the Maharaja in England; in the Round Table Conference debates, he startled the Imperial

* Interview with the Associated Press of India on March 15, 1929.

Power by his repeated emphasis on nationalism. Thus he not only fanned the Muslim dis-satisfaction, but also forfeited the support of the Paramountcy.

Meanwhile indigence among the small, educated Muslim middle-class had become intolerable. A small number of unemployed youngmen started a reading room near Fateh Kadal (Victory Bridge) in Srinagar in the summer of 1929, where they would meet and discuss their social problems, laying particular stress on the means to solve the growing unemployment. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, a quiet youngman of 25 years, fresh from the Aligarh University after obtaining the degree of Master of Science, was an active participant in the discussion group. A year later, a similar organization, styling itself as a Young Men's Muslim Association, was formed independently in Jammu; Chaudhari Ghulam Abbas was a prominent member of that association. The two groups remained ignorant of each other for some time, but ultimately merged into one Muslim organization. Nevertheless, parochialism did not permit a complete fusion of loyalties—a fact which was of serious consequence in the subsequent history of the organization.

It is also worth re-calling that the Jammu Muslim, though lacking the patronage enjoyed by the Rajput, nor financially the better of other Hindus, did not suffer as much disability as his Kashmiri co-religionist. The army was open to him, and he was the proprietor of his fields. Naturally, therefore, the problem facing the Reading Room Club was more acute; and, hence, its members exhibited greater liveliness and crusading spirit.

So it was the members of the Reading Room Club who took up the cause of their backward community against the rules of competitive examination, framed by the newly constituted Civil Service Recruitment Board. The cabinet granted an interview to a two-men delegation, which included S. M. Abdullah, and also received a written memorial. The members of the cabinet, however, did not accede to the memorialists'

demand for the amendment of the recruitment rules, and for the incorporation of direct appointment on communal considerations.

There was no freedom of speech ; and, in course of his interview, quoted earlier, Sir Albion Banerji had also remarked : "There is hardly any public opinion in the State. As regards the press, it is practically non-existent with the result that the Government is not benefitted to the extent that it should be by the impact of healthy criticism." But after the Maharaja had sailed abroad, the Government became even more unresponsive. As the disappointed members of the Reading Room Club did not find any organ within the State to give vent to their grievances, they turned to the press outside.

India was now taking more than a passing notice in the affairs of the Native States. The members of the Reading Room Club received a welcome for their fiery articles against the State administration, in the columns of the two communal dailies of Lahore, the *Muslim Outlook* and *Siyasat*. These articles became such a popular feature with the politically hungry Kashmiri masses that the papers continued to be smuggled into the State in hundreds, even after their entry was banned. The gag on the press whetted the zeal for clandestine work ; incriminatory pamphlets poured into the State and were freely distributed and avidly read. The British Indian Province of the Punjab connived at this illegal activity, despite the assurance given by the paramount power to the Indian Princes that the internal administration of the States would be protected from outside attacks.

The agitation of the Pandits against the recruitment of the non-State Subjects, though conducted by a single community, was non-communal in nature, because the sufferers were of all denominations. But as the service rules adopted by the Recruitment Board, making competitive examination compulsory, militated against the interests of the educationally backward Muslim community only, the agitation demanding their repeal took a definite communal shape. Soon the surreptitiously circulated

articles were exhorting the Muslims to rise against the Hindus and to establish an Islamic raj in Kashmir.

An unexpected success came to the Reading Room Club agitators when the two *Mir Waizes* composed their personal quarrel, and opened the portals of their mosques for political meetings. Muslim congregations could now be harangued without let or hindrance, because religious buildings were sacrosanct against the police. Though this association of the clergy with a political movement has subsequently been explained away as a 'functional necessity' in the circumstances when the freedom of speech and association was non-existent outside the mosques, yet a spade remains a spade whatever be its use.

Communal passion of the illiterate Muslim mass was sedulously worked up; petty incidents were magnified to echo the cry: Islam in danger. The Government was alive to the fact that religious freedom was being mis-used through the erection of political platforms within the precincts of the mosques. Therefore, the District Magistrate of Srinagar, in his capacity as the president of the Jama Masjid, banned delivery of political speeches within the mosque without a prior sanction from him. On Friday, June 9, 1931, a large congregation had collected to offer *Jumma prayers*; the Reading Room Club members exhorted them to defy the ban. They led the assembly to the Jama Masjid and there, for the first time, openly violated the State regulation and went scot-free.

The Young Men's Muslim Association of Jammu realized that all the limelight was stolen by the Srinagar rival. So, on the instigation and direct invitation of G.E.C. Wakefield, a deputation of the Association, led by Chaudhari Ghulam Abbas, arrived in Srinagar to form a joint front of all the Muslims of the State. This 'sponsored' meeting took place on June 21, in the compound of the mosque of Khanqah-i-Mulla, and was a phenomenal success; for the first time, the leaders of the two regional Muslim organizations and the rival *Mir Waizes* sat on a common platform. Speeches inciting the masses to throw off the Hindu rule were made by the *maulvis* and other leaders,

including S. M. Abdullah. When the assembly was dispersing and after the leaders had departed, an *agent provocateur*, Abdul Qadir by name, and imported as a cook from the North-West Frontier Province by an English tourist, delivered a very fire-eating speech. It was full of venom against the Hindus and openly exhorted for a *Jehad*.

The firebrand was arrested four days later, and was committed to sessions on the charge of preaching disaffection against His Highness's Government. Scores of protest meetings were, thereupon, organized by the agitators; and when the sessions opened on July 6, there was breach of peace in the city, which continued for many days. The Administration thought it advisable to shift the court to the Central jail, but on the first day of the trial there, that is on July 13, a big uncontrollable mob collected before the prison-gates and tried to storm their way in. Firing had to be resorted to when the situation went out of the hand; subsequent investigation revealed that 21 persons lost their lives from it.

In a twinkle, the dead persons became martyrs to the cause of Islam. Their corpses were taken out in a procession through the main thoroughfares of the town. Excited bands of Muslim youngmen paraded the streets, bereft of reason and victims of blind passion. Anti-Hindu riots broke out at several places in Srinagar and other towns, resulting in some fatal casualties and destruction of hundreds of shops. In the words of P. N. Bazaz, an eyewitness; "Untold barbarities were committed by the rioters. Houses were broken, windows and doors were smashed and whoever resisted was beaten and wounded. Indescribable hardships were perpetrated on innocent passers-by. Even women and children were not spared; they had their share of molestation."

The Riots Enquiry Committee, presided over by the non-Muslim, Parsee, Sir Barjor Dalal, Chief Justice of Kashmir, revealed a curious state of affairs at the time when the mob had virtually taken control of the city. Surprisingly, the head of the cabinet, G. E. C. Wakefield was "not at home"; the

Committee—to investigate into the reasons that led to the breakdown of the Temporary Truce and its aftermath. Muslim leaders, however, accused the committee of partiality, and by boycotting its sessions continued to steal the political thunder. The Pandits, in contrast, were dis-organized; they had suffered most during the July and September riots, but as they had no platform of their own, their voice was but a squeal in the midst of the Muslim din. So the famous public leader, Prem Nath Bazaz, set up a Sanatan Dharm Yuvak Sabha, under his presidentship, in November 1931. As the name suggests the Sabha was the Hindu replica of the Muslim organization.

Unlike his Kashmiri co-religionist, the Jammu Muslim, for reasons mentioned earlier, was not much disgruntled. So, despite the collaboration of the Young Men's Muslim Association in the historic Khanqah-i-Mualla meeting on June 21, and the subsequent arrests of its leader Chaudhari Ghulam Abbas and other delegates, that province had remained comparatively calm throughout the summer. The 'outside' parties, which were waiting to make capital out of the chaos, did not find this serenity to their liking; Ahrar and Ahmediya 'commandos' from the Punjab stole into Jammu. It was this non-indigenous hand which started communal rioting in Jammu on November 2. As its result, that town too passed under martial law.

The situation in both provinces was getting out of control. In desperation the Maharaja sought help from the Government of India. The Paramount Power, waiting for the opportunity to intervene in the internal administration of the State, acted with alacrity; and on November 4, British military units rolled in, to restore law and order. The Maharaja was persuaded to dissolve the Dalal Committee, and to institute a fresh enquiry under an 'impartial umpire'. But who could be more impartial, in the Government of India's eyes, than an Englishman? So the services of Mr. L. Middleton were lent to the State Government, and he set about his task on November 13. A day earlier, the Maharaja had taken one more step in fulfilment of the

promises made on his birthday. A Grievances Enquiry Commission was appointed, to enquire into and to submit recommendations on the genuine complaints of all communities. Another Englishman, Mr. (later Sir) B. J. Glancy was loaned from the Political Department of the Government of India to preside over the Commission. He was assisted by four non-officials ; Khwaja G. A. Ashai (Kashmiri Muslim), P. N. Bazaz (Kashmiri Hindu), Chaudhari Ghulam Abbas (Jammu Muslim), and L. N. Sharma (Jammu Hindu).

Obviously, liaison between the State administration and the British military forces was non-existent. The Maharaja was counselled that the replacement of the Hindu civilian Prime Minister by a British armyman would be the proverbial stone to kill two birds with one shot—Muslims would be mollified by the presence of a 'neutral' Prime Minister, and a co-ordination established between the civil administration and the military. He fell to the bait, and Col. E. J. D. Colvin was invited to the office of Prime Ministership in March 1932. British imperial interests were now in full *de facto* control of the State.

Col. Colvin's assumption of office synchronized with the publication of the Glancy Commission Report. In a sense it underlined the Muslim grievances, and recommended, *inter alia* : (i) establishment of a Legislative Assembly ; (ii) greater promotion of Muslim education ; (iii) adequate representation of different communities in the Government services, with lowering of minimum qualification to facilitate larger recruitment of the Muslims ; (iv) restoration of all religious places to the Muslims ; and (v) grant of proprietary rights in all State-owned lands.

The recommendation pertaining to the distribution of the loaves and fishes of office, when shorn of all its verbiage, meant that the members of the less-educated majority community were to be given 'weightage' in preference to the members of the better-educated minority community. It was a sore point with the Pandits who were understandably alarmed at the prospective loss of their livelihood. They disowned Mr. Bazaz, their representative on the Commission ; and ventured into a short-lived *Roti*

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The recommendation pertaining to the distribution of the loaves and fishes of office, when shorn of all its verbiage, meant that the members of the less-educated majority community were to be given 'weightage' in preference to the members of the better-educated minority community. It was a sore point with the Pandits who were understandably alarmed at the prospective loss of their livelihood. They disowned Mr. Bazaz, their representative on the Commission ; and ventured into a short-lived *Roti*

(Livelihood) agitation. Coming as an anti-climax, the *roti* campaign demonstrated that the 1931-32 was far from national in character.

The main recommendations of the Glancy Commission were accepted *in toto* by the Kashmir Government. The Muslims were exhilarated by this 'victory'; and to consolidate their gains they set up an All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, whose first session was held in Srinagar on October 15-17, 1932. The incorporation of the conference was a stimulus to greater Muslim solidarity for some time; but old personal factions soon raised their heads again. The unity, arising from the full-throated cry of 'Down with Dogra Rule', could hardly be sustained when self-interest became prominent. The first to chip off was *Mir Waiz* Yusuf Shah of Jama Masjid and his followers. Having received a *Jagir* (land grant) from the Government, he could hardly be within the organization professing hostility to his benefactor. The secessionists formed a separate Azad Conference of which the *Mir Waiz* became the first president. This parting of the company relieved the Muslim Conference of its most reactionary, upper-class element; to that extent it was a healthy event. But the active rivalry of the two organizations costed Kashmiris heavily in later days.

Meanwhile, the Britishers had thrown away the Muslim leaders like a squeezed lemon. Even under an English Prime Minister, the main recommendation of the Glancy Commission—regarding communal representation in the services—was not fully implemented. Disappointed, S. M. Abdullah and the Muslim Conference called a civil disobedience in January 1934, which soon spread to the countryside. But the British administrators came down on it with a heavy hand, and promulgated the 'monstrous' Regulation 19-L again on January 28. Chaudhari Ghulam Abbas was arrested and summarily sentenced to one year's imprisonment, along with some other colleagues. It may sound curious, but no 'outside' help arrived on this occasion; and the whole campaign fizzled out with no more than a whimper. It, nevertheless, opened Kashmiri Muslims' eyes to the British game in their country.

In the meantime the Franchise Committee, appointed on the recommendation of the Glancy Commission, had submitted its report, as a result of which a Legislative Assembly (popularly known as *Praja Sabha*) was constituted in April 1934, and held its first session on October 17, that year. It was not truly 'democratic'—the percentage of the nominated members to the elected being 56 against 44; nor could it be called 'responsible', in as much as many vital subjects were placed beyond its purview. Moreover, the Council of Ministers could turn down its recommendations, without assigning any reason. Nevertheless, for the first time, the people—or, a section of them at least—were associated in the governance of the country, which apparently was a progressive step. "But", records P. N. Bazaz, "soon it became evident that the Assembly was powerless. The Government played one party against the other, Hindus against the Muslims, nominated members against the elected members." In short, the same British diplomacy, as had found its happy-hunting ground in British India, was shaping its course in Kashmir.

We have already mentioned Sir Albion Banerji's caustic remarks on the lack of public opinion in the State. In a similar strain, Mr. L. Middleton, who had enquired into the causes leading to the recrudescence of the disturbances in 1931, had observed: "Another cause for disturbances may be found in the absence of any public press within the state." Therefore, on the recommendation of the Glancy Commission, the Press Laws were brought into conformity with those in force in British India; as a consequence, newspaper circulation multiplied, and a modicum of freedom of opinion was re-established.

The events of 1931-32 alarmed the Pandits; the partial success of the Muslim agitation, and the failure of their own *roti* movement, impressed them that neither a higher educational standard nor a separate organization (which, incidentally, perpetuates a minority) was sufficient to guarantee security to them when counting of the heads was the criterion. This revelation was the prelude to the attempts of the minority leaders in 1932-34, for the establishment of a common meeting ground with their

Muslim counterparts. As a concrete step, certain Pandits—and Mr. P. N. Bazaz, in particular—took active part in the 1934 agitation of the Muslim Conference. Another potent amalgamator was the weekly *Hamdard*, started in 1935—a joint venture of S. M. Abdullah and P. N. Bazaz.

The leaders of the majority community too—at least the progressives amongst them—were dissatisfied with the trend of politics dominated by the British-controlled administration. A section of them had reaped some harvest, it is true; but, by and large, the masses continued to live in penury. And the way the new 'white' administrators ignored them—as a thing having out-lived its usefulness—was most galling. Was it only to replace the brown bureaucracy by the white, that the Muslims has laid their lives on July 13, 1931? Memories of the century-old Hindu-Muslim concord became green again. *Hamdard*, as mentioned earlier, was the first child of this consummation.

The striving for a *rapprochement* between the two communities was visible even in the first session of the All-Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference in October 1932, when its president, S. M. Abdullah had remarked: "We assure our Hindu and Sikh brothers that we are prepared to help them in the same manner as we do the Mussalmans. Our country cannot progress until we learn to live amicably with one another." In furtherance of this objective, the Working Committee of the Conference appointed a sub-committee in March 1933, to find a *modus operandi* to associate the minority community with the activities of the Conference. Though the sub-committee was premature, but the idea had taken root and an incipient united front, between the elected representatives of the two communities, took shape in the Legislative Assembly.

In 1934, under the leadership and guidance of Jawaharlal Nehru, the Indian National Congress had sponsored a States' Peoples Conference as an independent forum, where the States' subjects could air their grievances against the rulers. Kashmiri Muslims discovered a friend in this Conference. Their bond with the minority was still further cemented, when the Hindus

and Sikhs fraternized openly with the Muslim Conference, in the observance of the Responsible Government Day on May 8, 1936 ; and suffered arrests along with the Muslims.

There were other politico-economic factors which contributed towards the evolution of a genuine national consciousness in Kashmir. The Indian Socialist Party—another political body formed under the inspiration of Jawaharlal Nehru, and the Communist Party of India—directed by the Communist International, were then working as separate groups within the Indian National Congress. They vied with each other, and with the parent organization, in wooing the students and the labouring class. Kashmir could not remain unimpressed by those ideological overtures. The entry of the Kashmiri students into active politics commenced with the establishment of the Kashmir Students Conference on November 17, 1936 ; and its second session held in 1937 was presided over by the veteran Communist leader, Dr. K. M. Ashraf, then working from within the Indian National Congress as its General Secretary. Kashmir labour followed suit, with the formation of a Mazdoor and Kisan Sabha in August 1937. Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims, jostling with each other on the platforms of these two organizations, developed a sense of mutual respect and a spirit of responsive co-operation. Luckily, Col. Colvin had gone away in the meantime ; the monkey was not there to keep the cats fighting.

S. M. Abdullah observed in his presidential address to the fifth session of the Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference at Poonch on March 26, 1938 : "The main problem therefore now before us is to organize joint action and a united front against the forces that stand in our way in the achievement of our goal. This will require rechristening of our organization as a non-communal political body and introducing certain amendments in its constitution and its rules" ; and added : "We must therefore open our doors to all such Hindus and Sikhs who, like ourselves, believe in the freedom of their country from the shackles of an irresponsible rule." The next forward step was

taken by the Working Committee of the Muslim Conference, at Srinagar, on June 28 that year, when it passed a momentous resolution recommending to the General Council that "the name and constitution of the organization be so altered and amended that all such people who desire to participate in the political struggle may easily become members of the conference irrespective of their caste, creed and religion." This resolution formed an important landmark, clearly indicating the distance the Muslim Conference had travelled in five years towards Nationalism.

The goal was reached at the special session of the Muslim Conference held at Srinagar on June 10, 1939, under the presidency of Mr. Ghulam Muhammad Sadiq. S. M. Abdullah introduced the resolution, passed the previous year by the Working Committee. After some heated discussion, the following historic motion was carried through by an overwhelming majority: "From this day, the name of the Muslim Conference is changed into National Conference and all those who believe in the objective of responsible and democratic Government in the State can become its members, irrespective of any caste, creed or religion." The passage of this resolution was not a plain-sailing; a few discordant notes marred the solemnity of the meeting, one of them being Chaudhari Ghulam Abbas's. His speeches were studded with bitter communal expressions, but he ended by seconding the resolution.

The conversion of the Muslim Conference into a national body was consummated with the co-option of five non-Muslims—Pandit Kashyap Bandhu, Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz, Pandit Jia Lal Kilam, Lala Girdhari Lal and Sardar Budh Singh—to the reconstituted Working Committee. The members of the minority community joined the new organization, the All-Jammu & Kashmir National Conference, in great numbers. As a counter-blast, however, *Mir Waiz* Yusuf Shah changed the name of his Azad Conference to Muslim Conference.

The commencement of the hostilities in Europe increased the political tempo in India, which reacted, in its turn, on the Kashmir body politic. The first session of the newly constituted

National Conference, which commenced at Anantnag on September 30, 1939 and lasted for two days, met, therefore, under an air of expectancy. Its high-watermark was the ratification of a 'national demand' asking for the replacement of the existing system of administration by a 'complete responsible Government'; establishment of a Legislature, wholly elected on adult franchise and joint electorate, and with certain reservation of seats for the minorities "for the protection of their linguistic, religious, cultural, political and economic rights according to the principles enunciated, accepted or acted upon by the Indian National Congress from time to time". A second resolution provided that the national flag for the State would be of red colour with the sign of a white plough inscribed in the centre.

Despite its secular aim, the National Conference had not completely rid itself of its communal inheritance; Chaudhari Ghulam Abbas's avowal at the June 10, 1939 meeting, already narrated, was an indication that the virus had not been totally ejected from the system. Often in later days, this inherent weakness would betray itself when the Muslim members of the Conference would out-herod the communal Herods in trying to gain the ears of their guillible brothers-in-faith. Such tactics might, or might not, have scored debating points against the reactionary Yusuf Shah's Muslim Conference; but they certainly made the national machine creak with an internal friction.

This unhappy state of affairs came to a head even before the first anniversary of the National Conference. Jawaharlal Nehru visited Kashmir in May 1940, on an invitation from the National Conference. At a meeting of the Reception Committee, S. M. Abdullah was provoked to blurt out that he was "Muslim first and Muslim afterwards," and was too piqued to retract that indiscrete remark, though he had realized its enormity. Thereupon Pandit Jia Lal Kilam and Pandit Kashyap Bandhu resigned in protest from the Conference, thus shaking the confidence of the minority community members.

Accompanied by Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, Jawaharlal Nehru came to Kashmir, and what a reception he received.

Even a vehement opponent of Nehru, P. N. Bazaz has to admit : "This was an important event. It was decided that he should be given a right royal reception. And what a reception it was ! Never before in the annals of Kashmir has any Viceroy, much less any other visitor, been received in such a right royal manner. Princes would envy such an honour." This triumphal tour, and Nehru's straight talk to the doubting Thomases amongst the Pandits, were instrumental in re-establishing peace and concord. But no sooner was Nehru's back turned then the communal virus erupted again. The whirligig of Nehru's tour was too much for certain loosely-linked peripheral elements, and they flew apart. Chaudhari Ghulam Abbas, who had never wholly eschewed communalism, and who was ever susceptible to narrow provincialism and personal jealousy, broke off without assigning any reason, and made a bee-line towards Yusuf Shah's Muslim Conference. In a longer perspective, it was a good riddance for the National Conference—another drop of the infected blood was expelled from the system. But its immediate effect was to create some confusion in the mind of the majority community.

The second session of the National Conference held at Baramulla on September 28, 1940, though less representative because of the defection of the Jammu Muslim group, passed some radical resolutions ; it demanded immediate tax relief for the tiller of the soil, and some tangible lowering of rural indebtedness. Having partly rid itself of the upper-class incubus, the middle-class leadership of the Conference could now bestow some considered thoughts on the problems of those who constituted the lowest strata in the country. This shift in emphasis had an immediate propaganda value ; the Kashmiri peasants flocked round the 'red flag with the white plough' in increasing numbers. The Government issued certain very sensible orders, truly national and democratic in nature, to re-organize the educational system in the State, which provided, *inter alia* : "The language should be common one, viz., simple Urdu. But for reading and writing, both the Devanagiri script and Persian

script should have equal recognition"; and "Teachers who are already employed in schools, which require both scripts but who are not acquainted with one of them should learn to the satisfaction of a prescribed authority within a period of one year. No person will be appointed to the post of a teacher in any such school in future unless he knows to read and write both scripts or if he does not know both scripts he shall not be confirmed in his post unless, within a period of one year of his appointment, he learns to read and write satisfactorily the script with which he is not already familiar." The Muslim Conference immediately seized upon these orders and issued a garbled version purporting that all Muslims would be compelled to read Hindi in future. Though even a plenary session of the Conference could not be held for lack of response, when called in November 1940, yet the mendacious speeches and manifestoes issued under its impremature hit the mark.

Unfortunately, at this juncture, the National Conference lacked the courage and self-confidence to go out to the masses, and to explain to them the true import of the educational reforms. Instead, they thought it fit to salve the Muslim sentiment by descending heavily upon the Government and, within the Legislative Assembly and outside, stigmatizing the reforms as "ill-conceived, mischievous and definitely anti-national." In trying to steal the communalists' thunder, the Nationalists over-shot the bolt; as a result, many Hindus walked out of the Conference, including P. N. Bazaz who had been included in the first reformed Working Committee and was also its first Treasurer. After leaving the National Conference in November 1940, P. N. Bazaz was strongly influenced by the ideology of the famous Indian revolutionary, M. N. Roy; so much so that Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, with whom he had kept a close and constant liaison since 1932-33, became, in his eyes, leaders of Hindu communalism masquerading as Indian nationalists. A few impressionable youngmen, of progressive leaning, gathered round him, and a Kashmir Socialist Party (not connected with the Indian Socia-

list Party) was formed in 1941. In the pattern of its counterpart in India—M. N. Roy's Radical Democrat Party—the Kashmir Socialist Party decided not to embarrass the Government on the 'national demand' issue during the war period. Hence it never became a mass party, drawing its members mostly from the young hero-worshippers.

Communism, as such, made a late appearance in Kashmir. Though two prominent Moscow-trained workers, Prof. Abdullah Safdar and Fazal Elahi Qurban, had made preliminary explorations in 1937, and Dr. Ashraf had shown his interest in the students' movement, yet Marxism like other ideologies—communalism and nationalism—entered the State much after its establishment in the sub-continent. The war-time 'understanding' between the Government of India and the Communist Party of India, and the incarceration of the Congress leaders after the 'Quit India' declaration in August 1942, allowed the communists full freedom to propagate their views. Accordingly, trained workers infiltrated into Kashmir; and one of them, Dhanwantri,* made some headway in Jammu. The communist couple—B.P.L. Bedi and his English wife, Freda Bedi—came as visitors, and later made their permanent home in Srinagar. As Nationalism was a 'bourgeois concept' to the Marxists, this injection of the communist thought in Kashmir's freedom movement created some confusion among the ranks of the National Conference.

1944 was an important year for the people of Kashmir; for the first time a local man was appointed Prime Minister of the State. When the Government of India re-called Sir B. N. Rau in February 1944, the Maharaja selected the Sanskrit scholar Pandit Ram Chandra Kak to replace him. Though the new Prime Minister was a Hindu, he received an all-party acclaim because Kashmiris could, at long last, boast of having produced one person at least who could occupy the highest seat of office.

Kak started off in a blaze of glory. His Government asked the Praja Sabha (Legislative Assembly) to set up a panel

* Mr. Dhanwantri died in July last.

of six members, out of which His Highness would nominate two to the Council of Ministers. For the first time, persons directly responsible to the people, though on a restricted franchise, were to be associated with the administration. This experiment in Dyarchy was universally hailed. In the election to the panel, Mirza Mohammad Afzal Beg, the Deputy Leader of the National Conference Party in the Praja Sabha, got the largest votes and was duly appointed a Minister. The second popular Minister nominated was Capt. Wazir Ganga Ram, a Jammu Dogra Hindu—a counter-poise to the Kashmiri Muslim, Mr. Beg.

It may be re-collected that as far back as May 6, 1936, the then Muslim Conference had organized a Responsible Government Day demanding full responsible government. Since then, the Day was celebrated every year and the 'demand' reiterated. The first session of the National Conference had included 'complete responsible government' in its charter of 'national demands'. Therefore the entry of the Conference in the half-way house of Dyarchy was, to a certain extent, a retrograde step. Naturally, many sincere party workers were perturbed about their 'revolutionary' organization developing a 'reformist' tendency. This dis-satisfaction gave birth to another disgruntled group, which grandiloquently styled itself as the Jammu & Kashmir Kisan Mazdoor Conference. Its organiser was one Mr. Abdul Salim Yatu, who had participated in the 1931 movement and had followed S. M. Abdullah since then; he was also a member of the General Council of the National Conference from its first session. Yatu came immediately under the influence of P. N. Bazaz; and within a year the splinter group separated from the National Conference,

A few years back, relapse into communalism was responsible for the defection of a group, having a socialist leaning, from the National Conference; an apparent lapse into 'reformism', now, made it lose another chunk. In these withdrawals the numbers involved were not large, and hence they did not receive much publicity. Nevertheless, if through dropping the *Mir Waizes*

and Chaudhari Ghulam Abbas the centre of gravity had shifted down from the upper-class to the middle, by the departure of Bazaz and Yatu, it moved up from the lower-middle to the upper-middle. Yet, the leaders of the Conference were not much worried, because no other party was powerful enough to steal their lime-light.

That the National Conference was carrying all before itself was demonstrated by the remarkable happenings connected with Mr. M. A. Jinnah's Kashmir visit during the summer of 1944. The Muslim Conference of Yusuf Shah and Chaudhari Ghulam Abbas had sent an S. O. S. to the All-India Muslim League leader, for help in resuscitating its dying prestige. Mr. Jinnah readily accepted the invitation, though he masked the purpose of his visit by declaring that "I am going to Kashmir for rest...and have no idea to take part in their politics." But even a warm welcome from S. M. Abdullah and the National Conference could not appease Mr. Jinnah. On June 17, 1944, at the annual session of the Muslim Conference, he pronounced *ex cathedra*: "Muslims have one platform, one *Kalma* and one God. I would request Muslims to come under the banner of Muslim Conference and fight for their rights"; and went on in a vituperative language to describe the National Conference as "a band of gangsters", and S. M. Abdullah a goonda. The Sheikh was flabbergasted by such liberties with his hospitality; he challenged the Quaide-i-Azam to a vote of confidence from the Kashmiri Muslims; and added a warning that if fulminations against the National Conference were not put a stop to, he could not guarantee safety to the League leader. Crestfallen, Mr. Jinnah beat a retreat from Kashmir, but when he tried his game again at Baramulla, his Muslim audience responded with a shower of stones. Never in his life had Mr. Jinnah received such an hostile reception!

Another remarkable event of 1944 was the production of the pamphlet, *The New Kashmir*, by the Working Committee of the National Conference. The booklet consisted of two parts, one political and the other economic. The first part started with

the classic preamble : "We, the people of Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh and the Frontier Regions, including Poonch and Chenani Ilagas—commonly known as Jammu and Kashmir State—in order to perfect our union in the fullest equality and self-determination, to raise ourselves and our children forever from the abyss of oppression and poverty, degradation and superstition, from medieval darkness and ignorance, into the sunlit valleys of plenty ruled by freedom, science and honest toil, in worthy participation of the historic resurgence of the peoples of the East, and the working masses of the world, and in determination to make this our country a dazzling gem upon the the snowy bosom of Asia, do propose and propound the following constitution of our state," and went on to formulate a new constitution based on the democratic principle of responsible government, with the elective principle applied from the Local Panchayat right up to the National Assembly, and an independent judiciary. The second part comprised a National Economic Plan for the "Evolution of an equalitarian society in which equal opportunities are provided for every member for self-expression and self-fulfilment, and the adequate minimum of civilized standard of life is assured to each member." In submitting this ideal to the masses, S. M. Abdullah said : "In our new Kashmir we shall build again the men and women of our State, who have been dwarfed by centuries of servitude, and create a people worthy of our glorious motherland."

'New Kashmir' came in for vigorous criticism from various points of view. The upper-classes and the landed aristocracy, among both the Hindus and the Muslims, denounced it for obvious reasons. And, though the chief beneficiary of the Peasants' charter was the predominantly Muslim peasantry, the Muslim Conference leaders were hostile because they saw in its acceptance the end of their *raison d'etre*. P. N. Bazaz and his group scoffed at it insomuch as the proposed constitution was not sufficiently socialistic. Finally, because it was drawn under the inspiration of the ex-communists B. P. L. Bedi and his

wife, advisers to S. M. Abdullah, the conservative-minded people greeted it with an *a priori* denunciation though, even at its utopian best, it had aimed no more than a welfare State.

Jawaharlal Nehru came on a second tour to Kashmir in August 1945 ; he was accompanied by the Congress President, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan. The presence of these leaders was utilized by the National Conference to hold its momentous annual session at Sopore on August 3, when 'New Kashmir' was accepted. Nehru advised the Hindus and Sikhs to join the National Conference in their own interest. In his concluding speech, S. M. Abdullah sounded a note of warning to the communalists from the Punjab against any interference in the internal politics of the State, and pledged that "our destinies and our final liberation are bound up with the freedom of India itself."

Signs, portending the birth of Indian independence, were not lacking in the summer and autumn of 1945 ; but its shape was not known. The leaders of the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League, and Lord Wavell on behalf of His Majesty's Government, were holding a tripartite conference. The princes were already jockeying for a safe position in the coming set-up ; but the States' subjects, as such, were a forgotten quantity. Lest their cause go unheard, S. M. Abdullah declared at the Udaipur session of the All-India States' Peoples Conference, on December 31, 1945 ; " Neither the Secretary of State for India, nor the Viceroy, nor even the Indian National Congress, will give the peoples of the States independence. For achieving independence which is essential for removing the present poverty and hunger of the people in the States, they will have to organize themselves against the princes' clique."

The above statement could hardly square with the presence of the National Conference representative in the diarchical compromise in Kashmir : it was a self-contradiction to talk of 'achieving independence' and, at the same time, to be in a responsive co-operation with those who denied independence. This inconsistency did not survive long. The shrewd Prime Minister

contrived to obtain the resignation of Mirza Afzal Beg on March 17, 1946, because as the latter explained, "he was not given an opportunity to function effectively." Flushed by the success of this diplomatic finesse, Mr. Kak played another card purporting to create dissension in the ranks of the National Conference—without any respect for the democratic principle, he appointed Mian Ahmad Yar, a member of the Conference, as the new Minister. The fears of those who distrusted the 'reformist' tendencies of the Conference came true !

Within a year of his regime, Mr. Kak had shown that he was no King Log; neither would he tolerate anybody who did not toe the line with him. The National Conference came to be the main target for his manoeuvres: and the Maharaja acquiesced in his Prime Minister's highhandedness. Out of this experience and loss of faith, arose for the National Conference, the necessity to achieve complete independence; in this respect, even the 'New Kashmir' was now out-of-date. Meanwhile the British Cabinet Mission had arrived in India, in March 1946, and was negotiating with the representatives of the political parties and the rulers of the States. The States' subjects were again ignored, Wavell-fashion. Nevertheless, S. M. Abdullah submitted a memorandum to the Cabinet Mission, which stated: "Today the National Demand of the people of Kashmir is not merely the demand but their right to absolute freedom from Dogra rule.No sale-deed, however sacrosanct, can condemn more than four million men and women to the servitude of an autocrat when the will under his rule is no longer there. We the people of Kashmir are determined to mould our destiny, and we appeal to the members of the Cabinet Mission to recognize the justice and the strength of our case". This expression of the 'right to absolute freedom' was symbolized in the slogan: 'Quit Kashmir', which S. M. Abdullah explained in a series of public speeches delivered between May 6 to May 10. The 'sale-deed' he condemned was none other than the 1846 Treaty of Amritsar, which transferred Kashmir to Maharaja Gulab Singh on payment of seventy-five lakh rupees. "Sovereignty is not the birth-right of a ruler,"

S. M. Abdullah thundered ; "every man, woman and child will shout "Quit Kashmir", he asserted.

The Cabinet Mission announced its award on May 12. The paragraph relating to the future of the Indian States read : "That the rights of the States which flow from the relationship of the Crown will no longer exist and all the rights surrendered by the States will return to the States. Political arrangements between the States on the one side and British Crown and British India on the other will thus be brought to an end. The void will have to be filled either by the States entering into a federal relationship with the successor Government or Governments in British India or failing this entering into particular arrangements with it or them." It meant that Paramountcy was non-transferable, and that 565 princes could become fully independent if they so wished ; though, incidentally, never in their dynastic histories had they enjoyed any international status. It also meant that the Princes were competent to decide the future of the territories they ruled, whilst their subjects remained mere chattels with no say in the matter.

S. M. Abdullah hurried to Delhi to consult Jawaharlal Nehru, the president of the All-India States' Peoples Conference, but was arrested by the Kashmir Government on May 20 at Garhi, on the charge of spreading sedition in the State. Within a few hours, hundreds of the National Conference members were taken into custody all over the country. It was a premeditated move, as admitted by the Governor of the Kashmir Province. "We planned ahead", he said, "with the help of the police and military, The combined operation of the two alone we knew could save the situation. The fusion has worked well and yielded good results. My faith in stern measures before the trouble spread has been justified."

Kashmiris answered these precipitate arrests with hartals and mass meetings, at which slogans were shouted : "*Kashmir Ko Chor Do*", "*Bainama Amritsar ko tod do*"—the only means available to the unarmed people to register their protests. In

giving an eye-witness account, the famous British journalist, H. M. Brailsford, says: "From scores of boats on the lake voices were shouting in chorus in their own language 'Quit Kashmir'. From crowded roads on shore, other voices echoed the slogan. It was addressed to the Maharaja of one of the biggest of the Indian States. His subjects were dispersing after one of the most memorable meetings ever held in Kashmir. The scene of it was the courtyard of an ancient mosque, some miles from Srinagar, which is a famous shrine because it cherishes a hair of the prophet's beard. Looking down from a gallery on the many coloured turbans of the crowd I estimated their numbers at ten or twelve thousand."

Kak's administration met this non-violent challenge with 'leonine' violence. Three units of Dogra troops were flown from Jammu, and deployed at strategic places in the Valley; Srinagar was placed under Martial Law, and Regulation No. 19-L of January 28, 1934, revived. The movement, which commenced as a demonstration against the ruling dynasty, soon became a defiance of the Prime Minister's authority. Mr. Kak had been itching for a trial of strength; "We have been preparing for it for eleven months", he revealed to the Special Correspondent of the *Hindustan Times* sometime after, "and now we are ready to meet the challenge. There will be no more vacillation and no weak-kneed policy. We shall be ruthlessly firm and we make no apology about it."—O, shades of Lord Linlithgow! Another eye-witness, Norman Cliff, the foreign editor of the London *News Chronicle*, corroborates that "with ruthless efficiency, not noticeable in other departments of administration, they imprisoned Abdullah's chief supporters and with the use of military and police forces they fired upon his followers, who rioted in protest with stones as their weapon."

To avoid wholesale arrests, some National Conference workers escaped from the State; others went underground. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, an ex-schoolmaster, who had been in the Conference since its inception and was S. M. Abdullah's right-

hand, established himself in Delhi as the acting-president of the National Conference. Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq, the 'leftist-soul' of the 'New Kashmir', fled to Lahore, and the movement continued to receive his guidance from there. The communist leader Mir Ghulam Muhi-ud-din Kara, nicknamed the Nightingale, went underground, and formed a 'War Council'; and, disguised as a Muslim bride, Freda Bedi became a nexus between the jailed Abdullah and the fugitive Nightingale.

The disposition of the other political parties at this juncture revealed an interesting pattern. The Dogras of Jammu were wholly pro-Maharaja—and understandably so. But the Muslim Conference, which, from time to time, had claimed to be the vanguard of the oppressed Muslims, came curiously on the side of the Kashmir Government; so much so that its leaders affirmed their loyalty by calling the Hindu Maharaja the "Shadow of God". Their attitude was dictated by the All-India Muslim League, which was, at that moment, trying to be on the right side of the Indian princes. The leaders of the disgruntled Kashmir Socialist Party and the Jammu & Kashmir Kisan Mazdoor Conference opposed the 'Quit Kashmir' movement, characterizing it as an 'adventure', and openly advised the Muslims to keep away from it. At the same time, not to be out-done by the National Conference, they adopted a paper-programme, which they called 'Azad Kashmir'. The State Kashmir Pandits Conference (originally known as the Sanatan Dharm Yuvak Sabha) held aloof in the beginning; but, later, it advised the Government to temper firmness with flexibility, for which impertinence its official organ, the daily *Martand*, was censored. The war-time honeymoon between Soviet Russia and the Anglo-American combine being over, the communist workers and the 'fellow-travellers' in the State did not refrain from supporting the movement—but they were not many.

Though the National Conference was almost friendless within the State, yet it was not long before succour came from outside. Jawaharlal Nehru could not remain inert; on June 20, he rushed to Kashmir to see things for himself.

Kak could not, however, brook any outside interference ; so Nehru was arrested immediately he set foot on the State soil. Apparently Kak had the full approval of the British officials and of the Political Department of the Government of India ; for Nehru's detention, at a time he was engaged in momentous talks with the British Cabinet Mission, led to such a peculiar international impasse, which a Prime Minister of an ordinary Indian State could hardly have dared to create unless his action had not previously been endorsed by the Paramount Power. A *modus vivendi* had to be found subsequently for Nehru's release, which came about when Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, as the head of the Indian delegation in the Cabinet Mission negotiations, recalled Nehru to New Delhi.

The Nehru 'incident' gave much publicity to S. M. Abdullah's trial, when the latter was committed to sessions, charged for having convened and addressed public meetings in different parts of the town of Srinagar "with the object and intention of bringing into hatred and contempt H. H. the Maharaja Bahadur and the Government of Jammu & Kashmir as established by law, and with a view to exciting dis-affection towards H. H. the Maharaja Bahadur and the Government of Jammu and Kashmir as established by law". Nehru personally arranged the legal defence ; the reputed Muslim barrister, the late Mr. Asaf Ali, arrived from Delhi, and was joined by Pandit Jia Lal Kilam at that time a prominent local advocate and once a member of the National Conference. S. M. Abdullah's defence statement is a piece of historic eloquence ; he declared : The fundamental rights of all men and women to live and act as free beings, to make laws and fashion their political, social and economic fabric, so that they advance the cause of human freedom and progress, are inherent and cannot be denied though they may be suppressed for a while. I hold that sovereignty resides in the people, all relationships political, social and economic, derive authority from the collective will of the people." Though the defence counsel warned about the repercussions of the trial—"It is not the trial of one individual ; it is not the

trial of Sheikh Abdullah ; it is the trial of the entire people of the State", he had said—the Session Judge sentenced the accused, on September 10, to nine years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,500/-.

Other colleagues of S. M. Abdullah were also summarily sentenced. The 'peace of the grave' was established in Kashmir with the help of Assizes and gaol ; yet not for Mr. Kak the wisdom of Jawaharlal Nehru—"Just when we find that India is on the verge of independence, we find that Kashmir authorities, totally oblivious of this fact, seeking to crush their own people and their desire for freedom. A real people's movement can never be crushed when India herself is putting an end to foreign rule."

Perhaps, the Kashmir Prime Minister was not quite sure of the British intentions ; perhaps he expected the Cabinet Mission Plan to end the way the Wavell Plan or the Cripps Proposal had done. In any case he decided against any 'quitting' to take place in Kashmir. To supplement brute force for suppressing the movement, he started a new organization with the name of All-Kashmir States Peoples Conference ; but paid agents always lack the missionary zeal, and the new body languished from want of enthusiasm. Kak then changed his tactics ; he dissolved the Praja Sabha, in which the National Conference had a significant representation, and ordered fresh elections. By asking the people to vote during mid-winter—Dec. '46-Jan. '47—when the country was covered with snow and many areas were not even accessible, Kak had given a clear hint of his intention to gerrymander the elections. The National Conference therefore boycotted them. Thus left to themselves, the communal bodies carried the day—the Muslim Conference captured most of the Muslim constituencies, and the majority of Hindu seats went to the various Hindu organizations. Kashmir Socialist Party and the Kisan Mazdoor Sabha, despite their leaders' tall claims, were nowhere in the picture. The elections were not truly democratic since the franchise was restricted to less than 10% of the people, and polling was conducted in the worst

climatic conditions with a major political party boycotting it; yet admittedly, the first round of the contest went to Mr. Kak.

Outwardly an oasis of calm, Kashmir was seething with discontent. But even politics is driven into hibernation when snow spreads its white sheet and keeps people within doors. Kak utilized the interregnum to consolidate his position. Splinter groups, like the Kashmir Socialist Party, received his patronage; the Muslim Conference was sedulously pampered; the machinery of commodity-control was employed to 'buy' support with a shower of permits and quotas. Even the All-India Muslim League was drawn into a tacit understanding, and to that purpose Mr. Jinnah's Secretary advised the General Secretary of the Muslim Conference to lend support to Mr. Kak's administration in combatting the 'Quit Kashmir' agitation.

By the time Lord Mountbatten arrived in India in March 1947, a quarter and more of the Indian States had "acceeded"* to India and decided to send their representatives to the Indian Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of the Cabinet Mission Plan. The Indian National Congress wanted to go ahead with the work of constitution-making despite the Muslim League boycott, and was prodding the remaining hesitant princes to make up their minds. The Chamber of Princes, dominated by the personality of the Nawab of Bhopal, and advised by his Foreign and Political Minister, Sir Mohammad Zafrullah Khan, continued to stall. The Muslim League instigated the Princes to keep aloof of the Constituent Assembly, and some States—Hyderabad, Travancore and Kashmir, in particular—nibbled at the bait of "absolute sovereignty."

* The Cabinet Mission Plan had provided that the Indian States could join or accede to the Union of India on three subjects—Defence, Foreign affairs and Communication. This idea was subsequently incorporated by Mr. V. P. Menon, Constitutional Adviser to Lord Mountbatten, in the formula of Instrument of Accession by which, after independence, the Indian Princes expressed their willingness to surrender the three subjects to either Dominion, retaining sovereignty in all other fields.

The second round of the conflict commenced—rather, it was forced on Mr. Kak—with the announcement of the Mountbatten Plan of June 3, 1947. Britain made a declaration of her intentions to “withdraw”; but before the final transference of power, British India was to be divided into two parts, i. e., the predominantly Muslim zones were to be separated from the rest of the country. Nevertheless, before the actual partition, the seceding areas were required to demonstrate their will, by the democratic method of casting votes, in favour of or against the proposal. This necessity to determine the popular desire, before the secessionists were allowed to have their way, indicated *ipso facto* that His Majesty’s Government did not admit the “two-nation theory,” nor the Muslim League declaration that the Indian Muslims as a whole constituted a nation separate from the non-Muslims and had an inherent right to have a separate homeland. What was conceded, however, was the right of self-determination to the people of certain areas. Moreover, acceptance of a separate nationalism for the Muslims implied an automatic transference of the population on religious basis, which did not find any place in the Mountbatten Plan.

The position of the Native States, under the Mountbatten Plan, remained substantially the same as in the proposals of the Cabinet Mission. The carrot of an independent status still dangled before the noses of the Indian Princes, and the Kashmir administration continued to be tempted by it. Meanwhile communal disturbances had spread from the far away Bengal and Bihar to the neighbouring Punjab. How long could Kashmir escape from the waves of insanity lashing her from the south and the west? Refugees of all denominations poured in, bringing with them heart-rending tales of woe and suffering. Procrastination, at this juncture, was not only waste of time, but also a criminal dereliction of responsibility. Unfortunately, Mr. Kak chose to mark time.

While Kashmir’s man-of-hour appeared irresolute, the different political parties within the State canvassed support for their respective points of view. The Dogras dreamt of a

sovereign country of their own, and advised the Maharaja to shun India and Pakistan alike. Though gagged and gaoled, the National Conference raised its stifled voice in favour of a union with India. The Muslim Conference, on the other hand, was free to shout from house-tops that Kashmir being predominantly Muslim should link herself with Pakistan. The visionary Kashmir Socialist Party, and other mushroom bodies set up by Mr. Kak, talked vaguely of the 'freedom-urge' of the Muslim, not making it clear how real 'freedom' can have a denominational label. In contrast, the All-State Kashmir Pandits Conference (Yuvak Sabha) submitted a memorial to the Maharaja on June 17, 1947, pleading that "the time has come when our whole State should join the Indian Union," and urged on His Highness's Government "the desirability of the resolution of the present political deadlock in the country and the release of all political prisoners in the State through honourable settlement."

Of the two main sub-continental parties, the Indian National Congress declared that the States must decide to join either Dominion, and in that decision the will of the people must prevail over that of the prince. In contrast to this unequivocal stand, the permanent president of the Muslim League, Mr. Jinnah, stated that the Indian States were free to join India or Pakistan, or to remain independent if they so desired; he took the strictly constitutional and legal view that, after the cessation of Paramountcy, the plenary sovereign authority flowed back to the princes, and not to their peoples.

Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi wanted to go to Kashmir, to persuade the Maharaja against making a declaration of independence. Lord Mountbatten stole a march on them, and himself went there on June 21, 1947, to advise the Maharaja and Mr. Kak "not to make any declaration of independence, but to find out in one way or another the will of the people of Kashmir as soon as possible, and to announce their intention by 14th. August to send representatives accordingly to one Constituent Assembly or the other"*; but the Maharaja astutely

* Alan Campbell-Johnson : *Mission with Mountbatten.*

avoided any reference to this subject in his talks with the Viceory. The Congress President, Acharya J. B. Kripalani, visited the State next, and had a number of fruitless interviews with the Prime Minister. In a final talk with Maharaja Hari Singh, he was dismissed with a poor consolation in the form of a cheque for Kasturba Gandhi Memorial Fund. Then Mahatma Gandhi himself arrived in Kashmir, to impress upon the Maharaja and the State administration the wisdom of an early decision on the question of accession.

The time for decision—August 15—approached, but Mr. Kak was still unmoved. Finally, when the crush of events was almost overhead, the Maharaja exerted himself, and Mr. Kak was removed from the prime ministership only five days before the D-day of Independence. Thus ended three and half years of 'Kakistocracy'.*

The second round of the contest had gone against Mr. Kak, but the National Conference still remained outcast; one hurdle in the path of progress of the Kashmiri people was removed, but the other—the clannish bias of the ruler—still remained. The Dogra Rajput clique, working through the Maharani's brother and the royal household, induced the Maharaja to appoint the reactionary septagunarian Major-General Janak Singh as the temporary head of the administration. This was a very unhappy choice, for the people of Kashmir had not forgotten the rule of the triumvirate during the Maharaja's absences in 1930-32, when Major-General Janak Singh, as one of it, had unleashed the dogs of oppression on them.

Even after Mr. Kak's departure, Maharaja Hari Singh toyed with the idea of sovereignty. Then to add to his indecision, Radcliffe Award presented him with boundaries with both Dominions, neutralizing the determinant of territorial contiguity as the chief factor in the choice of accession. Meanwhile violent communal disturbances were churning the Punjab; mass migration not only isolated Kashmir from the rest of the sub-

* Kakistocracy [Greek: *Kakisto* = worst + *crazy* = rule] was the nickname given by the people to the administration under Mr. R. C. Kak.

continent, but also appeared to overwhelm her with a flood of displaced persons overspilling her borders.

Then on August 15 Paramountcy lapsed, and the princes, who had not acceded to India, nor sent their representatives to the Indian Constituent Assembly, became independent; they could, however, according to the India Independence Act still accede to India or Pakistan. Like an obscurantist, Maharaja Hari Singh did not read the writings on the wall; he neither declared himself an independent ruler nor acceded to either Dominion, but announced his desire to sign 'Standstill Agreements' with India and Pakistan for the continuance of the existing administrative arrangements in respect of communications, post and telegraphs and civil supplies, leaving the accession issue to be determined later. Though not even a show of consulting the people had been made, Radio Pakistan, on behalf of its Government, announced the acceptance of the Agreement. On the other hand, consistent with the past declarations of the Congress, the Indian Union declined to give its consent before the will of the Kashmiris was known.

The Standstill Agreement did not appease Pakistan, because it still left a modicum of connection between Kashmir and India. Any form of a political linkage, between a predominantly Muslim area and a predominantly non-Muslim India, was, for Pakistan, not only an anathema, but also a challenge to her own *raison d'être*—a separate Muslim nationhood. That fatal nexus could be cut, only by compelling the Kashmir Government to accede to Pakistan *in toto*. Communal carnage had forced the Indian National Congress to agree to partition, the same winning ace could earn another trick in Kashmir. And if that too failed, there was still the trump-card of 'Direct Action'.

A conspiracy was therefore hatched, to engineer large-scale communal rioting in the State. The Valley was a stronghold of the National Conference and no breach of peace could be organized there with ease. Jammu Province, on the other hand, was the weak spot; there a triangular wrangle between a feeble National Conference, an active Muslim Conference, and a

strong Dogra clannishness, had already prepared the soil for the dragon-seeds of dissension. Jammu was also the homeland of the demobilised militia-men, unemployed and not yet rehabilitated, and heavily contaminated, during their active service abroad, with the virus of communalism and a peculiar trigger-happiness. It is not surprising that severe rioting broke out at the end of August, first in Poonch district of Jammu, and then spread westward to Bagh in Mirpur district, curiously both adjacent to the Pakistan-held portion of the Punjab.

A strict censorship was imposed on the news of the disturbances, but, in spite of it or perhaps on account of it, exaggerated stories about the communal 'massacres' spread like a wild prairie fire. Pakistan has called the riots "an open armed rebellion"; but history has not recorded a single instance where a rebellion is restricted to 'pogroms' against a small section of the populace, and is not accompanied by an attempt at a *coup d'etat* or defiance of the administrative authority. So long evidence is not forthcoming to prove that the so-called 'rebels' tried to establish a 'parallel government', or their rebellious activity was directed against the organs of the State as such, the appellation 'rioters' fits them better. Moreover, there is the testimony of Major-General Scott, the British G. O. C. of the Kashmir Army, which discloses that the agitation was non-indigenous; in a statement on August 31, 1947, he disclosed: "Situation in Hazara and Rawalpindi areas is very unsatisfactory. There is little doubt that the recent disturbances in Bagh Tehsil were led by armed gangs from Pakistan."

Large detachments of police and military were sent to the troubled area; but their composition was predominantly Hindu and Sikh. This selection, whether thoughtless or deliberate, was most unfortunate. Hailing from the region where their brethren had been killed and looted, the myrmidons of law and order were themselves not free from communal bias. As a result, some excesses were perpetrated on the Muslim population of the Jammu Province, which, subsequently, became a strong propaganda weapon in the hands of Pakistan.

The Valley continued to be an oasis of peace and tranquillity ; and, to this day, a Kashmir Muslim takes a justifiable pride in that he did not then call for a vengeance for his Jammu brethren. But how long could this idyll last ? Only a few days earlier a convoy of Kashmiri Hindus, residents of Rawalpindi, was attacked a few miles off the town on their way to Kohala in the State, even when it was moving under a Pakistani military escort ; none escaped from that ambush to carry their harrowing tale.

It was now evident that Pakistan was openly coercing the Maharaja for a declaration of accession in her favour ; but the violence of the pressure was driving him to a greater recalcitrance. Even the uncalled for advice of Lord Ismay, Chief of Lord Mountbatten's staff, who had gone for a "much-needed rest" to Kashmir, went to no purpose. The Muslim Conference—the party of Yusuf Shah and Chaudhari Ghulam Abbas—was even then not against a monarchical rule ; it would rather perpetuate the dynasty, if Kashmir would only accede to Pakistan. However, the Maharaja did not budge from the Standstill Agreement ; and Pakistan lost the first game of the rubber.

In September, Pakistan tightened the racking screw ; with an 'undeclared' economic blockade, Kashmir was sought to be starved into submission—no salt, no food, no transport facility, despite the clause in the Standstill Agreement regarding the continuance of the civil supplies. The harassed Prime Minister sent a series of frantic telegrams to the Pakistan Government ; only after weeks did the Secretary of the Political Department come to Srinagar, but his visit proved infructuous.

The situation in the State grew more serious as each day passed. The relation between the different communities was strained almost to a breaking point ; the price of essential goods soared rocket-high ; the harassed administration appeared supine, its importunities failing to strike any sympathetic chord in Pakistan. Emissaries and *agents provocateurs* had infiltrated from that country, and were making no bones of

their designs. There was no rallying force left in the State. The Dogras, like Bourbons, were incapable of learning anything. The National Conference was still "black-listed". The few democrats, like P. N. Bazaz, advocated that the issue of accession "should be settled by an impartial and free referendum on the basis of adult franchise"; but they made no concrete suggestion as to how Kashmir could survive till the referendum stage, when Pakistan was out to starve her to death. At this stage *Mir Waiz* Yusuf Shah and other Muslim Conference leaders slipped away to Pakistan, their precipitate departure suggesting that Pakistan had decided to play the trump card—Direct intervention. Already, ominous movement of Pakistanis across the border was much in evidence; "500 hostile tribesmen wearing green and khaki uniforms and carrying leather and web equipments were seen", was the front-line communique on September 4, from Major-General Scott.

Threatened by internal disruption; menaced by a Pakistani invasion; and abandoned, as it seemed, by an over-punctilious India, Kashmiris awaited a future more dark than the darkest night in the Hades. Like a drowning man clutching at the straw, the All-State Kashmir Pandits Conference passed a resolution, demanding the immediate release of S. M. Abdullah, who alone appeared to be capable to stem the intruding avalanche of death and destruction. The Prime Minister gave a similar advice; and the Maharaja at last relented. The Sheikh was a free man once more on September 26.

Immediately after his release, S. M. Abdullah resumed his struggle against the Dogra autocracy. In his first public speech, he declared: "So far as the question of the accession of the State to one or the other of the Dominion goes, it is for us the question of secondary importance. For us the question of the demand of national independence is of first importance. Our view-point is that the Maharaja of Kashmir has no right to decide the future political dispositions of the State. It is entirely the right of the people to determine that. But Kashmiris can do so only when they are free and masters

of themselves." As for himself, he reiterated his disbelief in the 'two-nation theory', and would ask of Pakistanis: "Where were they when the people of Kashmir were agitating alone for their freedom." He told another mammoth audience on September 29 at Srinagar that Pakistan "created greater and a far wider gulf between the two larger communities of India—the Hindus and the Muslims—by propounding the basis of two-nation theory. The philosophy of Maulana Azad failed, the vision of Badshah Khan failed, and the baseless theory of Mr. Jinnah succeeded." S. M. Abdullah's presence revived the nerves of the people, and they enthusiastically responded to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad's call for a Home Guard for the maintenance of communal peace.

Meanwhile, in early October, the temporary appointment of Major-General Janak Singh was terminated, and Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan was installed as the permanent Prime Minister of the State "for the period of five years". As if the length of the term of office was not a sufficient reminder that the Maharaja had no intentions to grant responsible government, the new Prime Minister declared on the very first day of his induction into office: "Kashmiris are not yet ripe to share such responsibility and it will take long to train them up." This dis-heartening statement was lost on the people who were rejoicing the release of their popular leaders with the usual river processions, a ceremonial by which the people of Srinagar give evidence of their love and respect.

Popular enthusiasm was, however, tempered by the disturbing news from the border; tribal raiders had already infiltrated from south-west and west. On October 14, the Prime Minister of the State sent a message to Mr. Liaqat Ali asking him to agree to an impartial enquiry on the unfriendly acts of the Pakistan Government, failing which Kashmir would be compelled to seek 'outside' assistance. Another desparate telegram was sent to the British Prime Minister for intercession on behalf of Kashmir; but Mr. Attlee kept a studied silence.

Meanwhile, responsible Pakistani leaders had conspired to

'kidnap' S. M. Abdullah, by inviting him to Lahore for discussions and then detaining him there.* The plan, however, did not work. The Sheikh had been elected president of the All-India States' Peoples Conference before he was arrested in May 1946, and his first commitment was to the standing committee of the Conference, then meeting in Delhi. So he put off his Lahore visit, and went to Delhi on October 17; whilst, not mistrusting his Pakistani hosts, he sent his trusted colleague, Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq, to Lahore to canvass Mr. Jinnah's support for his 'Freedom before Accession' demand. Mr. Jinnah, however, was not disposed to parley; for him 'Accession' and 'Freedom' were co-terminous. Sadiq's mission, therefore, did not succeed.

When preparations for a full-scale 'invasion' were complete, Mr. Jinnah condescended to reply to the complaints of the Kashmir Government. In a telegram on October 20, which made a vague mention of his Government's attempts to improve relations with the State, he invited Sheikh Abdullah to talk things over in Karachi. Ten years back, Adolf Hitler had summoned Dr. Schussnigg, the Prime Minister of Austria, on a similar mission, while the German troops had already been given orders to march into Sudetenland.

The summons to Karachi were merely a ruse to gain time, and a means to distract Kashmir Government from its declared intention to seek outside help; for, less than thirty hours later, a well-organized band of 'tribesmen', equipped and armed by the Pakistan army, broke into the State territory, without let or hindrance from the Government and the nationals of Pakistan.

As a direct result of the invasion the struggle for freedom was temporarily thrown into the background; resistance to aggression received top priority. Thus transformed, the first current entered the Whirlpool on October 22, 1947.

* This conspiracy was subsequently revealed by Mr. G. K. Reddy, a former Director of Public Information in the "Azad Kashmir" Government.

SECOND CURRENT

It is an accepted fact that Geography plays an important part, if not the most decisive, in determining politics. Understandably, the geography of the Indian sub-continent has played a significant role in the cavalcade of its people, from the pre-historic Vedic age down to to-day. But it has been a Janus-headed role: that is, the geographical configuration of the sub-continent has tended to promote, in the four hundred million inhabitants, a faith in their fundamental unity; and, at the same time, conduced to develop among them separate regional outlooks. As Dr. Spear correctly observes: "The configuration of the country both encourages the inspiration of unity and hinders its fulfilment; similarly in certain parts it encourages a certain degree of separation while hindering its development in isolation."*

This apparent paradox is well-illustrated in the history of Kashmir. This country has never remained unstirred by the cultural currents travelling out from the sub-continent, though a time-lag arising from the vastness of the distance might be impressed on them. Again, the physical isolation, enforced on the country by the Pir Panchal ranges, has created there a sort of a social back-water, where cultural vortices continue to live much after the parent current was dead. Not surprising therefore that Buddhism as a living religion still survives in Kashmir, whereas it is a subject for historical research only in the rest of the sub-continent. Brahminism, in its pristine Vedic form, is still puissant in the State—the Sarda script of the Kashmiri Pandits is more akin to the ancient Sanskrit than any Indian language—despite the fact that Islam has almost overwhelmed Kashmir for four centuries. The sense of isolation, moreover, is so deep-seated that, even to this day, when a Kashmiri starts

* Dr. Percival Spear; *India Pakistan and the West*.

out on a journey to the Indo-Gangetic plain, he and his associates regard it as a voyage across the seven seas.

The revolutionary tide generated in the sub-continent by a cultural clash with, and a struggle for emancipation from, the alien rulers was represented by the Swadeshi movement of the first decade of the present century, and the non-co-operation campaign of the Indian National Congress and the Khilafat agitation of the nationalist Muslims in the second. Starting a little later, the counter-revolutionary force took the shape of communalism which received much inspiration and encouragement from the rulers, first through the 'command performance' of the Aga Khan delegation to Lord Minto, and subsequently by the official patronage to the All-India Muslim League. It was inevitable that Kashmir, sooner or later, must be agitated by these political currents and cross-currents. But the geographical isolation of the State played a curious trick; the counter-revolution preceded the revolution. This 'lateral inversion' in the political life of the people of Kashmir was reflected in the fact that the Muslim intelligentsia—the Reading Room Club of Srinagar and the Young Men's Muslim Association of Jammu, who should have been in the vanguard of a really national revolution against the Dogra rule—started its political career under communal colours, while a section of the vested interests—the Pandits—became the first revolutionary. The middle twenties witnessed the first direct outside intervention in the internal affairs of the State and it were the reactionary communalists who played their hands first. In 1926, a self-styled 'All-India Kashmir Conference', having its centre in Lahore and with hardly any State-subject on its membership-roll, petitioned to the State Government for permission to submit a memorial to the His Highness; their request, however, was rightly disallowed because "it was made by outside Mohammadans regarding the grievances of His Highness's own subject."

The next three years of the Indian history were marked, on one hand, by the phenomenal boycott of the Simon

Commission culminating in the intensification of the national demand for 'self-rule'; and, on the other, by the ever-increasing crescendo on the desirability to divide India into separate Hindu and Muslim zones. The idea of a regional division, first adumbrated in 1923 by a Cambridge University don, Rahmat Ali, proposed the formation of a separate 'cultural zone' in the north-west where the Muslims formed a culturally homogeneous majority; it was to be called Pakstan (P=Punjab, A=Afghan districts, K=Kashmir, S=Sindh and 'tan=Baluchistan). The Anglo-Indian and the British press, and the All-India Muslim League, seized upon the idea and 'Pakstan' soon became 'Pakistan,' the Land of the Pure. The conception of a cultural division of the country was given a more concrete shape by Dr. Syed Abdul Latif of Hyderabad, Daccan, in a booklet entitled *'The Cultural Future of India,'* published in 1927; he proposed a cultural division of India into four main Muslim blocs with some minor centres like Bhopal and Ajmer, and eleven Hindu blocs. Dr. Latif's remarks on Kashmir are significant: "The Hindu State of Kashmir will need to be included in the Hindu-Sikh zone. There is a predominantly Muslim population in the State. The districts occupied by them may by mutual agreement be transferred to the Punjab proper and in return a portion of the North East of the present Punjab including the Kangra Valley be added to the jurisdiction of the Maharaja".

The Indian National Congress passed the 'Independence' resolution at its Lahore session in December 1929. As a counter-blast, the president of the All-India Muslim League, the great poet-seer Sir Mohammad Iqbal, raised the vision of Pan-Islamism in which an Islamic State in North and North-West India—according to him—was to play her 'destined' part. Salt satyagraha and the civil disobedience movement followed a year later; the nationalists—Hindus and Muslims—were clapped into jails by thousands. The Round Table Conferences in London in 1931-33 were designed to let off the "independence" steam.

The Indian national forces were still too preoccupied to give any thought to the problems of the Indian States, and Kashmir

was, by a long chalk, only a geographical entity then—a tourist paradise, and nothing more. But the counter-revolutionaries from outside the State were not inactive, the All-India Majlis-i-Ahrar and the members of the Ahmediya sect from the Punjab being most prominent. Some Lahore papers, like the *Siyasat*, the *Muslim Outlook* and *Inquilab*, took particular interest in the internal affairs of the State. These purveyors of communal ideology established contacts with the Srinagar Reading Room Club and the Jammu Young Men's Muslim Association in 1931. The naive leaders of the two organizations were soon captivated by the flamboyant dream of Pan-Islamism.

The story of the 1931-32 'revolution' in Kashmir—which was less of a revolution than a communal outburst—has already been narrated. It has also been described how the Glancy Commission became the fairy-godmother to the upper-class Muslims, and a lucky few from the middle stratum; how, during Col. Colvin's regime as the State Prime Minister, the All-India Muslim League and other Muslim leaders from the Punjab kept away from the State; and, finally, how the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference set its hesitant feet on the arduous road leading towards nationalism. Then the pendulum swung from reactionarism to radicalism. The Indian National Congress became more interested in the princely territories, and an All-India States' Peoples Conference came into being under its inspiration to give a central co-ordination to the separate democratic movements already in existence in many States. Jawaharlal Nehru took special interest in Kashmir since the very first session of the States' Peoples Conference in 1934; and gradually S. M. Abdullah and some other progressive elements in the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference were impressed by his sincerity. The Socialist Party and the Communist Party of India also made their presence felt in the State. On the whole, the democratic movement in Kashmir was on an even keel; and the emphasis was on its intensification.

Though during the later half of the thirties the advocates for the division of India did not interfere in Kashmir politics, yet,

whenever they opened their lips or used their quills, they always had at the back of their minds the eventual incorporation of Kashmir in the proposed Muslim zone. For instance, the Sind Provincial Muslim League conference, presided over by Mr. M. A. Jinnah, passed a resolution on October 10, 1938, asking "the All-India Muslim League to devise a scheme of Constitution under which Muslim majority provinces, Muslim Native States and areas inhabited by a majority of Muslims may attain full independence in the form of a federation of their own." And the enlightened Sir Sikander Hyat Khan had suggested a scheme in July 1939, based on a regional demarcation of India into seven zones—the seventh zone including "Punjab *plus* Sind *plus* N. W. F. Province *plus* Kashmir *plus* Punjab States *plus* Baluchistan *plus* Bikaner and Jaisalmer".

The polarization of the political forces in the sub-continent reached its saturation point with the commencement of hostilities in Europe in the autumn of 1939. At one end was the Indian National Congress with the socialists and communists forming ginger elements within its fold; on the other stood the All-India Muslim League with the official patronage as its buttress. This antagonism was reflected in the Jammu and Kashmir State also, especially after the conversion of the Muslim Conference into the National Conference on June 11, 1939. All Kashmiri nationalists—even those who are to-day bitter against the National Conference, like P. N. Bazaz—joined that party, which received support from the Indian National Congress; whilst the comunalists were attracted by the re-organized Muslim Conference, which came under the patronage of the All-India Muslim League.

The refusal of the Indian National Congress to join in the war-effort so long the British did not declare their war-aims, followed by Mahatma Gandhi's individual civil disobedience, exasperated the rulers of India. Jinnah, according to his own admission, became their 'pet boy'. Again, under British inspiration, the All-India Muslim League passed a resolution, subsequently known as 'Pakistan resolution,' at its annual session

held at Lahore in March 1940, demanding "that geographically-contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial re-adjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute 'Independent States' in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign". Significantly, Kashmir was not directly named in the resolution, nor was there any mention of a referendum or plebiscite to determine that country's popular choice. The resolution, therefore, made no stir in the State; ensconced in seclusion the Kashmiri masses were oblivious of the dire implication of the resolution.

The Indian National Congress was assailed, both from within and without, for its non-co-operative attitude. First, the Indian Communists, while still working from within the Congress-fold, made a volte face after Hitler's attack on the Soviet 'Fatherland' in the summer of 1941. Then, the famous Moscow-trained revolutionary, M. N. Roy, formed a splinter group, called the Radical Democrat Party. Finally, the Congress as a whole was gagged and pilloried, after the passage of the 'Quit India' resolution on August 9, 1942. By 1944, the Congress was not only in 'cold-storage', but also appeared crushed in the bargain.

These shifts in politics had repercussions in Kashmir too. Kashmir Government, like the Government of India, exhibited a peculiar fondness for the Muslim Conference—the Kashmir counter-part of the All-India Muslim League. The support of Chaudhari Ghulam Abbas and other Conference stalwarts was bought at the price of freedom to them to preach communalism; on the other hand, S. M. Abdullah was frowned upon when he openly commended the Indian National Congress stand on the British war-aims. Communism, an ally of Imperial Britain then, was allowed a direct incursion on the Kashmiri thought, and it made some headway among the students. M. N. Roy's ideology found echo in P. N. Bazaz's Kashmir Socialist

Party, which came in for some official patronage. Kashmir was gradually being sucked up in the Indian politics. The time was fast approaching when her masses would be required to choose between the 'two-nation' theory of the Muslim League and a unitary India of the Congress.

In this connection the contrast between the reception given to Jawaharlal Nehru in 1940, and the one given to Jinnah four years later, was the measure of the Kashmiri masses' revulsion from the 'two-nation' theory. And it must be so, for, as P. N. Bazaz, a most severe critic of S. M. Abdullah, himself admits: "Despite their differences in religious views, Hindus and Muslims have evolved a composite common culture; their way of living, thinking and believing has been similar. Both bigoted Hindus and Muslims from outside have jeered at them for their unorthodox ways. But unmindful of these taunts, the people of Kashmir have followed their self-chosen path unswervingly".

The hostile reception to Jinnah, and his hurried exit from the State, demonstrated that Kashmir was not ready to 'swallow' the Pakistan ideology. But there was too much on Jinnah's hands elsewhere in India, than to allow him more than an angry look at the small native state tucked far away in the Himalayas. His sole aim, at that juncture, was to get his 'two-nation' theory accepted by the Congress. Despite the rebuff received in Kashmir, he went on saying that "we (Muslims) are a nation of a hundred million, and what is more, we are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, sense of value and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calender, history and tradition, aptitudes and ambitions—in short we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life." *

The immediate cause of the failure of Jinnah-Gandhi talks in the autumn of 1944 could be traced to British mechinations, but, in the ultimate analysis, the result was foredoomed inasmuch

* Mr. Jinnah's letter, dated September 17, 1944, to Mahatma Gandhi during their abortive talks at Bombay.

as the two leaders had not agreed on a common definition of the word 'Nation', before they met for the negotiations. We have observed above what Jinnah had in his mind when he raised the slogan that the Indian Muslims constituted a nation ; Gandhiji, on the other hand, contended that a body of religious converts could not claim a separate nationhood. Let us, therefore, weigh the testimony of some authorities on Political Philosophy, as to the nature of the ingredients that go to make a nation.

In defining a 'Nation', M. Hauser states : "It is the will of a people to live together, the *vouloir vivre Collectif*, and not race or language which makes a nation. It is the union of men inhabiting the same territory, whether or not subject to the same government, and possessing such common interests of long standing that they may be regarded as belonging to the same race." *

And Mr. Garner is still more explicit ; "more and more in recent years", says he, "it has come to be recognized that it is not so much community of race, language, religion or residence which impresses a people with the character of nationality, as it is the feeling of community of interest and ideals, of 'like-mindedness'—as sociologists say, the mutual sympathy which comes from the consciousness of wrongs and oppression suffered through common subjection during a long period of time to a despotic government, the pride of common share in great historic struggles, and the possession of common heritage and common traditions expressed in songs and ballads".

Coming back to Kashmir, we must note that M. Hauser's essential constituent of a nation—the collective will to live together—was absent among the Kashmiri Muslims vis-a-vis their Indian co-religionists. And, if Mr. Garner were right, the inhabitants of the State—Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs alike—had, by virtue of their 'pride of common share in great historic struggles', qualified themselves—in a vague inchoate sense—for

* M. Hauser : *Littre Dictionnaire*.

a separate nationhood, rather than to be lumped with the Indian Muslims with whose political life they had not much in common. Mr. Jinnah, however, was a practical politician rather than a political theorist. Moreover, he was shrewd enough to guess that the British Government, in order to stave off a total debacle of their Indian Empire, would be compelled to lend a tacit support to his pet theory. He could, therefore, afford to wait, before he threw in his net for the Kashmiri shrimp.

That Mr. Jinnah was correct in his guess became evident even before the end of the World War II. The super-structure on which Britain had built her Empire had become ramshackle. India could not be held longer; and the Congress and the Muslim League were already sparring. The ruling chiefs of the Indian States, as also their subjects—at least the politically conscious among them—were busy jockeying for places in the set-up announced by the Cabinet Mission in May 1946. The Indian National Congress, through the All-India States' Peoples Conference, supported the State-subjects' movements; the Muslim League backed the rulers. The two organizations, therefore, talked at cross-purposes every time the question of the future of the States vis-a-vis Indian independence cropped up. For instance, the Nizam of Hyderabad, who always itched for an independent existence, declared in the summer of 1945, without consulting his people, that a *responsible* government, as distinct from a *representative* government, could not be established in those States which either had treaty relations with the British Government or were guaranteed protection by them. While the Muslim League acquiesced to this dictum thus denying sovereignty to the will of the people, the Standing Committee of the States' Peoples Conference—which included S. M. Abdullah—strongly repudiated the Nizam's claim, at its Srinagar session on August, 8.

This ideological conflict between the Congress and the Muslim League was much more clearly exhibited during the 'Quit Kashmir' movement. Mr. Jinnah called it the movement of a few 'renegades', and asserted that Muslims as such had nothing

to do with it. The Congress, on the other hand, showed active interest; so much so that Jawaharlal Nehru himself courted arrest. And when the adamant Kashmir Government impeached S. M. Abdullah for sedition, Jawaharlal Nehru administered a prophetic warning: "The story of this brave struggle against the armed forces of the State has not ended by this trial. The story will go on till it reached the logical end which can only be the establishment of freedom in Kashmir within the large framework of a free and independent India".

The announcement of Lord Mountbatten's Plan, for the division of the country, imparted a greater urgency to the Indian politics. As regards the future relation between the two successor Governments of India and Pakistan, and the Indian Princes, the Congress continued to deny any sovereign status to the Princes; according to it, the States must accede to one Dominion or the other, and in case of any doubt the prince must bow to the decision of his people. Muslim League, however, veered its sail, and became quixotic; while it egged those princes whose territories fell within the Indian Union to declare themselves independent, it simultaneously wooed all the Muslim Princes to share its vision of Pan-Islamism.

The conflict between the Congress and the Muslim League, and the latter's dual approach to the problem of the Indian States, made Kashmir a field for an active 'cold war' during the summer of 1947. On behalf of the Congress, its president, Acharya J. B. Kripalani, accompanied by his industrious wife, Sm. Suchita Kripalani, arrived in Kashmir, frankly confessing that he would advise the Maharaja to join the Indian Constituent Assembly. With this aim, he had a series of talks with the Maharaja and Prime Minister Kak. When his attention was drawn to the fact that Kashmir's trade-channels flowed through the proposed Pakistan, and economic factors would determine Kashmir's choice, he pointed to the contiguity of the Hindu majority district of Gurdaspur and the Kangra valley, and suggested that new road-links could be established with India. He canvassed for the State's accession to India, but his appeal

was based on anything but sectarian considerations. Kripalani's mission failed in face of Kak's obduracy ; and Mahatmaji himself arrived on the scene. The Gandhi-Hari Singh talks have not been revealed ; but Gandhiji made his own views plain, in a prayer meeting at Wah on August 11, on his way back from the State ; "Kashmir", he said, "has predominantly Muslim population and Sheikh Sahab has fired the Kashmiris with local patriotism. The Kashmiris...had one culture, and so far as I could see they are one people...I have no hesitation in saying that the will of Kashmiris will be the supreme law in Kashmir and Jammu."

While the Congress canvassed in the broad day-light, Muslim League preferred to work in a clandestine fashion under cover of a dubious 'neutrality', and whenever it came out in the open, it spoke—as has been mentioned earlier—with two voices. On one hand, Mr. Jinnah, as reported by his own organ, *The Dawn* of Karachi, dated June 18, 1947, declared : "Constitutionally and legally, Indian States will be independent sovereign States on the termination of paramountcy and they will be free to decide for themselves to adopt any course they like ; it is open to them to join the Hindustan Constituent Assembly or the Pakistan Constituent Assembly or decide to remain independent.....The policy of the All-India Muslim League has been clear from the very beginning. In my opinion they (Indian States) are free to remain independent if they so desire" ; and his party backed Mr. Kak's administration toying with the idea of independence. On the other hand, the League volunteers and 'recruiting agents' entered the State secretly ; they approached the National Conference supporters, including Ghulam Muhi-ud-din the 'Nightingale', the underground leader of the National Conference War Council, with the intention of 'converting' the 'Quit Kashmir' movement into a pro-Pakistan land-slide. With the same object, contacts were made with Ghulam Mohammed Sadiq, who had escaped to Lahore ; and even certain senior Pakistani officials—like Sheikh Noor-ul-Haq, Deputy Commissioner of Rawalpindi, and Dr. M. D. Tasir—came to Srinagar, ostensibly to look into the Kashmir Govern-

ment's complaints about the economic blockade, but in reality to canvass for the League cause.

Of the other parties, P. N. Bazaz's Socialists tried to run with the hare : "Kashmir being preponderantly Muslim, it is rational and democratic that it should be allowed to accede to Pakistan" ; and also to hunt with the hounds : "In order to remove any doubt from the mind, the issue should be settled by an impartial and free referendum on the basis of adult franchise."* Communists were also equivocal, though in a different fashion. While, on the local plane, the *camraderie* established during the 'New Kashmir' formulation period, and strengthened during 'Quit Kashmir' agitation, impelled them towards Sheikh Abdullah, their party's policy, on the sub-continental plane, was pro-Pakistani. Still farther in the background was the uncertainty introduced by the breakdown of the war-time 'honeymoon' between the Anglo-Americans and Soviet Russia. To escape the quandary, created by their dialectical acrobatics, the communists advocated an "Independent Kashmir"—a long range 'plan' to woo the State, ultimately, into the neighbouring system of the Central Asian Soviet Republics.

Kashmir was gradually being sucked up in the maelstrom of the Congress-League conflict. The replacement of Mr. Kak, whose administrative policies were favourably disposed towards the Muslim League, by the Dogra communalist, Major-General Janak Singh, represented a perceptible shift of the centre of gravity in the Kashmir politics. This provoked the leaders of the Muslim League ; but the Maharaja continued to mark time on the accession issue. Only on the D-Day of Independence he announced his intention to sign Standstill Agreements with both Dominions, which was accepted with alacrity by Pakistan. India, however, demanded certain clarifications before putting her signature on the agreement. This over-punctiliousness, on part of Sardar Patel's States Ministry, was subsequently to cost India and Kashmir heavily.

* Statement made by Mr. P. N. Bazaz in September 1947. (P. N. Bazaz : *Azad Kashmir*)

Pakistan would, however, not remain content with half the bread; nothing short of full accession would mollify her. Therefore, to force the issue, she discarded the 'neutrality' mask, and engineered communal riots in Poonch and Mirpur. And, when it appeared that the State administration had successfully withstood those punches, inspired threats were hurled at the Maharaja from across the border. On behalf of the people of Hazara district in the North-West Frontier Province, Raja Yakub Khan sent a wire on August 19: "We are ready to enter the State fully equipped to fight your forces. You are requested to ease the situation soon, otherwise be ready to suffer the consequences". And Mr. Jinnah's own mouthpiece, *The Dawn* wrote editorially on August 24: "The time has come to tell the Maharaja of Kashmir that he must make his choice and choose Pakistan", and thundered that should Kashmir failed to join Pakistan "the gravest possible trouble will inevitably ensue".

By the articles of the Standstill agreement, Pakistan was required to give protection to the Maharaja against such intimidations. But in clear breach of the understanding, she herself tried to 'soften' the State administration by an economic blockade. The frantic appeals of the Kashmir Prime Minister, both to the Pakistan Government and Mr. Jinnah, were like the little Red Riding Hood's address to Auntie Wolf; only on October 20, did Mr. Jinnah come forward with a vague rebuttal of the allegations, professing that "my Government adhere to our assurance and have every intention of carrying out the standstill agreement".

When threats and blockade failed, Pakistan took more vigorous steps. Border raids, organized and carried out since early September by her nationals, increased in intensity and frequency; meanwhile preparations for a military invasion were in full swing in the Punjab, N. W. F. P. and the tribal areas.

At this stage Pakistan embarked upon an intensive Goebbelsian propaganda, posing herself as the injured party. Air was thick with rumours that she had threatened to

approach the United Nations Organization for setting up an Enquiry Commission on "Genocide" of the Muslims in India. The Government of India objected to the induction of the U. N. O. 'observers', primarily because they were not likely to be acquainted with the local problems, conditions and languages and would not therefore be able to restore amity between the two countries. Nonetheless, under Mahatma Gandhi's influence, Nehru expressed his willingness for the appointment of a body of impartial Indo-Pakistan 'observers' selected jointly by the two countries. But as Pakistan's intention was merely to divert the public attention from the offensive preparations against Kashmir, this suggestion was brushed aside and Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan approached the British Government direct. These tactics were designed 'to condition' the common-man in Pakistan for a war in Kashmir.

Junagadh had, in the meantime, shot into news; events in that tiny principality in Kathiawar were comported with the Kashmir accession issue. It is worthwhile therefore to take a short journey to that small State, completely surrounded—with the exception of a thin sea-board—by other States whose princes had already acceded to India.

The Muslim Nawab of Junagadh wanted to accede to Pakistan because of his religion, but his subjects desired to join the Indian Union because of their cultural and ethnic kinship with the Kathiawaris. This was the first 'test' case, where the respective wills of the ruler and the ruled were in opposition. While Mr. Jinnah enthusiastically accepted the Nawab's Instruments of Accession, the Government of India, in consonance with their declaration about the supremacy of the people, would have none of it. Immediately, Pakistan came out with the argument that, conditions in Kashmir being *mutatis mutandis*—a Hindu ruler with a preponderant Muslim population—Maharaja Hari Singh should accede to Pakistan. Certain credulous elements in India, not conversant with the true facts, succumbed to the naivete of this line of reasoning.

The correct sequence of events in Junagadh exposes the spuriousness of the above dialectics. That State could of course claim a tenuous sea-link with Pakistan through its tiny port Veraval, but the railway connections, post and telegraph—virtually all communications—were integrated with India. Moreover, its territory was a veritable crazy-quilt, studded with enclaves of States acceded to India; and it had its own enclaves within those States. Accession to Pakistan, in such circumstances, would mean not only snapping all vital life-limbs, but also the creation of a political monstrosity—foreign isolated pockets within other isolated pockets. Realizing the logic of the situation, the Dewan (equivalent to a Prime Minister) Mr. Abdul Qadir had informed Lord Mountbatten, when the latter met the Princes and their advisers on July 25, that he would counsel the Nawab to accede to India. Similar advice was tendered by the Dewan's brother who was the Constitutional Adviser to the Nawab. But when the Dewan was away in America, he was dismissed *in absentia*, and a *coup d'etat* was carried out in the State on August 10. A group of Sindhi Muslims took over the administration, and Sir Shah Nawaz Butto became the Dewan, making the Nawab—in the words of Alan Campbell-Johnson, Lord Mountbatten's Press Attache—"a virtual prisoner in his own palace." Immediately, the new Government declared its intention to accede to Pakistan. Campbell-Johnson's diary records on September 15: "No pressure has been put by the Government of India on Junagadh to accede, but when the likelihood of accession to Pakistan loomed large, two formal approaches were made by Delhi to Karachi for some declaration of Pakistan's intentions. No reply has so far been received."*

Junagadh, however, appeared bent not only to destroy India's equipoise but also to provoke her to military activity. Babriawad, a feudatory enclave within Junagadh was forcibly occupied, though its chief had earlier acceded to India. A few days later, the Nawab of Mangrol, another similarly situated State,

* Alan Campbell-Johnson; *Mission with Mountbatten*.

was put under duress, and made to rescind his earlier accession to India ; and Junagadh troops were deployed in his State. Pakistan prompted the Junagadh Nawab's bravado by promising him a loan of eight crore rupees for the development of Veraval port, and a military force twenty thousand strong. Mr. Jinnah had shrewdly anticipated the sequence of events, that (we learn from Campbell-Johnson), "by luring India into a militant reaction to secure a verdict on legal point and to create a valuable precedent for any attitude he may care to adopt towards the far greater Princely objective of Kashmir and Hyderabad." For that reason Pakistan did not even reply to the Government of India Note seeking an immediate and unqualified referendum in Junagadh under impartial auspices. Finally, Liaquat Ali let the cat out of the bag during his conversation with Lord Ismay in the third week of September ; after these talks Lord Ismay was "quite convinced that Pakistan's strategy is to use the whole Junagadh contest as a bargaining counter for Kashmir." This interpretation is borne out by a significant remark Liaquat Ali made to Mountbatten on the same visit—"All right", he told him, "let India go ahead and commit an act of war and see what happens."*

The Junagadh story read in context with Kashmir issue reveals no parallelism between the two, save that in both States the rulers professed faiths different from those of their subjects. One glaring fact, nevertheless, emerges from a comparison between Junagadh and Kashmir, and it is that while India refrained from any retaliatory action against Junagadh till her own integrity was endangered, in Kashmir the hostile probes were initiated by Pakistan without any provocation.

We have already referred to the Pakistan-aided transgressions

* The stage of a "war" between Junagadh and India was never reached. Pressed by the dis-satisfied subjects, the State Government resigned and the Nawab fled to Karachi. Finally, on November 8, the naib-Dewan (Deputy Prime Minister) Major Harvey-Jones, who was left in charge of the administration, formally invited the Indian Government to take it over, and to save the State from a complete breakdown.

in Kashmir. They were supplemented by threats of uglier shapes to come if the Maharaja persisted in his 'obduracy'. Even the unruly feudatory chieftains of Hunza and Nagir were instigated to revolt against their over-lord. But after S. M. Abdullah's release Pakistan became more blatant and aggressive. Her agents arrived in Srinagar to persuade him to fall in line; "I had a heart-to-heart discussion with them, and explained my point of view", says S. M. Abdullah; "I told them in plain words that whatever had been the attitude of Pakistan towards our freedom movement in the past, it would not influence us in our judgement. Neither the friendship of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and of the Congress, nor their support of our freedom movement, would have any influence upon our decision if we felt that the interest of four million Kashmiris lay in our accession to Pakistan". This assurance, however, did not curry favour with Pakistan, for Mr. Jinnah wanted the full cake of accession. A plot was, therefore, hatched to 'kidnap' S. M. Abdullah, and to coerce him into submission. As already narrated, only a fortuitous circumstance saved him. The more eagerly Pakistan tried to embrace the Kashmiri maiden, the more did she repel the overtures—till lust broke down all moral restraints, and the tribal invasion of the State commenced on October 22, 1947.

It is pertinent to reflect, at this stage, on the reasons which impelled Pakistan to seek a military solution to essentially a political problem. Firstly, the injection of the 'tribesmen', in the initial phase of the invasion, is a pointer to the fact that Pakistani statesmanship was not making much headway with the recalcitrant tribes of the frontier region. The British had been paying "hush money" to keep them quiet—the largesse, of course, came from the Indian exchequer. Pakistan, however, was too improvident to continue the 'bribe'. Moreover, the departure of the British troops threw thousands of Pathan camp-followers—attached to the military camps—out of employment. Diversion of these moneyless, jobless malcontents towards Kashmir was a tactful move to ease the growing economic unrest in the tribal areas. As Maulana Mohammad Sa'eed, ex-General Secretary of

the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, once pointed out: "Tribesmen have been promised rich prospects of plunder and loot and settlement of lakhs in the lovely valley of Kashmir. This has naturally proved a strong lure".

Secondly, the political discontent in the N. W. F. P. was daily becoming graver. If the June 1947 referendum in that province were an index, half of the population at least had not taken in Pakistan with an open heart. Moreover, the policy of retaining British officers—even recalling some who had retired earlier—was actively resented by the Pathan fighters for freedom. The 'Azad Pathanistan' movement of Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, and the 'Azad Baluchistan' demand of Khan Abdul Samad Khan, were two simmering volcanoes ready to erupt. "The invasion of Kashmir", says Maulana Saeed, "was ready though a short-sighted solution of all these problems. The invasion has for the time being isolated non-communalist movements for Azad Baluchistan and Azad Pathanistan".

Third, and a more significant, reason was Pakistan's dread of a strong Indian neighbour, which had kept her heterogeneous Muslim elements—Sindhis, Punjabis, Pathans and Bengalis—together. Eliminate that psychosis, and the different cultural groups would fall apart. In such circumstances, the prospect of a further accretion to the Indian strength, resulting from Kashmir linkage, was a means to whip up the 'fear-complex'; or to use Liaqat Ali's language: "The accession of Kashmir to India is a threat to the security of Pakistan".* The invasion was meant to forestall the dreaded event—the accession of Kashmir to India.

Finally, it was the British intrigue, connived at by the Americans in their own interest, which egged Pakistan into aggression. In his book, *The Grand Hypocrisy*, the present writer has shown how the British had consistently striven to keep the Hindus and the Muslims apart, culminating in the Partition;

* Statement made by Mr. Liaqat Ali, in a broadcast from Karachi on November 4, 1947.

how "the very act of fission revealed itself as a conscious invitation to war between the two broken parts of the sub-continent." Kashmir was chosen as the first battleground of the coming 'war'.

It will, therefore, be seen that the 'invasion' of Kashmir was the resumption of the old struggle between the Muslim League and the Congress, albeit in a different shape. And, thus, the second current entered the Whirlpool.

THIRD CURRENT

In one form or another, and with various degrees of vitality, Russia has been the single steadily growing power in Central Asia since the sixteenth century. In that long career of conquest she has had lapses of inactivity and periods during which the spirit of annexation worked with spasmodic force. During the first quarter of the nineteenth century, after the Napoleonic adventure, she had lapsed into inaction allowing Britain a period of comparatively undisturbed expansion in India. But in the thirties, she was on the march again; and a judicious help to Turkey against Egypt secured in 1831 a free passage for her warships—to the exclusion of all other powers—through the Straits of Dardanelles, "the key to her house" as Czar Alexander II would call them.

With the gradual expansion of the Russian power south-eastward across the Central Asian steppes, and the British power north-westward across the Indo-Gangetic plain, arose the phantom of an eventual conflict between the two. The directors of the East India Company, in a despatch dated June 25, 1836, instructed the Governor-General, Lord Auckland, to "judge as to what steps it may be proper and desirable for you to take to watch more closely...the progress of events in Afghanistan and to counteract the progress of Russian influence in a quarter which, from its proximity to our Indian possessions, could not fail, if it were once established, to act injuriously on the system of our alliances, and possibly to interfere with the tranquillity of our territory...Such an interference would doubtless be requisite...to raise a timely barrier against the impending encroachments of Russian influence." It was to further the objective of raising 'a timely barrier' that General Napier conquered Sind in August 1843, breaking an existent treaty with the Amir, and that Lord

Hardinge intrigued with Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu to reduce the Sikh Court of Lahore to the position of a vassalage in March 1846.

We have already narrated how Kashmir was made over "for independent possession" to the Dogra dynasty by the British. At that time, the political and strategic importance of this area was only a vague quantity, and a propitiated ally was needed, both to sandwich the Sikhs and to form a flank against Afghanistan. That the British cherished no love for the Maharaja—despite the Amritsar Treaty—was apparent from the beginning; for instance, the English organ, the *Lahore Chronicle*, came out with a candid editorial on April 28, 1853: "No one can say that Maharaja Goolab Sing is not grateful for benefits conferred. He chooses to think that, as British Resident at the Court of Lahore, Sir Henry Lawrence rendered him many and valuable services; and there is no doubt that, in his official capacity, and as an organ of the British Government, the gallant Colonel did, from the force of circumstances, aid in raising Goolab Sing to the position of an independent prince. That he did so out of any personal regard for His Highness of Kashmir, may be denied out of the pages of the 'Adventure in the Punjab', into which we like to dip now and then; and where we find the Maharaja depicted in anything but amiable, and yet, no doubt for the time, very truthful colours."

So when the Sikh power was finally crushed at Gujerat in 1848, and the defeat of Dost Mohammad had neutralized the Afghan threat, the British felt astonished at the enormity of their reward to Maharaja Gulab Singh, and they cast greedy looks at Kashmir. The engagement entered into with the Maharaja had left the State's internal administration wholly to him—an arrangement known as 'subordinate isolation'.* Nevertheless, before the

* This political relationship between the British power and the Native States was first worked out by Lord Hastings. "He took from them the reality of international life. He deprived them of the rights of making war or of contracting engagements with their neighbours, forbade them to employ foreigners, and imposed restrictions upon their armaments. He left the Punjab

treaty was three years old, the obligations it imposed upon the British, not to interfere in the domestic affair of the ally, were felt out of tune with their imperial interests. Lord Hardinge, the Governor-General, was therefore seen violating the terms of the Treaty, by trying to get a British Resident appointed at Srinagar; only the Maharaja's resoluteness foiled the attempt. Two years later, however, the new Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, came back with a novel plan. Kashmir valley's scenic charm was attracting visitors in increasing numbers; the Maharaja was, therefore, persuaded to appoint a British Officer on Special Duty, to look after the affairs of the European tourists. Behind the mask of the innocuous proposal of a British 'baggage-master' in Srinagar was the strategy of perimeter-strengthening against any Czarist infiltration from Central Asia.

The timing of this move synchronized with the outbreak of the Crimean War and the predication of a Muscovite invasion of India. Britain, then, was obliged to choose between the strategy of defence, or of attack. Early in 1854, a certain Colonel Rawlinson advocated a forward policy, and advised the Secretary of State for India, Sir Charles Wood, "that we should be at once in the thick of it by sending a brigade of troops to Bagdad", and later Lord Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, recommended despatch of 10,000 men from the Nizam of Hyderabad's army for service in Turkey. However, with the western bastion—including Kashmir—within British control, Lord Dalhousie, entertained no exaggerated respect for the Russians; therefore, in his minute dated June 13, 1854, he told the Secretary of State: "That if Russia should invade India with all the power she can command at present, her army would be exterminated,

as a buffer state, and Burma was still outside the Empire; but elsewhere he introduced a general political settlement defining the limits of each state and leaving it in a position of subordinate isolation. At the same time he rigidly marked off the internal administration of each prince as outside the sphere of British action". (Sir William Lee-Warner; *The Life of the Marquis of Dalhousie*)

even if it ever reached the borders of India, is quite certain." The 'baggage-master' thus became a 'sentinel' on the Kashmir outpost.

Though the much talked off Russian invasion did not materialize, and the Czarist octopus withdrew its tentacles once more, yet the anxious months spent in defensive preparations obliged the imperial strategists to bestow greater care to India's western frontiers. Accordingly, a treaty was signed with Dost Mohammad on May 3, 1855, whereby Afghanistan became a defensive moat against Russo-Persian expansion. The Kashmir bastion, though less suitable for troop deployment, was still not invulnerable; moreover, administrative chaos on its extreme north-west fringe, in consequence of the incapacity of the Dogra rulers to subjugate the recalcitrant chieftains of Dardistan, was an added attraction for the Russian adventure. The duties devolving upon the Special Officer, therefore, became more omnibus, including a watch over the Pamirs.

The Russian bear did not take long to start nosing towards the southern waters of Iran and the eastern waters of China. By 1864, the Czar had established his over-lordship over Samarkand and Bokhara; and only after a strong representation by the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Clarendon, did Russia recognize the territorial integrity of Afghanistan and agreed to remain north of the river Oxus. But there was another spurt of activity soon, and the Khanate of Khiva succumbed in 1873. The rapidity of the Russian approach towards Kashmir unnerved the British rulers in India, so that in 1873 they revived their *demarche* for the appointment of a British Resident, which, however, Maharaja Ranbir Singh parried like his father and with equal success. All the time, the tramp of the Russian soldier sounded louder and nearer; and, writing about those anxious days, Sir W. W. Hunter admitted: "Twenty years ago (1855), the Crimean War taught Russia that for the present there is no thorough-fare for her in Europe. But during the past third of a century her march across Central Asia has been as the rush of a tidal wave, rapid, restless, buoying beneath its waters

all obstacles that would stay her course."** Failing to reach their objective in the straightforward diplomatic way, the Government of India resorted to lupine tactics of the 'Fable of the Wolf and the Lamb.' The British and the Anglo-Indian press opened a barrage of columny against the Maharaja, accusing him, in no uncertain language, of the most heinous crimes. They even charged him of drowning Muslims by boat-loads in the Wular Lake in 1877 in order to save the expense of famine relief, though a commission of enquiry appointed by the Government of India, on the request of the Maharaja, absolved him later. The cartridge, apparently, mis-fired; and the Maharaja's internal sovereignty remained intact.

The British lost a great ally with the death of Dost Mohammad in 1877. Relations with the Kingdom of Afghanistan were on the doldrums once more; and the Kashmir bastion needed buttressing up correspondingly. Therefore, the Maharaja's failure to restore tranquillity in Dardistan and Gilgit was seized upon by the Government of India as an excuse to send a military mission to that area, and a British Agent was posted at Gilgit.

The Russian avalanche moved on and crossed the Oxus in 1884; Merv was annexed and the Czar's soldiers appeared on the banks of Hari Rud. An Anglo-Russian Commission was appointed to demarcate the Russo-Afghan boundary between the two rivers. The need of a Resident in Kashmir was felt all the more.

A God-sent opportunity came by in 1884; the strong Maharaja Ranbir Singh lay dying. The Government of India sent a diplomatic note to the Secretary of State on April 7, accusing the Maharaja of corruption and inefficiency, and speaking in equally derogatory terms about the heir-apparent; they suggested a change in the British policy towards the State at the installation of the new Maharaja. The writer was unequivocal about the intention; he said: "It is a measure

*Sir W. W. Hunter; *A Life of Earl Mayo, 4th Viceroy of India*.

which may be called for not merely by the need of assisting and supervising administrative reforms, but also by the increasing importance to the Government of India of watching events beyond the North-Western Frontier of Kashmir. Any disturbance which continued misgovernment might create in Kashmir would be acutely felt on the frontier of Afghanistan...We have, therefore, to consider the necessity of providing for efficient political supervision not merely in the interests of the people of Kashmir but also in the interests of people of India. Under these circumstances we are anxious to obtain from Her Majesty's Government authority to appoint, if it should appear to be necessary at any time after the death of the present Maharaja, a residential political officer, who will exercise a general supervision over the affairs of the Kashmir State."

The Secretary of State received the suggestion enthusiastically, and replied, "...whether regard be had to the condition of the country, or to the character of the prince into whose hands the Government will shortly pass, or to the course of the events beyond the border which has materially increased the political importance of Kashmir, the appointment which you request a discretionary authority to make appears to be not only desirable but necessary"; but he tried to mask the real design with a very significant remark: "It may indeed be questioned whether, having regard to the circumstances under which the sovereignty of the country was entrusted to the present *Hindu* ruling family, the intervention of the British Government on behalf of the *Mohammadan* population has not already been too long delayed." (*Italics mine*)

Maharaja Ranbir Singh expired on September 12, 1885. Two days later, the British Officer on Special Duty, Sir Oliver St. John delivered a prepared message from the Viceroy to the new ruler Maharaja Partap Singh, asking for an immediate change in status of the officer, to that of a Political Resident. When the flabbergasted Maharaja wanted to know if the Resident would take an active part in the administration, Sir Oliver told him "that I could not undertake to define the exact duties of a

Resident, but that he would certainly leave all the active work of administration to the Durbar, while claiming the right to be made acquainted, should he require it, with all its details. He should give advice if asked for, and on any point he thought proper unasked ; and in this latter case would expect his advice to be followed."

The British, at long last, were successful in getting a political officer posted in Srinagar to 'advise' the Kashmir Government, and the first incumbent was Sir Oliver St. John himself. British military officers moved up and down the country—as if it were their own ; one Colonel Lockhart, for instance, crossed Hunza and scouted into Chitral in 1885, and a little later Sir Francis Younghusband went there on a similar mission.

The Russians, too, were out patrolling ; one Captain Grombtchevsky and his Cossacks crossed Chitral in the opposite direction, and made contact with the ruler of Hunza in 1887. The presence of the dreaded Muscovite near the border alerted the British ; the need to strengthen Gilgit defences received added urgency. Yet any induction of the British troops in Kashmir would have appeared as a transgression of the Maharaja's sovereignty. So the Resident advised the Government of India, in March 1888, to 'depose' the Maharaja, and to assume direct administration of the State. This suggestion, however, was dismissed by the Foreign Secretary, H. M. Durand, as inopportune ; he added : "We should limit our overt interference as far as possible to the organization of a responsible military force in Gilgit...If we have a quiet and judicious officer at Gilgit...we shall, I hope, in a short time, have the whole thing in our hand without hurting any one's feeling."

Sir Oliver St. John was succeeded by Colonel Nisbet, and the new Resident was even more eager to remove the Maharaja and to establish absolute British control over Kashmir. Col. Nisbet's zeal was so boundless that he did not disdain to commit a most nefarious act in 1889. He colluded with the Maharaja's ambitious younger brother, Raja Amar Singh, to forge a number

of letters alleged to have been written and signed by the Maharaja. These apocryphal letters implicated the Maharaja in a conspiracy with the Russians, and with his having murderous intention against some of his own relatives and the previous Resident. Before the young Maharaja had his say, he was made to sign, under duress, a 'voluntary resignation' prepared and kept ready by the Resident. Maharaja Partap Singh, then, sent a passionate appeal to the Viceroy, Lord Lansdowne, refuting the allegations, but the latter connived at his subordinate's activities. In the beginning, the Maharaja's guilt was taken for granted; the man-in-the-street in England trusted his own compatriots. But the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* of Calcutta 'scooped' H. M. Durand's secret memorandum and the Maharaja's letter to the Viceroy, and exposed the forgery. In a trenchant language, the paper said: "So it will be seen that, when Lord Sir John Gorst said that he would not be surprised if a feeble-minded man like Partap Singh would withdraw his resignation; or when Lord Cross declared that the Maharaja cruelly oppresses his subjects; or when Lord Lansdowne wrote to the Maharaja that His Highness was an extravagant and bad ruler, they were not unaware of the real reasons of the Maharaja's deposition. It was Gilgit that the Government wanted". The paper concluded another editorial with the remark: "Our object in publishing the document was to show that those who have persuaded him (Lord Lansdowne) to believe in the guilt of the Maharaja, and to cause his deposition, were, even before the advent of His Excellency hankering for 'the whole thing'".

Some liberal statesmen in Britain were humiliated by this mis-carriage of the much-advertised British honesty; for instance, William Digby spoke sarcastically: "In India condemnation takes place, sentence is carried out, and no attempt is made to ascertain whether a sentence ought to have been pronounced." The Maharaja's accusers produced a new charge-sheet—mis-government and financial bankruptcy—to fit the punishment already given. In the end the Maharaja did not regain his

sovereignty ; and the Council of Ministers appointed to administer the country, during the period of his deposition, became, a one-man's show, with the Resident as the producer, director, and chief actor, all combined.*

Having taken over full control of Kashmir, the Government of India appointed Lieut-Col. Durand as their agent in Gilgit, immediately subordinate to the Resident at Srinagar. He fully justified his selection, because, ere long, he had 'bought' the chiefs of Hunza and Nagir into an agreement permitting free entry of the Government of India officers into that country, on the promise of an annual cash allowance to be paid directly by the Government over the head of Kashmir Durbar. Speaking about the incorporation of Gilgit within the system of direct British administration—towards which they had all the time been acting—Lieut.-Col. Durand mentioned a Government of India despatch to the Secretary of State, "in which it was stated that the advance of Russia up to the frontier of Afghanistan, and the great development of her military resources in Asia, had admittedly increased the necessity for strengthening our line of defence, and that among points requiring special attention were the northern passes of Hindukush which afford a difficult but not impracticable route for a force large enough to cause excitement, if nothing worse in Kashmir." And about the importance of Gilgit in the system of 'ring-fence' defence of the British Empire, E. F. Knight, a subordinate of Lieut.-Col. Durand, writes in a similar strain : "The value of Gilgit to the Kashmir State commanding as it does the Indus valley and mouth of Hunza river, and so holding in check the unruly tribes on either side is obvious enough ; but it is only recently that the great strategical importance to the Empire of this position has been fully realized. This region is now attracting some attention. The Russian explorers are exploring the passes of the Hindukush on the Northern side. They have crossed the range too at several

* No member of the Council, with the exception of one, had any acquaintance with English language, yet the minutes of the proceedings were recorded in it.

points, trespassed into the territories of our allies.....Our influence should at least extend up to that great mountain range which forms the natural frontier of India. It is necessary for the safe-guarding of our Empire that we should at any rate hold our side of the mountain gates but unless we looked to it Russia would soon have both sides under her control."*

Apart from 'bribing' the recalcitrant baron-chieftains of Dardistan, the new Agent immediately set about reinforcing the defence-perimeter; roads were constructed, forts were strengthened and local levies raised to supplement the Kashmir militia now under the British command. As a result of these anticipatory moves, Durand was able to forestall and crush the rebellious intents of the Hunza and Nagir chiefs in May 1891, and even to penetrate deeper into the 'no-man's land' towards the Pamirs, where Russia was once again promenading insolently. Actually, Col. Ionoff had the impunity to run across the British-held Chitral, on a raiding mission to the Afghan territory of Bozai Gombaz on the Oxus: and when Sir Francis Younghusband was sent to demarcate the disputed frontier, the Cossack commander had him arrested and pushed out, claiming that region for the Czar.

Ionoff's haughty behaviour created a great stir. The Kashmir garrison in Gilgit was reinforced with contingents from the Indian Army; and Lieut-Col. Durand was instructed to inform the Chiefs of Hunza and Nagir "that it was necessary for their safety, and for that of Kashmir, that we should have free access to their territory in order to make all requisite arrangements for holding the line of frontiers.....and that, as they owed allegiance to the British Government, they would be expected to give any aid in their power. If the chiefs refused their consent to the road-making, they were to be told that the roads must be made, and that unless they complied with our demands, troops would enter their country and make the roads in spite of them." Safdar Ali Khan, the ruler of Hunza, replied in a defiant tone: "If you

* E. F. Knight: *Where Three Empires Meet*

venture, here", he fired back, "be prepared to fight three nations—Hunza, China and Russia. We will cut your head off, Colonel Durand, and then report you to the Indian Government." The Hunza chief had over-estimated his prowess; Col. Durand marched on him and, by the end of 1891, a *de facto* British sovereignty was established over Dardistan and Gilgit area. A Political Officer, assisted by a military contingent, was posted at Hunza also. With their flank secured, the British went out on a number of successful military excursions in Chitral (1895), and trans-Khyber and Tirah (1897-98). The Empire bulged out towards the Russian steppes—and the cost was debitted to the Indian exchequer.

For sixteen years the State administration was under the charge of the Resident; and only after the military strategists were fully satisfied about their position, was Maharaja Partap Singh restored to his *gaddi* in 1905. Ordinarily, the Resident should have safeguarded his ward's interests; but, curiously, he issued a fiat in 1901 detaching the Frontier Ilakas (minus Gilgit District) from the Maharaja's dominion, who was asked to remain content with a nominal suzerainty over that area without any right to interfere in its internal administration. A half-century of incessant political pressure—fair and foul—bore fruit at last; the wardens of the British Empire were, after all, able to plant themselves on that strategic outpost; a hole was plugged against the Russian flow.

Maharaja Partap Singh would have continued to languish without authority, if, with the turn of the century, Russia had not re-lapsed into inactivity. In the first two decades of the present century, the Czarist forces were paralyzed by the military debacle in the Russo-Japanese war, and through internal revolutions. But the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in 1917, followed by the establishment of the Soviet republics of Uzbekistan, Turkomanistan and Tazkistan on the Pamir plateau in the twenties, raised the 'Muscovite peril' once more. Russia resumed her march towards the warm waters of the Indian Ocean; and, though the communist slogan was different, the

purpose remained inherently the same. As a consequence, Kashmir came again into prominence; not only a *de facto* but a *de jure* possession of Gilgit became the British aim.

The end of World War I saw a powerful United States emerge from a century-old isolation. Historically and ethnically, she was a graft from Western Europe. So, in the prestine tussel for leadership in Asia, war-battered Great Britain discovered an ally in the New World. It must, nevertheless, be recorded that though Britain received the United States' moral and material support in her attempts to refurbish her imperial interests in Asia, American statesmen remained so much within their own isolationist shell that they would not, except casually, take notice of the reality of the Red Revolution, till the impact of an Economic Depression forced President Roosevelt to 'recognize' the Soviet Government sixteen years after it had seized power. It was this desire to run away from the facts, and partly a rawness in international diplomacy, that made the U. S. diplomats concede leadership in Asia to Great Britain.

In the early thirties, the new Maharaja Hari Singh committed a *faux pas* in giving public expressions to his pro-national sentiments, and thus to annoy the Paramount Power. The Government of India did not like disloyal vassals; they decided to bring the indiscrete Maharaja to task. The *modus operandi* this time was not a 'forgery' but communal riots, so effective in fighting Indian Nationalism. The sudden sprouting of the Muslim organizations like the Reading Room Club and the Young Men's Muslim Association in 1930, described earlier, gives a correct perspective to the shady activities of the British Prime Minister of the State, G. E. C. Wakefield. Soon the country was in the throes of communal disturbances, guided and fanned from 'outside'. All that time, the Government of India kept a studied silence though Article 9 of the very first treaty signed with the Dogra dynasty (Treaty of Amritsar) had provided: "The British Government will give its aid to Maharaja Gulab Singh in protecting his territories from external enemies". Not only the Kashmir Maharaja, but the

Princes, in general, were guaranteed protection through time-old engagements and *sanads*; yet in 1931, the British Government conveniently forgot their obligations. Inflammatory leaflets were allowed to be smuggled into the State; and trouble-mongering *Jathas* of Ahrars and Ahmediyas were let in from the Punjab. The Government of India could have, if they wished, put a stop to these illegal activities of the 'foreign' agitators, as was done through a Viceregal ordinance a few months later when the British officials had gone up the saddle; even Mr. Middleton, who had enquired into the causes of the disturbances, had to confess: "Had it been possible to take that action a few days earlier subsequent events at Jammu might have taken a very different turn."

So far about the creation of conditions in which the communal carbuncle swelled; as for the direct participation, it may be recollected that the fire-eater Abdul Qadir, who touched off the spark in 1931, was 'imported' into the State as a cook with a British visitor. Inscrutable are the ways of British Imperialism!

Driven to the wall, the Maharaja had to buy help from the Government of India at an enormous price; he was obliged to take Col. Colvin as his prime minister, and two other 'whites' as the Inspector-General of Police and the G. O. C. of the Kashmir Army. Once the British had all the reins of administration in their hands, they became unmindful of the Muslim masses, till eventually they cast away the 'squeezed lemon' of the Muslim Conference—S. M. Abdullah included. Even the recommendations of the Glancy Commission, vitiated by the imperialist consideration of divide and rule through the provision of separate electorates for the proposed Legislative Assembly, were not fully implemented; and when the astonished Muslim leaders resorted to another agitation in protest, their protectors marched them to goals in a summary fashion.

We have already narrated how disillusionment was the cause of the conversion of the Muslim Conference into the National Conference. But did the British care? Hardly so, because all the five years Col. Colvin 'ruled' Kashmir he was at a deeper

game. The British had been the *de facto* rulers of Gilgit since 1889; but on August 1, 1935, the Government of Kashmir—in other words, the administration presided over by Col. Colvin—handed over that district to the Government of India on a 99-years 'lease', thus transferring the *de jure* authority also. It is significant that shortly after this 'deal', Col. Colvin left his post, and never afterwards was another Britisher appointed as prime minister.

With the British entrenched in Gilgit, not much was heard of Kashmir for almost a decade. Central Europe had become the focus of international attention for, in 1931, the mark of Swastika had appeared in the European skies. Hitler was out with his dragoons on *Drang nach dem Osten* (Advance towards the East) mission. "We start anew", he proclaimed, "where we terminated six centuries ago. We reverse the eternal Germanic migration to the south and to the west of Europe, and look eastwards. If we speak of new soil we can but think first of Russia and her subject border states".* This Germanic push eastward relieved the Soviet pressure on the Middle East. The thirties, therefore, represented Britain's halcyonic period in Asia,

Then the British fortune took a sudden bad turn. Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia signed a non-aggression pact in August 1939; the prophecy of the Nazi political philosopher Hausofer almost came true; "...the inevitability of the co-operation of the Axis powers, the Russian Empire, and East Asia as the saviours [of the world culture] stood distinctly before the German Soul"; and the Russo-German alliance represented "the geo-political foundations of their adjustable space-existence."†

The World War II commenced; and India asked for an unequivocal declaration of Britain's war-aims, "for on that declaration depended peace and justice not only for India, but for the whole world". The organization was ostracized for

* Adolf Hitler: *Mein Kampf*.

† Dr. Karl Hausofer: *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*.

demanding a *quid pro quo* for co-operation, and the Muslim League, ignored till then, became the 'favourite wife'. Apart from the 'domestic' reason, international diplomacy also required this differential treatment; Middle East was then misbehaving, and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and Rashid Ali of Iraq had raised the banners of revolt against Britain. So, the emphasis on the Muslim League in India was a means to restore the balance in the Muslim world. But when Hitler's mad adventure in the east in June 1941 made Russia—the traditional rival—a friendly ally and Communism was locked in a life-and-death struggle, Imperialism got a free hand in its colonial haunts.

Meanwhile, the United States, though still non-belligerent was finding herself gradually involved in a 'shooting war'. Roosevelt and Churchill met on board the cruiser *Augusta*, in August 1941, and gave birth to the Atlantic Charter, representing the common peace-aims of the two countries. It was a historic agreement, for by it the United States discarded isolationism and bound herself to Great Britain—to sink or swim together. Through it, also, the United States committed herself so deeply to support the British imperial policies that when Churchill denied the application of the Charter to the Empire, Roosevelt did not even raise a murmur of dissent. The President's acquiescence in the mutilation of the Charter shocked the dependent countries; the fact, however, was that the American Ulysees had succumbed to the British Circe's imperial wine. Sumner Welles—a very close associate of F.D.R. in those exciting days—reveals that the President was thinking that "Great Britain and the United States would undertake to the policing of the world." * Thus the Atlantic meeting was an invitation to the United States to come out of her sanctuary and to join in the 'sphere of influence' politics. It may be noted that the Russian ally was excluded from the proposed world-policemen's role. Even before the war had taken a favourable turn, the Anglo-Saxon bloc was dreaming of world control.

After December 1941, when the United States joined the

* Sumner Welles : *Where Are We Heading ?*

'shooting war', British Imperialism became the Old Man of the Sea astride the Yankee back. Since then till almost yesterday, in Asian and African affairs particularly, John Bull has led the band; and, if ever, Uncle Sam did suggest a "new thought," he invited only a typical bulldog growl.*

1942 and 1943 was the period of *mariage de convenance* between the Anglo-Americans and the Soviets. Britain—now joined by the United States—and Russia, both were too much pre-occupied with the common enemy to give a thought to their traditional rivalry. The Casablanca Conference in January 1943, and the Cairo Conference in November-December 1943, cemented the Anglo-American league; and the Teheran Conference in December 1943 established an accord between them and Soviet Russia. The war-time alliance met its first hitch at Dumbarton Oaks in August 1944; at that Conference, the 'Big Three'—Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States—as the principal powers then waging war, joined a little later by the 'Fourth'—China, declared that international order depended primarily on the strong nations using military might to impose their idea of "peace" on the rest of the world. But despite a facade of unity, the 'Big Four' had not arrived at the conference with open minds, the Anglo-Saxon conception of 'peace' being dissimilar to the Slav's. Therefore, the proposal to set up a Security Council hedged in by the 'veto power' was "accepted with some reservation", for it was felt, confesses John Foster Dulles, a prominent member of the United States delegation to the conference, that it "put excessive dependence upon the post-war unity of the 'Big Four.'" † Not surprising, therefore, that soon after the

* On March 10, 1942, Roosevelt prompted Churchill to solve the Indian self-determination problem on the American lines, but Robert E. Sherwood records in his book, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, that Hopkins "did not think that any suggestions from the President to the Prime Minister in the entire war were so wrathfully received as those relating to the solution of the Indian Problem."

† John Foster Dulles: *War or Peace*. Mr. Dulles is the Secretary of State in the Eisenhower Administration.

Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the American and the British diplomats set about to discover a *modus operandi* whereby the 'veto power' in the Security Council could be circumvented.

By the time the Big Powers re-assembled in February 1945, at Yalta, the end of the German resistance was in sight, and Russia's bargaining power had correspondingly increased. Therefore, U. K. and U. S. A. yielded on the 'unanimity principle'; while Soviet Russia responded by agreeing to put international Communism under brakes. Nevertheless, the Yalta agreement on veto, too, was vitiated by mental reservations; the Anglo-American thought-process has been aptly described by John Foster Dulles: "If the Communist Party should win control of the government of a single South American country, then that government, with Soviet Communist connivance and support, could wage a war of aggression against its neighbours, and the United States or any other signer of an American pact could not take forcible action for peace unless the Soviet Union concurred."

This mistrust of the Soviet ally gave birth to the 'Act of Capultepec', adopted in March 1945—only a few weeks after the Yalta agreement—establishing a regional defensive agency, charged with the responsibility for the maintenance of peace in the two Americas. The shape of things to come after the war was coming into sight; the regional associations were soon to take on the character of armed camps; the stage was being prepared to divide the world into a number of 'spheres of influence'; the grave of 'One World' was being dug. The formula of Capultepec represented the loss of the United States' faith in the world organization even before the latter was set up.

The European War came to an end in May 1945. The San Francisco Conference assembled next month to give a concrete shape to the proposals agreed to at Dumbarton Oaks, but the mood of the Big Powers had, in the meantime, changed. This transformation was, on one hand, reflected in a concerted attack on the veto-right; and, on the other, in a clever defence of Regionalism or the right to form regional associations outside

the United Nations Organization. In both cases, Soviet Russia appeared to make concessions—she conceded that no single power would have the right to veto *discussion* within the Security Council ; and agreed to the incorporation of Article 51 of the U. N. Charter which provided for a “collective” right of self-defence outside U. N. O. She had been too much mauled by the German invasion to be able to risk an open breach with U.S.A. and U. K. at this stage.

San Francisco also revealed that the European ‘colonial powers’ wanted a *status quo* in their colonies ; limitations put on the Atlantic Charter by Churchill, and continued in practice by the Labourite Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, had become the basic tenet of the British colonial policy. The United States continued to yield on this score—President Truman maintaining his predecessor’s non-interference line—since she herself did not like to give up the ‘mandated’ Japanese islands, and because the Pacific Ocean was now a part of the American world-policeman’s beat. Therefore, while in the Conference deliberations, the European colonial powers and the United States would talk vaguely about the obligations and responsibilities towards the ‘non-self-governing peoples’, yet each time the question of placing all the dependent territories under an ‘international trusteeship’ system was raised, the U. S. delegation would greet it with a monotonous ritual : “It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under trusteeship system and upon what terms.” The “subsequent agreement” never arrived—except in case of the Italian colonies. The reason for the Anglo-American evasion on this issue, vital for the peace and world-order, was obvious ; they were not prepared to give up—in the memorable language of Churchill—‘what was our own,’ and would not let the Soviets poke fingers there through the proposed International Trust Commission. The old game of checking and counter-checking the expansion of each other’s zone of influence was in full swing again.

The Potsdam meeting between the ‘Big Three’ in July 1945

had the ostensible object "to build among those engaged in the German occupation a friendly acceptance of each other as individuals striving peacefully to attain a common understanding and common purpose—our mutual good."* That 'mutual good', however, turned out to be a re-division of the 'spheres of influence'—an attempt at Hausofer's 'adjustible space-existence' under altered circumstances, the Anglo-Americans retaining the Middle and Far East and Japan (after her surrender), and the Soviets allowed to expand into Poland and other Central European areas, and China.

Though the agreement not to poke one's nose in another's manger was meant to decrease the area of conflict, yet mutual suspicion and aggressive propensities had a particularly unsettling effect on the borderland zones, where the different spheres over-lapped or were otherwise not clearly demarcated. One such region was the Muslim 'strip' from Egypt to western India. Freed from the anxiety on the west by the Potsdam 'understanding', Russia started making dents into this 'strip'; her march southward towards the Indian Ocean, held in check for forty years, re-commenced on the faith that the Tartar blood would have retained much of its historical kinship over the Kublai Khan's huge empire from Caucasia to Outer Mongolia. And to forge a national unity under the aegis of Communism among the internecine Muslim tribes inhabiting the Soviet Central Asian republics, large scale development and modernization schemes were carried out in the years immediately following the war; so that towns like Stalinabad, the capital of Tadzhikistan, Bokhara and others, became hives of industrial activity—"little Moscovs" as their proud dwellers would call them.† This possibility of a link between Islam and Communism has received a lucid exposition from

* Dwight D. Eisenhower; *Crusade in Europe*.

† *New York Times* Special Correspondent has recently sent a glowing picture of these Central Asian republics calling it "a monument of the practical application of Soviet multi-national policy". (Report from Stalinabad, dated September 29, 1953.)

the able journalist Guy Wint, ; says he, "Once atheism is abandoned it would not be difficult to represent communism as Islam brought up-to-date, so strong is the equilitarian tradition in Mohammadan society. For these reasons, even the critics and enemies of Russia sometimes feel constrained to prophesy an inevitable Russian supremacy in Asia. This might not come from the intentions of the Russian Government, but from *historical* necessity, for if there is disorder in Asia, Russia would find it genuinely hard to stay aloof." *

The British designed to supplant the Russian 'historical necessity' by one of their own. Their strategy was well described by Lt.-General Tucker ; "Turkey for some centuries," he pointed out, "was the centre of Islamic power and even now it seemed that she was a stalwart opponent, though much weakened. But she had lost her leadership of Islam, and Islam might now look for leadership to the Muslims of Russia. This would be a most dangerous attraction ;" and added, "There was much therefore to be said for the introduction of a new Muslim power supported by the science of Britain...and if we could orient the Muslim strip from North Africa through Islamia Deserta, Persia and Afghanistan to the Himalayas, upon such a Muslim power in Northern India, then it has some chance of halting the infiltration of Russia towards the Persian Gulf...and to induce the states in the strip, including Turkey, to look eastwards to Muslim India instead of northwards to Islamic Russia." † Thus for the British the establishment of a friendly Pakistan was as much a 'historical necessity' in mid-twentieth century, as the conquest of Northern India and the Pecksniffian behaviour in Kashmir had been a century earlier—only, the stakes were higher this time.

Paradoxically, the break-up of India was a 'historical necessity' for the communists also, although for different reasons. Among the major Asian countries, their hold had been weakest in India—due particularly to the Gandhian influence, and to a

* Guy Wint : *The British in Asia*,

† Lieut-General Sir Francis Tucker : *While Memory Serves*.

minor extent to the rivalry of the Socialists : in fact, Indian nationalism was *not*—in the Marxian dialect—dyed red. In contrast, a Red meteor was rapidly blazing across the Chinese sky. Therefore a weak India was as much in the Soviet interest as a strong China. That explains the Indian communists' advocacy of the Muslim League ideology in the pre-Partition days ; and also after Partition, their liaison with the Akali Party in the Punjab (I) and Pepsu, and their open alliance with the militant communalists, Razakars of Hyderabad.

Thus we see that—for the last quarter century at least—the Middle and Near East have been a vast arena for the struggle, not so much to annex the Muslim countries as to win over the Muslim soul. The rival imperialisms—Russian and Western—strove incessantly to achieve indirectly through Religion, what in the nineteenth century they had done directly with Sword.

The relevancy and the justification of our long *detour* in international diplomacy would become apparent if we glanced at the map of Asia and saw that the State of Jammu and Kashmir formed a supporting cornice to the proposed 'new Muslim power'. It would then be understood why British Imperialism, even while it appeared to withdraw, manoeuvred not only for the ultimate detachment of Kashmir—along with the 'leased' Gilgit—from India, but also to retain the State within its own 'sphere' by the Cabinet Mission promising independence to her prince. We can also appreciate then, why the Communists pleaded for an 'independent status' for the State ; after all, a sovereignty, lacking the wherewithals—both economic and military—to maintain it, was sure to end in the eventual subservience to a bigger power. Both Great Britain and Soviet Russia were thus baiting the Kashmiri trout.

Despite the many obnoxious features of the Cabinet Mission Plan, the Indian National Congress accepted the responsibility for the governance of the country, in August 1946. But even this little modicum of self-government was not to the Viceroy, Lord Wavell's taste. Then some cataclysmic events shook the world, which still more sharply defined the divergence

between the Angle-American and the Russian blocs. The Reds nosed too far into Azerbaijan, and towards Kars, Ardahan and Thrace. Though a loud ballyhoo in the Security Council made the Russian beat retreat, he was openly suspected to be implicated in the separatist movements in Iran and Greece, from where the British oil-fields and the Suez Canal were not far off.

Later, Palestine went into flames. First, the British rulers cleverly 'pakistanized' a separate State of Trans-Jordan on March 22, 1946, and then, after vigorously fanning the Arab-Jew hostilities, handed over the mutilated body to the United Nations on February 14, 1947. British diplomacy in the Middle East was based on the creation of a multiplicity of 'national' states all warring with each other and, disunited, none strong enough to challenge the British supremacy. The Bulldog smelt the prowling Bear, and in an eagerness to drive the latter away created a mess of his manger.

In the Far East—which was within the U. S. zone of influence—the continued failure of Marshall Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang to stand up to Mao Tse-Tung's communists, despite the steadily increasing flow of American military aid, so much puzzled and disquietened the Truman Administration that on January 23, 1947, U. S. withdrew from the Big Three Committee set up on Feb 9, 1945, to mediate between the two contestants. It represented in spirit, and resulted in effect, in the scuttling of the main continental defences against the Soviet Union in the Far East. In any case it was a triumph of the Russian policy in China. The Eagle and the Bear now faced each other across the Yellow Sea, and in their eyes wese fear and distrust.

Whereas in the nineteenth century two supermen—Britain and Russia—contested for the division of Asia; in the twentieth, Colossus Anglo-Americania and Colossus Communisti were striving for the division of the world. The grimmer the struggle, the greater the eagerness to attract more allies. These circumstances gave birth to the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947—"the policy of the United States to support peoples who

are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure." The Doctrine, subsequently reinforced by the Marshall Plan corollary, was anti-Soviet, except in name. From resistance to Soviet expansion in the present, to the preparation for an offensive in the future, was but a short step. British mechinations in India and the neighbouring Asian countries, with their slant on the preparation for the coming conflict with Communism, therefore, received tacit support from the American Administration.

In India, the Constituent Assembly set up under the Cabinet Mission Plan passed a resolution on January 22, 1947, that the new India would be an 'Independent Sovereign Republic'. This resolution represented a 'compulsory' liquidation of the Indian Empire. The imperialists, therefore, set about to salvage as much as they could ; and proceeded in the fashion indicated by Lt-Gen. Tucker.

Lord Mountbatten arrived in India on March 21, 1947, and immediately put his 'high pressure diplomacy' in motion. The soil has already been prepared to receive the seed of Partition by the churning process of communal riots in Bengal, Bihar and the Punjab. His persuasive logic, and the tactics of not allowing a second thought to one's opponent, hustled the Indian National Congress to accept the Partition, despite Mahatma Gandhi's 'doubts' and the strong opposition from the Indian Socialists. The new Muslim power was born on August 15, 1947.

Following the creation of Pakistan, there was a sudden change in the British approach to the problem of the princely territories. No more was the emphasis on sovereignty flowing back to the princes after the cessation of paramountcy ; rather they were to be persuaded or wheedled to join either successor Dominion. No more did Imperial interests require a 'ring-fence' independent Kashmir, a permanent financial liability to the British Exchequer ; the same purpose was to be served by inducing or pushing Kashmir into the orbit of a friendly Pakistan, with costs to be borne by the latter. Not sovereignty of the princes, but 'compulsions' of geography and religious affinity of

the subjects were now the most hard-worked phrases on the British lips.

But, in the meantime, Maharaja Hari Singh and Prime Minister Kak have had a fleeting glimpse of 'La Belle Dame Sans Merci'—an independent Kashmir on the Swiss model; the two 'knights-at-arms' were in her thrall. Nehru was anxious to fulfill his Kashmir commitment which Kak had cut short the previous summer; and Gandhiji wanted to prepare the way for Nehru. But Mountbatten played his fiddle first; and, says Campbell-Johnson, "succeeded in deferring both visits by saying he himself had a long-standing invitation from the Maharaja and would like to see him first". Be it remembered that his lordship was never so anxious to visit Hyderabad—another recalcitrant State on the accession issue; and that Mountbatten's Kashmir dash anticipated, by more than a month, the meeting of the Chamber of Princes to which Kashmir was to send a strong delegation. Why, then, this hurried visit to Kashmir? Why did Mountbatten want to see the Maharaja 'first'?—Because he had already obtained an assurance from Sardar Vallabhai Patel, the States Minister, "that if Kashmir went to Pakistan this would not be regarded as an unfriendly act by the Government of India". This assurance when conveyed by a person none other than the Viceroy himself, and coupled with the stress on the State's geographical contiguity to the proposed Dominion of Pakistan—the Boundary Commission had not till then awarded 'contiguity' to the other Dominion also—was thought sufficient to influence the Maharaja's choice. But Maharaja Hari Singh did not yield to Lord Mountbatten's logic. Even then the valiant lord did not accept defeat; and after the Chamber of Princes sitting in Delhi on July 25, 1947, he extended his 'good office' to arrange a special meeting between Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Kak.

Notwithstanding Mountbatten's manoeuvres, Maharaja Hari Singh, who had fought the people's movement to perpetuate his autocratic rule, was not prepared to yield it, just at the moment when there was a chance of his becoming a sovereign

monarch. He was fortified in his belief when, as a preliminary step towards the ultimate lapse of paramountcy, the British restored the Gilgit agency to him on August 1, 1947, and not to the successor government of India or Pakistan.

Three days before the transfer of power, the Maharaja made known his desire to have 'standstill agreements' with both India and Pakistan. As already narrated, Pakistan accepted the arrangement; but India would not, without ascertaining the wish of the State-subjects. The status of the Jammu & Kashmir State, at this stage, was a political anomaly—a 'neutral' territory without an international rank.

In the first week of September, Lord Mountbatten's Chief of Staff, Lord Ismay, arrived in Kashmir on a "much needed rest"; it transpired that he was acting as Lord Mountbatten's emissary. After August 15, Lord Mountbatten was merely a constitutional head of the Indian Union; officially, Pakistan was outside his jurisdiction. Still he had it conveyed once more to the Maharaja that India would not take it amiss if his State acceded to Pakistan. In contrast to this over-solicitousness, Lord Mountbatten disdained to make any personal interference in the Junagadh imbroglio which developed a few weeks later.

Round about the end of August, inspired riots had taken place in Poonch and Mirpur. The State was blockaded by Pakistan, and the infiltration of armed Pakistan nationals and agents had commenced. How did the British on Pakistani-side behave at this juncture? The border province of the Punjab (P) was presided over by the old-brigade die-hard, Sir Francis Mudie; like his predecessor during the 1931-32 Ahrar and Ahmediya intervention in the State, the British satrap turned a blind eye to the repetition of similar incidents. It has also been reported that an unexpectedly large contingent of retired British officials had come, all the way from England, to enjoy a tourists' holiday in Kashmir at that particular time; Sir B. J. Glancy, who had played such an important part in the tumultuous thirties, was one of them. And due to some mysterious circumstance, a battery of Anglo-American press-correspondents had assembled

at Rawalpindi just on the eve of the 'invasion'. As regards the active part played by the British officials who had opted for service in Pakistan, Josseleyn Hennessy admits in Commander King-Hall's News-Letter that they had "quickly become more Pakistani than the Pakistanis themselves." It was not for nothing that the first Pakistani Governor-General, Mr. Jinnah, had invited, immediately after his swearing-in ceremony, the retired Governor of N. W. F. P., Sir George Cunningham, to rejoin the post at Peshawar—curiously, the request was backed by Lords Mountbatten and Ismay. The re-appointed Governor returned the compliment, not only by conniving at the preparations for the invasion, but, as it is reported, by canvassing support for it through his henchman Kuli Khan and other paid-agents.

Despite the masterly show of goodwill towards India, the British mind continued to be bitterly partisan. And we get a peep into it when the window is thrown open in some unguarded bluster; for instance, the ex-Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan, Lt.-General Sir Douglas Gracey was piqued by some remarks of Jawaharlal Nehru to write in the weekly *Truth*, in the summer of 1952: "The feeling of inferiority aroused in the breasts of the Indian politicians when they compare themselves with the grand fighting men of Pakistan is increased by the knowledge that British officers do tend to bestow upon their old comrade-in-arms a respect which the hysterical little Pandits of New Delhi can never enjoy."

This pro-Pakistani attitude and Lord Mountbatten's machinations in Kashmir could not be explained away as mere exhibitions of the personal ideosyncracies. There was, in fact, a deeper reason behind them—the persistent British fear of Russian expansion.

Firstly, by attempting to develop a more or less independent foreign policy, India made herself unwelcome to the Anglo-American policy-makers. We may re-collect the episode, when the Dutch went back on the March 25, 1947, Linggadjati Agreement with the Indonesian nationalists and launched a

'police action' two months later against the infant Republic. It was India who took up the matter to the U. N. O., much to the embarrassment of the Anglo-American bloc, and compelled the Dutch to a 'cease-fire' in August. But from the Security Council debates it transpired that, while all European colonial powers—including United Kingdom—were opposed to the Indian *démarche* and the United States remained 'neutral', the Soviet countries alone voted *en bloc* with India. This Indo-Soviet flirtation raised envy in the rival breasts; so much so that, in the later half of 1947, the Anglo-American press was full of stories and reports about the Indian Union's alleged plans to break away from the Commonwealth, and her eagerness to have a 'pact' with Soviet Russia.

Secondly, India was at cross-purposes with the Anglo-Americans over the Palestine issue—having signed the minority report of the United Nations' special committee, on August 31, and opposing partition of that country. Thus India was trying to put a spanner in the British designs on the Middle East.

Thirdly, the *apartheid* policy of the South African Government was another subject on which India was at loggerheads with the Anglo-American bloc. Under the dignified leadership of Nehru's sister, Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, the Indian delegation had carried the day in January 1947 in the Security Council wrangles on that subject; and had, in the bargain, unmasked the British and American pretensions about racial equality.

Fourthly, there was a flutter in the western dovecotes when India invited an inter-Asian Relations Conference in March 1947. Though this assembly at New Delhi was defined to be non-political, the Anglo-American journals gave it a bad press, calling it a thinly disguised attempt to boost Indian leadership of Asian peoples. Nehru's remark in the concluding stages of the conference—"we are now in the process of finding ourselves and others are also in the process of realizing that Asia is not merely a place for the rivalry of various imperialisms, but Asia consists of human beings who are going to have a great future—" was

lost on them. The positive role that the inter-Asian relationship was meant to play in making Asians 'Asian-minded' was an anathema to those who wished to retain the leadership of Asia even after World War II.

American jitteriness about an independent India's intentions was relected in the question then often asked in the United States, about the necessity of filling in the military vacuum to be created by the British withdrawal. We may quote a representative sample: "Not only is India (or areas of it) demanding independence from England, but it is yielding in places to the voice of Moscow. In accordance with the logic of our State Department, if Russia goes too far with what General Marshall calls a bulge into this sub-continent, then America must step in where England pulled out. A few years ago we had thousands of American soldiers there to fight for Russia and China. If we send them back we will send them to a land that the English now fear to tread."*

Even if Mr. Uhler's might have been an extreme view, it could not be gainsaid that the century-old Russian phantom was stalking once more ; and, in the American calculation, the time to grapple with it was fast approaching. This dread of a coming conflict with communist Russia had been lucidly described by Harold R. Issacs, an American expert on Asian affairs ; he says ; "If continental northern Asia passes largely into the Russian sphere, the present status of South Asia will change...India and South-east Asia would become, far more than now, objects of rather intense Russian interest. By the same token South Asia would shift from low-priority to high-priority status in Anglo-American calculations. The Anglo-Americans could then foresee a day when they might want South Asia to provide against Russia the defences it failed to supply against Japan. These factors are already actively present in the shaping of British policy, in the area where Britain acts, in effect, as America's Deputy. It is not too difficult to imagine a coming time when

* John Earle Uhler, in the *Catholic World*, August 1947.

we may be hearing as much about the North-West Frontier as we have heard, for example, about Iran.”*

But with India shouting her neutrality from the house-top, she was not, in the American jargon, a ‘good security risk’. In comparison, Pakistan was a ‘safe bet,’ especially when she had ‘behaved’ on the Palestine issue and did not join the Arabs and Egyptians in raising a vehement ballyhoo over the dismemberment of that country. Kashmir bastion was, therefore, more dependable if placed within Pakistan’s defence-perimeter. The ‘maker’ of Pakistan had also very shrewdly gauged his power to black-mail U. S. on the Russian issue. Miss Margaret Bourke-White, the special correspondent of the *Life*, had the good fortune to be the personal guest of Mr. Jinnah immediatly after the creation of Pakistan. She had asked him, “Did he hope to enlist technical or financial assistance from America ?”

“‘America needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America’ was Jinnah’s reply. ‘Pakistan is the pivot of the world, as we are placed’, he revolved his long fore-fingers in bony circles—‘the frontier on which the future position of the world revolves.’ He leaned towards me, dropping his voice to a confidential note. ‘Russia’, confided Mr. Jinnah, ‘is not very far away.’ ”

Though after the revealing interview, the American lady “wondered if the Quaid-e-Azam considered his new state only as armoured buffer between opposing major powers”, Mr. Jinnah could not have more frankly quoted his price, and expressed his power to extort it.†

Thus, the third current, the century old struggle to keep the territory round the Pamirs ‘out of bound’ to the Russian—transformed to the extent that Great Britain was now joined by the United States—entered the Whirlpool.

* Harold-R. Issacs : *New Cycle in Asia*.

† Margaret Bourke-White : *Halfway through Freedom*.

THE WHIRLPOOL

The Whirlpool, in which the Kashmir politics tumbled on October 22, 1947, has been described as 'invasion' by the pro-Indian elements, and as 'liberation' by the pro-Pakistani. In the same fashion, when the North Koreans crossed the 38th. Parallel on June 22, 1950, the United States branded them as 'invaders', but Russia described them as 'liberators'. It has always been so when the opinions of the interested and effected parties are totally polarized. Nevertheless, a modicum of Truth can be gleaned through a correct appraisal of the events—some of them already touched upon earlier.

When Kashmiris awoke on the morning of August 16, 1947, they found that in place of one frontier with the British India their country had now two, a 450-mile long with Pakistan, and another—though much shorter—with India. Across the two borders, Hindus and Muslims were killing each other. Displaced persons, belonging to both communities, were spilling over the tenuous frontier, seeking refuge and shelter. They were bringing with them heart-rending memories, and also the bitterness for revenge. Their communal passions formed a most incendiary material ready to consume whole Kashmir, if a conscious or unconscious spark set it alight.

The first fires broke out in Poonch, along the Pakistan frontier, in the last week of August. Soon they spread to Mirpur and Bagh Tehsil. The State was then cut off by an undeclared Pakistan-imposed blockade, and all links with the outside world put asunder. The Inspector-General of the State Police and the State Army Commandant, both senior British Officers, despatched police and military contingents—predominantly Hindu and Sikh—for the restoration of law and order. Their communal composition put the fat on the fire; the myrmidons of law and order exceeded the limits of firmness required to

deal with the situation, and committed many acts of atrocity on the innocent Muslim population of the Jammu Province. Then action and reaction started their macabre dance of death and destruction.

Poonch disturbances were utilized by the pro-Pakistanis as an excuse to poke their noses in the internal affairs of the State; the alacrity with which the matter was taken up suggested that the riots were 'made to order'. Threats came in galore from Raja Yakub Khan of Hazara, and the premier of the North-West Frontier Province, Khan Abdul Qayum Khan*, and other responsible Pakistani leaders. Soon the sabre-rattling was followed by the gleam of sabre itself. Major-General Scott, G-O-C. of Jammu and Kashmir State Forces, reported on August 31, ".....situation in Hazara and Rawalpindi areas very unsatisfactory. There is little doubt that the recent disturbance in Bagh Tehsil were led by armed gangs from Pakistan"; and again on September 4, he saw hostile tribesmen wearing green and Khaki uniforms and carrying leather and web equipment. Simultaneous to the rendezvous of the armed tribesmen along the western border of the State, marked increase in the activity of the Pakistan regular troops was detected on the main roads leading to the State. But when the harassed Kashmir Prime Minister sent a protest-note to the Pakistan Army on September 4, pointing to the aggressive nature of the troop movement, it was brushed aside; the Deputy Commissioner, in a reply two days later, denying any knowledge of infiltration. On September 11, a convoy of the Kashmiri Hindu evacuees from Rawalpindi was attacked though it was moving under Pakistani military escort.

The State was now threatened with disruption. The economic blockade had effectively stopped the flow-in of the essential commodities—food, salt, cloth and petrol; and the phenomenal inflationary spiral generated thereby was developing a situation conducive to revolt. Not only the intrusion of

* He has now been elevated to the Pakistan Central Cabinet as Minister-in-charge of Agriculture and Industries.

the armed raiders continued but regular Pakistani soldiers, themselves, appeared in the frontier villages of Alibeg and Jitli on Sept 13-14. Such unwelcome visits were repeated at many points along the Pakistan-Kashmir border. When engaged by the State forces, the intruders would retire to their sanctuary in Pakistan; the strategy behind these pin-prick attacks was to get the small State militia deployed all along the 450-mile frontier, so that over-stretching would render the defences too thin to resist an all-out attack. The worried Kashmir Government sent a desparate cablegram to the British Prime Minister, accusing Pakistan of hostile intentions; but the British were themselves interested in the bear-dance, so Mr. Attlee was not obliging enough to call it off.

Regular skirmishes between the State forces and the raiders took place at Chirala on October 4; the attackers were found to be equipped with automatic weapons, which the primitive arms-factories in the tribal areas could never have turned out. By October 15, the invaders had penetrated deeper; Fort Owen in Mirpur was put under siege, and its small garrison was forced to evacuate. Three days later, they had advanced farther and cut the Kotli-Poonch road; another hostile prong developed near Bhimbar supported by a large-scale concentration of Pakistani lorries and other transport. On October 20, the Wazir of Mirpur sent a distress-message to the Government that armed hostiles were assembling across the frontier opposite the border-villages Chechian and Mangla. The same day, Mr. Jinnah replied to a series of protests and appeals from the Kashmir Government; he refuted the charge of having broken the 'standstill agreement,' and ascribed the delay in despatch of the essential supplies to the 'disturbed conditions'.

The all-out invasion began on the night of October 22, 1947. Written in cold print to-day, after six years, it makes a prosaic reading; but viewed in the context of the people's struggle against autocracy, of the 'two-nation' controversy, and of the shifts in the imperial strategy, the invasion revealed

a peculiar pattern of contradictions. The forces which had once sided with the Dogra dynasty—from within and without—were now ranged paradoxically against both the Maharaja and the nationalists; a Mohammadan went out to fight another Mohammadan; an important bastion against Russian expansion was thrown into disorder—an unconscious invitation to Communism.

One must record here that the Government of India were not totally ignorant of the preparations for the tribal incursion in Kashmir; on the other hand, it is to their discredit that no use was made of the fore-knowledge. It is now known that Sir George Cunningham, the Governor of the N. W. F. P. had sent a warning to the Indian C-in-C, General Sir Bruce Lockhart, in a 'private communication,' that the tribesmen were intending to infiltrate into Kashmir, and the members of the N. W. F. P. government were actively helping them. Though the Government of India acknowledges that the contents of the letter—"the first authoritative intimation of impending trouble in Kashmir"—had been communicated to the Defence and External Affairs ministries, no suitable action was taken on it; and only an apologia, issued a year later, admitted that "in retrospect one might regret that the letter was not preserved", and that "it is quite possible that in those anxious early days when the fate of Kashmir hung in balance this fact was not remembered". This episode of the missing letter bears out the truth of the aphorism; the price of freedom is eternal vigilance.

On the night of October 22, over 3,000 tribesmen, armed with automatic weapons, poured across the Kishanganga bridge, west of Domel. They came on 300 lorries and army-transport, and it was subsequently revealed that the vehicles were driven with petrol released from the North-West Frontier Province's rationed quota—an instance of direct complicity by the Pakistan government. The State troops were worsted in short engagements near Domel and Garhi; within a few hours Muzaffarabad was in the raiders' hands, and the town was set ablaze after

an orgy of looting. Having secured a bridgehead, the invading horde fanned across Kishanganga into the State territory, and established a link with the hostiles already astride the Kotli-Poonch road.

That the invasion was *long* planned is proved by the fact that a picked team of foreign correspondents was accredited to the attacking force.* That it was *well* planned was soon evident from the pincer-tactics adopted by them in the assault on Uri, at the bottleneck-mouth of the Valley and the next target on the road to Srinagar. The town was attacked from three directions, one prong advancing from Muzaffarabad, another from Kohala, and the third from the direction of Poonch. Without meeting any opposition, the three advancing columns joined on the outskirts of the small town on October 24. Only a small contingent of the State militia under the command of Brigadier Rajendra Singh, the Chief of Staff of the Jammu and Kashmir Forces, barred their path. With only 114 determined soldiers, the Kashmiri Leonides refused to yield the pass, even at the risk of total annihilation. He was successful in slowing down the tidal rush; but at what a staggering cost? —Not one from that small unit returned to tell the saga of their supreme sacrifice, Brig. Rajender Singh including. Though Uri fell, but precious hours had been gained.

Failing to melt Mr. Jinnah's heart, the Maharaja made a desperate appeal to India on October 24, for arms and ammunition needed by the local populace in Srinagar and the countryside to put up some sort of defence. The question to rush aid to Kashmir was considered on October 25, by the Indian Defence Committee, presided over by Lord Mountbatten and including the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Bruce Lockhart.

* Sydney Smith of the *Daily Express* was there; and Eric Britter of the *Times*, and Margaret Bourke-White of the *Life*; and, perhaps, Andrew Mellor of the *Daily Herald* too. It could not be any supernatural magnetism that drew them there, but only an advance knowledge that newsworthy events were about to happen in that not easily accessible corner of the earth.

Mountbatten advised the Council that, in the absence of an Instrument of Accession, and having no 'standstill' agreement either, any despatch of troops by the Government of India to a 'neutral' State might not be legally tenable. Therefore, observes Campbell-Johnson, "no final decision was taken on these vital questions on the 25th, but it was agreed that V. P. [V. P. Menon—Secretary to the States Ministry] should fly to Srinagar at once to find out the true position there". Thus precious time was lost by Mountbatten's casuistry, which Brig. Rajender Singh and his men had won at the cost of their lives.

And it was not that the 'true position' was not within the knowledge of the Defence Committee; the C-in-C had, in fact, conveyed to it the text of a telegram from his Headquarters, telling that the raiders were 'already within forty miles of Srinagar—in other words, their vanguard had reached the environs of Baramulla, an advance of 30 miles in a day. If such progress were maintained, the attackers would be in Srinagar the next day; the flat terrain of the Valley and the good road linking the capital with Baramulla were, more likely than not, favourable to the invaders. Radio Pakistan was continuously on the air, claiming fantastic successes for the raiders; a communique, at a very early stage of the invasion, announcing the formation of a 'Provisional Azad Kashmir Government' at Pallandari—"somewhere in Poonch"—under Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim, brother of Khan Abdul Qayum Khan, the premier of N. W. F. P. Mr. Jinnah had already shifted his camp to Rawalpindi, and was ready to make a triumphal entry into Srinagar. Ten years back, Adolf Hitler had descended on Vienna in a similar fashion, on the pretext of helping the Sudetan Germans.

The rumour of loot, arson and abduction indulged into by the success-intoxicated invaders were flying ahead of them. Kashmir Army had evaporated into thin air—a part annihilated or otherwise 'neutralized' into disjointed groups, and the other 'going over' to the enemy. Srinagar was benumbed, a terrified dove awaiting the jaws of the devourer. S. M. Abdullah, Bakshi

Ghulam Mohammad and their National Conference colleagues alone went about exhorting the people to keep calm and to organize resistance to the 'foreign invasion'; and under their inspiration, young boys and girls—both Muslim and Hindu—formed a volunteer corps (*Bachao Fauj*). Finding that armless Kashmiris could hardly put up an effective front against a foe equipped with modern weapons, the Sheikh flew to Delhi on the evening of October 25, to secure help before it was too late. The next morning V. P. Menon was back from Srinagar with a very disturbing news; "he had found the Maharaja unnerved by the rush of events and the sense of his lone unhappiness", and "the troops left in Srinagar had no prospect whatever of holding the invaders, for they consisted merely of one squadron of cavalry".

Ditched in the back by Pakistan despite the 'standstill agreement', and compelled by the exigency of the military situation, the Maharaja at last realized the necessity of removing the legal impediments from the path of the Indian Union, and thus to clear the way for the despatch of military aid to his State. As an expression of his wish, he signed the Instrument of Accession, and sent it under cover of a personal appeal to Lord Mountbatten*. And to strengthen the appeal, he sent his Prime Minister, Mehr Chand Mahajan to Delhi.

October 26 was taken up by a quadrangular conference at Delhi, between Mr. Mahajan representing the Kashmir Government, S. M. Abdullah on behalf of the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, Lord Mountbatten playing the dual role of a constitutional head and a watch-dog of his own country's interest, and the Indian Government. Meanwhile, the raiders' avalanche seemed to slow down mysteriously at Baramulla. The real reason, however, of this temporary hold up has become another tragic saga in the history of Kashmir. Let us hear the story of the unbelievable martyrdom of Maqbool Sherwani, a quiet unassuming worker of the National Conference, from a

* Appendix II

neutral American, Margaret Bourke-White, who had visited Baramulla soon after it had fallen to the raiders :-

"When the tribesmen invaded Kashmir and terrorized the country-side, Sherwani, who knew every foot-path in the Valley, began working behind the lines, keeping up the morale of the besieged villagers, urging them to resist and to stick together regardless of whether they were Hindu, Sikh or Muslim, assuring them that help from the Indian Army and Peoples' Militia was on the way. Three times by skilfully planned rumours he decoyed bands of tribesmen and got them surrounded and captured. But the fourth time he was captured himself.

"The tribesmen took Sherwani to the stoop of a little apple shop in the town square of Baramulla, and the terrified townspeople were driven into the square in front of him with butts of rifles. Knowing Sherwani's popularity with the people, his captors ordered him to make a public announcement that joining Pakistan was the best solution for Muslims. When he refused, he was lashed to the porch posts with ropes, his arms spread out in the shape of a cross, and he was told he must shout, '*Pakistan Zindabad*' ; '*Sher-i-Kashmir murdabad*.'*

"It was a curious thing that the tribesmen did next. I don't know why these savage nomads should have thought of such a thing, unless the sight of the sacred figures in St. Joseph's Chapel on the hill just above had suggested it to them. They drove nails through the palms of Sherwani's hands. On his forehead they pressed a jagged piece of tin and wrote on it : 'The punishment of a traitor is death'.

"Once more Sherwani cried out, 'Victory to Hindu-Muslim unity', and fourteen tribesmen shot bullets into his body." †

Sherwani's sacrifice, nevertheless, could not save Baramulla ; the town was occupied by his assassins in the early hours of October 27. Inrushed the blood thirsty brigands, and soon the town was another Golgotha. Were the Christians spared ? Not at all, for blood-lust makes no religious distinction.

* Sheikh Abdullah was popularly called Sher-i-Kashmir (Lion of Kashmir).

† Margaret Bourke-White ; *Halfway through Freedom*.

Father Shanks of the St. Joseph's Convent has given an eye-witness account of the orgy perpetrated in the house of God itself: "The tribesmen came shooting their way down from the hills on both sides of the town. They climbed over the hospital walls from all sides. The first group burst into a ward, firing at the patients. A twenty-year-old Indian nurse tried to protect a Muslim patient whose baby had just been born. She was shot dead first; the patient was next. Mother Superior Alderrude rushed into the ward, knelt over the Indian nurse and was at once attacked and robbed. The Assistant Mother, Torosalina, saw a tribesman point a rifle at Mother Alderrude and jumped in front of her. A bullet went through Torosalina's heart. At that moment, Colonel Dykes, who had assured us we would not be attacked, raced from his room a few yards along the terrace to get the Mother Superior out of danger, shouting at the tribesmen as he ran. But the Mother Superior fell shot, and Colonel Dykes collapsed beside her with a bullet in his stomach. Mrs. Dykes ran from her husband's room to help him. She, too, was shot dead".* Not satisfied with indiscriminate murders, the raiders desecrated the statues of Jesus Christ and Virgin Mary, and destroyed the furniture and tapestry of the chapel; and finally they carried away in triumph the young daughter of Mr. and Mr. Dykes, as the most lucious booty.

If the fate of one English girl was abduction, that of the hundreds of the Kashmiri women—Muslim, Hindu and Sikh—was unspeakably worse. More than 200 of them were taken into custody and almost all molested, while many more were carried away to be sold in the bazaars of Peshawar. Islam promises to the faithful, a Heaven full of Peris; so, in a country reputed to be the 'heaven on the Earth', the credulous raider could certainly claim his share of the Kashmiri Peris, for having risked his life for what he was told by the Mullahs to be the cause of Islam.

The menfolk in Baramulla shared their sisters' tribulations. Hundreds were forcibly converted to Islam; and more were

* Interview published in the London *Daily Express* on Nov. 11, 1947.

massacred in cold blood. The captors had established two concentration camps in the town where men and women were brought for interrogation and to extract information by making them sit naked on a water-logged cement floor for days without food. Hundreds of lorries were commandeered to carry away the looted property.

While the Pakistan-aided raiders were entering Barmulla—their triumphal shouts echoing the refrains of the *War Song of the Saracens*—India Government shed its vacillatory attitude at long last, and accepted Kashmir's accession. Nevertheless, it still could not shed its obsession with legality ; so that while conveying the decision to the Maharaja, Lord Mountbatten qualified the acceptance as 'provisional', to be ratified through a plebiscite after normalcy had been restored.* We are told that this queer 'halfway house' accession emerged from the Government of India's self-imposed principle that, in case of doubt, the will of the people must prevail over the wish of the ruler. But, inasmuch as the Maharaja's decision was backed by the most representative people's organization—the National Conference—it is not quite clear why the Government of India went out of its way to affix a 'conditional' signature to the Instrument. This extraordinary formula had, according to Campbell-Johnson, come from the brain of Lord Mountbatten ; says he : "He [Mountbatten] considered that it would be the height of folly to send troops into a neutral State, where we had no right to send them, since Pakistan could do exactly the same thing, which could only result in a clash of armed forces and in war. He therefore argued that if indeed they were determined to send in troops, the essential pre-requisite was accession, and unless it was made clear that this accession was not just an act of acquisition, this in itself might touch off a war. He therefore urged that in the reply his Government asked him to send 'on their behalf to the Maharaja accepting his accession offer he should be allowed to add that this was

* Appendix III

conditional on the will of the people being ascertained as law and order was restored". *

The frivolity of the above argument becomes apparent from the fact, with which the Government of India was painfully aware, that Pakistan was already committed to an 'act of war' by giving 'material' aid to the raiders. In any case, the Indian Cabinet was taken in by Lord Mountbatten's persuasive logic; with the result that India, of her own volition, took half of the cake when Kashmir had offered the whole.

Despite Mountbatten's unhappiness over India's decision, and the military advice of the three Chiefs of Staff—these heads of the services were British at that time—against the feasibility of sending troops to a place with which India had no proper road-link even, the Government's mind was made up; accordingly the 1st. Sikh Battalion was ordered to be flown immediately to Srinagar.

However, before the airborne Indian force could reach the destination, the raiders were in the environs of Srinagar. Making Baramulla their headquarters, they had fanned round the capital and taken up positions on its outskirts, at places like Gandarbal, Bandipura and Badgam, and were preparing for a final pincer squeeze. Administration in the town had collapsed; all high officials had left for Jammu, and the Maharaja himself had led their flight. "Without a gesture toward protecting his capital or his people," narrates Margaret Bourke-White, "the Maharaja fled from his palace at four in the morning with all his relatives and all his jewels. He deserted with a convoy of forty-eight military lorries carrying the palace carpets, the jade and marble mantel-pieces that had been ripped from the fire-places, the precious ornaments from the necks of the goddesses in the State temple, and took refuge far from the fight in his summer palace of Jammu. Most serious of all, His Highness took with him the entire State's supply of petrol". †

* Alan Campbell-Johnson; *Mission with Mountbatten*.

† Margaret Bourke-White; *Halfway Through Freedom*.

Nobody was now left to intercept the raiders, except the ill-equipped National Volunteer Corps. Truly did their leader S. M. Abdullah declare : "Those who are responsible for its [Kashmir's] defence have failed us and the responsibility therefore falls on the people of Kashmir. They are determined to fight the invaders and raiders who have come to despoil the country and to compel our people to function in accordance with their will. This is a new kind of slavery which we will resist to the utmost".* He was back in Srinagar on October 28, to defend "our heritage and homeland", and was invited by the Kashmir Prime Minister, Mehr Chand Mahajan, to form an interim Emergency Government in accordance to the Maharaja's intention already expressed to Lord Mountbatten. It was another red-letter day in the history of Kashmir, and especially in the history of the struggle against Dogra rule, when the new Government was installed. Kashmir now breathed the air of freedom, her centuries-old shackles broken.

But the retailers of the "new kind of slavery" were trying, in the meantime, to bind the emancipated people with stronger chains. Having captured all the approach-roads and encircled Srinagar, the 'slave-raiders' sent a column to Gulmarg, a beauty spot 28 miles on the west. They broke into the Anglican Church and the English-managed hotel, and carried away all cash and silver. The sardonic humour in the loot of Gulmarg was that, to the barbarians from the tribal area, all that glittered was truly gold—for even the brass electric fittings were wrenched away in the belief that they were wrought in the precious metal. In short, the town was made one vast scene of brigandage ; and, it is said, 500 Pakistani trucks were commissioned to carry the booty. The fashion for looting was lustily followed by a section of the local populace in Gulmarg and the country-side—here was a good opportunity to settle old scores between the indigent tenant and the rapacious landlord, as also between the poorer 'Kabaali' of the higher slopes and the richer Valley-dweller. After all when the lions prowl, a retinue of hyenas and jackals follows them.

* Statement issued at Delhi on October 27, 1947.

The decision to send Indian troops to Kashmir immediately led to a feverish activity ; Royal Indian Air Force Dakotas, and other chartered aeroplanes, buzzed into air with men and munitions, and the first Indian contingent landed at Srinagar aerodrome at 9. 10 A. M. on October 27. No sooner it touched the ground, a tiny unit under the command of Col. D. R. Rai started for Baramulla. They were totally ignorant of the lie of the terrain ; the enemy hide-outs were not known ; to think of supplies and reinforcements, when local people were running away, was out of question. Yet the intrepid colonel and his equally intrepid men pushed their cautious way forward ; for if one wants a kill he must go where the hunting is. Thus the dare-devils marched almost up to the outer-reaches of Baramulla, when night-fall made them halt. Srinagar had been left thirty miles behind ; to seek shelter in the neighbouring villages was foolhardy when military intelligence was lacking. The column was, therefore, compelled to fall six miles back, where it took up position behind a small mound a few hundred feet off the Srinagar-Baramulla road. The enemy, who had been stalking the unit like a man-eater, closed upon it from all sides at the dead of night ; and the contingent was completely wiped out. The Colonel thus paid the penalty of entering the 'jaws of Death' ; the Indian Army received its first wound of war.

Meanwhile, at Lahore, the Quaid-i-Azam was getting impatient to hear the tidings of Srinagar's fall. In fact his Private Secretary, Khurshid Ahmed, was already there, preparing the ground for him.* The injection of the Indian troops baulked his ambition ; he was exasperated by this thought. In a typical Hitlerite gamble, he gave peremptory telephone orders, at midnight on October 27, to his acting C-in-C General Gracey at Rawalpindi head-quarters, tentamounting to a *tour de force* with India. The British had, however, hoped for continued squabbles only between the two countries, but an open war—

* Ahmed was arrested a few days later for complicity in the raids, and had to be unceremoniously bundled out of the State.

with one British C-in-C fighting another—was much of a muchness. In a show of righteousness, therefore, General Gracey thought it fit to refer Jinnah's orders to the Supreme Commander, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, whereupon 'Auk' flew to Lahore the next day and succeeded in "persuading" Mr. Jinnah to cancel them and also prevailing upon him to invite Lord Mountbatten and Jawaharlal Nehru to Lahore for a face-to-face talk on the Kashmir crisis.*

The massacre of Col. Rai's unit showed the gravity of the military situation in the State. Even Mahatma Gandhi sensed the crisis; in his Prayer Meeting on October 28, he warned that while men could not but do or die, the result remained in the hands of God. He would not, he added, shed a tear if the little Union force was wiped out like the spartans bravely defending Thermopylie, nor would he mind Sheikh Abdullah and his Muslim, Hindu and Sikh comrades dying at their posts since such heroic defence would be a glorious example to the rest of India.

Jinnah's invitation to Mountbatten and Nehru, at Auchinleck's behest, was received enthusiastically in Delhi; but, unfortunately, just on the eve of his departure, Nehru "practically collapsed and had to be put to bed," and was not fit enough to travel. Mountbatten, thereupon, proposed that he should be allowed to go alone, larding his suggestion with the typical British

* Many British publicists have made proud reference to this incident, claiming that 'Auk' saved the two Dominions from being involved in a state of 'open' war with each other. But to suggest that the Supreme Commander's dramatic intervention was motivated by a political consideration, as distinct from a military appraisal, is to mistake gold for gilt. Says Campbell-Johnson; "In point of fact his argument was based solely on the military issue that an act of invasion would involve automatically and immediately the withdrawal of every British officer serving with the newly formed Pakistan Army". These remarks bear, though indirectly, the thesis that 'Auk' was more concerned about the British officers in the Pakistan Army fighting their brothers-in-arms in the Indian, than by the rights or wrongs of a war between the two countries. After all, the Pakistani C-in-C, General Gracey, had already permitted an 'undeclared' war, first by allowing the tribesmen to be equipped from the Pakistani arsenals, and later by the loan of regular Pakistani troops.

sanctimoniousness that he "had no feelings of personal pride when the question of saving the two countries from disaster was at stake." At first this proposal did not receive the approval of the Indian Cabinet, but in the end Mountbatten had his way. Nevertheless, just as he was packing his bags for the Lahore trip on October 30, Pakistan Government threw a bucketful of cold water over the negotiations by issuing a calculated, wild statement in which Kashmir's accession was described as having been "based on fraud and violence, and as such cannot be recognized." Embellishing the Aesop's story of the Wolf and the Lamb, the official communique stated that the State troops had first attacked the local Muslims which "provoked" the Pathans. The timing of this denunciation was Jinnah's finesse of applying diplomatic pressure—a method which made diplomacy almost impossible.

Despite this rebuff, Mountbatten, accompanied by Ismay, flew to Lahore, and had a three-and-a-half hours talk with Mr. Jinnah on November 1. Though no official resumé of the talks has been made public, yet Campbell-Johnson's version is sufficiently enlightening on the processes of Mr. Jinnah's mind. The latter started the argument by repeating that the accession was void, being based on violence and fraud, and therefore not acceptable to Pakistan. "Mountbatten agreed that the accession had indeed been brought about by violence, but the violence came from the tribes for whom Pakistan, and not India, was responsible—To this Jinnah would retort that in his opinion it was India who had committed the violence by sending in the troops, and Mountbatten would continue to stand his ground that where the tribesmen were was where the violence lay. Thus it went on until Jinnah could no longer conceal his anger at what he called Mountbatten's obtuseness.

"Mountbatten advised Jinnah of the strength of the Indian forces in Srinagar and of their likely build-up in the next few days. He told him that he considered the prospect of the tribesmen entering Srinagar in any force was now remote. This led Jinnah to make his first general proposal, which was that both

sides should withdraw at once and simultaneously. When Mountbatten asked him to explain how the tribesmen could be induced to remove themselves, his reply was, "If you do this I will call the whole thing off," which at least suggests that the public propaganda line that the tribal invasion was wholly beyond Pakistan's control will not be pursued too far in private discussion."

During these discussions, Mountbatten introduced the prospect of a plebiscite under United Nations Organization auspices—a suggestion on which, perhaps, he had not been briefed by his Cabinet; but Jinnah's experience with his Kashmiri co-religionists had not left him too sure of his ground, wherefore he rejected the proposal offhand. Nevertheless, having scored a diplomatic point against India, he advanced some fantastic counter-proposals:—a cease-fire administered by the two Governments; simultaneous withdrawal of the Indian troops and the invading tribesmen; joint administration by the two Governors-General; and a plebiscite under their joint control and supervision. These proposals meant giving equal status to Pakistan, and investing the Governors-General with an authority not warranted by their constitutional position. Of course, Lord Mountbatten could not stretch his discretion so far, and the talks were called off on an inconclusive note.

Another peace-move, initiated by S. M. Abdullah, was similarly scotched. Soon after he assumed the office as the head of the interim administration, Abdullah had made a statesmanlike gesture; in a broadcast directed to Pakistan, he had declared: "I request Mr. Jinnah to use his influence and power to withdraw the invaders. I am ready to go over to Karachi to meet him if he so desires." Could the slave-owner parley with the prospective slave?—Abdullah received a severe rebuff from the Pakistan Prime Minister a few days later; Mr. Liaquat Ali was excessively abusive in his language, calling Abdullah a "traitor", and one "who had been convicted of high treason."

One more opportunity for Indo-Pakistan talks was at hand; the Joint Defence Council meeting between the representatives

of the two countries was called for November 8, at New Delhi. On this occasion it was Pakistan Prime Minister who was taken ill, and could not accompany his country's delegation. But before the representatives were scheduled to assemble for the conference, he could not hold himself in check, and issued from his sick-bed another diatribe against India. Despite this truculence, Nehru sent a telegram to Liaqat Ali, repeating Lord Mountbatten's earlier suggestions to Jinnah :—

- (1) That the Government of Pakistan publicly undertake to withdraw the raiders ;
- (2) That the Government of India repeat their declaration to withdraw their troops as soon as the raiders have left, and law and order are restored ;
- (3) That the Governments of India and Pakistan make a joint request to the United Nations to undertake a plebiscite in Kashmir at the earliest possible date.

There was no response to this message, and the Council meeting proved sterile.

While these talks for a *rapprochement* were going on, war had reached the outskirts of Srinagar. Pakistan radio and press had opened an incessant barrage proclaiming the entry of the raiders in the capital. Sardar Vallabhai Patel and Sardar Baldev Singh made a joint tour of the front and, on their report, the Cabinet ordered the Army to give top priority to the recapture of Baramulla. The High Command took the cue ; and a strong Indian column, supported by the Spitfires of the R. I. A. F., pushed along the route taken earlier by Col. Rai's ill-fated expedition. It clashed with the raiders on November 5, near Pattan, eighteen miles from Srinagar. The persistent squeeze of the raiders on the aerodrome was also successfully repelled ; and a sharp pincer drive developing from Gulmarg side was stemmed at Badgam, only five miles from Srinagar. The capital was now safe—though it had a narrow shave. The news of the arrival of the Indian troops restored the morale of the people, and those who had evacuated from the town streamed back. The young National Guards continued their day-and-night parade.

The R. I. A. F. planes, and the civil aircraft converted into troop-carriers, continued to fly incessant sorties, jam-packed with reinforcement and supply. A fighting army, however, cannot be kept in the field with the air arm alone; yet there was no direct land route from India—the mule-track connecting Udhampur on Jammu-Sialkot road with Pathankot on the Indian border being hardly more than a name. The Indian sappers took up this challenge of logistics; they set to improve the mule-track so that it could safely take the heavy army vehicles, and made a good job of it. Soon land-borne troops and artillery were rolling through Pathankot into the Valley.

With ampler reinforcements flowing in, the drive-back of the raiders commenced. Soon their retreat became a rout; and Baramulla was regained by the Indian troops on November 8, thus ending an eleven-day reign of terror. Continuing their advance, the Indian soldiers reached the heights of Uri by November 11; there they stopped, partly to recoup, and partly to mop up the straggling groups of the retreating enemy. The tribesmen were in such a hurry to withdraw, that they gave up Tangmarg and Gulmarg without even firing a shot. With the fall of Uri two days later, fighting turned in India's favour; and Pakistan cried out in an impotent rage. Liaquat Ali outdid Goebbels again on November 25; he denounced Sheikh Abdullah as a 'Quisling', who "struts about the stage bartering the life, honour and freedom of the people for the sake of personal profit and power".

Meanwhile, the Jammu front—between Akhnoor and Mirpur—had become lively again. The enemy could quite easily bring reinforcement there, along many good roads leading into the West Punjab, and on the railway track linking Jammu with Sialkot. The flat nature of the terrain was also helpful for infiltration tactics. The isolated pockets of the State Militia were, therefore, soon encircled in Poonch, Naushehra, Rajauri, Jhangar and Mirpur. To save the besieged garrisons from being over-run, supplies were dropped from air; meanwhile relief forces made contacts with them, extricating ones which were

untenable. The relief of Poonch deserves a particular mention ; we quote the report of the Special Correspondent of the Calcutta *Amrita Bazar Patrika* : "Nearly 40 thousand refugees from different parts of Poonch Jagir, over-run by the enemy, had gathered in Poonch town. They were without rations, even without vestment on their body. And as the Poonch town itself was isolated from the rest of Jammu those days due to enemy action, the problem of feeding and evacuating them presented enormous difficulties. The Indian Army, however, took the initiative. Air supplies were dropped in Poonch town to let the refugees keep their body and soul together. In the meantime arrangements were speeded up to evacuate them by air. It was not an easy task ; but the Indian Air force accomplished it with an amazing speed and precision."

Continuing their offensive, Indian relief columns reached Naushehra garrison on November 18, and Jhangar a day later. They, however, met reverses in other places ; Rajauri fell on November 18, and Mirpur had to be abandoned on November 28. At the extreme eastern end of the front, adjoining the Indian territory, the enemy was feverishly digging trenches in Munawar tehsil, near Akhnoor ; an Indian flying-column crossed Munawar-Tawi river and captured Chamb, pushing out the entrenched raiders from that area.

In the first week of December, Liaqat Ali came to Delhi for the Joint Defence Council meeting, but, as usual, he prefaced his visit with a vituperative telegram to Nehru, once more calling Sheikh Abdullah a 'Quisling', etc. Lord Ismay submitted the following proposals, and negotiations were conducted on them :—Pakistan should use all her influence to persuade the 'Azad Kashmir' forces to cease fighting and other 'invaders' to withdraw from Kashmir territory ; India should withdraw the bulk of her forces ; the United Nations Organization should be asked to send a commission to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir and to recommend to India, Pakistan and Kashmir, before it was held, steps which should be taken to ensure that it was fair and unfettered.

The venue of the talks was shifted to Lahore on December 8, with Lord Mountbatten and Nehru representing India. During the discussions, Lord Mountbatten injected the suggestion that U. N. O. might be called upon "to fill the third-party role". Liaquat Ali welcomed the proposal, but, as the idea did not appeal to Nehru, the meeting ended without any decision been taken on the matter. Nevertheless, it cannot be gainsaid that the acceptance by Pakistan Prime Minister of the proposal, which her Governor-General had rejected outright only a month earlier, was the measure of her decline on the military front.

In two months of close-quarter fighting the Indian Army had collected sufficient material evidence about Pakistan's complicity in the invasion, and also to prove that it was her aid that was keeping the Kashmir "war" going. More significant was the capture of several Pathans hailing from the tribal area of Dir and Swat, who revealed that their head-quarter was located at Kalsian in Pakistan, whence they had been conducting the raids under the direct command of the Pakistan Army. Despite numerous requests Pakistan would neither persuade the tribesmen to withdraw, nor herself stop their further incursion; in other words, she was not keeping her international obligations. To drive the invaders away from Kashmir under such circumstances, it was necessary for India to strike and neutralize their bases or "nerve-centres" in Pakistan—a step which the latter might construe an act of war. Placed in this predicament, the Government of India allowed themselves to be persuaded by Lord Mountbatten unilaterally to submit the Kashmir dispute to the Security Council under Article 35 of the U. N. O. Charter. In furtherance of this decision, Nehru personally delivered the letter of complaint to Liaquat Ali on December 22—a necessary preliminary for such a reference to the international body.

Liaquat Ali promised to send his reply in due course; but it never came. On the other hand, the raiders tried to boost their flagging morale by designing to take Jhangar and Naushehra by storm. Machine-guns and three-inch mortars were brought

in, while probing patrols attacked Indian convoys carrying supplies to those garrisons. The attack on Jhangar came off on the morning of December 24, with nearly 3,500 raiders going the whole hog. The small beleaguered garrison could not hold out and was forced to withdraw to Naushehra. Exhilarated by the victory, the raiders mounted a double-prong attack on Naushehra—one column advancing from Jhangar, and the other from Bhimbar. Naushehra received the first burst of mortar fire on December 25; and, at one stage, it appeared that the town was lost. But heavy strafing by R. I. A. F. and a well-timed counter-attack repulsed the threat. Though Naushehra survived, yet the perfection in the raiders' tactics confirmed the Government of India's belief that not only was Pakistan abetting them, but her own highly trained troops were manning the lines opposite. Indian military pickets were also astonished to recognize their pre-Partition comrades of the Frontier Force Rifles in the opposite trenches.

With all doubts about Pakistan's direct intervention now removed, and having received no reply from Liaquat Ali to their complaint, the Government of India submitted a memorandum* to the Security Council on December 31, 1947, requesting that the Government of Pakistan should be asked :-

- “(1) To prevent Pakistan Government personnel, military and civil, from participating in or assisting the invasion of the Jammu and Kashmir State ;
- (2) To call upon other Pakistani nationals to desist from taking part in the fighting in Jammu and Kashmir State ; and
- (3) To deny the raiders, (a) access to and use of the Pakistan territory for operations against Kashmir, (b) military and other supplies, and (c) all other kinds of aid that might tend to prolong the present struggle.”

A copy of the memorandum was forwarded to the Pakistan Government the same day. They, however, did not reply to it ; but forwarded an innocently-worded request to U. N. O. on January 5, 1948, to defer consideration of the complaint

* Appendix IV

for some time. The time which Pakistan obtained from the Security Council to prepare her reply was utilised on the battlefield, to mount another assault on Naushehra. This attack was also repulsed by the Indian defenders with equal success.

The Security Council met on January 6 ; and, after a plenary debate, adjourned till January 15 to enable official delegations from India and Pakistan to arrive. During the full dress session of the Council, it became evident that the leader of Pakistan delegation, Sir Mohammad Zafrullah Khan, wanted to drown the real question of his country's aggression in a cloud of other irrelevant issues like Hyderabad, Muslim 'genocide', etc ; and that a majority of the members of the Council under the Anglo-American leadership backed him. As a result, the main point under reference—India's request that Pakistan be asked to fulfill her international obligations—was put aside, and a resolution was passed on January 20, to set up a Commission to mediate between the two countries.

The Indian delegates had arrived at Lake Success with high hopes about U. N. O's integrity ; their naiveté received a shock when they witnessed the intricate diplomatic shadow-play by the British and American delegations. So, when the January 20 resolution, which totally ignored the main complaint, was thrown in their face, they felt flabbergasted, and had to be recalled home for further briefing.

While the Security Council was hearing the long-winded Sir M. Zafrullah Khan deny his country's complicity in the hostilities, the invaders tried a *fait accompli* on the battlefield. Supported by regular troops in Pakistani uniforms and carrying machine-guns, mortars and flame-throwers, thousands of raiders advanced to Bishna, within a mile of the Pathankot-Jammu road. Simultaneously, they increased their pressure on the beleaguered Poonch. The threat to the main supply-artery, and the show of strength on Poonch sector, were major feints to distract the Indian Command's attention from the Naushehra front ; but constant patrol activity and aerial reconnaissance had disclosed the enemy's intentions. So, the Indian commander,

Brig. Mohammad Usman, decided to catch the bull by the horn. While the patrol probes into the enemy lines were intensified, he made a surprise direct assault at a time when the enemy was least expecting it. February 1 was a very cold day and the raiders lay huddled in blankets round their camp-fires. At the break of dawn, when the earth itself appeared frozen, the Indian armoured cars made a sudden dash from Naushehra, and captured Kot. This surprise move threw the raiders into confusion, and they fled leaving large quantities of war *matériel* behind. Brig. Usman's brilliant tactics completely upset the raiders plan and, though they counter-attacked on February 4 and subsequent days, Naushehra remained an unrealized dream to them. In sheer desperation, Radio Pakistan announced a prize of Rs. 50,000/- for the capture, dead or alive, of this 'hero of Naushehra.'

The good news from the Naushehra front was damped by the disheartening story from Gilgit. It may be recollected that the responsibility for the administration of the 'leased' Gilgit was restored to the Maharaja on August 1, 1947; Brig. Ghansara Singh was posted as the Governor with a garrison of State forces under his command. As soon as the invasion commenced, the tribal raiders swarmed into this area, actively aided by the chiefs of Dardistan, who saw in the disturbance an opportunity to throw off the Dogra yoke. Cut away by the snow-covered mountain-passes, the State forces could not hold out long, and had to retreat towards Srinagar. The tragic fate of this small unit is not fully known; the details of their merciless killing have been buried with those who are no more. The decimated garrison withdrew to Bunji, and brought the news that Col. Hassan Khan of the Pakistan Army had been appointed the Garrison Commander and Raja Babar Khan the Governor.

After occupying Gilgit, the raiders raced along the Indus valley towards Skardu, the door to Baltistan—and thence on to Ladakh. By early February 1948, Gurez was in their hands, and they had infiltrated into Zoji-la, the only connecting land-link between Srinagar and Ladakh. Operating under Major Ehsan

Ali and Capt. Mohammad Khan—both of the Pakistan Army—the raiders besieged Skardu on February 11, after killing the local police officer and looting the treasury. Soon Kargil was threatened and its telephone connection with Skardu was tampered. The invading force had taken meticulous care to control all inlets to Baltistan and Leh from Srinagar. The 200-mile bridle-path on the eastern fringe, connecting the Buddhist portion of the State with the Kulu valley in East Punjab, was too tenuous to carry sufficient supplies for a successful defence of Baltistan and Ladakh. The invaders' strategy was to encircle the Valley from the north-east; thereby not only to achieve what they failed to do on the Uri front, but also to starve Northern Kashmir into submission.


A remarkable feat in air-transport by the Indian aviationists baulked the raiders just when they were on the verge of success. The Indian Air Force planes, in collaboration with the Indian Army, dropped fully equipped military units from air, and even medium-sized tanks were landed in Ladakh. The appearance of the Indian troops—literally dropping from the air—took the enemy by surprise; a link with the besieged Skardu garrison was established, and the threat to Ladakh averted. In the annals of the defence of Ladakh, the name of Sonam Narbu will ever remain enshrined. A foreign-trained engineer—perhaps the first Ladakhi to have sailed the seven seas—Narbu had constructed the airstrip near Leh, the highest landing ground in the world.

Thus by March 1948, the Indian soldier had, on the southern and south-western front, not only repulsed all attacks of the invader but also wrenched the initiative from him; yet, in the north-east, the military advantage hung in the balance. In the realms of politics, much had happened since the three currents entered the Whirlpool and re-emerged six months later. From now on the Kashmir narrative will be the story of those three streams, separated once more, though—in more sense than one—still inter-linked and affecting, and being affected by, each other.

LAKE
 RIVER
 ROAD
 RAIDERS' ADVANCE
 INDIAN ARMY'S ADVANCE
 DATE OF ADVANCE

26

SCALE :- 1 in. = 5 MILES



BATTLE FOR SRINAGAR

Oct.—Nov. 1947.

"IT BROUGHT THEM"



A Pakistani bus in which the raiders entered the State.

"SHE FOUGHT THEM"



MAHMOUDA

A Mohammadan girl-fighter in the
National Volunteer Corps. (*Bachao Fauj*).

"HOUSE OF GOD"




Statue of Virgin Mary in St. Joseph's Convent, Baramulla, desecrated by the raiders.

"HOUSES OF PEOPLE"



Rajauri as left by the raiders after five months' vandalism.

FOR WHOM THE BELLS TOLL (1)



MAQBOOL SHERWANI

FOR WHOM THE BELLS TOLL (3)



BRIGADIER MOHAMMAD USMAN

FOR WHOM THE BELLS TOLL (2)



LT-COL. D. R. RAI

In the ultimate analysis, it is the failure to comprehend the triple aspect of the Kashmir problem that makes many a political Ali Baba hope for an 'open sesame'. It is only when the separate currents, and their occasional inter-spillings, have been fully explored, that the spuriousness of the magic pill which cures every ailment in one dose is realized. The five most advertized patent medicines for Kashmir are :—(1) she should accede to Pakistan ; (2) she should completely merge with the Indian Union ; (3) she should be partitioned between the two ; (4) she should become independent ; and (5) the verdict of the Kashmiris should prevail.

In the subsequent pages, we shall try to expose the myths of such single solutions. In fairness, however, to their proponents, we may give their *résumé* before we re-start our narration.

According to the exponents of the first solution, the State being preponderantly Muslim will, and ought to, join Pakistan. This consummation "is not only natural but also in accordance with the fitness of things.....[and] having been attained, appeal to religion in political and social matters will begin to lose force and weight. This will open a broad avenue towards real secularism in both countries."*

As for the second, the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India should become permanent and not remain temporary as it obtains today, and the State as a whole become a 'Part B' unit of the Indian Union. The advocates of this solution argue that if 40 million Muslims can live with security and dignity in India having full citizenship rights even after the birth of Pakistan, 3 million Kashmiri Muslims have no valid cause for fear in their State's merger with India.

As regards the third, we may quote from the statement made on October 11, 1951, by its chief proponent, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar. Giving reasons for his resignation from the Indian Cabinet, he said that India was fighting Pakistan on an unreal issue, because "the issue on which we are fighting most of the time is, who is

* *Kashmir Today*—Pamphlet No. 1, issued by the Kashmir Democratic Union.

in the right and who is in the wrong? The real issue to my mind is not who is in the right, but what is right. Taking that to be the main question, my view has always been that the right solution is to partition Kashmir. Give Hindu and Buddhist part to India and the Muslim part to Pakistan as we did in case of India". A similar view has been expressed in a joint manifesto issued on July 29, 1951, by P. N. Bazaz (President, Kashmir Democratic Union), Abdus Salam Yatu (President, Jammu and Kashmir Kisan Mazdoor Conference) and Noor Mohammad (General Secretary, Kashmir Socialist Party): "As the sub-continent has been partitioned on the basis of religion, and as neither India nor Pakistan is yet a secular democratic State, it is reasonable and just that Kashmir be divided into parts and that different regions in the State be allowed to enjoy the right of an accession to either country."

The fourth panacea has been prescribed by different parties from time to time, according to the change in the international climate. At first, the British favoured an independent, sovereign Kashmir—a fledgling, all the same, under Mother Britain's protective wing. Subsequently, when India had to be partitioned to create Pakistan, Britain disowned her brain-child, which was then adopted by the Communists. A weak non-aligned Kashmir on the fringe of the mighty Soviet system was easier for an ultimate absorption than if it were territorially a part of either India or Pakistan. Last summer, U. S. diplomacy had tempted S. M. Abdullah with a slight variant of this idea; and his strong advocacy for an autonomous Kashmir Valley and *not* the whole State, guaranteed and aided by U.N.O.—which in the present context meant U. S.—had caused an upheaval in the State. In any case, each successive 'doctor' who advocated this remedy had self-aggrandizement at his heart, and was least concerned about the patient's life.

About the last solution, paradoxically, nobody can take exception. It is cogently summed up by P. N. Bazaz: "The matter should be decided by an impartial and free plebiscite on the basis of adult franchise. With this objective in view all

the non-Kashmir armies, regular as well as irregular, belonging to India, Pakistan or any other country, should be made to leave the State. The administration of the State should be in recognized neutral hands and equal opportunities should be afforded to all the political parties to place their point of view before the country. No outsider should be allowed to enter the State during the period of plebiscite to do any political propaganda".* This admirable scheme flounders on the rock of impracticability. Where are the 'neutral hands'; by what signs can they be 'recognized'; can the impartiality of the administration be vouched unless the present personnel, down to the lowest office-peon, were changed; can a political party be allowed to preach 'jehad' or religious 'genocide'; how can the capacity of an 'outsider' to do propaganda, even if he were not allowed to enter the State, be reduced to nullity when radio-broadcast transgresses all territorial bans and when 'tourism' itself becomes a traffic in ideas? The more one thinks about this scheme, the more convinced he becomes that its proponents are the Rip Van Winkles of to-day.

* P. N. Bazaz : *Azad Kashmir*.

THE NEW BACKGROUND

We have seen how the invasion compelled Maharaja Hari Singh to seek accession with India, which was accepted—after some hesitation—on a 'temporary' basis; how he, of his own desire, proposed to set up an Interim Government under Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, which too was approved by the Indian Government. These facts were first publicly disclosed by the State Prime Minister, Mr. Mehr Chand Mahajan, on October 28, 1947; he told the pressmen: "His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir has acceded to the Dominion of India and has asked me to invite Sheikh Abdullah, leader of the National Conference, who has always shown genuine interest in the welfare of the State subjects, to form the Interim Government". Thus, on October 31, Sheikh Abdullah was sworn in as the Head of the Emergency Government.

Though the Maharaja had 'de-vested' himself of power, yet the new administrative arrangement appeared, in a strictly legal sense, to perpetuate the dynastic rule, wherefore the Muslim Conference leaders who were kowtowing to the Maharaja only a few weeks back raised the cry that the Sheikh, having accepted the post under a Hindu ruler, had become a 'traitor' and a 'quisling', while they alone were the true patriots. Though this propaganda was a source of embarrassment to the National Conference, it failed to cut much ice, for he alone can comprehend the true quality of Abdullah's popularity who has witnessed the enthusiasm with which the French received the *Maquis* after the liberation of their country.

In the first six months of its existence, the Emergency Government was engaged in building up people's resistance and organizing large-scale relief. Economic blockade and military activity had made this task formidable, but the new administration tackled it with courage. Another unhappy task, which

confronted the Emergency Government from its inception, was to eliminate the elements 'undesirable' to the security of the war-embroiled State. Press laws were, therefore, made more stringent, and all newspapers doing propaganda in favour of the invader or Pakistan, under the shield of the freedom of press, were totally banned.

We have noticed the equivocal stand taken, on the eve of the invasion, by the Kashmir Socialist Party and the Kisan Mazdoor Conference. Lacking a correct perspective of the events and disguising, under a socio-ethical pose, their failure to catch the popular eye, they continued to behave like Pakistani 'trojan horses'. We have already met their leader, Mr. P. N. Bazaz; essentially a negative character, he *opposed* the 'Quit India' movement, he *opposed* the 'Quit Kashmir' agitation, he *opposed* R. C. Kak's removal, and he *opposed* Kashmir's accession to India.* No Government, in throes of a struggle for existence, could allow freedom to a person whose stock-in-trade was *opposition*; and Mr. Bazaz had to be taken into custody by the Maharaja's Government on October 22—the day Pakistan-aided raiders entered the State.† Many other leaders of his parties were either interned or externed; for instance, Noor Mohammed, the General Secretary of the Socialist Party, was arrested in October 1947 for propagating his leader's quixotic views, and in January 1948 Abdus Salam Yatu, the President of the Kisan Mazdoor Sabha, was put behind bars for a similar reason. Before long these organizations had to be banned for sowing dissension among the masses, and for various other subversive activities.

* His last opposition was based on religion; though, paradoxically, he has himself confessed in his *Truth About Kashmir*: "By a curious and agreeable coincidence it so happened that while some Muslims favoured Kashmir's accession to India, certain liberal Hindus wanted it to join Pakistan." Mr. Bazaz cannot be more eloquent in disclosing the side on which his own sympathy lay.

† Subsequently he was released by the Abdullah Administration, and externed from the State.

Kashmir Government was immediately accused for 'liquidating' all opposition; some go to the extent of saying that an 'iron curtain' had descended on Kashmir. The carping critics, however, fail to mention—knowingly—that the State was and still is a theatre of war, and even the best-intentioned democrats have bowed to the dictates of military expediency.

The readers are acquainted with the crisis through which Kashmir had passed during the 1947-48 winter. The worst was over, certainly; but, in the meantime, the physiognomy of the State was so much transformed that hardly any resemblance with the pre-invasion features remained. For a proper evaluation of the post-invasion events, it is therefore necessary to observe the nature of this transformation.

That part of Jammu, which remained on the Indian side, was denuded of its Muslim population, and the demographical vacuum thus created was more than filled in by the Hindu and Sikh refugees, both from the 'occupied' area and from the Pakistan portion of the Punjab. *Mutatis mutandis*, the 'occupied' area, or 'Azad Kashmir', was practically emptied of its Hindus and Sikhs, and the few who could not come out were forced to embrace Islam. In a sense, therefore, an unconscious transference of the population on the basis of religion had taken place in a large part of the Jammu Province.

Curiously, the Valley retained its mixed population though many Pandits sought greater security in India, while some Muslim Conference sympathisers followed their leaders to a spiritual haven in Pakistan.

A polarization of the population affected the frontier district of Ladakh too—the Muslims increased in the western half bordering 'Azad Kashmir', and the Buddhists drifted to the eastern side adjoining the Tibetan border.

The transformation in the character and the strength of the various political parties was still more significant, varying considerably from province to province. We shall request our readers to enter into details of this metamorphosis with us.

Jammu Province :—The Dogras in general, and the Rajputs among them in particular, had been the main prop of the monarchic rule; this feudal group retained a liaison with the Maharaja through the palace clique. Kashmir Army, it has been seen earlier, was a close preserve for them; and, in addition, thousands had been absorbed, during the War, in the Indian Army. Demobilisation confronted them with the problem of re-employment and rehabilitation, which for one reason or the other, the Emergency Government tackled in no more than a perfunctory fashion. Clannishness had paid them good dividends in the past; therefore, the 'de-vestiture' of the Maharaja's powers amounted, for them at least, to a 'de-vestiture' of the special privileges they had been enjoying. To this rude shock was added the chagrin that with the State administration passing into the Valley people's hands the relation between their home province and Kashmir had turned turtle—for a hundred years, the Valley had remained a political appendage to Jammu, now it was the other way about. Therefore, the Dogras were from the beginning hostile to any administrative change, and continued to counsel the Maharaja, even after he had 'left' the State, to impede the democratization of the new government.

Communal disturbances in the Punjab had made thousands of Sikh and Hindu refugees spill over into the peaceful Kashmir. They brought with them bitter memories of their own tragedies, and—what was worse—the Rashtrya Swayam Sevaka Sangh mentality, which, in plain words, meant the establishment of a Hindu domination over the sub-continent and, as a corollary, racial hatred of the Muslim.* The poison thus injected into

* About R. S. S. S. Alan Campbell-Johnson makes a revealing note in his diary on February 4, 1948: "I have just seen an astonishing article from the R. S. S. S. paper, *The Organiser*, which proclaimed doctrines that would have warmed the heart of Rosenberg. It speaks of a neo-culture which includes indoctrination of every age from under eight to over sixty; persons of the above ages are all eligible to take part in the activities of the R. S. S. S.; their firm faith in their Hindu parentage, heritage and culture being the only

the indigenous Hindus and Sikhs—unfortunately never much inoculated against it with the National Conference ideology—became increasingly more lethal after the communal disturbances in Poonch and Mirpur in August 1947, and the partisan behaviour of the army and police sent to quell them. The sectarianism of the Jammu non-Muslims soon crystallized into the *Praja Parishad*, a Hindu organization set up anew under Pandit Prem Nath Dogra, a retired State servant. Though, on paper, the Parishad had a non-communal programme; yet, in practice, it drew inspiration from the R. S. S. and leant heavily on the All-India Hindu Mahasabha.

No brain-racking is needed to understand how the Parishad would have behaved when power was flowing away from the Hindu Maharaja to a Muslim head of the administration; and soon it had established a nexus with the disgruntled Dogra also. Therefore, with practically no Muslim left in the province, almost whole Jammu was hostile to the Emergency Administration, though that hostility remained dormant in the beginning.

Kashmir Province :—An absolute contrast was to be seen in the Valley where Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's popularity had sky-rocketed, because of the heroic manner in which his National Conference had organized the resistance of the Maharaja-abandoned people, as also for the amazing way he had kept the Valley communally calm. It may be remembered that the Pandits were the first to clamour for his release; their youths—both boys and girls—were now thronging the National Guard. The minority community's esteem for him had reached unprecedented heights.

The Muslim Conference represented the upper-class; its leader, *Mir Waiz Yusuf Shah*, had—it may be remembered—received patronage from the Maharaja and the successive prime ministers. He had, along with many henchmen, secretly

requisites of membership. 'No foreigner can make social inroads into this family. No alien can invade to subdue this spirit of corporate life. No enemy can fetter the progress of this neo-culture.' (*Mission with Mountbatten*)

'evacuated' to Pakistan before the invasion. The rank and file of the party apprehended danger to their vested interests in the rise of the National Conference, the party of the lower-middle class. They were pro-Pakistani by sentiment and pro-Maharaja by profession ; in any case, they were anti-National Conference in every aspect.

The Kashmir Socialists and the members of the Kisan Mazdoor Conference had—as observed earlier—forfeited their place in the State by their queer behaviour before and after the invasion. Thereafter, they shifted the centre of their activity to Delhi and formed yet another body, styling itself as the Kashmir Democratic Union, under the inevitable leadership of Mr. P. N. Bazaz. The main activity of the Union is to turn out a spate of pamphlets, full of invective and mis-representations—more smoke than fire. Safe from the ravages of the anti-Hindu passions of Pakistan, the members of the Union continue to bestow on the tribal incursion the high-sounding epithet of a 'people's revolt', and to explain away the looting and burning of the towns, and the rape and abduction of the women, as the inevitable consequences of a 'rebellion'.

The communists, as such, who had stood by the National Conference during the 'Quit Kashmir' agitation, were curiously inactive during the invasion. In fact, they were caught in the coils of their own dialectics. We have already drawn attention to the support which the Communist Party of India had given the Muslim League in the pre-Partition days—the 'freedom-urge' of the Muslim was its slogan. This injection of sectarian thought in the freedom struggle acted as a boomerang against the communists themselves, for the invasion broke their ranks vertically into two religious factions—Muslim and Hindu. The former led by Ghulam Mohi-ud-din Kara, whom we remember as the Nightingale of the 'Quit Kashmir' days, openly advocated accession to Pakistan ; while the latter was for a closer association with India. Nevertheless, the highest hierarchy in the International Communism, being mortally afraid of India and Pakistan remaining within the Anglo-American camp, did

not favour the incorporation of such an important strategic bastion like Kashmir into either of the two Dominions. A way out from the dilemma was found in the deceptive slogan of 'independent Kashmir'—the independence remaining as long as the Soviet Fatherland was not ready, or did not consider the time appropriate, to absorb the State into its orbit. In any case, the communists' passivity during the critical days of Kashmir lost them their many youthful supporters and 'fellow-travellers', who flocked into the National Conference.

Frontier Iliaqs :—We have mentioned earlier that the recalcitrant chieftains of Dardistan were subjugated by Col. Durand only after the establishment of the Gilgit Agency in the nineties. So long the British curb was there, Hunza, Yasin, Nagir and Punial respected the over-lordship of the Maharaja of Kashmir; but after the reversion of Gilgit to the Maharaja, they started shaking their heads. Pakistan egged them to think themselves sovereign; and when they proposed direct accession to that country, without the consent of their juridical over-lord, their wish was granted readily though it amounted, on the part of Pakistan, to a breach of the Standstill Agreement. Moreover, with the Indian Army having their hands full in Jammu and Kashmir provinces, and the mountain passes into Dardistan being snow-bound and inaccessible, this area was soon over-run. In consideration of this help, the tribal chieftains have been allowed to denounce the Kashmir over-lordship, and they now render the traditional homage in gold not to 'Azad Kashmir' but direct to Pakistan.

Hostilities in the State stirred the Buddhist of Ladakh too. Gradually they became cognizant of the fact that a peaceful existence in the religious world could not go on, unless they participated in the hurly-burly of the political world as well. Since the invaders spared neither them nor their monasteries, they became active anti-Pakistanis, and—in the absence of another focal centre—they looked to the Emergency Administration which had saved them from annihilation. This consciousness found a voice in Kashok Bakula, the Head Lama of Spituk

monastery ; since then, his pronouncements receive the importance they deserve.

The above perspective would remain incomplete without reference to the modulation in the social and economic trends in the State. Upto October 1947, when the tribal incursion transformed the social fabric, Jammu and Kashmir was an arena for the struggle between the 'have-nots'—with the lower-middle class leading the assault under the banner of the National Conference, and the 'haves'—represented by the monarchy, the upper-class and the communal groups. The immediate peril, which made no social distinction, accounted for a temporary eclipse of the 'haves'—some quitted the scene like the Maharaja and Yusuf Shah, and others sought security in an alliance with the 'have-nots'. Social or religious distinction did not save the people during the rape of Baramulla, the loot of Gulmarg, and other scenes of destruction in the countryside. Nothing brought about a greater reconciliation between the antagonistic social classes in Kashmir than the atrocities jointly suffered at the hands of those whom Pakistan called *Mujahids* (Servants of Islam). How true it was when "in the name of the people of Kashmir," S. M. Abdullah publicly announced : "I invite observers from all countries, especially Islamic countries, to come and see for themselves, what the invaders have done to destroy the homes of those very Muslims for whose deliverance they pretended they were coming in the name of Islam. These raiders abducted women. They massacred children. They looted everything and everyone. They even dishonoured the Holy Quran and converted mosques into brothels, and today every Kashmiri loaths the invading tribesmen and their arch-inspirers".

Raja Mohammad Afzal Khan, the jagirdar of Namblah, near Uri, was a victim himself ; his womenfolk and children had their ears chopped for the sake of the ear-rings, and their wrists twisted to remove the bangles. He wailed on January 16, 1948 ; "We have seen enough of Pakistan. Islam has been very inaptly represented by these 'Mujahids' who have exploited religion for their own ends. Let Mr. Jinnah or any of his lieutenants come

and see for himself the incalculable amount of havoc and devastation wrought in this fair valley of Kashmir by these 'friends of Islam'.

"I shall be ready to give them eye-witness accounts and living testimonials of loot, arson, rape and plunder, perpetrated by these so-called 'Azad Kashmir' forces,.....villages like Namblah, Balakot, Garkot, Salikot, Sahura, and Hathlanga with 100 per cent Muslim population were looted and totally burnt without discrimination..."

Mohammad Akram Khan, the Salar-i-Ala of the Muslim Conference in Poonch, was disillusioned by what he saw of the raiders. He complained: "I had imagined that my leaders of the Muslim Conference were fighting against autocracy and oppression and for an 'Azad Kashmir' based on Islamic conceptions of justice and equality. But these few months have opened my eyes to reality. Today I am ashamed of my connections with that body, whose patrons in Pakistan have brought misfortune to the freedom-loving people of my land. Having seen with my own eyes the desolation in Baramulla, I can say that these traders in Islam are only petty thieves, cut-throats and ruffians".

If the invasion acted as a social amalgamator, it had an opposite effect in the fiscal field. Blockade had already thrown the economic machinery out of the gear; and the influx of the refugees—some statisticians compute that at one time their number rose to 5 lakhs in a total population of 40 lakhs—was playing ducks and drakes with the administrative life. Coupled to them was the fact that the retreating raiders were making a clean sweep of the countryside like a locust-swarm.

The indirect effects of the invasion were equally consequential. Cottage industries collapsed; all transport linking Kashmir with the outside world came to a stand-still, with a considerable number of vehicles detained in Pakistan and all petrol denied to the State; and the disturbed conditions reduced the once flourishing 'tourist' trade to a trickle. Between them, these three trades had been the main source for the livelihood of

the lower and the middle-classes; their diminution, therefore, released an inflationary spiral. The situation was worsened with the flight of the capital, consequent upon the departure of the well-to-do and propertied section from the State. Soon, Inflation was stalking through every part of the State, and was more pronounced there than in India—while in India, the rise in the cost of living had outstripped the increase in the wages of the lower-income group, thus producing a *relative* inflation; in Jammu and Kashmir, on the other hand, the rise in living-index synchronized with the fall in income, resulting in an *absolute* inflation. And, finally, the need to introduce commodity-control opened opportunities for nepotism and bribery, arising from a bureaucratic administration with an under-developed social conscience, and without checks of a democratic opposition.

Before the invasion, the State was a medley of bellicose political parties; a mélange of mutually distrustful social classes, and a backwater where the relation between the exploiter and the exploited had taken a permanent character. The invasion carried out a total transformation in the scene. The State became monolithic, the society homogeneous and the economics chaotic. In the succeeding chapters, we shall trace how far these changes assumed permanence, and to what extent they themselves were changed by the flux of events, after the three Kashmiri 'currents' had emerged from the Whirlpool and resumed their separate courses.

FIRST CURRENT (Continued)

The Emergency Government of Jammu and Kashmir, established on October 31, 1947, was the centre of all *de facto* power; yet, having been set up on the Mysore model, with separate offices for the Prime Minister and the Administrative Head, it militated against the democratic dream of the Kashmiris. This lacuna was removed by the Maharaja on March 5, 1948, through the amalgamation of the two offices, and the reconstitution of the government with S. M. Abdullah, the president of the largest political party, as the new prime minister. The appointment of a responsible government in the State was a remarkable achievement of the national struggle.; but the goal of a true democracy was still far off, and the road to it bristled with many obstacles.

It was to remove those road-blocks that, soon after its assumption of office, the new Administration pledged :-

- (i) To have the entire territory of the State restored to the lawful Government, and to liquidate the so-called 'Azad Kashmir' Government and its forces;
- (ii) To rehabilitate all those persons of the State who had left their places of residence after raids and consequent disturbances;
- (iii) To set up an Assembly on the basis of the general adult franchise which will draw up the new Constitution for the people of the State.

S. M. Abdullah had believed that the first task could be accomplished if the problems were placed squarely before the 'world conscience'—the United Nations Organization. So he had accompanied the first Indian delegation to the Security Council meeting called to consider the Indian complaint. Addressing the sitting on February 15, 1948, he had graphically narrated the genesis of the Kashmir imbroglio, and added :

"I had thought all along that the world had got rid of the Hitlers and Goebbels, but from what has happened and what is happening in my poor country I am convinced they have only transmigrated their souls into Pakistan. We are being attacked daily. Thousands of armed men come across the Pakistan border and raze each and every village of our country to the ground. That is what is actually happening. We see it daily with our own eyes, and yet we are being told that Pakistan has nothing to do with this—that it is not at all interested." Nevertheless, not all the reasoned arguments of Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyanger, the leader of the Indian delegation, nor all the passionate appeals of Sheikh Abdullah, could move the Security Council which, after a protracted haw-hawing and much bear-baiting of India by the Anglo-American group, passed a resolution on April 21, calling for the appointment of a five-men United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP), "to proceed at once to the Indian sub-continent and there place its good offices and mediation" at the disposal of the two Governments with a view "to the restoration of peace and order, and to the holding of a plebiscite."

Shorn of all pharisaical verbiage, the Security Council resolution sought to reduce India and Pakistan to a common level. Therefore, it evoked loud and emphatic protests in India and Kashmir. The General Council of the National Conference, meeting on April 22, called upon the people "to resist this decision," and upon the government "to arm the people and to take immediate steps to mobilise the entire nation for this purpose." It appeared, at one stage, that the State authorities would 'boycott' the UNCIP, but by July when it landed on the sub-continent, India has 'persuaded' them to relent.

With the arrival of the foreign 'observers' on the scene, the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, could not keep the cat in the bag much longer, and had to make an admission to the Commission that a regular army

from his country was fighting in Kashmir. This avowal would straightway have settled the question under dispute—the non-observance of the international obligations by Pakistan; but, in the Security Council, international justice was a prisoner of international diplomacy. For that reason, both the UNCIP and the Security Council turned blind eyes towards the continued injection of the Pakistan troops in the State, especially in the northern areas. And, also for that reason, Pakistan became intransigent enough to reject the Commission's cease-fire proposals, presented both to India and to Pakistan in August 1948, but which India accepted. We shall narrate the story of the sacrifice of moral justice at the altar of political expediency in the next two chapters; suffice to mention here that, despite India's military and diplomatic aid, the Kashmir Government has not yet been able to have its lawful authority restored over more than one-third of the State territory.

The second task to which the Kashmir Government had dedicated itself—the rehabilitation of the displaced persons and the re-settlement of those who had lost their livelihood due to the altered circumstances—was quite formidable. Such afflicted persons fell broadly into three categories :—

(a) The Hindus, Sikhs and Mohammadans, who had to flee from, or were pushed out of, the 'Azad territory', due either to their religious beliefs or to their political affiliations ;

(b) The Hindus, mostly Pandits, who had left their ancestral homes due chiefly to the communal fear ;

(c) The demobilized Rajputs returning home after the progressive disbandment of the Indian armed forces, and with no land to settle upon.

Though, according to one estimate, about six lakh such unmoored persons awaited rehabilitation—every fifth person so to say—yet the Government set about the job lion-heartedly. Relief centres were opened in villages round Srinagar ; interest-free grants given for the construction of houses and for the purchase of agricultural implements, etc. ; ploughs and bullocks, and hand-looms, supplied gratis ; even the education of the displaced

was cared for, and schools, equipped with books and stationery, were opened in the refugee-camps. Plots were allotted to the uprooted peasants. Many Pandits were also recalled by the Government from the far away Kingsway Refugee Camp in New Delhi. Within one year, according to an official estimate, more than two lakhs were re-settled in the Valley and the Jammu Province.

The achievement of Abdullah Government in the field of rehabilitation was certainly commendable, to the extent that the Indian Government, with a proportionately smaller refugee population and bigger resources accomplished much less in a much longer period. Having said this, it must be admitted that the rehabilitation schemes of the State Government were not free from certain taints of disguised parochialism and sub-conscious communalism. The refugee re-settlement was carried out in such a fashion that it exhibited religious segregation—the Hindus and Sikhs in Jammu, and the Muslims in the Valley. In addition, it presented the minority community the gift of a grouse that it had been discriminated against, insofar as Jammu soil had lower fertility.

Again, while many Pandits trekked back to their ancestral homes, not a few, having a 'pull' in India due to reasons of kinship or otherwise, still prefer to remain under unfamiliar skies. It is not rare, therefore, to come across a Pandit youth, even as far away as Calcutta or Bombay, who does not talk wistfully of the *chinar* and the poplar, and complain that he is not 'wanted' in his own country despite, or because of, his superior education.

And, finally, the Rajput soldier, 'demobbed' from the army, and 'de-vested' of his traditional privileges, found himself not only ill-equipped for a change in vocation,* but also ignored by those who were once his social inferiors.

* The Political Correspondent of *The Statesman* narrated an episode on January 3, 1953; "During my tour of Jammu Province this week, a young Rajput, when asked about his education, drew himself up with pride and almost snorted back: 'We are Rajputs; we do not go to school.'"—This pathetic love' of ignorance bred a sullen discontent, when knowledge started earning premium.

While, in their defence, the Government could justify their actions on a multitude of extenuating factors, yet it could not be gainsaid that, to a certain extent, the ghost of the communal hang-over in the National Conference—the party of the Government—was still playing tricks with the corporate life of the people. In any case, sectarian mistrust and parochial jealousy, which had almost disappeared at the outset of the invasion, raised their ugly heads again.

No rehabilitation could be complete without the restoration of normal trade-channels. The three main roads, leading out of the State, terminated in Pakistan and were now 'out of bounds', practically isolating the country from the world. In order, therefore, that the 'lungs' of Kashmir could breathe again the Jammu-Pathankot bridal-path, which had been re-laid for the military convoys, was developed into a major road and opened to civilian traffic also. Moreover, after the invasion, all transport had come to a virtual standstill; of the 1,500 vehicles plying between Kashmir and the Punjab, some had gone over to Pakistan voluntarily and the rest were forcibly detained there. This abrupt suspension of communications had created a serious economic vacuum, which the new Government filled in by setting up a Transport Department, with a nucleus of 350 new trucks purchased from an India Government loan. While the few private buses had been fleecing the public with a freight rate of Rs. 5/- to Rs. 10/- per maund from Pathankot to Jammu, a distance of 65 miles only, the State-owned and State-managed service brought relief by cutting down the rate to a quarter. It is a common experience, however, that the entry of the State in the private sector of the trade is resented by the businessmen. Kashmir traders were no exception; so, in a fit of competitive rivalry, they joined the increasing band of the Administration's critics.

Pre-occupation with the immediate problems of rehabilitation had kept the Kashmir Government some distance away from one of their self-appointed task—the drawing up of a new Constitution. But the failure of the tripartite cease-fire talks

between UNCIP, India and Pakistan, in August 1948, and the continued occupation of a part of the State by the Pakistan forces, made it expedient for the Kashmiris to make a public declaration of their political objective once more, for on the successful conclusion of that mission depended the removal of the gnawing uncertainty about the future. After all, international machinations and Pakistani aggression could not be allowed to thwart, for all times, the people's climb to the higher realms of democracy.

Therefore, the National Conference called a National Convention in October 1948, at which delegates assembled from all over the State except, for obvious reasons, from the 'Azad territory'. After prolonged deliberations, the Convention passed a long resolution, which declared, *inter alia*, :—

(i) "New Kashmir undoubtedly transcends all barriers of race, religion, colour and economic inequality...Pakistan with its basis on two nation theory and its persistence on the perpetuation of religious distinctions does not and cannot accommodate a programme and an outlook which is the very negation of its basis and conception of social justice. In these circumstances, this convention, therefore, confirms the accession of the State with India. It further pledges its fullest support to the final accession of Kashmir to India, on the basis of New Kashmir...".

(2) "This Convention feels very strongly the urgency of convening a Constituent Assembly * on the basis of adult franchise for framing a democratic constitution for the State..."

Then a ray of sunshine appeared unexpectedly in the otherwise dismal sky. It was announced that India and Pakistan had, after all, agreed to terminate hostilities; and a 'cease fire' became effective from January 1, 1949. Kashmir Government,

* Jawaharlal Nehru had such a Constituent Assembly, or a similar body, in mind when he suggested in his *Aide Memoire* to the U. N. Commission that "in view of the difficulties of holding plebiscite in the present conditions of Kashmir, other methods of ascertaining the wish of the people should be explored."—However, we shall revert to it in a subsequent chapter.

on their part, acted to the spirit of good cheer by ordering release of the detained leaders of the Muslim Conference, and even repatriating those who desired to go to Pakistan—Chaudhari Ghulam Abbas was one of them. Was the Kashmiri 'current' at last entering the Ocean of Peace?

More good tidings came from New Delhi; the Union Constituent Assembly, then hammering out the Indian Constitution into shape, adopted a motion on May 27, 1949, which enabled the Maharaja, on the advice of his prime minister, to send four nominees to the Assembly. It may be remembered that since Kak's refusal to join the pre-Partition Constituent Assembly, Kashmir was not represented on that body. But when the Maharaja established a 'temporary' nexus with India, and thereby surrendered his sovereignty in three subjects—Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communication—Kashmir had earned the right to a say when matters pertaining to those subjects were on the anvil. On May 27, India admitted that right; and, with much felicitations from everybody, S. M. Abdullah, Maulana Mohammad Saeed Masoodi, Mirza Mohammad Afzal Beg and Pandit Moti Ram Baigre took their seats in the Union Constituent Assembly. Nevertheless, as the nature of Kashmir's relationship with India was, in a technical sense, restricted, it was logical that the provisions of the Indian Constitution, other than those which pertained to the three acceded subjects, could not be made applicable to the State. Appreciation of this fact was, therefore, translated into Article 370 of the Constitution,* which allowed the Kashmiris maximum autonomy to build their country according to their tradition and genius. This essentially contractual tie, fundamentally different from the 'merged' Part B State relationship, is not without historical precedents—the most recent being the status of the constituent units of the Soviet Union under the 1925 Treaty of Amalgamation. But being peculiar to India, it has been a target of attacks from various quarters—but of that later.

* Appendix V

The exultation over a satisfactory adjustment of the Indo-Kashmiri relations was soon cut short, when it transpired that the 'cease-fire' was a manoeuvre for anything but honourable motives, and that both India and Kashmir lost a great tactical advantage through that agreement. The story of the fighting in Kashmir, during 1948 till the cease-fire, will be narrated in the next chapter, and we plead with our readers to curb their impatience for it a little while longer; suffice it to know that by the end of the year India was advancing on all fronts in Kashmir, particularly on the Northern, and the liberation of the 'occupied areas' was taking place remarkably fast. A little longer, and the *raison d'être* for the UNCIP itself should have been over. So India was first lured by the 'cease-fire' red-herring, and thereafter entangled into a protracted Truce negotiation in which the Commission gave *suo motu* conflicting assurances to the two countries. Thus Pakistan got a breather to re-organize her northern forces, and time to establish a direct administration in Gilgit, Skardu and portions of Baltistan.

Thereafter for a year, till the autumn of 1950, the people of Kashmir witnessed, so far as the negotiations at the United Nations level were concerned, a cinematic performance of the type of 'Alice in Wonderland', in which at moments they detected their own resemblance to Alice. The cavalcade successively showed the ignominious retreat of the Kashmir Commission, the diplomatic acrobatics of General McNaughton and the conjuring tricks of Sir Owen Dixon, till the latter made a final bow on September 27, 1950, with the remark that it was "perhaps best that the initiative [of negotiations] should now pass back to the parties [India and Pakistan]."

The failure of the Dixon mission made the Kashmiris conscious that two precious years had been lost since the decision was taken to convoke a constituent assembly; parenthetically, it added urgency to the task of 'framing a democratic constitution for the State.' So the General Council of the All-Jammu & Kashmir National Conference re-assembled on October 27, 1950, and passed a long resolution tracing the

history of the Kashmir problem from its genesis till Dixon's failure due, as it said, "to the continued concessions given to Pakistan by placing a premium on her intransigence". The resolution asserted that "time has come when the initiative must be regained by the people to put an end to this indeterminate state of drift and indecision", and concluded with an operative clause recommending "to take immediate steps for convening a Constituent Assembly based upon adult suffrage and embracing all sections of the people and all the constituents of the State for the purpose of determining the future shape and affiliations of the State of Jammu and Kashmir."

The demand for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly was like putting a cat among the pigeons. Sir M. Zafrullah Khan sent a frantic request to the Security Council to restrain India from taking the contemplated step ; and the British and the U. S. delegations submitted a joint resolution, on February 21, 1951, disapproving "the convening of a Constituent Assembly as recommended by the General Council of the All-Jammu and Kashmir National Conference and any action that assembly might attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliation of the entire State or any part thereof....." The vehemence of the Pakistani and Anglo-American denunciations was the measure of their nervousness about the answer the proposed Constituent Assembly was likely to give on the accession issue.

India, on the other hand, took a thoroughly dignified and legal stand. She reiterated her pledge that ultimately the wish of the Security Council would determine Kashmir's future ; but she could not, in consonance to her democratic professions, interfere in the domestic affairs of the State or advise its people to refrain from calling the assembly, if that was their desire. The National Conference, however, was more outspoken ; in the annual session held at Srinagar in June, it expressed its "painful amazement that attempts are being made through the Security Council in direct violation of the provisions of the U. N. Charter, which clearly recognize the right of self-determination of a people as

sovereign and sacrosanct, to thwart our desire to convene the Constituent Assembly," and warned that "it is too late in the day to question the propriety of exercising this right now."

While the rehabilitation of the refugees and the re-organization of the transport service were the immediate ameliorative steps, and the drafting of the State Constitution formed a distant goal, Kashmir Government did not leave the intermediate period to any vacuous inactivity, but filled it with bold attempts at educational and economic reforms. And the achievements in those fields have been so remarkable that we shall take liberty with the forbearance of our readers in dwelling upon them at some length.

Geography had given the imprint of the Punjab on the Education in Kashmir; the State's educational institutions were also affiliated to the University at Lahore. With this link snapped by the Pakistani blockade and the subsequent invasion, Kashmir, so to say, fell into a well of ignorance. The task to rehabilitate knowledge was so formidable that Sheikh Abdullah himself took over the portfolio of Education. Under his inspiring zeal a University was established within a month of the invasion, and the first examinations under it were held in May 1948. As all the text-books were set by the Lahore University and the Department of Education, Punjab, and were also printed and supplied from there, Kashmiri students were left without any educational media. A Text-book Advisory Board, under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, was set up in 1948; it rendered a good account of itself by bringing out nearly 300,000 books every year.

The 'New Kashmir' goal, adopted by the National Conference in August 1945, had envisaged that instruction would be given through the *mother tongue* in all primary schools. We have already mentioned that the State was multi-lingual, and many spoken tongues and dialects, including Kashmiri, had no script of their own. Therefore, the principle of teaching the child through the medium of his or her mother tongue, though theoretically sound and desirable, was found to be

wellnigh impracticable. The Government, nevertheless, did not admit defeat, and set up two committees, viz., a Language Committee and a Script Committee, to overcome the practical difficulties. The first committee was so successful in its task that Kashmiri was introduced as the vehicle of instruction in the first and second primary classes from April 1949, in the third class the next year, and by 1952 it had been adopted for all subjects throughout the Kashmiri-speaking areas.

The Script Committee adopted the Persian-Arabic script, introducing the necessary letter-symbols peculiar to Kashmiri phonetics; it thus raised the Kashmiri dialect into a language. Though this reform was well-intentioned, yet it evoked a hostile reaction, of the nature of the 1940-41 'script controversy.' The Pandit child used to imbibe the ancient Sanskrit lore from his parents, and in the process learnt the rudimentary Sarda script (Sanskrit style); to make the alien Persian-Arabic script compulsory for him appeared to betray not only cultural domination, but also religious intolerance. Those who have heard the cry of 'linguistic imperialism' in India and Pakistan can well understand the bitter controversy that has raised its head in Kashmir over the national task to evolve a common language and a common script.

Another excellent educational reform, the removal of denominationalism in schools and colleges, has caused even bigger storms. The principle that in a secular State Hindu or Muslim educational institutions, as such, had no place could not be denied; but when in practice it appeared that a reform benefited one religious group alone, the other group was morally justified to condemn the move as communal. And the reformers in Kashmir, in their hurry to establish secularism in education, opened themselves to this serious charge. For instance, during the Dogra rule, many non-government Hindu schools and colleges were run with the governmental grants-in-aid; withdrawal of the monetary help to them by the Abdullah Government has not only threatened the existence of many, but also forced others to close their doors. Some Kashmiri

Pandit educationists had established a Women's Welfare Trust in 1926, which had done pioneering work in the girls' education in the State, and had been running a number of schools upto the the matriculation standard. Though some of those were denominational in the sense that there were separate schools for the Muslim and the Hindu girls, yet others had mixed rolls too. When the Government stopped the grants to those schools, the Trustees were assured that the State would take them over ; however, nothing of that sort was done, so that most of the schools have now closed down, thus putting the clock of the female education back. Similar sad stories are told by the empty classrooms of many old Hindu institutions ; and the grouse takes on an ugly shape when the disendowed point out that almost all Muslim institutions have been taken over by the Education Department and are now running under the governmental labels.

It will therefore be seen that while the Government could rightfully claim that "a new spirit has been infused into the frame-work of education in Kashmir", they had, at the same time, conjured the bogey of communalism. Under such circumstances, future alone can tell whether the far-reaching educational reforms will achieve a greater cultural unity in the State, or will be a cause of its disruption. With these misgivings, we invite our reader to the economic field, where even more momentous achievements have been claimed by the Kashmir Government.

In his very first broadcast from the Jammu station of Radio Kashmir, after assuming the office as the first responsible prime minister of the State, S. M. Abdullah had admitted : "We realize that political freedom is not enough ; that to make it durable and an effective means of peace and progress in a country, it must be found on the socio-economic freedom.....The government will, as conditions permit, implement the Economic Programme of 'New Kashmir' which has inspired hope into the hearts of the millions of our countrymen." But Kashmir being mainly agricultural, no betterment plan could be worth the

candle unless it elevated the peasants from their existent status of medieval serfdom. This realization had been translated into the basic principles of the Agricultural Plan of 'New Kashmir' as :-

1. Abolition of landlordism—"So long as a privileged class exists, itself doing nothing, but living on the labours of others, there can be no equitable distribution of the products of the soil" ;
2. Land to the tiller—"To satisfy the land hunger of the landless peasant, and ensure the efficient working of the land";
3. Co-operative association—"To increase the material prosperity of the individual tiller...[because] it eliminates waste, increases productivity, economises labour, roots out destructive competition, and pools local resources".

The first step towards the ultimate abolition of landlordism was taken in April 1948, when the Government resumed all *Jagirs* and *Muafis*, and other fixed cash grants called *Mukarraris*—assignments, running into thousands, made by the Dogra rulers, of which some were tenable during the pleasure of the assignor, and others held in perpetuity. *Jagirdari* system was unalloyed Feudalism, in which the only interest of the Jagirdar was to extort as much as possible from his tenant living in a state of serfdom. The removal of this parasitic anachronism not only added Rs. 7 lakhs to the State exchequer, but also relieved the peasants of the crushing burden of more than Rs. 3 lakhs which they had to pay in kind. It is pertinent to remark that the administrations of most of the Part B units in India are still struggling with this piece of land reform ; while the Kashmir Government had carried it out within a month of its establishment, and that too during the full fury of the invasion.

In October 1948, the Kashmir Government brought out an Amendment to the Tenancy Act, designed to shield the tenant from the predatory absentee-landlord. The more salient provisions of this legislation were :—

1. The tenant was protected by conferment of permanent tenancy rights, where the land was in his continuous possession since April 1948, and he was its actual tiller.
2. The share of the landlord was reduced from more than $\frac{1}{2}$ of the produce to $\frac{1}{4}$ th. in case of irrigated land, and $\frac{1}{3}$ rd. of dry land, in respect of tenancies exceeding 100 *Kanals* (equivalent to $12\frac{1}{2}$ acres).
3. The tenant was safe-guarded against unlawful ejectments ; further, all tenants, wrongfully ejected after April 1947, were summarily re-instated ; and all pending ejectment proceedings were stayed for one year.

The far-reaching effects of this legislation can be visualized when it is remembered that more than one half of the total population of the State profitted by it. Incidentally it may be mentioned that this enactment could finally do away with the invidious revenue system under which all land in the Kashmir province was the personal property of the Ruler, and the tenants there were merely occupants-at-will.

Kashmiri tiller, like his other Asian brothers, was a virtual serf, with his life and property pledged to the landlord and the money-lender. Of him H. N. Brailsford was moved to write in 1946 : "The peasants are sunk in unimaginable poverty. Their mud huts contain hardly a trace of visible property, save a few pots and water jars. When I put my questions in a typical village, every household was in debt, and the usual rate of interest was 48 per cent." In order to ameliorate these conditions, the Government enacted a legislation in 1949, known as the Jammu and Kashmir Distressed Debtors' Relief Act, which authorized setting up of Debt Conciliation Boards and for a speedy and equitable settlement of debts upto the monetary limit of Rs. 5,000, and thus circumventing the long and expensive machinery of the ordinary revenue courts. The Act required every debtor or creditor to apply to the Board for the settlement of the debt in which he might be interested. A revolutionary feature of the enactment was

that it made obligatory for the creditor also to seek settlement on pain of the debt being extinguished unless he applied within four months from the date of the establishment of the Board in the area in which the debtor resided or held any land. The Government claims that in two years of the setting up of the debt conciliation machinery, 41,295 cases for settlement were registered, out of which 34,640 involving a debt of 96.6 lakhs of rupees were disposed of scaling down total debt to 23 lakhs of rupees, i. e. a reduction of 77 per cent.

The biggest step forward in the agrarian reform was the Government decision, taken on July 13, 1950 *, to abolish all intermediary rent-receivers between the State and the primary producer, and to transfer the ownership of the land to the actual tiller. This historic resolve—the central pillar supporting the edifice of the Agricultural Plan of 'New Kashmir'—was translated into an executive action with the passage of the Big Landed Estates Abolition Act on October 17, 1950. According to this Act, the landlord's right of ownership over land in excess of 18 *Kanals* (equivalent to $22\frac{3}{4}$ acres) extinguished and ceased to vest in him, and was transferred to the tillers of such land to the extent of their actual possession, provided that no tiller, with the land so transferred and that which he already had, possessed more than 160 *Kanals* (equivalent to 20 acres). To implement this revolution in the landlord-tenant relationship, special revenue officials were appointed, and were charged with the task of transference or mutation of the excess land to the tenants concerned. The Act left the question of evaluation and payment of compensation to the contemplated Constituent Assembly; but, till the people's forum brought to bear its decision on the matter, a subsistence allowance was sanctioned to the 'expropriated' landlord in proportion to the land revenue he paid, with the maximum of Rs. 3,000 annually.

* 13th. July is commemorated every year in the State as the Martyrs' Day, in memory of those who fell in the Police action in 1933.

Perhaps there is no country in the world, not even Soviet Russia or Communist China, where such a radical transformation in the production-relation has been effected through a single piece of legislation. The sponsors of the Act call it the peasants' Magna Charta and take a justifiable pride in it. The State Governments both in India and Pakistan, still grappling with this problem, envy Kashmir; and foreign observers, excepting those who see Red everywhere, shower bouquets on the administrators.

The next task tackled by the Kashmir Government was the development of 'co-operative association' among the rural masses. Moreover, the fact that the State would remain cut away from India, the source of most of the necessities of life, for six months in a year, almost forced the Administration to take their procurement and distribution in its own hands. A Co-operative organization was set up, with over three hundred multi-purpose societies spread among the rural population, and charged with the task of distributing all essential commodities, providing financial assistance and marketing the produce. An attempt was made to bring the artisan also in the co-operative movement, and an experiment was undertaken in joint farming on co-operative basis.

The revolution in the productive economic relativity raised a marvellous vision of equity and social justice; but in practice, it sowed a nettle bristling with many new problems. For instance, the agrarian reformers mistakenly believed that with the liquidation of landlordism and limitation of individual holdings all feudal and semi-feudal land tenure systems would, *ipso facto*, be abolished. Yet some vestigial feudal characteristics continue to exist in every production relationship wherein some owners of land, however decimated, are not the actual cultivators, and especially when the limit of the size of holdings has no direct relevance to the economics of agriculture. In the absence of a simultaneous drive for the consolidation or pooling of the uneconomic holdings, whether by compulsion or through intense co-operative activity, the highly commendable reforms of the

Kashmir Government took on the gruesome shape of parcelling the land into uneconomic units, thereby setting at naught the very purpose in view, viz., the increase in the yield of the land.

Another fact which escaped the notice of the land reformers, when they fixed a ceiling on the size of holdings, was that the soil was not equally productive everywhere. As its consequence, the revenue officials appointed for the redistribution work were placed in an unenviable position, i. e., to discriminate between one landless claimant and another—a climate most suitable for display of graft and purchase of favours. Again, the creation of tenancies of superior and inferior lands sowed dragon-seeds of class jealousy amongst those who were at least socially equal in their landless state.

Nevertheless, the worst feature of the limitation of holdings was that it appeared to discriminate against the Jammu people, due to the lower fertility in that province. Moreover, while the additional acreage for an orchard allowed with each holding might render a tenancy in the Valley economically viable, it was not even a sop to the people of Jammu where neither the climate nor the soil favoured fruit-growing. Provincial jealousy was thus touched on the raw, for which the Kashmir Government had to rue consequences afterwards.

In Ladakh, as we already know, the biggest landlords were the *Gompas*—the large endowments of land created for the monks or *lamas*. Accordingly, the tillers in that district were the victims of the same social evils—parasitism and poverty—as prevailed in the medieval feudal systems anywhere. Another aggravating factor was the practice of the *Gompa*-managers to loan back the grain at very exorbitant rates to the very same cultivators who produced it. Thus the same institution combined the functions of the landlord and the money lender. And when it happened to be the custodian of lay souls as well, there was nothing which belonged to the tiller—in this world or the next. Therefore, the Big Landed Estates Abolition Act ought to have been a boon to the Ladakhi cultivators; but, as the proposal

cut at the roots of lamaship, it was assailed with a vehemence expected from the religious fanatics only. In consequence, the application of the Act had to be held in abeyance except in case of the about 24 lay landlords near Leh, till the Government had re-examined the implication of the law in relation to the social and religious customs of the Buddhists.

We have noticed the State's entry in the private sector of the trade through the Transport Department. It made further inroads with the establishment of the procurement and distribution controls over civil supplies, rendered essential by the continued war-emergency, and because for about six winter months the State remained isolated from the main source of supply—India. Controls, *per se*, are irksome ; but where the social conscience is undeveloped, the opportunities for condemnatory practices are many. Kashmir did not remain immune to those evils ; thus allowing the gift of a grouse to the trader that while his avocation had been taken away, the consumer was being mulcted by the official. There was a heavy run on the banks after the raids, and the banking structure was in a state of collapse. The Government, therefore, promulgated an ordinance preventing weekly withdrawals exceeding Rs. 5,000/-, lowering the limit subsequently to Rs. 1000/-. The remedy proved worse than the disease, for nothing hastens the flight of the capital than any artificial checks on its fluidity. The cumulative result of the State's interference with the normal capitalistic channels of trade was to drive the businessmen into the ranks of the opposition.

No hornet likes its nest to be disturbed. But Kashmir Government's zeal for an over-night social transformation had shaken many. The irritated hornets—the vested interests—found a ready-made rallying centre in the Praja Parishad, which soon became the forum for the eclipsed Jagirdar and the dispossessed landlord, the discontented professional and the threatened merchant. And what with the fall in productivity in the wake of the agrarian reforms, and the apparent parochial and partisan bias in the others, the stings to chafe the Government were

many. To the ill-luck of the Kashmiri people, the party in power remained complacent at those criticisms, due either to a lack of political acumen in the leaders, or to their overweening opinion of themselves, or to both.

The anti-government forces became particularly active during the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. Though the displacement of the population had made the task of preparation of the electoral rolls stupendous, and the continued 'occupation' of a part of the State had complicated the job of the delimitation of the constituencies, yet the Government fulfilled its pledge during the spring of 1951. The conduct of the election, however, was marred by a bitter controversy with the Praja Parishad, starting with recriminations for an alleged gerrymandering of the constituencies and ending in the boycott of the elections as a whole by that party. With the main opposition thus withdrawing, the few 'independents' still in the field could not give much of a fight; wherefore the National Conference nominees were returned with sweeping majority from everyone of the seventy-five constituencies. Though the election demonstrated the popular support for the Conference, yet who can deny the truth in the observation of P. N. Bazaz's party: "There is no democratic legislature in any part of the world where all seats have been captured by a single party in free and fresh elections. Manifestly, this is contrary to human nature." And, forsooth, eye-witness reports are not lacking which suggest that the cent percent returns were partly accountable to the official pressure and like malpractices, though nobody denies that the Conference would have captured, all the same, sufficient number of seats to command a majority in the Assembly.

Cursed at its conception by Pakistan and the Anglo-American bloc, and born with the above organic weakness, the Constituent Assembly commenced its first session on November 5, 1951, under the chairmanship of Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq. S. M. Abdullah's inaugural address was a masterpiece of oratory, studded with many historic policy-statements; in solemn tone he had declared: "Today is our day of destiny. A day which

comes only once in the life of a nation...After centuries, we have reached the harbour of our freedom, which for the first time in history, will enable the people of Jammu and Kashmir to shape the future organ of Government. No person and no power stand between them and the fulfilment of this—their historic task."

Whilst the Assembly thus set out on its 'historic task', viz ;

- (1) To pass a final verdict on the landowners' claim for compensation ;
- (2) To decide the future of the Royal Dynasty ;
- (3) To devise a Constitution for the future governance of the country ; and

(4) To take a final decision on the accession issue ; the opposition forces, with the R. S. S. S.-infected Parishad as their prime mover, gathered momentum, and soon picked up on the run other stray particles of antagonism—economic or parochial. The political atmosphere was thus surcharged with explosive potentialities, the result of a polarization into an irremovable executive and an irresponsible opposition. The inevitable cloud-burst came—but of that a little later.

The first problem tackled by the constitution-making body was the reference made to it by the Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, in regard to the determination of the form and scale of compensation to be given to the expropriated landlords, as also to discover the ways and means to obtain the amount agreed upon. India had based her Constitution on the principle : 'No confiscation without compensation' ; and since then all the reformist activities of the different State governments have been overwhelmed by the hugeness of the amounts of compensation. But as Kashmir was autonomous of the Indian Constitution except in the three acceded subjects, and as her own slender resources themselves drew upon the Indian monetary aid, the sub-committee, set up by the Constituent Assembly to report on the issue, recommended quite obviously against payment of any compensation. The Assembly accepted the recommendation on March 26, 1952, and from that day the expropriated landlord was deprived of his small interim rental

annuity. Loud were the protests against this legislation ; it was even dubbed 'communistic'. The chorus was joined in by the vested interests in India ; for the success of 'no compensation' policy in Kashmir, they apprehended, might persuade the Indian land and social reformers to try their hands at imitation. So, when the Praja Parishad took up cudgels on behalf of the landlords, it received encouragement—overt and covert—from the All-India Hindu Mahasabha, the Akali Dal, and other communal bodies who, themselves, drew sustenance and support from the Indian landlords and the monied classes.

The second decision of the Assembly, the adoption of the Conference party-flag as the State-flag, which was one of the 'national demands' formulated at the very first session of the Conference, raised another uproar, to which responsive echoes came from outside too. It is, nevertheless, intriguing how the pattern of criticism altered in accordance to the plane it was directed from (sooner or later, every problem in Kashmir reveals its triple aspect—local, sub-continental and international). We shall, therefore, dwell on each in some detail.

(a) Partly due to a political naiveté and partly from a legitimate pride for leading the freedom-struggle, the constitution-makers had become oblivious to the fact that, by an unconscious association of ideas, the identity of the party-flag with the State-flag was likely to establish in the minds of the ignorant masses another identity, that of the party with the State. It is not suggested that the top leaders themselves wanted to advance such a fantastic claim ; but the field-worker, occupying a lower rung in the party hierarchy, could not be expected to rise to such an acme of self-abnegation as not to cash in on the reverence arising from the incapacity of the people to distinguish the nuances between the party-flag, the symbol of the State authority, and the authority itself. In any case, this move of the Constituent Assembly opened the Kashmiri leaders to the charge of totalitarian practices.

(b) While technically the sovereignty of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly, except so far it was surrendered through

the Instrument of Accession, was unchallenged, wherefore the Union-flag could not, *ipso facto*, become the State-flag; yet the very idea that the constitution-makers were exerting their right to a separate flag raised a suspicion that they dreamt of a separate existence too. While the Kashmir Government apologists pleaded that the unfurling of the Union-flag side by side the State-flag on all ceremonial occasions was a sufficient alibi, or that the masses were not yet psychologically conditioned to identify themselves with India *in toto*, yet the leaders' own emphasis on autonomy, repeated in season and out, made many a well-wisher of the State look askance at the separate flag move. These apprehensions strengthened the bond between the Praja Parishad—the opposition in Kashmir, and the Hindu Mahasabha and other communal opposition in India. This combination tested its vitality when the Jammu students were instigated to demonstrate against the hoisting of the new Kashmir flag on their institution on February 8, 1952, and a local controversy was transformed into an all-India issue. In the agitation following the arrest of the student leaders, the Parishad president, P. N. Dogra, and his lieutenants were taken into custody, and were released two months later on the 'advice' of the Union States' ministry.

(c) The third objection stemmed from the resemblance of the new flag with the U. S. S. R. flag, both having the same deep-red background, and the plough of the one carrying the same symbolism as the hammer and sickle of the other. The syllogistic reasoning that because the Kashmir flag and the Soviet flag were alike the political ideologies of the two countries were also similar, came easily to the megalomaniac perversion which started with seeing communism in every red splash and has now reached the excesses of McCarthyism.

The next question to which the Kashmir Constituent Assembly addressed itself was the future of the Ruling Dynasty. While the 'New Kashmir,' propounded in 1944, had made a provision for a constitutional Maharaja, much water had flown down the Jhelum since then, and the Ruling Princes as such had disappeared

from the Indian stage. According to the Indian precedent, therefore, the Kashmir Constituent Assembly should have recommended Maharaja Hari Singh as the Rajpramukh of Jammu and Kashmir. It must, nevertheless, be admitted that the institution of Rajpramukhs retained, in however dormant a form, some vestiges of the dynastic rule. On the other hand, the 'Quit Kashmir' agitation had sealed the fate of the Dogra dynasty; moreover, the constitution-framers had also to take notice of the radio-barrage from Pakistan and 'Azad Kashmir' constantly harping upon the alleged servility of S. M. Abdullah to the Hindu master. It was, therefore, obvious that the institution of Rajpramukhs did not suit the Kashmiri genius, and that the constitutional Head of the State would have to be democratically elected through a popular vote. And, in due course, the Assembly decided to abolish the monarchy, and to substitute it with a constitutional Headship on the elective system, having a five year tenure of office.*

The proposal to substitute the hereditary rulership by an elected Head was assailed by parties within the State and outside. Praja Parishad was again in the forefront of the opposition; it went about frightening the credulous Hindu that, with the removal of the protective shield of the Hindu ruler, life under a 'Muslim' administration would mean a loss of faith—in other words, it inverted the Muslim League slogan, 'Islam in danger' into 'Hinduism in danger.' And to the newly formed Bhartiya Jana Sangh † and the older communal organi-

* As in the Land Reforms, so in this matter too, Kashmir had set an example to India; and Dr. K. N. Katju, the Union Minister for Home Affairs and States, was reported to have expressed, on March 31 this year, his grudging appreciation of the idea that the Rajpramukhs should be 'persuaded' to retire.

† R. S. S. S. was lying low since Mahatmaji's assassination. In March '51, in a closed door meeting it decided to convert itself into a new party, named the Bhartiya Jana Sangh. Though non-communal by label, it is an irredentist Hindu body with the annulment of Partition its aim, and 'non-appeasement' of Pakistan its battle-cry. Its draft manifesto reads: "The whole of Bharat Varsha from Himalayas to Kanya Kumari is and has been through the ages a living organic whole, geographically, culturally and historically. Its recent

zations like the Hindu Mahasabha, the fall of the Hindu Head in the Muslim majority State was almost like an attack on their *credo*, so much so that they chided the Government of India for retaining of the Nizam of Hyderabad while the Maharaja of Kashmir had been asked to quit. To persons of their way of thinking, the different historical development of the freedom-movements in the two States was of no consequence; nor could they take the act of ending the hereditary rule in Kashmir in their stride to make it a premise to demand the end of the hereditary rule in Hyderabad as well. Again, it had been suggested that the acceptance of the unilateral decision of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly amounted to a breach of the Indian Constitution which, by defining the Government of Kashmir as "the person for the time being recognized by the President as the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir etc.", seemed to have given a constitutional guarantee for the continuation of the rulership in the State. But if one delved deeper into the pages of the Indian Constitution, he would discover that the aforesaid definition appeared as an *explanation* interpolated to Section 1 (b) of Article 370, which has been interpreted by the constitutional lawyers as only a recognition of the factum of Maharaja's existence at the time of the promulgation of the Constitution, and not the acceptance of the hereditary principle *per se*. Whatever be the pros and cons of the issue, it generated a pro-Royalist sentiment in the State.

The election of Maharaja Hari Singh as the first Head

partition, instead of solving any problem, communal or otherwise, has given rise to many new ones. Culturally, economically, politically, as well as internationally, United India is essential.....

"So long as Pakistan remains a separate entity, the party will stand for a strict policy of reciprocity and not one of appeasement as hitherto pursued."

Its membership multiplied manifold when the dynamic Dr. S. P. Mookerjee was elected the leader of the Sangha. Though a microscopic number of Muslims have joined it, yet the overwhelming Hindu composition is sufficient to brand it as a communal organization. Moreover, it has exposed its nature by going into a working alliance with other Hindu bodies like the Mahasabha and Ram Rajya Parishad.—A man is known by the company he keeps!

would have been an ideal gesture; but he had 'black-balled' himself, first by his unkingly behaviour during the tribal raids and afterwards by his incapacity to adjust himself to the changed climate.* The next choice was the young Yuvraj, about whom S. M. Abdullah had spoken many good words in his inaugural address to the Constituent Assembly. "During our association with Yuvraj Karan Singh these last few years", he had stated, "I and my colleagues in the Government have been impressed by his intelligence, his broad outlook and his keen desire to serve the country. These qualities of the Yuvraj single him out as a fit choice for the honour of being chosen the first Head of the State...a fitting symbol of the transition to a democratic system in which the ruler of yesterday becomes the first servant of the people, functioning under their authority, and on their behalf."† The Yuvraj wanted some time to decide his line of action. Meanwhile Praja Parishad made no secret of its disapproval of the offer; and the Yuvraj's father gave no guidance, being interested, as revealed by Nehru in the Indian Parliament on November 15, 1952, "more in the kind of privy purse he is likely to get than in any other matter."

Abdullah Government was now four years in the saddle. During this time it had committed itself, as we have seen, to many major acts of policy, which, considered individually and out of context, could provide any astute counsel with sufficient legalistic material to build up a prosecution case. In a similar way, one could equally pick holes into not a few of its day-to-day administrative activities; for instance:—

(a) In 1948, certain changes were made in the territorial set-up of the State with a view to bring the outlying inhabitants

* Shortly after the appointment of S. M. Abdullah as the Prime Minister, Maharaja Hari Singh 'left' the State and put himself into a voluntary exile. His son, Yuvraj Karan Singh, was thereupon appointed to act as a regent during his father's absence.

† The Yuvraj gave a demonstration of his statesmanship, when within a few days of his election as the Head of the State he flew to Ladakh, which none of his ancestors had ever cared to visit.

within convenient distances to the administrative head-quarters. One such re-adjustment was the creation of a new district of Doda, by carving out some estates from Udhampur Tehsil in Jammu Province and amalgamating them with the Tehsils of Ramban and Bhadrawah in Kashmir province. The incised part being a Muslim enclave within the Hindu-majority province, its linking with the Muslim-dominated Valley was interpreted as an appeasement to Muslim communalism.

(b) Soon after S. M. Abdullah took over power, he suppressed the floating 'red-light' quarter, which had flourished on the banks of the Jhelum in Srinagar much to the humiliation of the local people. Similar action was not taken in Jammu, and brothels not only continued to exist there, but also multiplied in number and size with clientele now coming in from the 'out-of-bounds' Srinagar. Soon people were saying that the Kashmiri girls were being saved from the traffic in vice at the expense of their Jammu sisters.

(c) Severe floods devastated a large part of Srinagar in September, 1950 ; and a 'flood-tax' had to be imposed on the residents to raise a rehabilitation fund. As the Hindus were in general richer, the incidence of the tax fell heavier on them ; and when its collection was extended beyond the emergency period, doubts cropped up that the Government were out to fleece a section of the people on communal considerations alone.

The cumulative result of all the above acts of omission and commission was to give sufficient gun-powder to the opponents of the Government. Yet it was the tragedy of Kashmir that S. M. Abdullah seemed to take no account of the mounting list of charges. Not only that but, after his return from the Paris session of the United Nations Assembly in February 1952, he appeared to be out for making more enemies just when circumspection should have been the highest virtue. His repeated scathing reference about the Dogra rule—with the bitterness, with which the word 'Dogra' was pronounced, clear to his hearers if not to him—touched many wounds on the raw. But the worst was when he started making a lavish use of his oratorical brush to

tar India in general with the Mahasabha colour, climaxing his quixotism with a speech at Ranbirsinghpura on April 10, 1952, where he was reported to have said : "It is all very well for the people of India to think that communalism in India has been finally eliminated but no one can deny that the communal spirit still exists in India. Many Kashmiris fear what will happen to them and their positions if, for instance, something happens to Pandit Nehru".* And, as if his innuendo was not sufficiently flabbergasting to his Indian supporters, he repeated a week later at Hazrat Bal near Srinagar : "To assume that communalism prevails in Pakistan and is completely non-existent in India is a dangerous idea."

It will be shown in the next chapter that, despite the eclipse of the communal candidates in the 1951-52 General Elections, India was, at that time, threatened with Hindu revivalism, wherefore the Sheikh's outbursts could be explained as a measure of the Muslim fears. Yet it could not be gainsaid that, in the climate then prevailing, nothing could have been more harmful to the Indo-Kashmir amity than the Ranbirsinghpura bluster. As it were, the Indian public opinion was already getting restive over the 'accession' issue, the most fundamental—in the Indian eyes at least—of the four main questions posed to the Kashmir Constituent Assembly ; and though in his inaugural address S. M. Abdullah had given calculated reasons in support of the view that the State's interest lay in a closer association with India, yet the Constituent Assembly's hesitancy in this matter let the impression gain ground that procrastination was purposive, and irresolution but a cloak to hide the autonomy design.

This suspicion received weight through a calculated 'news-leak' of the secret deliberations of the Basic Principles sub-committee of the Constituent Assembly. A member of the committee and a Minister in the government, Mirza Afzal Beg

* These remarks, which even Nehru characterized as "not very pleasing," were denied a few days later ; but there are many persons and press-correspondents who vouch for their authenticity which the *dénouement* of the last summer confirms,

'disclosed' on March 24, 1952: "The Jammu & Kashmir State will be...an autonomous unit within the Indian Union. The Unit will be a republic like other republics. According to our plans the State will have its own President, a separate National Assembly and a judicial set-up. We also have a proposal for a regional administration of the State". The anti-National Conference elements were immediately up in arms, for they readily detected the existence of a causal linkage between Abdullah's anti-Indian speeches and the 'autonomous republic' idea.

Another bitter fruit of the 'disclosure' was the growth of the feeling that Sheikh Abdullah was hoping to keep Kashmir 'independent' with the support of the communists—a thesis based on the premise that the Indian Communist Party not only had once proposed the re-division of India into a number of autonomous republics based on the Soviet model, but had been, since the invasion of Kashmir, pronouncedly in favour of a sovereign, autonomous entity. With the Anglo-Americans already ill-disposed towards the Kashmir Government, the suggestion, that the administration was being 'white-anted' by Russian counsels—the land reforms had already been dubbed communistic—was enough to raise anti-communist howls. And with the establishment of the People's Republic of China in the immediate neighbourhood, the thought that Abdullah was likely to decoy the Kashmiri maiden into the communist harem was a good enough excuse, for his local foes to create a split within the National Conference, for the Indian communalist-capitalists to attack Nehru, and for the Anglo-Americans to support Pakistan. In a curious way, Kashmir established a bond of like-thinking between the Praja Parishad, the communalists and the propertied class, and the international *haut finance*. Yet, it was a trick of fate, that it came about at a time when the Communists had taken a somersault, and had given up their 'independent Kashmir' pose. They were now openly advocating Nehru's policy of limited accession, with an occasional word of praise for the National Conference as well.

This change in the communist front, however, was, not due to any love for India or Kashmir, and we shall see in a subsequent chapter that it came about on considerations of international politics only.*

At this time much publicity was given to a memorandum presented to Sheikh Abdullah by Kashok Bakula, the Ladakhi representative in the Constituent Assembly. It demanded "a statutory provision in the future Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir under which the province of Ladakh would become a federating unit of Kashmir as long as the accession of the State to India endures"; such autonomous unit was to have a separate Legislative Assembly and an Executive Council for "internal administration", so that it "would largely bear the same relations to Jammu and Kashmir State, as the latter does to India." Bakula, however, pointed out that if his plan was not "feasible just now", a statutory advisory committee elected on a joint electorate could be set up for his district, and no measure affecting the economic, political and religious life of the province should be passed by the State Constituent Assembly or Jammu and Kashmir Government without the approval of the committee which should be treated as the "voice of Ladakh."

Bakula's demand for autonomy in Ladakh was in line with Mirza Afzal Beg's hint about 'regional administrations', and might have arisen from a lurking fear of losing the *Gompa* income through the application of the Big Landed Estates Abolition Act. But at the back of his mind was the growing conviction that the Security Council was trying to make a present of Kashmir to

* In this connection a little remembered incident deserves mention. Some Kazak families, driven out from Turkistan in 1950 by communist persecution, sought asylum in Kashmir. It was considered an unfriendly act by China, and her Cultural Mission, touring India in the winter of 1951-52, refused an invitation from the State. Some people allege that the refusal was only a 'protest' against the mis-behaviour towards some Tibetan nationals by the State officials posted along the Ladakh-Tibet border. Whatever be the truth, the lesson is plain—Kashmir Government was still far from becoming a 'fellow-traveller.'

Pakistan, in which eventuality the autonomous Ladakh would prefer to continue its connection with India, but, if that failed due to compulsions of geography, to link itself with the contiguous and culturally akin Tibet.* The regional autonomy idea appeared very attractive to the Jammu people also, partly as a salve to their provincial prejudice smarting from the abolition of the Dogra monarchy, and partly as a means to extricate themselves if the plebiscite resulted in Pakistan's favour.

We have spoken of the growing hiatus between Kashmir and India. By the summer of 1952 the crisis was at hand; or, in the words of "Vedette": "Two main questions appear to agitate the Indian mind at present. In the first place it has been asked whether Sheikh Abdullah intends the State to be a part of India or that it merely associates with the Union in a loose relationship, with the balance of advantage entirely in favour of Jammu and Kashmir. Secondly, people here wish to know whether, if the latter presumption is correct, it is worth while for the Union to continue her relationship with the State."† To avoid a further drift between the two countries whose comradeship had been cemented earlier with rivers of blood, the Government of

* Bakula made himself clear in a letter to Nehru in January this year in which he asserted that Ladakh had of its own free will chosen to remain with Kashmir so long Kashmir remained with India, but if the plebiscite in the State resulted in favour of Pakistan, "we shall automatically merge with India without any intervening link...If, however, it becomes, for any reason, impossible for India to directly annex our land then as a last course open to us we shall seek political union with Tibet."

Justice William O. Douglas, of the Supreme Court of U. S. A., trekking in Ladakh in August 1951, "heard prominent people say that if the Kashmir dispute were resolved in Pakistan's favour Ladakh would forsake India and rejoin Tibet." (*Beyond the High Himalayas*)

In this connection it should also be remembered that Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu had conquered Ladakh by sword, much before Kashmir was 'sold' to him by the Treaty of Amritsar. So, with the fulfilment of Sheikh Abdullah's demand for the abrogation of the Amritsar Treaty, Ladakh could claim a juridical separation from Kashmir.

† "Vedette"—the Political commentator of *The Statesman*, in an article in his paper, dated July 13, 1952.

India invited S. M. Abdullah and his colleagues to New Delhi to 'talk things over.' The negotiations, aiming to clarify the ambiguity about the quantum of the State's accession to India, culminated in an agreement, known as Delhi Agreement, whose salient terms, as disclosed by Jawaharlal Nehru in the Indian Parliament on July 24, were :—

1. Citizenship : Although citizenship will be common, the State Legislature will have the power to define and regulate the rights and privileges of State subjects, especially with regard to the acquisition of immovable property, appointment etc ; with special provision for the return of migrants from Pakistan.

2. Fundamental Rights : While they will apply to the State subjects, steps will be taken to safeguard the land reforms in the State.

3. Supreme Court : Besides being the final court of appeal, it will have original jurisdiction in regard to the fundamental rights applying to the State.

4. Head of the State : A person "recommended" by the State legislature—the method of selection being left to the State—"shall hold office" during the "pleasure" of the President, for a term of five years.

5. State Flag : While the Indian National Flag will be supreme, the State flag will continue as a symbol "for historical and sentimental reasons."

5. President's prerogative : The President to have power to grant reprieves or commute death sentences.

7. Emergency Powers : The power to declare a state of emergency under Article 352 of the Constitution will be extended to Jammu and Kashmir, but, when such a declaration is necessitated by internal disturbances, the State's concurrence will be obtained beforehand.

8. Financial Integration : Further consideration of details of the financial arrangements between the Union and the State will be undertaken.

Certain provisions of the above agreement came under fire of strong criticism, which, though partly mis-construed and

ignorant, created an impression that India had given away more than she received. We shall tarry awhile and see how far that view was justified.

Firstly, it was asserted (i) that by agreeing to a qualifying clause in the citizenship formula, India had unwittingly created two classes of citizens—privileged or Kashmiri, and non-privileged or the Rest; and (ii) that the special provision for the returning migrants discriminated in favour of the displaced Muslims. Now, if our readers would recollect the State-subjects' Definition agitation of the twenties, they would appreciate that the qualified citizenship clause did nothing more than accept the validity of a historical incident in the lives of Kashmiris, and gave recognition to the State Government's genuine fear that without such provision Kashmir would be over-run by people whose sole qualification might be the possession of too much money. As for (ii), Sheikh Abdullah gave a personal assurance in the Constituent Assembly, on August 11, that "the provision will operate only when the conditions are normal, and such conditions naturally presume that the resettlement of the dislocated population, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, cannot be one-sided or unilateral."

Again, it was questioned, why the Fundamental Rights, guaranteed in the Indian Constitution, could not be conferred *in toto* on the residents of Jammu and Kashmir. The grouse was honest, but betrayed a lack of appreciation of the legal dictum that when the fundamental right of an individual came in conflict with the interests of the larger mass, it should be the former that needed modification and exception. Obviously, the fundamental right for 'compensation' came in the way of the land legislation of the State Government and had to be discarded.

The objection to a separate State-flag has already received our attention. Postponement of the financial integration—when India was sinking crores of rupees to keep the State economy buoyed up—was another sore point; the State Customs alone formed a substantial barrier to the free flow of Indo-Kashmir

trade. Then there was Sheikh Abdullah's initial hesitation to join the talks at Delhi—he could be persuaded to come only on a second invitation—which, it was pointed out, indicated his growing alienation from India.

All said and done, the Indo-Kashmir agreement represented a step forward ; and, as such, was hailed by the Congress and the 'leftist' parties in India, including the Communist. Though the Kashmir Constituent Assembly put its seal on it on August 21, 1952, much of the rancour against the Abdullah Government, which developed later, was avoidable, had action been taken for the immediate implementation of all its provisions. That was not done ; and the Basic Principles, Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship sub-committees of the Constituent Assembly were allowed to go into a prolonged hibernation, which put Kashmir Government's honesty of intention under a cloud.

Some wit has remarked that the Abdullah Government had been its Opposition's most successful recruiting agent. It was truly so, because nothing could have more effectively helped the Praja Parishad than the Constituent Assembly's apparent dilatoriness over the accession issue. Not surprising therefore that the Parishad membership in Jammu Province swelled to 16,000 within a short span of time, in contrast to a bare 6,000 of the National Conference. Hiding its ulterior purpose—the undoing of the *economic* policies of the State—the Parishad had formulated the following high-faluting *political* demands :-

- (a) Complete accession of the State to India ;
- (b) Use of the Union-flag to the exclusion of the State-flag ;
- (c) Self-determination for the people of Jammu, if there is no complete accession ;
- (d) Dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and re-election of a more representative body.

A party Convention, held in Jammu on August 9-10, 1952, repeated these demands, and added that the Indo-Kashmir agreement "had not changed the situation to such an extent as to warrant any alteration in the stand taken by the Praja Parishad." Moral aid to the Parishad came from the Jana Sangh

and the Hindu Mahasabha, in the shape of the personal presence of Dr. S. P. Mookerjee (President of the first body) and V. G. Deshpande (General Secretary of the second) at the Convention.

Not only had the Parishad's cry a tonal similarity with the Muslim League's demand for Partition inasmuch as 'self-determination for Jammu' was a step towards the ultimate dismemberment of the State, but its intransigence was equally inordinate. When Yuvraj Karan Singh agreed to be elected the Head of the State, Pandit Prem Nath Dogra, the president of the Parishad, gave a warning—a *la* Direct Action threat of the Muslim League—that his election would touch off a political agitation of grave import. Communalism had thus turned full circle in Kashmir, Hindu leadership using the same idiom which was deprecated when it came, in the past, from Muslim lips.

Yuvraj Karan Singh was unanimously elected the Head of the State—or Sadar-i-Riasat, as the Constituent Assembly called it—on November 14. And, in consonance with the Delhi Agreement, his name was "recommended" by the Constituent Assembly, and a formal "recognition" given it by the Union President, Dr. Rajendra Prasad. Then, three days later, amidst scenes of unprecedented enthusiasm, the new Head took the oath of office, describing himself "the first servant of the people" and his office "the focus of unity," and made an appeal for an "abiding unity based on the interests of the common man in all parts of the State." The installation of the Sadar-i-Riasat marked the formal end of hereditary rule in Jammu & Kashmir State.

Immediately after the election of the Head, the Government circulated a draft Five Year Plan for the State amounting to Rs. 13 crores, and made a call for public co-operation. Amongst many major development projects, the most important was to be the new Bannihal tunnel, $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles long and located at an altitude of 7,200 ft., providing an all weather-link between Kashmir Valley and the world outside. Though no final decision had yet been taken on the financial integration of the State,

India agreed to make available a greater portion of the capital requirement for the Plan, viz. Rs. 7 crores.

But, just when Kashmir appeared to be entering the Vale of Happiness, tragedy overtook her—the same old curse that has caused her to shed incessant blood, and sweat and tears, since time immemorial. For neither Mr.* Karan Singh's appeal for unity, nor the Government's call for co-operation, could lure the Parishad back from its separatist aims. And, as threatened, the agitation against the State administration commenced on November 24, on the occasion of the Sadar-i-Riasat's first official visit to Jammu, with the Parishad workers shouting slogans and waving 'black flags. Despite an open defiance of Sec. 50 of the Kashmir Defence Rules, banning public gathering in the town of Jammu, the Government did not allow itself to be provoked into retaliation. But the arrest of Prem Nath Dogra, two days later, became the signal for an organized violence, in which the State officials and property were special targets. Curiously, the Parishad volunteers, at some places, helped the dispossessed landlords to take forcible re-possession of their fields. The breach of law and order received encomiums from the leaders of the Jana Sangh and the Hindu Mahasabha; and Dr. S. P. Mookerjee's eloquence and campaigning qualities whipped up some support for the Parishad.

The annual session of the Indian National Congress assembled at Hyderabad in January this year. Though the president-elect, Jawaharlal Nehru, characterized the Parishad movement as "a disruptive agitation which can only do good to the enemies of the State and India,"† a considerable section of the party, that had always been lukewarm to their leader's non-sectarian views, was very critical of Sheikh Abdullah. The Kashmir Prime Minister put up a spirited defence of his policy; he said that the strange question—"How long can Sheikh Abdullah stay with us?"—raised every now and then, was a challenge

* With the end of monarchy, the 'Yuvraj' became an ordinary 'Mister'.

† Pakistan press was calling the Parishad agitators, the "heroes of Jammu."

that put him to painful test every time, and trenchantly added, "If you feel I cannot come along with you for ever, then there is no use carrying me with you." Finally, Nehru's persuasive logic silenced the doubting Thomases in the Congress; though, during the discussions in the sub-committees and the open session, sufficient had been said to indicate that the country, as a whole, was 'touchy' on the news coming from Kashmir. On the other hand, the vehemence of Sheikh Abdullah's language showed that the chasm between him and India was widening.

Left to themselves, the Jammu agitators would have shouted themselves out of breath; but artificial respiration from India not only kept them alive but also kicking. Twenty years ago, Muslim communalism from 'outside' had interfered in the local politics; now Hindu communalism was paying it a belated compliment by imitation. Soon Kashmir was a Macbethian cauldron in which many indogenous and non-indigenous ingredients got mixed up, and in whose fumes each interested party detected whatever smell it liked.

While the Indian men-in-the-street were confused in their minds, our readers should have observed, we are sure, that the basic issues were two—political and economic—though often one shaded into the other. The first aspect was reflected in the equation of the cry for the State's total integration with the Mahasabha slogan: one State, one President, one Flag. The fact that the agitation received only a cold welcome from the Pandits, themselves not less dissatisfied than their Jammu brethren with many State policies; that for the Buddhist leader it had "no meaning"; and that it was eschewed by every Indian political party, except those organizationally sectarian, should lead one to the belief that it was only a stick to beat the Indian Government with.* The communalists knew that on account

* The president of the Hindu Mahasabha, Mr. N. C. Chatterjee, had declared that his organization aimed to 'revise' the Indian Constitution to bring it into conformity with the 'Hindu Ideals'. The Jana Sangh was not so frank about amending the Constitution, but, as already mentioned, its objective was the establishment of a 'Bharatiya culture' over whole of the 'undivided' India.

of the international complications likely to arise from the total "merger" of the State, and Abdullah's growing recalcitrance on this issue, it would be indelicate for Nehru to go beyond the Delhi Agreement, and therefore they tried to earn cheap laurels through his helplessness.

The second aspect of the agitation manifested itself as an economic fever, bred by many partisan and unsatisfactory policies of the Kashmir Government: the malaise developed first in the Jammu province obviously because the virus was more irritant there. The curious phenomenon, noticable to any impartial observer of the Valley, that a greater number of Kashmiris talked nostalgically of the Maharaja's rule when rice was available so much cheaper, was a proof positive that things were fundamentally wrong in Kashmir's economy. *

The picture of the agitation was ably summed up by the Political Correspondent of *The Statesman*, after his tour of Jammu last winter, when he reported: "Communal leadership at home, supported by bitter opponents of the Congress in the Union, has worked diligently and with considerable success on inflammable material, including economic distress, religious prejudices and loss of traditional privilege. To each group the leaders' appeal has been different, but the total reaction has been a multiplication of discontent." Much of the fever was controllable if a political remedy had been administered in time for the political disease, and an economic soporific applied to allay the economic pain. This was not appreciated in the early stages of the agitation; and on the failure of the Kashmir Government to stem it single-handed, a token contingent of the Union police force had to be sent to deal with the situation. Subsequently, when it was discovered that Punjab (I) had become the base of the agitation, † and many Parishad leaders who had 'absconded'

* The Valley used to be self-sufficient in *shali* (rice), the staple diet of the people, and its pre-invasion price was Rs. 15/- per *khirwar* (equivalent 2 maunds 6 seers). Early this year, it had shot up to Rs. 50/- and more for the same quantity.

† The premier of Punjab (I), Mr. Bhimsen Sachar, made a disclosure that

from the State went freely about their business in the Union territory, the Government of India declared a state of emergency in Punjab (I) on February 6, 1953, and some Jana Sangh and Mahasabha leaders were arrested.

Jammu was, in truth, the nostrils of the respiratory system of the Valley ; and it was getting 'congested' just when the aggressive tone of the Pakistani leaders and press required Kashmir's perfect health. Therefore, under judicious promptings from India, Sheikh Abdullah's government had gradually come to the realization that a purely negative approach was insufficient ; and that some positive economic measures had become the need of the hour. On February 2, the Kashmir Government announced the appointment of a four-men official committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice Janki Nath Wazir, Chief Justice of the High Court, to report on the working of (a) land reforms in the Kandi (dry) areas of the State, and (b) the system of price and other controls prevalent in the State ; as well as on (c) the progress of the rehabilitation of the displaced persons, and (d) the ways and means to be adopted for the rehabilitation of the ex-servicemen of the State. Our readers have already come across these foci of discontent, and will appreciate that Sheikh Abdullah's gesture, though belated, was important all the same.

The Wazir Committee was handicapped by its restricted terms of reference ; moreover, its official composition was not likely to command full confidence of the people. Nevertheless, its appointment, coupled with Nehru's repeated reference that the Parishad movement was "basically communal" and only helped the "enemies" of India and Kashmir, cut much earth from beneath the agitators' feet. Mr. Karan Singh characterized the agitation as "aggressive, misguided and misleading, which, while professedly seeking to strengthen the kinship and association of the State with the Indian Union, in actual practice constitutes a grave

"the sympathisers of the movement in Punjab (I) had been holding secret meetings, enrolling volunteers, collecting funds, making speeches and poisoning the minds of simple people." Unfortunately, the provincial and the Central governments remained quiescent for an inexplicably long time.

danger to this relationship."* Prof. Hiren Mukherjee, the leader of the Communist bloc in the Indian Parliament, said that the groups supporting the agitation were "wolves in sheep's clothing", who would "lose their occupation" if communalism disappeared. And the Praja Socialist Party of Acharya Kripalani and Jai Prakash Narain expressed its perturbation at "the communal antecedents and associations of the Parishad and the covert and overt opposition of the agitation to the secular character of the State." †

A full dress debate in the Indian Parliament, on March 25, revealed that support for the Jammu move came solely from the parties essentially communal in composition or conception, and from that ill-informed mass which was not happy with the picture of India emerging after Partition, nor could 'brain-wash' itself of the pre-Partition communal memories. And above them towered the personality of Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee, who was out to enlist into service every anti-government sentiment in order to re-establish his party in the eyes of the Indian electorate.

After having taken the movement under his wings, Dr. Mookerjee had first advocated—on January 2, at a Press Conference in Delhi—complete merger of Jammu and Ladakh with India, and a 'special status' for the Valley. ‡ Could there have been, one may justifiably ask, any better proposal for an ultimate dismemberment of the State—in other words, for the 'pakistanization' of that territory? Nevertheless, the

* In his inaugural address to the Kashmir Constituent Assembly meeting in Jammu, on March 25, 1953.

† In a resolution passed by the National Executive Committee of the party on March 26, 1953.

‡ When a press correspondent asked Dr. Mookerjee if the Parishad movement would not lead to the partition of the State, he made the astonishing retort that as Kashmir had already been "partitioned" between India and Pakistan, what harm would ensue if Jammu and Ladakh were fully integrated with India, and the Valley remained "partially acceded" as at present. Apart from the fact that India had not accepted the Pakistan-imposed 'partition', it is a wonder how Dr. Mookerjee could suggest one evil on the basis of another.

Hyderabad session of the Indian National Congress, and Nehru's plain-speaking, brought to light the dangerous implications of the Jammu agitation and Dr. Mookerjee's suggestion. Thereafter, the Jana Sangh leader veered his sail and made an 'offer' in the Indian Parliament, on February 17, to 'withdraw' the movement, provided the Kashmir Government undertook to release the arrested Parishad leaders and to call them to a round-table conference.* A brilliant tactician, he had anticipated that personal prestige would stand in the way of Sheikh Abdullah responding to a 'conditional' peace. In fact, the Sheikh became more adamant.

Dr. Mookerjee's subsequent moves were well-planned. March 5 was observed as 'Jammu and Kashmir Day'; and a call was issued for a 'symbolic' all-India *satyagraha* movement. The lack of enthusiasm for this 'observance' was proved from the fact that not even a *hartal* was called in his own home town, Calcutta, when Dr. Mookerjee, along with some of his lieutenants, was taken into preventive custody in New Delhi the next day. Within a week a habeas corpus petition was moved in the Supreme Court on his behalf, and he was a free man again. His party and the Mahasabha now worked frantically to whip up an all-India campaign; volunteers from Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Bharat and West Bengal came to Delhi to court arrest, and *jathas* tried to make unauthorized entries into the State.

We have noticed Sheikh Abdullah's increasing truculence in his references to India. Following a renewed spurt of the Jana Sangh activity, he displayed a righteous indignation, and would often burst out that the Kashmiris' alone could determine whether to accede to India or to remain independent—thereby not only disowning his own past advocacy in favour of India but also implying that the existing link could unilaterally be

* Will our readers recollect a similar 'conditional offer' by Mr. Jinnah, to call off the Kashmir invasion? Moreover, Dr. Mookerjee's remarks bespoke of the non-indegenous character of the Parishad movement.

revoked. Such calculatedly indiscrete utterances gave Dr. Mookerjee sufficient fuel to keep his camp-fire burning.

The Sadar-i-Riasat tried to pour oil over the troubled waters. To allay Jammu's fears, his inaugural address to the Budget session of the Constituent Assembly contained a policy statement, that in the new constitution of the State the conception of domination by one group or area over another would be totally absent and each group and area would voluntarily "contribute towards a social and political fusion of the entire State pursuing a common objective". Sheikh Abdullah also confirmed on April 18 that it had been "decided to give autonomy to different cultural units in the State so that no one unit may be in fear of domination by another." But Dr. Mookerjee did not resile even then; and the desultory cycle of unlawful activities and consequent arrests went on.

By the summer, international situation appeared to take a somersault. Both the Communist and the Anglo-American blocs let up on the 'hot war' in Korea; but intensified the 'cold war'—particularly in Asia—not only by means of diplomatic pressures on the countries in the Middle East and South-east Asia, but also by direct intervention in their domestic affairs. Happenings on the international plane had repercussions on the sub-continent. A sudden and mysterious change in the Pakistan Government followed, and the new Prime Minister, Mr. Mohammad Ali, spoke with a gusto on the possibility of settling all disputes with India—including Kashmir—by direct peaceful negotiations. Certain prominent members of the Mahasabha and the Akali Dal realized the far-reaching import of the Nehru-Mohammad Ali talks scheduled for July, and advised the Parishad supporters to strengthen Nehru's hands by suspending the agitation. Meanwhile, the Wazir Committee had submitted its report to the Kashmir Government on June 1, recommending many far-reaching measures for ameliorating the economic conditions in the State. Even otherwise, the *satyagraha* was getting atrophied.

If ever there was an occasion for display of high statesmanship it was now ; but Dr. S. P. Mookerjee chose otherwise. He was convinced that to keep the agitation alive he must 'go it alone', that to whip up mass sympathy something more was needed than whirlwind lecturing tours. He offered himself for re-arrest in Delhi, but the gaol authorities would not oblige him. Then, as a desperate attempt to earn the martyr's mantle, he rushed to Kashmir against the express advice of the State Prime Minister ; and was taken into custody on May 11, because according to the State Government warrant he "has acted, is acting, and is about to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety and peace." Dr. Mookerjee's second arrest, like the first, failed to create much stir in the country.

Nevertheless, by now, the quantitative effect of the Parishad pressure was making itself felt as a qualitative change in the outlook of Sheikh Abdullah and some of his close associates. Many a time we have referred to the parochial and sectarian inheritance of the National Conference ; the evil raised its head again as a reaction to the Parishad challenge, and its first casualty was the Sheikh himself. The dominance of his communal left-hand, Mirza Afzal Beg, increased, at the expense of the non-communal right, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad. Correspondingly, the tone and the text of his anti-Indian speeches hardened ; he would now balance Pakistan with India, and even raise doubts about Kashmir's accession to India—ideas which he had repeatedly repudiated in the past.

We have also mentioned the increase in the meddlesomeness of the Big Powers ; while fuller details of these 'intrigues' will be given in the subsequent chapters, suffice it to mention here that the United States went into full steam over, and into, Kashmir in the first half of the current year. The contact which the Anglo-American diplomats had made with Sheikh Abdullah at the February 1952 Paris session of U.N.O. General Assembly was renewed by the numerous Kashmir visits of some V.I.P.'s (very important persons) from the United States and the American Embassy in New Delhi, and was

supplemented with the secretive activities of certain U.N. 'observers' and 'foreign agents' in the Valley.* The Sheikh was apparently persuaded to forget feuds inherited from the old guard of the Muslim League—Jinnah, Liaquat Ali and Nazim-uddin, and to expect more accommodation from Mohammad Ali. But if the Sheikh were not ready for an immediate make up, there was the U.N, *alias* American economic and military guarantee available for a Kashmir de-linked for India.

The above two thought-currents gradually gave a twist to Sheikh Abdullah's mental picture of the State's future. The Dixon proposal of a regional plebiscite for the Valley,† and Dr. Mookerjee's suggestion of a 'limited accession' of that province after Jammu's total merger with India, made the Sheikh tend towards the idea of a fairly independent Kashmir, attached only loosely to another State which would look to its defences and guarantee finance but leave it alone to enjoy its own conception of privileges and freedom. If India was not prepared to be such a protecting god-mother, there was Pakistan eager to fulfill that role; and failing her even, the mighty Anglo-American combination would be only too glad to step in.

The first rumblings of the approaching crisis were heard on May 18 at the meeting of the Working Committee of the National Conference when Sheikh Abdullah not only opposed the implementation of the Delhi Agreement clause on the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, but was reported to have said: "We have not to think of little things like the Supreme Court. We have in fact to evolve a new relationship with India"; and he made no secret that the 'new relationship' would be on the basis of an independent Valley. The deliberations in the Working Committee went on for the next seven days and, curiously, the

* It may be noted that Kashmir having acceded to India in Foreign Affairs, any direct political goings-on between the U.S. representatives and the officials of Kashmir Government over the head of the Indian Government was a breach of the diplomatic etiquette by both parties.

† Fuller details of this proposal will be given in the chapter entitled: Third Current (Contd.)

day to day secret discussions were made public knowledge in Srinagar. In the end, the Sheikh lost—4 for and 11 against, while the voting among the special invitees being 1 for and 4 against. In his inaugural address to the Kashmir Constituent Assembly on November 5, 1951, the Sheikh had spoken strongly against "making ourselves an Eastern Switzerland", but that vision successively evoked by the British, then by the Communists, and now by the Americans, was Circean in its enchantment. Like Maharaja Hari Singh and R. C. Kak in the past, it now claimed Sheikh Abdullah and some of his colleagues as its victims.

Hearing about the disunity in the National Conference, Nehru arrived in Srinagar; but Sheikh Abdullah was deliberately disrespectful—no Indian flag, not even the Indian National Anthem, greeted Nehru at the aerodrome. Yet, with extreme patience, he appraised the members of the Working Committee that an independent Valley—80 miles long, 20 miles broad and with a population of only $1\frac{1}{2}$ million—was bound to become an arena for international intrigue. He was also candid about other dangerous consequences of the proposal—on his own position, and the communal balance which continued to be delicate in India, and ended by counselling patient thinking. He, however, failed to move the Sheikh who, it is reported, was not even on speaking terms with him in the last stage of his Srinagar visit. Maulana Azad arrived a few days later, but was equally unsuccessful. The breach was complete, at least from the Sheikh's side.

For two weeks more the Working Committee debates went on—long and bitter; in the end, the majority view prevailed—the division remaining unchanged—and the Committee gave a directive to the party members in the Constituent Assembly to go ahead with the implementation of the Delhi Agreement. The Sheikh, nevertheless, continued to stall, insisting that the directive should be endorsed by the open session of the Conference, which he designed to avoid by postponing the elections, even after they had been held in some constituencies.

Sheikh Abdullah then tried to win back the support of the Conference by accusing the Government of India of an alleged bias against the employment of Kashmiri Muslims in the Ordnance depots and Post Offices—Defence and Communications being the acceded subjects. Our readers will remember the Sheikh's entry into active politics twenty years ago, *via* the Reading Room Club, and with the demand for an increased Muslim representation in the services; his career had now turned a full circle, and he was back at the starting point. Magnification of such petty grievances, and the deepening cleavage within the National Conference, had an adverse effect on the Hindu-Muslim relations in the Valley; gradually, the Muslims were becoming pro-Pakistani, and the Hindus Jana Sanghi. The Muslim communist, Ghulam Muhi-ud-din Kara, organized a pro-Pakistani public meeting in Srinagar on June 22, in which *Pakistan Zindabad* slogan was openly raised. Though Sheikh Abdullah had him arrested, but the atmosphere remained so much charged that a repetition of 1947 was openly apprehended. Naturally Indian tourists hurriedly left Kashmir, thus aggravating the economic situation considerably. Yet the Sheikh did nothing to arrest its growth, and continued to keep the Wazir Committee Report in the Secretariate pigeon-holes.

Then a grim unexpected event added its quota to the crisis. The Kashmir Government order, served on Dr. S. P. Mookerjee on May 11, had clearly specified that he was to be detained "for a period of two months". The obvious interpretation that he should have been released after that period is confirmed by the fact that a case pending against him, at Delhi, in which he had to make a personal appearance, was also adjourned to July 15. It is reported that the State Government was thinking to repatriate him to India after Nehru's return from Queen Elizabeth's coronation. But death played her hand first; on June 23 Dr. Mookerjee expired suddenly of heart attack. The tragic circumstances of his death, far from his home and relatives, and for a cause he held dear however wrongly, administered a shock to the country. The unfortunate hush-hush policy of

the Kashmir Government about the news of his fatal sickness lent an air of 'mystery' to the calamitous occurrence, and a vociferous cry arose from many quarters for a judicial enquiry, which even Abdullah's invitation to Dr. B. C. Roy, the premier of the home province of the deceased, for personal investigation could not quieten.*

The controversy about the Kashmir Government's culpable responsibility for the death of Dr. Mookerjee, reverberated for many weeks. Meanwhile many voluble Indian spokesmen fired repeated broadsides at the Kashmiri leaders, oblivious of the fact that to level a charge amounting to 'planned murder' on communal grounds, *ex cathedra*, betrayed not only an ignorance about the composition of the State Administration—with two Hindu Ministers, and another Hindu as the Head of the State—but also their own communalism. Nevertheless, with the powerful dynamo now gone, the Jammu agitation rapidly petered out, and Prem Nath Dogra finally called it off on July 7.

The withdrawal of the movement should ordinarily have cleared the political atmosphere. The report of the Wazir Committee was also there; according to the unofficial information, its main suggestions were:—

(i) Limitation of land-holdings—The criterion for maximum limit should be land-revenue, and not acreage; as such the area of maximum holding to be increased from 22 $\frac{1}{3}$ acres to 38 in Jammu province, and to 28 in Kashmir in case of dry soil.

(ii) Rural Credit—As the Government-sponsored co-operative societies had woefully failed in their task, while the village money-lender had also been liquidated, it was the responsibility of the Government to provide rural credit.

* Curiously, Indian Communists have been most loud in demanding an enquiry, though they never had any love lost for Dr. Mookerjee. In fact, they have utilized the tragic event as a weapon to attack the Preventive Detention Act, as well as to cash on the anti-Government sentiments in West Bengal.

(iii) Controls—De-control of Transport, and the relaxation of control over cloth, sugar and salt in the Kashmir Valley—these commodities being already de-controlled in Jammu.

(iv) Rehabilitation—Early steps to re-settle the demobilized ex-servicemen and refugees, in the same way as the returning migrants from Pakistan.

But just when the horizon appeared a bit rosy, the evil fairy intervened again to play Kashmir another scurvy trick. Sheikh Abdullah came out in open defiance of the party mandate, with his formula based on a negotiated independence of the Valley jointly guaranteed and financed by India and Pakistan; and, if the two neighbours did not agree, by U.N.O. It was purely a personal view, for the few others who apparently sided with him in the Cabinet and the Working Committee publicly proclaimed that independence was a stepping-stone to Pakistan.

Meanwhile Sheikh Abdullah had whipped up an anti-Indian campaign. On July 3, when the air was thick with rumours about the impending withdrawal of the Parishad movement, he delivered a bitter speech at Mujahid Manzil, Srinagar; he said: "Whether the Praja Parishad now withdraws the movement or not is immaterial, for it has already done its intended harm. India's intentions towards us have been exposed. We have acceded to India in three subjects.....They [Indians] have broken this relationship now, and not we (*is ilhak ko bhi ab unhun nae tod diya hai*)". A week later, and after the Parishad agitation had been called off, he spoke from the same platform even more dangerously, out-doing the Ranbirsinghpura outburst; repeating that the withdrawal of the movement "is of no use" now, he commented bitterly: "When I rose against Pakistan to save non-Muslims, I was hailed as a hero, even through Pakistan accused me of treachery to Islam. I am still their enemy No.1. But when I wanted to defend Muslim interests, I was accused of treachery to India. I am now being called a Pakistani". Then charging his old friend Nehru with the intention to

"swallow" Kashmir, he stated : "I have come to the conclusion that our relationship with India has been harmful to the Muslims"; and ended with the remark, sounding like the crack of doom : "This is my final opinion."

The prospect of an autonomous Valley, under the wings of the U.S. dominated U.N.O, had alarmed the Communist Party of India also. In June, three high-ranking leaders, Dr. Z. A. Ahmed, Mr. P. Ramamurthy and Mr. S. V. Ghate came to Srinagar. They found the Sheikh dead-set on autonomy under U.N.O. guarantee ; he was thereupon advised to include specifically Soviet Russia and Communist China—being the neighbouring powers—among the proposed 'guarantors'. Only when it was seen that the Sheikh relied on the American assurances alone, did the Communist Party Executive pass a resolution at its Delhi sitting, in the first week of July, openly disapproving the 'independent' Kashmir thesis.

The situation in Kashmir was utterly confused, because Sheikh Abdullah used to address his audience behind closed doors, later issuing different versions of his own statements, one for the party paper *Khidmat*, the second for the Kashmir Radio, and the third for the Indian Press. 'Foreign' element was also very busy in the Valley, not only egging the Sheikh, but also acting as his 'friend, philosopher and guide.' Mr. Karan Singh made a hurried visit to Delhi on July 18, but was advised to act according to his own judgement with a view to restore the unity of the ideals.

The hopes raised by the numerous mutually friendly references by Nehru and Mohammad Ali, before their Karachi meeting in the last week of July, and their expressed anxiety to reach an agreement, deluded Sheikh Abdullah into the belief that the time was ripe to put forward his 'third proposal' for the consideration of the two Prime Ministers—independence of the Valley by agreement. But the negotiations failed to bring the Indo-Pakistan dispute on Kashmir any nearer solution ; and another joint meeting was arranged to take place at Delhi in September.

A stalemate at Karachi was foredoomed because the 'foreign' advisers had not yet succeeded in persuading Sheikh Abdullah finally to give up his formula for joint Indo-Pakistan guarantee, and to accept one from U.N.O. only. More time was needed by those agents to bring both the Sheikh and the Pakistan Prime Minister round. Even the closest associates of the former had observed a curious indecision in him on this point.

The crisis developed further during the first week of August; the differences in the Working Committee were transferred to the Cabinet—Sheikh Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beg in favour of dissolving the existing Indo-Kashmir relationship, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, Sham Lal Saraf and Giridhari Lal Dogra suggesting its strengthening. The bubble burst with a violent wordy duel between the Sheikh and Mr. Saraf, followed by the Prime Minister demanding his colleague's resignation on August 7, which was refused because "in the manner in which you have created a dangerous situation in the country...such a course will be suicidal."

The differences between the Sheikh and the majority in the Cabinet were carried a stage further when the latter submitted a memorandum on August 7 to the Sadar-i-Riasat, accusing the Sheikh to having "created large-scale discontent in various parts of the State," and for having "deliberately delayed implementation of the [Delhi] agreement"; and charging Mirza Afzal Beg of "narrow sectarianism and communalism" with the connivance of the Sheikh, so that the "unity and the secular character, the two fundamental aspects of our State stand threatened to-day." The memorandum ended with the submission: "It is therefore with great pain that we have to inform you of our conclusion that the Cabinet, constituted as at present and lacking as it does unity of purpose and action, has lost the confidence of the people in its ability to give them a clean, efficient and healthy administration."

Apparently the Sheikh was in a minority in the Cabinet, as well as in the party Executive. The Sadar-i-Riasat tried to seal

the breach ; he called a Cabinet meeting at his residence on the afternoon of August 8. Not only did the Sheikh fail to respond, but left Srinagar suddenly for Gulmarg announcing that on August 21 "I will reveal my plan" before an audience of 100,000 on the occasion of the Id prayers.

The Sheikh had believed that without a direct vote of no-confidence, a Constitutional Head had no power to intervene ; and had hoped apparently to capture the Muslim mind by synchronizing his announcement with the festival of Id. The young Sadar-i-Riasat faced the crisis with remarkable courage. He dismissed Sheikh Abdullah for "establishing foreign contacts of a kind dangerous to the peace and prosperity of the State" ; reconstituted the Cabinet with Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad as the head ; and ordered arrest of the Sheikh and Mirza Afzal Beg under the Public Security Act.

The way the news of these decisions reached Sheikh Abdullah in Gulmarg makes a dramatic story. At 4 A. M. on August 9, he was awakened from sleep by the police, and handed over some papers to read. He groped for the torch, because the electric connection was cut off ; meanwhile a contingent of Kashmir militia surrounded his house. The first document was Mr. Saraf's letter refusing to resign from the Cabinet ; the second was the joint memorandum from the three Ministers ; the third was the Sadar-i-Riasat's order dissolving the Cabinet and dismissing him from Prime-ministership ; and the last—the most severe blow—was the one announcing that he was not a free man any more. He could scarcely understand what had happened ; he asked angrily, "Who has issued this warrant ?", and after reading the officer's signature, rasped, "How can he do so when he is my subordinate ?" Only after some minutes did he comprehend that he was no longer the all powerful Prime Minister of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

The news of Abdullah's fall bewildered Kashmir, masses became listless and lost—a reminder, incidentally, that it is a dangerous risk to leave the destiny of a people in the hands of a single individual, howsoever great and powerful. A general

round-up of the Sheikh's principal associates—in the party and the administration—followed, leading to some breach of civil order, stray pro-Abdullah and pro-Pakistan demonstrations, and occasional wails in the night—a customary Kashmiri way to express sorrow. Nevertheless, the very first broadcast of the new Prime Minister was statesmanlike. Declaring that "the interest and honour of our State are safe in the association" with India, it stressed that the key to the present crisis lay in the deep-rooted economic discontent, and concluded with the announcement of a number of ameliorative measures, which went beyond the Wazir Committee recommendations even. A few weeks later, the new Administration made a sweeping revision of the pay scale of the government servants, benefitting the lower income group specially. The re-orientation of the local problem on the economic issue, in contrast to the over-emphasis on the desultory politics, came as a waft of refreshing air. Nevertheless, as most of the members of the new Cabinet were participants in the Abdullah regime, whose sins of omission and commission must be laid at their doors as well, it is too early to say if the State and the National Conference had come out of the woods. The masses, in the town and the village, are still sullen and perhaps pro-Abdullah; that mood may pass when the benefits promised by the new ministry start flowing in. But the most dangerous aspect of the situation is that most of them—including many party workers—are still ignorant of, or do not understand, the main reason behind Abdullah's removal. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad's remark that the Sheikh was going back on his promises to India, and "who would have trusted a Kashmiri if we had not acted", is a nuance whose distinction does not come easy. The success, therefore, of the present regime will be in proportion to its capacity to educate the people—of course, the education must go hand in hand with the lightening of the economic burden.

India, in general, viewed the *denouement* with sobriety, and a slightly uneasy calm. While regretting that the parting of ways from a comrade of 20 years should at all have taken place,

Nehru stated in the Parliament that the change in the State set-up was an internal matter in which "we did not wish to interfere", and reiterated that "on the larger issues our policy remains what it was and we shall stand by the assurances we have given." It is to be noted that the Indian troops posted within the State did not take any part in quelling the civil disturbances, which responsibility devolved wholly on the State police and militia.

Pakistan, on the contrary, was much excited; false reports were widely circulated and avidly believed in that country, which "upset", as admitted by her Prime Minister, "the equilibrium of the people", and the cry for *jihad* was heard again. However, a hurried trip to Delhi by Mohammad Ali, to discuss the situation with Nehru, cooled the excited Pakistanis.

The official communique, issued after the conclusion of the second Nehru-Ali talks on August 20, was received with warmth in Kashmir, not because the two Prime Ministers agreed that the accession issue could ultimately be decided only by the people of Kashmir—after all they had been saying that all the time—but for their reiteration that the plebiscite to determine the popular will would be held State-wise, and not regionally as proposed by Sir Owen Dixon. Thus they dispelled the grave misgiving about the 'unnatural' partition of the State, which had been heightened by the Parishad movement and the Abdullah episode.

All eyes are now turned towards Kashmir; today the question most asked in the market-places is: Will Kashmir have peace now? Its answer, however, depends upon four factors, in the following order of priority:—

(i) Elimination of economic discontent—Our readers are aware that the most potent causes of this dissatisfaction are (a) the various anomalies in the working of the land reforms; (b) the degeneration of the co-operative movement into a social ailment where graft and incompetence thrive; (c) the association of the party with the administration leading to the development of a totalitarian tendency; and (d) the lack

of a powerful opposition keeping watch both on the conduct of the local officials and on the broad policies of the central government.

(ii) Pacification of regional apprehensions—Even the Abdullah regime had given an undertaking to allay the fears of the minorities, but little was done to translate those promises into practice. It is true that the Praja Parishad has assured a 'qualified' support to the Bakshi Government ; but, as it has not yet given up its sectarian and parochial bias, unless something is done—rapidly and radically—to regain the approval of the masses in general and the Jammu people in particular, the initiative will pass back to that party with its negative, desultory approach to politics.

(iii) Early decision on the fate of Sheikh Abdullah—Though the Kashmir Government think it inadvisable, for the present, to release him or to put him on trial, his continued incarceration, like Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan's in Pakistan, not only weakens the party structure but also militates against the 'New Kashmir' ideals, notwithstanding Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad's election as the new leader by an overwhelming vote of the National Conference party on October 4.

(iv) The implementation of the Delhi Agreement—Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad has confirmed that the "hand we have given in the hands of India shall remain there." Much depends not only on keeping them there, but on joining them into a clasp. The process seems to have begun on September 16, with the handing over of the Jammu and Kashmir Telegraph and Telephones Department to the Government of India in terms of the Instrument of Accession. Yet, much remains still to be done ; for instance, a decision on the quantum of the Supreme Court's power, and the financial integration of the State with India.

As we stand on the threshold of Tomorrow, we see a glimmer of the Ocean of Peace, and notice a tendency for the first Kashmiri 'current' to glide into it. But as one part of the horizon brightens, the other still appears threatening. Chaos

may yet again engulf the State—which it certainly had done 1947-48 winter, and almost repeated last summer—as a direct result of a shift in the delicate balance of the Indo-Pakistan relations, or indirectly from the worsening of the relationship of the two Power blocs. Nevertheless, with a hope that the vision of the Ocean will not turn out to be another mirage, we resume our exploration of the second 'current'.

SECOND CURRENT (Continued)

We have recorded earlier how the second Kashmiri 'current' entered the Whirlpool with the ideological struggle between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League manifesting itself as an 'undeclared' shooting war on the Kashmir soil between India and Pakistan. Before the 'current' re-emerged, some desultory attempts had already been made to channel it along peaceful lines, through the correspondence exchanged between Nehru and Liaqat Ali and Mountbatten-Jinnah talks ; nevertheless, their failure was not unexpected, because secularism and theocracy are antithetical.

Yet before proceeding to explore the meandering course of the second stream, we shall make a detour to see how communal resurgence in India had again made its waters turbid. As Independence approached, the vested interests—the *fons et origo* of Hindu reactionarism—were seen demanding from the Congress their price for the support given it during the later stages of the freedom-struggle. And the Congress was only paying the debt back when, in April 1947, it joined in the 'howl of millionaires' at the 'peoples' budget' of the Interim Finance Minister, Liaqat Ali. The hob-nobbing of the Congress with the capitalists-cum-communalists let Hindu sectarianism make deep inroads into the Indian body politic ; so much so that a section succumbed to the racial theory of R.S.S.S., and thus gave the Muslim League the compliment of imitation. In this context, Sardar Patel's unilateral assurance to Lord Mountbatten, that India would not take it amiss if Jammu and Kashmir acceded to Pakistan, revealed the existence of a streak of two-nation mentality within the Congress-fold, which took for granted that a Muslim majority area must *ipso facto* go to Pakistan. The riots following the Partition worsened this unhappy state of affairs ; so that, while the year 1947 was ringing itself out, such a

complex situation had arisen that while India was having the better on the military field, large fissures were seen to develop on its ideological front. The Congress 'left-wing' weakened with the Socialists drifting away, thus tilting the balance in favour of the R. S. S. S. 'white-anted' and monied-class dominated 'right-wing'. This lop-sidedness has been the bane of that party since then.

The continued drain on the Indian men and money on account of Kashmir fighting, and the bellicosity of the Pakistani leaders, drew Sardar Patel's wrath; on December 18, 1947, he ordered stoppage of the payment of fifty-five crores of rupees to Pakistan—that country's share in the cash-balance of the undivided India—purporting to mean that, 'Why should Pakistan be given money to buy arms to shoot Indian soldiers with?' This action might have been politically expedient; but to break one's solemn agreement was a palpable betrayal of the Gandhian ideal.

The time was so much out of joint that even the Mahatma's voice was being drowned under the slogan-mongering of 'Hinduism in danger.' He had arrived in Delhi two months earlier *en route* to Pakistan on a mission of reconciliation, but recrudescence of communal distemper in the capital detained him. He felt distressed "that a person like Dr. Zakir Hussain, for instance, or for that matter Shaheed Suhrawardy*, should not be able to move about in Delhi as freely and with as much safety as myself"; and, therefore, decided on a 'fast-to-death' as a means to cleanse the hatred in the people's hearts. Announcing his resolve at the Prayer Meeting on January 12, 1948, he said: "It was only when in terms of human effort I had exhausted all resources.....that I put my head on God's lap", and added that his fast would end "if and when I am satisfied that there is a reunion of hearts of all communities brought about without any outside pressure but from an awakened sense of duty."

Gandhiji's fast had the wonted electrifying effect. On January 15, India Government decided to pay out the fifty-five crores to

* Ex-premier of the undivided Bengal, detested by the Hindus for his alleged complicity in the 'Great Calcutta Killing' of August 1946.

Pakistan as a gesture of goodwill. * But as he was not mortifying his flesh on this issue, the fast continued ; in a thin, weak voice he spoke into the microphone placed near his cot : "It would have been foolish for me to wait till the last Moslem had been turned out of Delhi by subtle and undemonstrative methods which I would describe as killing by inches". The happy *dénouement*, however, came on January 18, when the inter-communal Peace Committee, set up under the direction of the Congress President, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, satisfied Gandhiji that the necessary reunion of the hearts had taken place, whereupon the latter broke his fast.

Gandhiji's 'shock-tactics' had wider ramifications. At Lake Success, the leader of the Pakistani delegation, Sir M. Zafrullah Khan, told the Security Council that "a new and tremendous wave of feeling and desire for friendship between the two Dominions is sweeping the sub-continent in response to the fast". But peace was not for the sub-continent ; at 5.05 hrs, on January 30 evening, Mahatma Gandhi was consumed by the fire of Hindu Communalism. With his death the 'feeling and desire for friendship' cooled off once more, and the old practice of mutual recrimination restarted.

Nevertheless, the shock of Gandhiji's martyrdom restored the sanity of the Indian nation. Dr. S. P. Mookerjee, an ex-president of the Hindu Mahasabha, whom Nehru had included in his composite cabinet, advised his organization to suspend all political activity ; an official ban was imposed on R. S. S. S. ; and the Government of India issued a directive to the State governments not to entertain petitions from the communal organizations or to grant interviews to their leaders.

Before we recommence our narration of the influence of the Indo-Pakistan relations on Kashmir, we should clarify some widely prevalent notions which have, by raising false hopes and

* A popular misconception is that Mahatma Gandhi fasted to coerce Sardar Patel. In fact this issue was not even among the seven conditions which Gandhiji had laid down for the termination of the fast.

equally false fears, often bedevilled appreciation of the nature and the unfolding of the Kashmir dispute. We would divide them under two heads :—

(A) The belief that Kashmir is the sole obstacle to the Indo-Pakistan amity, and once it is removed from the path the two countries will march along arm-in-arm ;

(B) The legitimacy of Pakistan's claim for the incorporation of the State.

Let us consider them in some detail.

*Notion (A) :—*This belief has received a very wide currency, though a little scrutiny will disclose that it arises from either a historical obscurantism or an optimistic short-sightedness. For who is not aware of the fact that, in the six years since Pakistan was created, many other disputes—both major and minor—have arisen between the two countries, which did not have any direct bearing on Kashmir, and whose solution was not dependent on her ? We list a few of them below :—

(i) Junagadh and Hyderabad—Immediately following the Indian reference of the Kashmir dispute, the Security Council had, on Sir M. Zafrullah Khan's initiative and under Anglo-American pressure, included Junagadh and Hyderabad also on the agenda. Even a resolution was passed on June 3, 1948, directing the U. N. O. Commission to "study and report" on these matters. Pakistan's counter-reference is still lying tucked away in some obscure corner of the U. N. O. archives ; to be aired, if Pakistan desires, at any time. She appears to have some such intentions, for she not only has not withdrawn her complaint but is allowing the irredentist Junagadh Nawab to live in Karachi as an 'exile', and also harbours a host of other political 'wanted's'. *

* A Trade Agent for Hyderabad, whose accreditation to Pakistan had been sanctioned by the Nizam before the 'Police Action' but was revoked after the merger of the State, continued to function in Karachi till June 1953. That the closure of that office was nothing more than a hollow gesture on the prelude of the Nehru-Mohammad Ali talks in July, could be understood from the Pakistan Prime Minister's statement of July 29, that Junagadh and Manavdar were "constitutionally" parts of Pakistan.

(ii) Evacuee property—This problem is getting knottier every day, so much so that the two countries have not even agreed on a common formula for the valuation of the properties, movable or immovable, left behind by the displaced persons on either side.

(iii) Canal waters—The dispute over the volume of water each country could rightfully claim for its canals from the Indus basin has become a *cause célèbre*, despite the May 4, 1948, agreement by which India promised to maintain the pre-Partition quantum. In a thirty-page brochure, entitled *The Indus Basin Irrigation Water Dispute*, issued on February 13 this year, Pakistan has accused India of a design to deprive the former of her share of waters "to make a large area within Pakistan a desert". As the potentiality of the water resources of the Indus basin was currently under investigation by an expert committee under the auspices of the World Bank, the categorical nature of the accusation appeared to give an ominous ring, especially when Pakistan seemed unable to avert a crack on her food front.

(iv) Minorities—The feeling that each country is responsible for the security of the minority community in the other is a potent source of unending—often intolerable—friction, sometimes leading the two countries to the brink of war. A pernicious theory has been propounded—perhaps more so in Pakistan—that the members of the minority community in one country are merely 'hostages' for the good behaviour of the other towards its own minority. As a result, even a slight tension between the two countries causes large-scale exoduses in both directions.

(v) Trade barriers—The rupture of the complementary economy of the sub-continent as a result of Partition, and the desire of each country to become self-sufficient, have led to a minor 'fiscal' war between the two countries. An instance to the point was provided in September 1949, when Great Britain decided to de-value her currency and all Commonwealth countries followed suit, with the exception of Pakistan. It

is a moot question whether India was in the wrong to de-value, or Pakistan not to de-value ; in any case, India did not accept the 'over-valued' Pakistani rupee, whereupon Pakistan complained against Indian 'interference' in her domestic fiscal policy. Finally the dispute was taken to the International Monetary Fund.

Now, if seemingly insurmountable disputes exist for which Kashmir bears no responsibility, there had been others which were overcome despite Kashmir. In fact, the area of agreement between the two countries, especially when they are left to themselves and not made pawns in the game of international diplomacy, is quite large—the Nehru-Liaquat pact (of which we shall speak a little later), the agreement on air-lanes across Western Pakistan for the Indian commercial flights to Afghanistan (which Pakistan had earlier disallowed for security reasons), the simultaneous withdrawal of Jute impost by Pakistan and Coal surcharge by India on March 19 this year (which even the GATT Committee could not bring about). There are many more instances of this kind, though the dust of the Kashmir controversy has obscured them.

Thus we reach the conclusion that if the two countries itch to fight, even a solution to the Kashmir problem cannot hold them back ; and, equally, that if there is a will to peace the lack of that solution is not much of an obstacle.

*Notion (B) :—*The logic behind Pakistan's claim for Kashmir has been variously defined as the Muslim League's 'two-nation theory', and 'other factors'—namely, (a) Kashmir's security and economic interests, and (b) Pakistan's security and economic needs.

As regards the first, it has already been pointed out that the 'two-nation theory' did not receive any *de jure* recognition in the Mountbatten Plan, though the subsequent separation of the two predominantly Muslim fringes might have given it a *de facto* plausibility. Nor do political theorists support the view that religion alone formed the substratum of nationhood*.

* All Jews are not Zionists ; all Christians not one nation. The Ahmediya agitation in Punjab (P), of which we shall speak a little later, proves that religious affinity alone is no qualification for a common nationhood, even in Pakistan.

So a claim based on this argument has only a dubious validity; or, if we are permitted to say so, 'k' in Pakistan is not beyond criticism.

Then taking the first 'other' factor, we hear the negative argument that the security of the Kashmiri Muslims would be jeopardized if India someday gave up her secular ideals. This reasoning was echoed in S. M. Abdullah's Ranbirsinghpura speech. But he was also heard to have said that "the presence of Kashmir in the Union of India has been the major factor in stabilizing relations between the Hindus and Muslims of India".

Others take a positive stand, on the belief that it would be more advantageous to the Muslim-majority Kashmir to have a political jointure with an Islamic country. It is, however, an obtuse argument, for while it sets up an apparently impossible ideal of bringing all Muslim countries under one political organization, the fact is ignored that the Muslims in the post-Partition India, over-numbering the Western Pakistanis by more than 10 million, are likely to exert a greater pull on their Kashmiri co-religionists. As the brilliant Egyptian journalist, Ahmed Kassim Gouda, put it—the issue before the Kashmiris is "whether they should join a country with 30 million Muslims or a country with 40 million Muslims".

Coming to the oft-repeated reference to the logic of economics, we hear it said that, as all trade-channels of Kashmir—roads and rivers—flowed into Pakistan, the economic life of the State would end unless it joined that country. Yet it should not be forgotten that a very large proportion of the State's export trade—tourist, fruit, handicraft and timber—ended in India; which is also the source of all its import trade—textile, sugar, medicines, leather goods, tobacco, etc. Moreover, being mainly agricultural, Kashmir will gain hardly anything by linking herself with Pakistan's agrarian economy; whereas, in S. M. Abdullah's words, "India being more highly industrialized, can give us equipment, technical services and materials".

We now turn to the second 'other' factor, that Kashmir is 'vital' for Pakistan's security and economy. The leaders of

Pakistan have often asserted that their people would not feel secure until Kashmir joined them. But let us reason—secure from whom? There is India on one side and Afghanistan on the other; and, ignoring Kashmir for the sake of argument, Pakistan already has hundreds of miles of common frontier with either, very vulnerable militarily. Therefore, possession of Kashmir cannot render Pakistan less vulnerable; for which reason the 'fear psychosis' in Pakistan is either deceptive or simulated.

As regards the economic necessity of Pakistan, Sir William Barton, a retired 'koi-hai' from the Indian Political Department now turned Pakistani-apologist, says in an article in the *Quarterly Review*: "Pakistan has no coal or industries of any consequence; if she is to develop her military and economic potential she must build up industries on large scale. In the absence of an adequate coal supply, the only course is to develop power from hydro-electric installations; for these she must depend largely on the rivers of Kashmir". Again, Western Pakistan is dependent on Kashmir for her timber requirements; "without Kashmir forests, Pakistan will be washed off the forest map of India", was the observation of Mr. Hamilton, a former Inspector-General of Forests in the undivided India. Yet again, Pakistan is acutely conscious that the Kashmir water-shed is essential for her agrarian system; her Irrigation Department records tell how forty years ago the State of Jammu and Kashmir was denied the right over its riverine waters except in so far as permitted by the then Punjab Government, and provided it did not interfere with the Punjab's expanding canal system.*

Is it not, however, the criterion of colonial imperialism that the stronger country exerts a right of political possession over the weaker, in order to exploit for its own benefit the strategic potentialities and the natural resource of the latter?

* This arrangement was arrived at between the Punjab Government presided over by a British Governor, and the Kashmir Government dominated by a British Resident—a sort of 'family party'—while Maharaja Partap Singh had been deposed.

Or, to put the argument the other way about, are we to justify, for reasons of economic or military necessity, Japan's rape of Manchuria in 1931-32, Mussolini's house-breaking in Abyssinia in 1936, and the pre-and postwar Soviet expansion? And then there is B. N. Rau's apt retort to Sir Mohammad Zafrullah Khan, when the latter told the Security Council on February 8, 1950, that, "possession of Kashmir can add nothing to India's economy, nor to its strategic security. On the other hand, it was vital for Pakistan". The leader of the Indian delegation countered the argument by the pithy remark: "The wolf may need the lamb desperately, but the lamb may have different wishes in the matter".

About the means adopted by the 'wolf' to satisfy its need, let us hear the independent testimony of Andrew Mellor, the special correspondent of the *Daily Herald*. Says he, "The invasion was well-organized affair out of the category of normal tribal raids. The tribesmen came not only from nearby Hazara District but across 200 miles of Pakistan from the Peshawar area. They arrived in buses and lorries, some wore green uniforms and all were armed. After a desultory disarming of a few hundred Pathans at Abbottabad, the Pakistan authorities allowed the rest to pass unhindered. Later they contended that owing to their Army's commitments in the Punjab because of the riots they were unable to impede the tribesmen. Since these protestations, Pakistan has had no difficulty in controlling the tribes in their own areas, in bombing the Fakir of Ipi's gang, and putting down a revolt in Kalat State. In fact, the invasion was prepared by a whip-up of religious feeling throughout the Tribal Areas by North-West Frontier political leaders and this was coupled with the irresistible promise of loot. Whether the affair was prompted by the Pakistan Government is a moot point, but certainly that Government did nothing to prevent it and not only allowed towns like Rawalpindi and Abbottabad to be used as bases for the campaign—in which, according to the Indian Government, more than 80,000 Pathans were at one time involved—but soon

assumed the role of protector of the Azad (free) Kashmir Government..." *

But the story of the 'wolf' and the 'lamb' did not end as it usual does, with the latter resting safe inside the former's belly, for a 'sheep-hound' made a timely appearance to give the 'wolf' a licking instead. The way fighting between India and Pakistan had progressed since then has been recorded earlier; yet we may summarize that, by March 1948, the pressure on Pathankot-Jammu sector had been eased and Poonch-Naushehra-Jhangar triangle was holding out, and westwards, the raiders had been made to withdraw beyond Uri; but on the north-west, Tithwal still remained an arrow pointed at the heart of the Valley, and, on the north, the 'enemy' had stabilized himself in Gilgit and Skardu.

April opened with a resounding success for Brig. Usman; pressing from Naushehra he gained Rajauri, a small town 30 miles north-north-east. The tragic tale of this town, while under the raiders' occupation, should be read by those who express disgust at the Belsen concentration camps and the Katyn murders, and yet support Pakistan. Before the disturbances, Rajauri was a pretty little habitation mostly of well-to-do businessmen. As the invading tide rolled nearer, the population swelled to 12,000 with the non-Muslim refugees coming from the surrounding areas. On November 18, 1947, the Muslim contingent of the State garrison deserted, leaving the town open to the raiders. Since then till its relief by Brig. Usman, Rajauri remained under a 'news blanket', though snippets about the reign of terror would trickle out from time to time. During five months of their occupation, the raiders freely indulged in rape and arson, and carried away more than two crores worth of looted property. But before they pulled out, those "animals in human form" committed one of the worst crimes in the human history—the wholesale massacre of thousands of men, women and children, herded together from

* Andrew Mellor : *India Since Partition*.

the town and countryside. When the Indian troops entered the deserted town, they discovered three big pits filled with rotting corpses of the victims of the modern Golgotha.

As if to mock at the tragedy, the Security Council passed a resolution on April 21, appointing a five-men commission (UNCIP) for the restoration of peace and order in the State; and suggested replacement of the Abdullah Government by a 'neutral cabinet' representative of 'the major political groups' during the plebiscite to be carried out under a U.N.O. Plebiscite Administrator. Since 'Azad Kashmir' was to be represented in the reconstituted cabinet, the sponsors of the resolution had assured ministerial seats to those whose hands were still red with the blood of Rajauri victims. Naturally, Indian and Kashmir Governments protested against the resolution, but to no avail.

Emboldened by this tacit support from U.N.O, the raiders came back against Jhangar on May 10, but Brig. Usman stood his ground and, in the end, the attackers beat retreat. Among the dead were identified many men belonging to the 4/13th. Frontier Force Rifles from the regular Pakistan Army.

During May, the raiders made attempts to break through the Uri perimeter. Lt-Col. Rehmat Ali of the Pakistan Army conducted the operations, with a contingent of the Frontier Force Rifles, a battalion of the Punjab Regiment and units of Jinnah Force, supported with 25-pounder guns and howitzers; but he failed to dislodge the Indian defenders. Nevertheless, on the northern sector, India suffered a major set-back—Kargil fell on May 10, and the defending force was wiped out.

By early June the UNCIP had met informally at Lake Success and was planning to have its first regular meeting at Geneva. Then came Pakistan Prime Minister's usual stock-in-trade statement; on June 8, he protested to U.N.O. that "India is out for a military decision." The boot was however on the other leg, for making Tithwal its base, the 25th. Pakistan Brigade, consisting of the Frontier Force Rifles, the Punjab Regiment

and the Khyber Rifles, was trying to fan out from north towards Baramulla, and Zoji-la farther east. Once again, the Indian troops successfully withstood the raiders who had compelled some civilians, at the point of the bayonet, to form an advance party. Unnerved by defeat, a Pakistani unit near Gurais mutinied, and there was some desertion as well; Lt-Col. Shehzada Matul Malik, brother of the Mehtar of Chitral, was put under arrest, and Brig. Mohammad Yusuf had to visit the area to restore the morale of the forces. In their counter-attack, the Indians captured Tithwal and Gurais, thus relieving the pressure on Zoji-la—the artery connecting Ladakh with the Valley.

After eight months of resounding successes, the Indian Army suffered a very grievous casualty. On the Jhangar front, on July 4, Brig. Usman, who had just finished inspection of his piquets after a heavy enemy barrage, fell victim to a stray 25-pounder shell. Yet with his last breath, the hero of Naushehra shouted: "I am dying, but let not the enemy have the land for which we are fighting."

Brig. Usman's sacrifice was a strong rebuttal of the 'two-nation' theory. Truly did Nehru remark: "So while we naturally grieve, we rejoice at the courage which triumphs over death and which, in the ultimate analysis, makes a nation."

Soon after its arrival in India in July, the UNCIP requested both countries to desist from doing anything materially to alter and to aggravate the situation. But, in violation of this directive, Pakistan continued to deploy its own regular and 'Azad Kashmir' forces in Baltistan, under the command of Capt. Buhran-ud-din—of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose's Indian National Army fame—who had replaced Lt-Col. Shehzada Matul Malik after the Gurais mutiny. On August 11, he took Skardu, and pressed towards Ladakh along the Indus route.

The international 'observers' were, however, on the scene, and not all the mellifluous phrases on Sir M. Zafrullah Khan in the Security Council could hide Pakistan's transgression in Kashmir. Yet when the foreign press flashed the news that Pakistan's British Commander-in-Chief had admitted before the


UNCIP that her regular troops were engaged in the hostilities, an official Pakistan communique denied it outright. Nobody, however, was taken in; the London *Observer*, for instance, observed on August 8: "Though the Pakistan Government has repudiated a reported admission to the U.N. Commission that Pakistan troops are fighting Indian troops in Kashmir, yet there seems no doubt that they had been there since May. The general belief is that Pakistan is out to establish its position before the U.N. Commission can recommend partition of the State, *which indeed is the only solution*". (Italics mine) The murder was out a month later, when the Commission reported that Pakistan's Foreign Minister had already admitted on August 4—incidentally, this admission had been made much before the official denial—that "Pakistan Army was at present responsible for the overall command of the Azad forces"; and again, five days later, that the "Azad Kashmir forces were operationally controlled by the Pakistan Army."

In this context, we may recall a point often been made out by Pakistan that the deployment of her troops in Kashmir was a 'measure of self-defence'. Yet Article 51 of the United Nations' Charter, to which Pakistan is a signatory, has provided that the right of self-defence begins only "if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." Therefore, even if the entry of the Indian forces in Kashmir were construed as an 'armed attack' as defined in the Article, the right of a separate self-defence could have accrued only if Pakistan had reported to the Security Council, and until the latter took joint action to restore peace in accordance with the Charter. Pakistan, however, did not lodge any complaint with U.N.O. On the other hand, it was Pakistan who was unilaterally "out to establish its position," first when she opened an offensive towards Ladakh; and again when she virtually rejected the Commission's 'cease-fire' proposals.

But with Pakistan's rejection of the 'cease-fire,' India was relieved of all moral restraints arising from her promise to the

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CONCLUSION

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Commission not to alter the situation materially. Pushing out from Jammu sector, a relief column established a link with Poonch on November 20, where the besieged garrison had been sustained, since more than ten months, by an incessant air-lift, which operation the pilots had humourously nicknamed 'Punching.' A little later, offensive patrols had penetrated many miles beyond Uri; they had gone up Pir Kanthi (10,930 feet), the highest summit in that sector, and were rolling the enemy downhill towards Domel, the escape-route to Pakistan. But the main Indian counter-attack was mounted in the Ladakh salient. It was a two-prong drive—one tongue pushed north-east from Zoji-la and captured Dras on way to Kargil, and the other advanced westward from Leh, where the enemy had infiltrated within ear-shot and was taking the usual toll of mass massacres, forced conversions, and indiscriminate loot. The two prongs met at Kargil, which was recaptured on November 23, thus lifting the dark cloud hovering over the Buddhists and their Gompas.

Apart from the military set-backs, Pakistan had received two other major blows—the first was the death of Mr. M. A. Jinnah on September 11, and the second was India's spectacular 'Police Action' against the Nizam of Hyderabad culminating in his surrender of the claim for sovereignty which Pakistan had encouraged with arms and propaganda. So, as the year came to a close, Pakistan appeared too feeble to resist the push-back in Kashmir. But just when the military advantage was again passing over to India, she was persuaded into a 'cease-fire' through false assurances given by the UNCIP. And curiously, the proposals were practically the same which Pakistan had earlier rejected.

The answer to the question, why Pakistan at all took a negative attitude in the first round of the negotiations, is that she wanted a breathing-time to organize the 'occupied' areas as a counter-poise to the State Government. In fact, at that time, all was not well in 'Azad Kashmir' and its leaders had fallen out amongst themselves. Moreover, in the 'northern areas', which Capt. Buhran-ud-din was feverishly trying to overrun,

a regular 'Azad Kashmir' administration had yet to function. On the other hand, India had claimed that, "as the authority of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir over this region as a whole had not been challenged or disturbed, the responsibility for the administration of this area should revert to the State Government and the defence to India." In short, the character of the 'Azad Kashmir' Government vis-a-vis the State Government was very weak. So, Sardar Ibrahim, the head of the 'Azad Cabinet', was replaced by Chaudhari Ghulam Abbas, who was more tractable and had an additional propaganda value in having once participated in the struggle against the Dogra rule. A Political Agency, directly under the Governor of N. W. F. P., was established over Gilgit, Skardu and Dardistan. * Starting from a scratch the 'Azad' forces were built up, in the words of the UNCIP itself, to the "formidable strength of 32 battalions during the 'cease-fire' period." And roads and aerodromes were constructed to link Pakistan to the less accessible 'occupied' areas, with the aid of certain foreign 'careerists,' like the ex-State servants—Scott and Powell. By dragging the negotiations at a snail's pace, the Commission had given Pakistan sufficient time for a *fait accompli* in the 'occupied' territory.

We shall narrate the sordid story of the intrigues by, and within, the Commission at the appropriate time; suffice it to record that one minute before midnight, January 1, 1949, fighting ceased all along the front, and the 14-month old 'hot war' between India and Pakistan came to an end. Since then, apart from some minor border incidents and small-scale infiltrations, there has been no serious hostile activity in Kashmir.

The goodwill generated by the 'cease-fire' soon led to an agreement on military truce. Even the inter-Dominion Conference, which was bogged over the evacuee-property and minority issues, made some progress towards a *modus vivendi*.

* A sad commentary on the adjective 'Azad' (Free) when the 'head' is unceremoniously pushed about, and a part of the territory is under a direct non-indigenous control. Compare it with the 'autonomy' of the Kashmir Government vis-a-vis the Indian Government.

These were tangible signs of a *rapprochement* between the two countries, yet there was to be no peace. M. Litvinov had once said that Peace was indivisible; the Indian sub-continent, therefore, could have it only if the wartime *mariage de convenance* between U.S.S.R. and the Anglo-American bloc had resulted in a *mariage d'amour*. Since that did not consummate, India and Pakistan remained estranged, and the Kashmir problem continued to change its complexion according as the international barometer rose or fell.

1949 was an unsettled year for the sub-continent. Internally, in India, the Government gave a sop to the capitalist-cum-communalist in February, by postponing all industrial nationalization schemes for ten years; in the words of Dr. S. P. Mookerjee, then Central Minister for Industries and Supply: "The policy of the Government is specific that existing undertakings will not only remain with private enterprise for at least ten years, but that they will be assisted to increase their efficiency and expand their production." It was followed by a concerted bid for a come-back by the communalists. In May, the Hindu Mahasabha declared its intention to re-enter politics, its General Secretary revealing that never had there been any departure whatsoever from his party's old ideal of 'Hindu Rashtra.' The dormant Muslim League came to life again. And the Akali Dal, not to be out-shouted, made claims for a special treatment of the Sikhs, and its spokesmen talked increasingly of a 'Sikhistan'.

The Communists were another headache. In furtherance of their international strategy, an Asian Youth Conference was sponsored and held in Calcutta in February 1948. It was followed by the purge of the 'reformist' P. C. Joshi, the secretary-general of the Indian Communist Party, and the appointment of the militant B. T. Ranadive in his place. Digging themselves in, particularly in West Bengal, Madras and Telengana, the communists and other 'fellow-travellers' indulged in all sorts of subversive activities, ranging from cat-call strikes to organized murders and agrarian revolts. To a certain extent they were

helped by the steep rise in prices following the Government's bold, though ill-starred, 'experiment' in de-control. Stern action by certain Provincial governments and the Centre did not bring about any abatement in their insurrectionary methods, which continued on well throughout 1949. It was in the interest of Soviet Russia to hinder the build up of the *cordon sanitaire*, and in furtherance of that aim the communist strategy in India was to bear-bait Nehru for his alleged acquiescence "in a scheme of defence of American and British empires in the East". And it is true that, at that stage, Nehru's external policy appeared to orient itself towards the Western democratic camp.

Thus both the communalist and the communist were seeking—though each with a different motive—some way to weaken Nehru's position. And with the Indo-Pakistan relations estranged further, by the intrigues within the Kashmir Commission, what could be more expedient than a military show-down. And how cleverly the communists manipulated it is evident from the fact that the spark which set off the explosion was no bigger than a matchstick flame. In 1948-49 there was more freedom for them in Pakistan; in fact, many active workers had betaken themselves to East Pakistan when their organization was banned in West Bengal. There they carried out an outrage in a village in Khulna district on December 24, 1949, resulting in some police casualties. When the investigating officers arrived on the spot, the *agents provocateur* had already escaped; but as the Hindus had supplied a larger quota to the East Pakistan Communist Party, the Government reprisal fell on that community as a whole. As a consequence, January and February, 1950, witnessed a heavy exodus of the Hindus from East Bengal. A whispering campaign for 'revenge' was started in the eastern part of the Indian Union, in which the communists were quite prominent and were soon joined in by the communalists. Soon shouts for a war or *jehad* were raised in both countries. An otherwise sober newspaper, *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, even held a gallop poll in which it claimed that more than 80% of the replies favoured military action against Pakistan. And when

both countries deployed their troops along the borders, and made other war-like preparations, it seemed that the die had been cast. But a last minute stroke of statesmanship by the Prime Ministers of the two countries, coupled by some behind-the-scene wire-pulling by the British High Commissioners in Delhi and Karachi, drew India and Pakistan back from the edge of the precipice.

Though the situation was eased by the Nehru-Liaquat Pact signed in April 1950, yet the forces of Communalism had been strengthened in the meantime. The resignation of Dr. S. P. Mookerjee at this juncture, for what he termed the Government of India's 'appeasement' policy towards Pakistan, gave Hindu revivalism a flying start. Before many months had passed the hymn of hate against Pakistan had become a *Horst Wessel* against the Muslims as such.

The Indian Government could have pulled out the roots of resurgent communalism if it had moved speedily and with determination; but the hands of the ruling party—the Congress—were palsied, particularly because of the dominance of the 'right-wing' and also due to its financial dependence on the capitalists who themselves were backing the communalists. Therefore, worried by a wane in popularity, the Government acted in exactly the opposite fashion—appeasement of communalism. The State administrations were circularized to drop all legislative steps taken, or contemplated to be taken, for the implementation of the 1948 directive banning official recognition of the sectrarian bodies; so much so that while the Indian Prime Minister was participating in the Commonwealth Premiers' Conference in London, Sardar Patel—who was deputizing for him—gave interviews to Madhav Golwalker, the 'fuehrer' of the most militant organization, the R. S. S. S.

Throughout 1950 and 1951 reactionarism consolidated itself in India. It was abetted by a broadening of the fissure within the Congress, after the election of the 'right-wing' leader Purshottam Das Tandon—Sardar Patel's nominee—as the president for the annual session at Nasik, defeating the Gandhian-socialist, Acharya Kripalani—Nehru's nominee. This was followed

by Rafi Ahmed Kidwai's resignation from the Central Cabinet and his threatened withdrawal from the Congress. Rumours were also afloat that Nehru himself was predisposed to quit in 'disgust'.

Across the border, there was an eruption of the irritating official and non-official anti-Indian propaganda, and of the talk of a Muslim re-conquest of India.* It was partly simulated to 'influence' the U. N. Representative, Dr. Frank Graham, who had arrived on the sub-continent to mediate in the Kashmir dispute, and went on in an increasing crescendo throughout the summer of 1951—the 'clenched fist' sign of the Pakistan Prime Minister including.

A valiant bid by Nehru—a cabled offer on July 17, for a joint 'No-War declaration'—arrested the slide down towards the precipice, though Liaquat Ali made its acceptance conditional on Nehru's agreement to refer all outstanding unsettled disputes to arbitration. Though the Pakistan Prime Minister soon made amends by inviting Nehru to Karachi, but by making peace between the two countries conditional, he had given sufficient food for Hindu chauvinism to fatten upon.

In August the Indian Prime Minister clashed with the Congress President, though the immediate issue—the relation between the Executive and the Party—was minor. However, when it appeared that the Congress might have to choose between the two, even the 'right-wing' realized Nehru's vote-catching power during the coming General Election. A belated window-dressing followed which led to the retirement of Mr. Tandon; Nehru himself assumed the presidentship of the Congress, and persuaded Kidwai to rejoin the Cabinet. Nevertheless, these swings within the Congress-fold encouraged the communal groups to bid for higher stakes.

* The nature of the propaganda is seen from the following quotation from F. K. Khan Durrani's book, *Meaning of Pakistan*: "There is not a single inch of the soil of India which our fathers did not once purchase with their blood. We cannot be false to the blood of our fathers. India, the whole of it, is therefore our heritage and it must be conquered by Islam".

The General Election in the winter of 1951-52 was, to a certain extent, a victory for secularism, inasmuch as the candidates set up by the Jana Sangh, Mahasabha and Rama Rajya Parishad were soundly beaten despite an electoral alliance. But undeterred by the verdict of the polls, Hindu revivalism was soon on the look out for an opportunity to regain its lost popularity. Kashmir became its happy-hunting ground, for the replacement of the Hindu Maharaja's rule by a Muslim-dominated administration had enough propaganda value. The situation was aggravated by certain executive and legislative acts of the Abdullah government, which—as mentioned in the previous chapter—had some sectarian tinge. The stage was thus set for a political intervention in the State directed from India, as was done twenty years back, only this time the label was Hindu in place of Muslim.

The communal opposition in India soon discovered an affinity of interests with the Jammu Praja Parishad, the centre of opposition in the State. The overt support given by the Jana Sangh and Mahasabha to the Jammu students' strike in February 1952 on the 'flag issue' not only scared the Kashmir Government, but raked up the dormant Muslim communalism as a reaction. As a result, when forbearance would have been a priceless virtue, S. M. Abdullah allowed himself the indulgence of certain indiscreet remarks against the Hindus in general. Admittedly, Abdullah's vehemence betrayed the communal inheritance of his party—a section of which, led by Mirza Afzal Beg, had continued to draw upon it. Nevertheless, can it be denied that in the broad perspective the Kashmir Prime Minister's fears exemplified the law of 'Action and Reaction' ?*

* Let our readers, for a moment, imagine themselves as Kashmiri Muslims and then consider their reaction to the following :—

- (i) Propaganda for Akhand Hindustan and Bhagwa Flag.
- (ii) Cry for denominational exchange of population with Pakistan.
- (iii) Demand for a ban on cow-slaughter.
- (iv) Triumph of Akali communalism in the neighbouring PEPSU.
- (v) Covert propaganda to declare Urdu a 'foreign' language.
- (vi) A romance between a Hindu girl and a Muslim youngman leading to a general attack on the minority community in the Indian capital itself.

In the ultimate analysis, the fact that some of Abdullah's anti-Indian outbursts could raise a thick dust of controversy whereas his equally momentous pro-Indian pronouncements—made contemporaneously—received little notice was in itself some justification for his apprehensions. Those misgivings came partly true, when the Praja Parishad launched an agitation against the State authority in November 1952, and the Jana Sangh, Mahasabha and Akali Dal came openly out in support of the civil-resisters.

We have dealt with the Parishad campaign in some detail in the last chapter; still it must be recorded that its unsolicited ministrations by the Indian communal parties was not so much an altruistic move by them to help the Kashmiri underdog, as it was a gambit in the game of higher Indian politics. Dr. S. P. Mookerjee, who was the spearhead of the Indian Opposition, himself declared at a meeting, jointly sponsored by the Jana Sangha, Mahasabha and Ram Rajya Parishad, to celebrate the 'Jammu and Kashmir Day' on March 5 this year, that their success in Kashmir would strengthen their hands to press the Government of India on other issues such as East Bengal and the refugee resettlement. And Pandit Mauli Chandra Sharma, who became the acting President of the Jana Sangh after Dr. Mookerjee's death, made an astounding declaration at Agra on August 26, that there should be no agreement on Kashmir until "our other outstanding disputes with Pakistan are also settled".

Thus not only the rulers in Pakistan, but many political organizations in India too have made Kashmir a stool-pigeon to practise target-shooting at. Conclusions could be drawn from the fact that, immediately after Dr. Mookerjee's untimely death, the Parishad leader Prem Nath Dogra called off the Jammu agitation. But that is not the last we have heard of Communalism in India; in fact, it is re-organizing its ranks for a renewed struggle, for behind and supporting it is the *haut finance*—Indian and international—still designing and assiduously

working to blow Nehru's Welfare State and 'nationalization' fads into smithereens.*

But if Nehru has been on the rack since Independence—excepting for a short respite immediately following Gandhiji's death—he has received some mercies from the Communists since his recognition and support of the Peoples' Republic of China, and particularly for his non-involvement in Korea. We shall have a closer perspective of the shifts in the Soviet diplomacy when we explore the third 'current'; it will be enough to record here that while the Communist bloc has apparently shown appreciation of the Indian foreign policy by a general let up in the internal militant activities, its stand in the Kashmir dispute had remained strictly non-committal, excepting when self-interest demanded otherwise. This Janus-faced attitude has made the communist leaders often take on contradictory poses—for instance, while Prof. Hiren Mukherjee cheered Nehru on his Kashmir policy, the late Dhanwantri formed a liaison with the Parishad leaders in Jammu; and while A. K. Ghosh observed at a public meeting at Cuttack in May 1952 that "the present agrarian reforms in Kashmir were good only on paper", P. Sundaraya told the Indian Parliament on June 6, only a few weeks later, that "Sheikh Abdullah and his government should be left free to carry out their land reforms."

We shall now take our readers to have a look at the neighbouring Pakistan. If the communal monster has not yet

* The Akali Dal has come out again with its separatist demand and threats of *Morchas* to back it. The Hindu bodies are trying to re-emerge into politics. The Muslims have formed an all-India Convention to draw up a sectarian political programme. Even the Christians, who had never in the past taken their politics with the religious sauce, have lately displayed strange tastes—demanding a separate electorate for themselves. A more serious danger is developing in the secret link between the communal parties and press, and indigenous and foreign 'capital,' via the various newly grown societies allegedly for the 'defence of freedom in Asia.' Thus a sort of orderliness and solidarity is growing within the fighting phalanx arranged against the Government—with the militant communal worker as the 'soldier', the foreign 'capital' as the 'General Head-quarters', and the Indian 'capital' and the communal leaders as the 'commissioned' and 'non-commissioned' officers respectively.

been decapitated in India despite various attempts to scotch it, its depredations in Pakistan have been on a vaster scale. It should be remembered that even during the life-time of Mr. M. A. Jinnah the 'two-nation' chicken were coming home to roost ; for that was what had happened when Maulana Abu-ul-Moudoodi formed his Jamait-ul-Islamia, a cogglomeration of *Maulavis*, *Ulemas* and other religious obscurantists, and demanded the establishment of the Shariat laws in Pakistan. But Quaid-i-Azam was trying to 'westernize' the infant State with the help of the British officers well-studded in every sphere of administration. So the Jamait openly attacked the "Anglo-Muslim leadership which has usurped the State power to initiate an un-Islamic way of life." And the godless Communists, who then had greater freedom in Pakistan as a reward for their help in propagating the League ideology in pre-Partition days, joined hands with that militant body for their own ulterior motive. Much of the taciturnity and listlessness which Mr. Jinnah displayed during his last days—he had never been seen like that before—was due to the prescience of not a happy future for his country.

Quaid-i-Azam's early demise, and the traditional intra- and inter-provincial rivalries, rendered the task of building a nation, on nothing except a hate psychosis or a religious slogan, difficult. For, no sooner the object of hate was eliminated or removed from sight, or the *Kaffir* driven out, as it almost happened in the western wing of Pakistan, the cement keeping the edifice together began to crumble. The last few years, Pakistan leaders have tried to cure the malaise, but, unfortunately, very often the course of treatment has been worse than the disease.

Before we describe the political earthquakes that have time to time rocked Pakistan from within, it is worthwhile to remember that two powerful forces have all the while been working against her from without. And, paradoxically, they have been generated by the very diplomacy which has created Pakistan—the machinations to raise that region as a bastion against Soviet expansion.

The first delitarius force is the Pakhtoonistan movement, which has drawn active sympathy from the neighbouring Afghanistan, and where it is now firmly planted with its own parliament and a flag—a red mountain with a rising sun. The Pakhtoon leader, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan's appeal is very catchy—removal of the British influence from Pakistan; in a statement smuggled out from the jail—he has been there without trial since five years—he is reported to have said: "I told Mr. Jinnah that even after achieving Pakhtoonistan, we would be willing to continue with Pakistan on the understanding that if the British still have a foothold in Pakistan we would be free to secede. We are brothers in faith and therefore I expected Mr. Jinnah to give me my due. It is a disappointment to me that he could not be persuaded." * And the one question that dogged Justice Douglas, touring Afghanistan in July 1951, was, "Why America does not do something about Pakhtunistan?" Recently Mohammad Akbar Khan, president of the Pakhtoon Jirga-i-Hind, had threatened at a press conference in Calcutta, on January 13 this year, that the U. N. O. would be urged to hold a referendum in N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan to ascertain whether the people wanted Pakistan or Pakhtoonistan. And Prince Peter of Greece, returning from an anthropological expedition in Afghanistan last September, has reported to have seen a Pakhtoon levy of 60,000 strong ready for military action.

The second force is the Communist pull on the Muslim countries on Pakistan's north. Mention has already been made to the 'modernization' going on in the Central Asian Republics under U.S.S.R. technical directions. This alternative appeal to the Muslim mind—and stomach—became increasingly seductive after China turned Red and Sinkiang became a hive of industrial activity. In 1891 the recalcitrant ruler of Hunza had threatened Col. Durand that if the British marched against him, they would have to fight Russia and China also. Now, not only

* Substance of Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan's statement published by an Afghan journal, *Kabul*, in March 1949, and reproduced in the *People* of Delhi.

his successor but Pakistani statesmen as well look over their shoulders nervously at the fast developing northern neighbourhood, while the standard of living in their own country falls steadily. *

While the external threats to Pakistan grow apace, the danger from within is no less perturbing. Muslim countries very often do not get their political demands redressed through constitutional means, despite the much-vaunted Islamic democracy; there *coups d'état* and political murders are more in fashion. That Pakistan also was not immune from this affliction came as a shock, when a 'conspiracy' to overthrow the government was discovered in December 1950. Since the official communique announcing the discovery of the 'sinister' plot did not disclose the nature of the attempted *coup* except that an unnamed 'foreign' power was involved, nor had the military tribunal which tried the 'conspirators' thrown any revealing light on their aims, mere speculation has been given a long rope. But by piecing the available evidence together—the arrested persons coming from the highest military and social strata,† a general round-up of the communists, a sudden cutting off of Miss Fatima Jinnah from the air—a plausible story can be built up. It appears that Mr. Jinnah had died a disappointed man, because of the failure of his Kashmir gamble. ‡ His close associates and the religious divines were demanding a quick finish of the

* In 1949 the present chief of Hunza inquired from Franc Shor, the special correspondent of *Life*, if his State could become a part of the United States; in 1951 he asked another American visitor, Justice William O. Douglas, if the United States was going to protect his State from Russia. Behind the pathos of these entreaties is the admission of Pakistan's incapacity to defend her northern frontiers—which explains the American and British manoeuvres in Kashmir.

† Chief of Pakistani Staff, Major-Gen. Akbar Khan and his wife—the daughter of Begum Shah Nawaz; Air Commodore Juneja; Mr. Faiz Ahmed Faiz, a famous journalist; Mr. Sajjad Zaheer, a well-known communist; and others.

‡ "The blow that finally broke his spirit was the crisis over Kashmir... With the beginning of this torturing anxiety, the Quaid-i-Azam's siege of bad colds began, and then his dismaying withdrawal into himself." (Margaret Bourke-White: *Halfway to Freedom*)

affair—open war if necessary—on the principle, 'Let us have done with it, once for all'. In the beginning Liaqat Ali put his blind eye to this propaganda for a *jehad*, for a calculated display of Pakistani sensitiveness was likely to earn dividends from the Security Council and its organs. But he had been made wiser by the fate of Korea, and was therefore not prepared to go the whole hog. So he jammed the brakes on just when the war-machine was getting out of control; in the process much psychological heat was generated, and the 'conspiracy' was merely its release mechanism. As for the Communists, they always work for instability: in a non-communist country. Their British-phobia, whetted by a U. K. 'trade mission' to Pakistan, had brought them closer to the *Ulemas*; and the glamour associated with all 'underground' work let them infiltrate a section of the Pakistani *élite*. Their argument was that if a person wanted to commit suicide after endorsing the insurance policy in their favour, why should he not be abetted? And, in the bargain, they baulked Liaqat Ali's contemplated despatch of a Pakistani contingent to Korea.

Pan-Islamism has been an attractive slogan in various times, at various places, from various mouths. To Pakistanis, who had never been taught to distinguish kinship in faith from ties of nationhood, this idea was more attractive than an iridescent rainbow to a child. Moreover, with a population and resources larger than any other Muslim State, here was an opportunity to grasp the leadership of the Islamic world. So, an International Islamic Economic Conference was called at Karachi in the autumn of 1949; it passed some pious resolutions on the desirability for a greater volume of trade between the participating countries, but, apart from doing some publicity for Pakistan, it achieved little on the practical field. After all, commerce is determined not by religious labels but by economic factors.

Failing to propagate the Pan-Islamic ideal on the economic plane, Pakistan attempted to realize the dream on the political. A World Muslim Conference (*Motamer-e-Alam-e-Islam*)

assembled at Karachi between February 9-14, 1951. The aim was to fight the "poisonous propaganda of Nationalism preached by the West, and weld the Muslim nations.....verily into one". Again some resolutions were adopted—to break down the barriers of racial nationalism as between the Muslim countries, and to annihilate the forces creating rifts and schisms in the polity of Islam; but as the delegates had come in their individual capacities and no country was represented on the official level, the decisions of the Conference reflected the wish of only those who had forgathered. Nevertheless, Pakistan partly regained the prestige she had lost after the 'conspiracy', and a 'Kashmir Scroll' was got ready for presentation to the U. N. O. *

But the Minotaur came again, and on this occasion the victim was the Prime Minister himself. On October 15, 1951, Liaquat Ali was murdered at Rawalpindi under mysterious circumstances. The 'hush-hush' inquiry committee, which investigated into the crime, did not satisfy the heart-broken Begum; and the whole affair has been allowed to remain so much enshrouded in secrecy that one is led to believe that it was the devil of fanaticism that had caught hold of its high priest in the long run.

After a quick reshuffle of the Government, Khwaja Nazim-ud-din stepped down from the Governor-General's *gaddi*, to occupy the office left vacant by Liaquat Ali. Having a record of collaboration with the British in the pre-Partition days, and with a tendency to be more pliant to friendly counsels than Liaquat Ali, the Khawaja was a welcome change to the Anglo-Americans.

But 1952 was one long year of frustration in Pakistan. Constitution-making was stalled; the refugee-problem was a great stigma to the Islamic brotherhood; and the provincial governments were hotbeds of personal rivalries. Nazim-ud-din tried to

* A petition, called 'Kashmir Scroll', was prepared setting forth Pakistan's claim for Kashmir, and was reported to have been signed by more than a million Muslims and other supporters. It was finalized at the Conference, with many delegates forcefully backing Pakistan.

arrest this growing estrangement between the people and the administration with the old stock-in-trade 'propaganda for *jehad*. By the end of the year, the U. N. mediator Dr. Graham had reported failure to the Security Council, and when the Anglo-Americans submitted a resolution favourable to Pakistan, the anti-Indian cry was re-doubled to put extraneous pressure on the delegates. Thereupon, India was compelled to lodge a formal protest against the continued exhortations to war, and Nehru wrote to Nazim-ud-din renewing his 'No-War declaration' offer.

Conditions in Pakistan had become even worse on the economic front. The dynamics for Pakistan in the pre-Partition days had come from the landed aristocracy, and particularly from the few Muslim capitalist-families—Haroons of Sind; Ispahanis and Adamjis of Calcutta; Rahimtoolahs and Habibs of Bombay; Allanas of Lahore. They found underdeveloped Pakistan a closed preserve and a mine of opportunity; but in their plans and projects, the peasant and the worker were nowhere in sight. Yet Pakistan's economy remained, for the first five years, in a halcyonic phase, helped fortuitously by the Korean boom. That idyll was now over; and for that Pakistan had herself to blame. Due to the unwise policy of making hay (jute and cotton) while the economic sun shone, she did not have another fodder (rice and wheat) when that sun set. While early this year a desperate appeal had gone to the United States for a big wheat loan, the way the 'canal water' dispute was publicized, it appeared that India was being condemned *in absentia* for the crimes of Pakistan's Agricultural and Industries Ministry. The opposition leader, H. S. Suhrawardy pertinently asked on February 20: "Has it become necessary for Mr. Nazim-ud-din once more to excite the people with anti-Indian sentiments in order to bolster up his tottering regime and divert the attention of the people from the immediate problem?"

Nevertheless, the invoked Minotaur came again; and its ransom this time was not so costly as the extermination of

another high priest, but his political ostracism instead. There being practically no Hindus left in Western Pakistan, upon whom Muslim communalism could vent its spleen, it caught hold of the Ahmediyas,* reputed for their unorthodoxy. For years, the *Ulemas* and the religious divines had been campaigning against these 'heretics', till a fanatical agitation, demanding that the community be declared a separate minority, took Western Pakistan in its grip. The crisis developed with the 'arrest' of 11 *Maulanas* in Karachi on February 27, and soon spread to the Punjab (P). On March 1, a mammoth crowd, about 100,000 strong and executing the Bhangara 'terror-dance', paraded through the main streets of Lahore, shouting: "*Nazim-ud-din, hai-hai*"; "*Zafrullah, hai-hai*", and pointing to an effigy of the Foreign Minister, with which it had equipped itself, asked for his dismissal. Military had to be called out, and only a firmly imposed martial law and a change in the provincial ministry restored order. The communists were seen to help the agitators, apparently to chastize Sir M. Zafrullah Khan for his predilection for the Anglo-American defence system in the Middle East.†

If, therefore, medieval obscurantism was devouring even the builders of Pakistan one by one, the lot of 'Azad Kashmir' masses was unenviable. They were a prey to the ambitions of their

* The Ahmediyas form a sub-sect of Muslims, with their spiritual centre at Qadian on the Indian territory. In general, they are of liberal temperament, and they take their religion with a non-conformity sauce. Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Sir M. Zafrullah Khan, is a prominent Ahmediya.

† Some agitators were sentenced to death and others to various terms of imprisonment by the military tribunals. Maulana Abu-ul-Moudoodi of the Jamait-i-Islamia, whom we have seen making the Quaid-i-Azam's last days bitter, was awarded the death sentence, but it was later commuted to one for 14 years' imprisonment. An enquiry committee, appointed many months later, threw much revealing light on the whole affair. One important fact was given prominence by most of the witnesses—that the continued presence of Sir M. Zafrullah Khan in the successive Cabinets was in some way connected with his "popularity" with the British and U.S. Governments. But the most startling disclosure was made on November 18 this year by Khwaja Nasir Ahmed, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the *Civil and Military Gazette*, Lahore, that Maulana Moudoodi had been financed by the Americans.

leaders, who had imported their personal rivalries with them. First, Sardar Ibrahim Khan came on top through the patronage of his brother Abdul Qayum Khan ; a year later, he was pushed into the background by Chaudhari Ghulam Abbas, whose past reputation as a fighter against the Dogra rule had to be paraded before the Kashmir Commission. The elevation of the ex-Jammu leader evoked claims from *Mir Waiz* Yusuf Shah of Srinagar. Soon a fourth contender, ex-engineer Raja Haider Khan entered the lists. The scramble for power resulted in a sort of division of the 'Azad' territory—the Muzaffarabad-Mirpur area went to C. Ghulam Abbas, Poonch to Sardar Ibrahim Khan and Yusuf Shah, and the entire area from Muzaffarabad to Uri to Raja Haider Khan. Soon there was a kettle o' fish aboiling in 'Azad Kashmir.' Disgusted with their squabbles, Pakistan brought the warring cliques under her direct political control, opened a Political Agency in Gilgit under the N. W. F. P. government, and appointed a whole-time Minister for Kashmir Affairs in the Central Cabinet. Since then, 'Azad Kashmir' has gone under a sort of news-blackout, for after the acceptance by the UNCIP of the factum of a separate 'Azad Government' vis-a-vis the Kashmir Government, the 'Azad' territory has practically become a province of Pakistan, with a constitutionally subordinate position.*

This brings us to Pakistan's seemingly unending struggles with her Constitution ; in comparison, India has hers in operation since January 1951. Its desultory progress supports the thesis that it is a herculean task to 'make' a nation on religious sentiments alone. One of its Basic Principles, as formulated in the sub-committee report submitted on December 22, 1952, to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, is to "inculcate to them

* The Muslim Conference in 'Azad Kashmir' continues to be a platform for personal rivalries even today—while Sardar Ibrahim claimed to have been elected President after the elections to the General Council last autumn, Chaudhari Ghulam Abbas "accepted" the Presidentship at the convention of the Conference workers only a few days later. A victim of this feud was Mr. Hamidullah, Finance Minister of the 'Azad Kashmir' Government, when he was dismissed by the latest titular "Head" Col. Sher Ahmed, on September 19 last.

[Muslims of Pakistan] the spirit to keep foremost in their minds the fundamental unity and solidarity of Millat, and the requirements of the ideology and mission for the implementation of which Pakistan came into being".

That 'the fundamental unity and solidarity of the Millat' had always been there on the religious plane is exhibited by the universal Islamic belief in the Holy Quran and the Prophet, as well as in the way the Haj pilgrimage is regarded as the *summum bonum* of one's earthly existence—no Mohammadan needs exhortation on that score. So the professed 'ideology and mission' of Pakistan can only be the translation of the Millat's religious unity into a political solidarity; in other words, Pan-Islamism or an Islamic Federation with Pakistan at the helm. The acute differences with Afghanistan; the failure of the International Islamic Economic Conference and the World Muslim Conference to achieve any unity—economic or political; the cold water thrown by almost all Muslim countries in the Middle East and North African on Pakistan's anti-Indian propaganda; and the lukewarm support which Pakistan herself has given to the national struggles of those countries against the British and French Imperialisms*—all point to one fact, that the Basic Principle dream exists on the paper only.

Moreover, the political solidarity of the Millat within Pakistan was rudely shaken when Khwaja Nazim-ud-din was dismissed by the Governor-General, Mr. Ghulam Mohammad, on April 17 this year, on the plea that his Cabinet "has proved entirely inadequate to grapple with the difficulties of the country." The constitutional propriety of this dismissal, while the Khwaja still had the confidence of the electorate, has been justified on the ground that as Pakistan was still following the Government of India Act, 1935, her Ministers held office during the Governor-General's pleasure. But the precipitate way this was

* As recently as October 8 last, Pakistan withdrew her resolution on the French imperialistic activities in Morocco, tabled before the U. N. Political Committee, as she "does not have any desire to embarrass France," despite the unanimous wish of the Arab-Asian group to the contrary.

brought about—"breath-taking", as the new Prime Minister, Mr. Mohammad Ali, described it—suggests that there was more in it than met the eye.

It is true that the deepening of the economic crisis was on the debit side of the balance-sheet. But the United States had already promised substantial 'food aid', and Great Britain had given a ten-million pound loan; these largesses were enough to buttress the crumbling economic edifice. Moreover, the Government had survived the challenge of the Ahmediya agitation, and the political emergency was also over. On the other hand, there was a large entry on the credit side—a perceptible improvement in the Indo-Pakistani relations, resulting from the exhaustive correspondence between Nazim-ud-din and Nehru. The trade-talks held in Delhi in the middle of March were such an all-round success that Sardar Abdur Rab Nastar, Pakistan's Industries' Minister, declared on March 25, that "the possibility of a real *rapprochement* between India and Pakistan was never stronger since partition." And this resurgence of mutual goodwill was confirmed when the two Prime Ministers agreed to meet at Karachi by the end of April, to thrash out all outstanding disputes between the two countries—the first direct negotiation since the death of Mr. Liaquat Ali. Therefore, the dismissal of Khwaja Nazim-ud-din, just on the eve of those talks and when Pakistan appeared to be regaining her equipoise, was more than coincidental—though it 'surprised' the victim himself.

Nevertheless, a mass of circumstantial evidence point to the Anglo-American hand in this affair. Though in such matters it is difficult to catch anybody in *flagrante delicto*, yet we have the evidence tendered before the Disturbances Court of Enquiry that American 'finance' had been helping the leader of the agitators. There are other indirect proofs, which we give below.

Firstly, U. K. and U. S. A had never liked Pakistan to emulate India and to toe an independent line; so Liaquat Ali was succeeded by a less spirited person. But Nazim-ud-din came from the Muslim League 'old guard' and had the

stubbornness which usually comes with age. It was therefore in the interests of the Anglo-American diplomacy to get him replaced by someone more pliant. In that respect Mr. Mohammad Ali was more suitable—he was a junior politician and was known to the Americans, being his country's ambassador to the United States. Another independent-minded person, Mian Mumtaz Daulatana had been replaced less than a month back by a pro-Britisher, Malik Firoz Khan Noon, as the premier of the Punjab (P).

Then there was the significant article by Mr. Aneurin Bevan, the 'left-wing' Labour leader of Great Britain, written a few days before the Pakistani *denouement*, in which he had given his impressions on the Indo-Pakistan relations, and spoken about the prospects of a meeting between the Indian Prime Minister and the Pakistani Governor-General, while everybody else in the sub-continent was talking about one between the two Prime Ministers. Mr. Bevan's belief that Khwaja Nazim-ud-din would be eliminated from the projected talks came, more likely than not, from a remarkable prescience of the things to come, whose shape was already known in the inner circles in Pakistan and the United State, for Mr. Mohammad Ali had been recalled from Washington only four days earlier and was therefore on the spot when asked to form the new Government.

Finally, a series of remarkable happenings on the international plane, in the first quarter of this year, had completely altered the United States' approach towards the Middle East and South-east Asia. The Eisenhower Administration had adopted the 'gettough' attitude with Russia. To further this policy the United States was seen interfering in the internal affairs of many Asian countries, even trying to overthrow the anti-American governments there. We shall develop this point in the next chapter; suffice it to mention that, at that juncture, the United States was found working against the Indo-Kashmir and Indo-Pakistan amity. So, Nazim-ud-din's eagerness to make up with Nehru—"I shall be prepared to go more than half way to meet him", he

was heard to declare—was, to a certain extent, the cause of his undoing. And, not satisfied with disrupting both the time-table and the prospects of the Prime Ministers' meeting, the United States tried openly to sow greater discord between the two countries—when the Communist negotiators in the Korean truce-talks named India, Pakistan, Burma and Indonesia as the 'neutral' Asian nations of which one could be asked to hold custody of the unrepatriated prisoners-of-war, their American opposite-number selected Pakistan. While the choice was, in itself, an indication of a general preference; in the context of the Indo-Pakistan discord it was designed to cause more heart-burning in the two countries.

The new Pakistan Prime Minister started with a gusto; he called Nehru his 'elder brother'—the phrase has a deeper significance in Urdu in which it was spoken, than in English—and confirmed that the proposed meeting between the two Prime Ministers would still take place. Nevertheless, as he was new to the office, and both the participants were programmed to attend the Coronation of the British Queen in the first week of July, Mr. Nehru's Karachi visit had to be deferred to the last week of that month. Meanwhile, interested circles hoped to pull 'strings' in London, and were also preparing the ground for a showdown by Sheikh Abdullah.

The two Prime Ministers met at Karachi on July 28, but international diplomacy being in a negative mood, the three-day talks did not yield much. The balance-sheet was ably drawn up by Nehru at a press conference in Karachi on July 30; according to him, "some minor problems were solved, some major problems are being talked, while some other major problems have not been solved". The Kashmir dispute fell into the third category.

Nevertheless, some ground having been broken, and direct contact established, the two Prime Ministers agreed to meet again in New Delhi by the end of August, or during early September. Then Sheikh Abdullah's 'autonomy' stand shook the sub-continent like an earthquake. While India absorbed the shock

camly—though not without a mental wrench in seeing a comrade of twenty years drift apart, Pakistan was thrown into a convulsion. For India, it was ultimately an internal matter for the people of Kashmir to settle; she had never so much as raised an accusing finger any time when the 'Azad Kashmir' set-up was changed.* But to Pakistan all moves which brought India and Kashmir closer were anathema; and *mutatis mutandis*, all steps leading Kashmir away from India—Sheikh Abdullah's desire to abrogate the Delhi Agreement being one—were welcome. Therefore, the Sheikh's dismissal was not interpreted as a constitutional issue between the people and him, but "as a challenge to Pakistan."† The strange hysterics exhibited by Pakistan—she cancelled all celebrations connected with the anniversary of her independence, and called a 'Kashmir Day' on August 16—is a measure of the emotional storm into which the leaders had thrown the ignorant masses. And inspired messages appearing in the Anglo-American press on this event goaded the Pakistanis.

Some adroit gestures, efficacious with mob-psychology, by Mohammad Ali let off the steam to a certain extent. He pacified his people by advancing the date of the second series of talks with Nehru, and arrived in New Delhi with his Foreign Minister on August 16. After a four-day deliberation the two Prime Ministers issued a joint communique, announcing a limited agreement on the method to resolve the Kashmir tangle. As that phase of negotiations was directly linked with the various attempts made by the U. N. organs, it would be proper to

* As mentioned earlier, Mr. Hamidullah was summarily removed from the 'Azad Kashmir' Cabinet only a month after the Abdullah episode; that event not only passed unnoticed in India but not even a bird twittered in U. K. and U. S. A., in contrast to their loud haw-hawing in Sheikh's sympathy.

† On August 10, a public meeting was held in Karachi, presided over by a Pakistan cabinet minister and addressed amongst others by Miss Fatima Jinnah, at which a demand for a 'police action' against Kashmir was raised. There were also renewed threats of *jehad* against India, both from the press and the platform.

consider it in detail in the next chapter. Nevertheless, it must be mentioned here that on two points at least, Mr. Ali seemed to have yielded ground which his predecessors had been sticking to with pertinacity—whether that was due to the non-inclusion of the pro-Anglo-American Zafrullah Khan in the talks proper is another matter.

The first point was that by agreeing that the Plebiscite Administrator was to be inducted under the orders of the 'Jammu and Kashmir Government,' Mr. Ali had, for the first time, accepted the sovereignty of that Government over the whole State, including all areas occupied by the 'Azad Kashmir'. And the second was that by hinting that the choice for the Administrator might not be limited to the American admiral, Chester Nimitz—whose appointment had earlier been approved by the Security Council—he had lifted the dispute from the arena of international intrigue. It was, therefore, doubted whether the Pakistan Prime Minister would be able to carry his country, and the United States and Great Britain, with him. As for the 'Azad Kashmir' which had been brought into existence as narrated earlier by U.S.-U.K. machinations, it saw its existence threatened by the Nehru-Ali agreement; so its spokesmen were extremely critical of the communique. Nevertheless, the agreement on a provisional 'time-table' for the plebiscite was some achievement, and Mr. Ali returned to Karachi with his "minimum hopes fulfilled".

The scepticism about Mr. Ali's capacity to obtain approval from his own people was soon confirmed for it needed seven long meetings of the Pakistan Cabinet before a qualified sanction could be given him—and that too without unanimity. He had also to 'appease' the Americans, firstly by re-opening the question about the nationality of the Plebiscite Administrator, and secondly by voting in U.N.O. against India's inclusion in the Korean Political Conference, while every other Muslim country and practically every Asian voted in favour.

The Pakistan Governor-General, Mr. Ghulam Mohammad has declared on the last Pakistan Independence Day: "Old wounds

take time to heal and where suspicion, mistrust and hatred have unfortunately taken root, only great determination, courage, and sympathy could provide the healing balm which would serve to erase the sad memories of the past". These are unexceptional sentiments; almost a call for a 'clean slate'. Pakistan civil service is also gingering its Government for a settlement with India—after all it had worked with its Indian counterpart in pre-Partition days, and the spirit of old comradeship still lives.

Yet, simultaneously, powerful influences—internal and external—are not allowing Mr. Ghulam Mohammad and Mr. Mohammad Ali to wipe the old slate. Hardly had the ink dried on the Nehru-Ali agreement than there was another anti-Indian outburst in the Pakistan press and talks of a 'war of liberation' in Jammu and Kashmir, directly contrary to the joint appeal made by the two Prime Ministers deprecating "any propaganda or attacks on one country by the other in the Press, over the radio, or by speeches and statements made by responsible men and women of either country". And though recently both sides have repeatedly expressed mutual goodwill, yet the achievement of their representatives, who met in Calcutta this month (October) in pursuance to the Prime Ministers' agreement, has been insignificant, particularly on the two important questions of the exchange of the 'enclaves' and the easing of the travel restrictions between East and West Bengals. And lately there have been renewed bickerings over the 'evacuee property' and the alleged breaches of trade-pacts.

Today, the sub-continent is an arena where the vision of a co-operative future is contending issues with the communal "memories of the past"—in India, the former is gradually getting the better of its opponent, of course with occasional lapses; in Pakistan, the latter is still the stronger of the two, though its contender too is slowly gaining strength. In this contest, while the vested interest and international diplomacy are lending support to the latter, the most powerful ally of the former is

the indomitable will for peace, which is as old as the Man himself.

Looking at the canvas of Tomorrow from the Indo-Pakistan plane, we see the faint outline of the Ocean of Peace towards which the second Kashmiri 'current' appears to move. Yet, to make sure that the idyllic vision is not the shape of a coming storm, we now proceed to explore the third 'current'.

THIRD CURRENT (Continued)

We have seen how the third 'current'—the sphere of influence politics—had pushed the State of Jammu and Kashmir into the Whirlpool in October 1947. We also know how the dispute was raised from the Indo-Pakistan plane to the international. In this affair, Lord Mountbatten's role had been conspicuous and significant.

Reference has already been made about Lord Mountbatten's over-eagerness for a meeting with Maharaja Hari Singh, his emphasis on Sardar Patel's assurance about Kashmir's accession, and his gratuitous arrangement of a Jinnah-Kak talk in the pre-Invasion months. We remember his casuistry against the despatch of the Indian troops to Kashmir after the Invasion had been set off; and his inspiration behind the qualified accession formula. We also know that, though the Indian Cabinet had declared that the final accession of the State would be ratified by a "reference to people", it had never contemplated that such "reference" could be made under any auspices other than the State Government. Lord Mountbatten had, on his own, offered to Mr. Jinnah that the plebiscite might be held under the United Nations Organization. This counsel for the induction of a 'third party' was, if anything, an aspersion on the impartiality of the Kashmir Government.

By the close of 1947, the raiders were on the run. But just when the military situation was turning in India's favour we are told that "the full weight of Mountbatten's military authority is against any extension of already vulnerable and tenuous lines of communication".* And not satisfied with casting aspersions on the Kashmir Government he went one step better, to doubt his friend Nehru's credentials even; in his opinion, Nehru's

* Alan Campbell-Johnson : *Mission with Mountbatten*. "This is the limit of India's combat potential", commented the *London Times* on December 27, 1947,

"origins as a descendent of Kashmiri Brahmins, his friendship and political association with Sheikh Abdullah, make it difficult for him to stand above the problem at the moment of decision."

Then, in order to 'soften' Nehru, Mountbatten threw propriety to the winds; and though a constitutional Governor-General only, he over-stepped his powers to invite the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, to fly out immediately to India to mediate between Nehru and Liaquat Ali. Finally, he sent a letter to Nehru on the Christmas Day, 1947, scaring him out of wits against any further embroilment with Pakistan and urging him to submit the matter to U. N. O., till the latter was persuaded to appeal to the international body, presumably against Mahatma Gandhi's advice.*

This is how the Government of India allowed the initiative to pass from their hands to the Anglo-American dominated U.N.O., at a time when India was not even getting a good 'coverage' in the two countries. Many British and American journalists were 'cold' to the Indian version of the Kashmir story; others distorted the sequence of history to put a premium on the Pakistani version; yet others said that India was the "aggressor" or that she had "intervened forcibly" or that Pakistan

* Mr. Campbell-Johnson asserts that when Mountbatten saw Mahatma Gandhi, in the first week of December 1947, the latter was "favourably inclined to the invocation of U. N. O." This interpolation, after Mahatma's demise, is improper, and is meant only to bring the weight of his name on the controversy. Gandhiji's own view on the propriety of the Indian reference has been recorded by his biographer, Louis Fischer: "He regretted the fact that Nehru had submitted the dispute to the United Nations. At the U. N., he told Horace Alexander, the British pacifist, considerations of international 'power politics' rather than merit would determine the attitude of countries towards the Kashmir issue. Gandhi therefore urged India and Pakistan to 'come to an amicable settlement with the assistance of impartial Indians'; that, he said, would enable the Indian Union's representation to the U. N. to be withdrawn with dignity. If direct negotiations failed, Gandhi contemplated mediation by one or two Englishmen; in his talk with Horace Alexander, the Mahatma mentioned Philip Noel-Baker, a member of the British Labour Government, as an acceptable mediator." (Louis Fischer: *The Life of Mahatma Gandhi*)

was "provoked." In short, if the Press were an index of the national opinion, India had already lost her case.

Let us here digress a little to discuss India's "legal title and moral grievance as a plaintiff" in the Kashmir dispute. First, India's complaint about Pakistan's failure to deny the raiders access to and use of her soil.—Physical inability was Pakistan's excuse; the impossibility to guard all frontier points, and, once the invasion had started, the extreme communal strain on the police or army to ask either to turn the raiders back. These pretexts cannot, however, exonerate Pakistan because, in international law, a State is made responsible to the prejudicial acts committed within its territory against another State, and is charged to prevent them with diligence proportionate to the gravity, and with all the means at its disposal. Says Dionisio Anzilotte, the ex-President of the Permanent Court of International Justice: "The State which knows that an individual is plotting an unlawful act against a foreign State or sovereign and does not prevent it when it should have done so becomes in a certain manner an accomplice in the commission of the offence; a kind of solidarity is created between it and the culprit, derived from the tacit approval of the act; from this approval, and not from the relationship between the individual and the State, arises the responsibility of the State."

Then, India's accusation of Pakistan as an "aggressor"—This charge hinges on the definition of the term 'aggression'. At the Pan-American Conference, held at Montevideo in 1933, this term was defined to mean, *inter alia*, "acts of violence effected by armed bands against the territory of another State subject to the condition that the State where such bands have been formed has not adopted all the measures necessary for the suppression of such acts." In almost identical language, Article 2 of the Convention signed in London in 1933, between the Soviet Union on one hand, and Afghanistan, Esthonia, Lithuania, Persia, Poland, Rumania, Turkey, Yugo-Slavia, Czechoslovakia and Finland on the other, defined the term to include

"provision of support to armed bands formed on the territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to take on its own territory all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection".

Lastly, Pakistan's counter-accusation about Junagadh—To this let Campbell-Johnson answer : "Quite apart from the test of majority populations, the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan was in violation of the principle of geographical compulsion to which Pakistan leaders had themselves subscribed. The accession of Kashmir was not. Moreover from the strategic and economic points of view, while Pakistan had no interest in Junagadh, India had considerable interest in Kashmir. There were two further special factors involved in the case of Kashmir but absent from that of Junagadh—the use of force by tribal invasion to overthrow the Maharaja's regime before accession, and the presence (also before accession) of an important inter-communal political organisation in the State.

"Taking into account all these 'other factors', the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan was wholly frivolous, while that of Kashmir to India was definitely arguable. It was just because of all the special circumstances attaching to both accessions that the Government of India accepted the principle of a confirming plebiscite for the action taken in both States. Finally it should be noted that when India challenged the validity of the Junagadh accession, Pakistan asserted the doctrine of the Ruler's absolute and sacrosanct right to accede, but promptly challenged that right in the case of Kashmir".*

Gopalaswami Ayyengar's presentation of the Indian case to the Security Council on January 15, 1948, was along the above line of reasoning. In reply, Sir M. Zafrullah Khan harangued the Security Council for two days—perhaps a record in speech-making in that assembly ; first he denied his country's complicity in Kashmir fighting, and then, like the tactician whose strongest defence is an attack, he rolled out a long list of

* Alan Campbell-Johnson : *Mission with Mountbatten*.

counter-charges—non-fulfilment of inter-Dominion agreements, Junagadh and Hyderabad, and 'genocide' of the Muslims. While all the issues raised by the Pakistani leader were extraneous to the complaint under discussion and should properly have been considered separately on their own merits, the 'court of appeal' allowed itself to be 'red-herringed', so that the Council President, Langanhove of Belgium, himself intervened to widen the agenda from "Jammu and Kashmir" to "Indo-Pakistan dispute", even overruling the Soviet delegate Andrei Gromyko's protest against such a procedural irregularity. Futile was Ayyengar's lament that the Security Council was "fiddling while Kashmir burns".

We are aware of the century-old British longing for Kashmir; in recent years, that design was furthered, first by hinting at 'sovereignty,' and then by canvassing for an accession to Pakistan. Subsequently, the tactics changed and the same objective was sought to be reached, with the help of the United States, "under the aegis of the Security Council". So, going off the tangent, the British delegate Noel-Baker, and his American counterpart Warren Austin, proposed a 'neutral' regime in the State under United Nations' supervision. And Langanhove—ever obliging to the Marshall aid benefactor—formally proposed on January 28, a "neutral administration and a plebiscite under Security Council control".

S. M. Abdullah, who had come out as a member of the Indian delegation, tried to bring the debate back to the central issue; he told the Security Council on February 5, that the subject of dispute was not "the sovereignty of the Prince", nor "the mal-administration", but that the tribesmen "have been helped and are being helped by the Pakistan Government with the result that there is the possibility of a greater conflagration, between India and Pakistan." As for the need of a *soi-disant* impartial government of the State during the proposed plebiscite, he asked: "After all, what does 'neutral administration' mean?...If elections were to be held in the United Kingdom sometime with the Labour Government in power, would any one say to Mr. Attlee: 'The

elections are now going on. Because you happen to belong to the Labour Party, your sympathies will be in favour of the labour vote. Therefore, you had better clear out. We must have a neutral man as Prime Minister until our elections are finished'. But it was like talking logic to a deaf person with a closed mind.

Nehru's naiveté for the U.N.O. received a shock; he at last realized, what Gandhiji had the prescience to do from the beginning, that "the nations of the world sitting on the body [Security Council] got lost in power politics". Accordingly, the Indian delegation was recalled home on February 12, 1948, for further consultations. Nevertheless, by the time the delegation was ready to return, India's bargaining power had improved. First, the British Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Gordon-Walker, had come to New Delhi for hammering out a formula with Mountbatten and Nehru, "as to how the structure of the Commonwealth could perhaps be altered, particularly in nomenclature, to allow Asian countries to remain more easily associated with it"; or, in other words, to find if India would agree to accept the British Sovereign as a Head without owning allegiance in the citizenship sense. Secondly, there was a perceptible tilt of the military balance in India's favour during January and February, which we have already described in the previous chapter. And lastly, Mahatma Gandhi's martyrdom had brought the Indians to their senses; the schism weakening the Cabinet had disappeared and the nation was standing almost to the man behind Nehru.

The effect of this change in the situation was seen when the Indian delegation arrived again at Lake Success. Dr. T. F. Tsiang of China, the new President of the Council, submitted a draft resolution on March 18, which appeared to give some consideration to the Indian point of view. But when India had expressed her general acceptance of the spirit of the draft, the British delegation threw a spanner by inducting 'Azad Kashmir' into the discussion.

In April, Dr. Lopez of Colombia took over the presidency of the Council. Dr. Tsiang's proposals were brushed aside

and a radically different resolution sponsored by six nations—Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, United Kingdom and United States—was moved from the chair on April 17. * It proposed the establishment of a Commission of five members of the United Nations, with India and Pakistan nominating one each, to mediate between the two countries "with respect to the restoration of peace and order and to the holding of a plebiscite". But the rest of the new resolution incorporated all the obnoxious suggestions made earlier by Noel-Baker and Warren Austin—and those, too, in a worse form. The Plebiscite Administrator, though technically "acting as an officer of the State of Jammu and Kashmir," was to have (i) powers over the "direction and supervision of the State forces and police," (ii) "authority to nominate special magistrates," (iii) "right to communicate direct" with the Security Council and the Governments of India and Pakistan"—in short, he was to be a 'super-authority' over the head of the Kashmir Government. Moreover, while the arrangements for the plebiscite were on the way, the Abdullah administration was to be remodelled into a "neutral Cabinet" with the "major political groups to designate responsible representatives to share equitably and fully in the conduct of the administration at the ministerial level".

The only sop, which the six-nations' resolution offered to India, was the admission that hers was the sole responsibility for the defence of the State, and for the due discharge of which she was permitted to retain a part of her Army "to the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power, and in maintenance of law and order." But this concession, too, was vitiated by the provision that the Commission could, under certain circumstances, call upon the Pakistan forces "for purpose of the pacification of the country."

Nevertheless, as India's bargaining power haing improved, she boldly announced her inability to accept the resolution. In emphatic tones Gopalaswamy Ayyengar declared that the

* Appendix. VI

provision of a 'neutral cabinet,' in which the very people who had been conducting and organizing tribal raids would find a place, "is to invite the paralysis of the Kashmir Administration"; further, as the plebiscite administration was supposed to function in the name of the Kashmir Government, "it cannot, therefore, be asked to apply to an outside State to supply forces," since that "round-about method of introducing Pakistani forces.....is fraught with incalculable risks."

Pakistan, too, was in a negative mood. Sir M. Zafrullah Khan told the sponsors of the resolution that his country was unable to carry out the obligations sought to be laid upon her by them, unless she was given a parity with India in the retention of the armed forces.

Despite serious objections by both parties in the dispute, the resolution was adopted on April 21, with Syria abstaining from voting on many of the paragraphs, and Ukraine and U.S.S.R. on all of them. The extent to which the Security Council had compromised India's position was aptly stated by Gopalaswamy Ayyengar, when he remarked that "the resolution tars us with the same brush and makes us look like the co-accused."

The cavalier treatment of India by the Western democracies was purposeful, and therefore surprised a credulous few only; but the totalitarian bloc's 'neutrality' took the breath away of the many who had seen in the early Indo-Soviet overtures the preliminary stage of a permanent amorous union. They did not know that in the Marxian dialectics amity and animosity had tactical values only, and were inter-transferable according to the requirement of the Soviet interests. Russian references were friendly, to the extent Indian independence represented an attrition of rival Britain's strength. Reciprocally, any hardening of the Indo-British link—Gordon Walker-Mountbatten formula for instance—merited Soviet censure. Accordingly, U.S.S.R. and the satellite Ukraine's abstention from voting represented a chartered accountant's cancellation of the debit and the credit on the balance-sheet.

Kashmir was much exercised by the heavyhanded diplomacy at

Lake Success ; the General Council of the National Conference said on April 22 that it "rejects the resolution in toto and calls upon the people to resist this decision." Reaction in India was equally sharp. But the inevitable Mountbatten appeared again on the scene. With his extraordinary flair for the argument and a capacity to go round and round the mulberry bush till the other person gave up, he was "instrumental in securing Nehru's agreement that the proposed plebiscite commission be allowed to come to India". Under this pressure, the Government of India resiled, and they informed the President of the Security Council on May 15 that while "there can be no question of the Commission proceeding to implement the resolution on Kashmir until the objections raised by the Government of India have been satisfactorily met," if it visited India "they would wish to confer with them."

The first step India took towards co-operation with the proposed UNCIP was to nominate Czechoslovakia on it. Pakistan sent in Argentina ; and Belgium, Colombia and U. S. A. completed the team. India's selection of a country gone 'red' only three months back was an attempt to counterpoise the Anglo-American dominance in the Commission, as also to 'purchase' Soviet goodwill. This crude design failed to work for international Communism was playing the old game in which not India alone but South-east Asia and the Middle East were involved, and the stake was the ultimate absorption of whole of the southern Asian fringe. That apparently was the objective of the Asian Youth Conference held in Calcutta three months earlier, which many 'underground' leaders from the neighbouring countries attended, to decide upon the pattern of insurrectionary activity for each.* The programme for India

* It was at this stage that Ho Chi Minh, the Moscow-trained Viet-Minh communist, became the 'national' leader in Indo-China ; that the Malayan communists made capital out of the stupidity of the tin and rubber barons and the woodenness of the colonial administration ; that Thakin Than Tun linked his rebel White Flag party and the dissident P. V. O.'s with the Karen separatist movement in Burma ; that Huckabaleph were first heard of in the Philippines.

was the replacement of P. C. Joshi by B. T. Ranadive, an alliance with the communalist Akalis and Razakars, and the preparation for the Telengana 'adventure'. And as the Communist attitude towards India was determined by the tactics in South-east Asia, so the behaviour with Pakistan was patterned on the strategy in the Muslim countries of the Middle East, the *leit-motif* of which was to cash on the British mistakes and, in general, to create ill-will against Great Britain and U. S. A. The communists in Pakistan, therefore, did not direct their attention on the landlords and the vested classes, but, in league with the *Mullahs* and the *Maulvis*, raised slogans against the foreign Governors and civil servants. With international Communism in that temper, should it be surprising that the Czechoslovak delegate, Dr. Chyle, became more a watch-dog of the Soviet interests than a custodian of the Indian? But, then, we are anticipating events.

India's co-operation with the Commission now assured, Pakistan was instigated to re-open discussion on the various extraneous issues raised by Sir M. Zafrullah Khan in the Security Council, and a resolution was passed on June 3, directing the Commission "to study and report to the Security Council when it [Commission] considers appropriate" on those matters. Thus an international organ charged to maintain peace tried to increase the area of conflict between India and Pakistan.

The five-men Commission assembled in Geneva on June 15 on the first lap of its journey to the sub-continent. Nehru promised a welcome; "the Government of India," he cabled on June 26, "will be glad to confer with the commission when it arrived in Delhi. We shall also give what assistance we can." And, to unruffle Kashmiri sensibilities, he went to Srinagar also.

After its arrival on the sub-continent in July, the Commission forwarded an appeal to the two Governments not to do anything materially to alter, or to aggravate, the situation in the State. As already narrated, Pakistan flouted this request openly and deployed troops in Baltistan etc., while India had put her army on the reins. Then came Pakistan's admission—first denied, but

later accepted—that her regular forces were involved in Kashmir.* Here at last was the vindication of India's complaint ; even the Commission admitted that "the presence of the troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation". With Pakistan now crying *peccavi*, no further 'mediation' was necessary, and the Commission should have pronounced the judgement. Instead of adopting this straight-forward method, the Commission passed a resolution—subsequently known 'Cease-fire' resolution†—on August 13, proposing an immediate and unconditional cease-fire along the fighting line ; and went into prolonged negotiations with the sinner and the sinned placed on the same level.

Then the Commission requisitioned services of the U.N.O. Military Observers. Soon forty-four were flown to Kashmir—26 from the American Army, 8 each from Canada and Belgium, and 2 from Norway. Jacob Malik of Russia, who was presiding over the Security Council, pointed to the Palestine Commission precedent, where the Observers were drawn from the countries represented on it, but he was out-voted. The Anglo-Americans would not permit import of the 'Red' agents into Kashmir, masquerading as 'Observers'.

On August 20, the Government of India signified their acceptance of the 'cease-fire' proposal, but made a reservation about the "sparsely populated mountainous regions of the Jammu and Kashmir State in the north"—viz. Baltistan and

* In fairness to Pakistan, it must be recorded that she had followed her C-in-C General Gracey's advice. In an address to the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs at Karachi on August 28, 1950, Sir M. Zafrullah Khan revealed that the General had warned Pakistan that if she "does not want to be faced with another big refugee problem ; if India was not to be allowed to sit at the doorsteps of Pakistan ; if the civilian and army morale was not to be undermined, it is imperative that the Indian Army is not allowed to move beyond the Uri line." Be it remembered that the same General Gracey had once earned spurious encomiums from the British press for his hand in 'averting' a war between Pakistan and India. And also contrast this call for action with the jaramiads of Lord Mountbatten and the three Indian Chiefs of Staff against any military involvement by India.

† Appendix VII.

Ladakh. "As the authority of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir over this region as a whole had not been challenged or disturbed, the responsibility for the administration of this area should revert to the State Government, and the defence to India"; or, in other words, India wanted to be assured that this area would not be put on level with the territory to be evacuated by Pakistan troops and administered by the proposed "local authorities". In his reply on August 25, the Chairman of the Commission, Dr. Joseph Korbel, confirmed that "due to peculiar conditions of this area, the Commission did not specifically deal with the military aspect of the population in its resolution of August 13", but this question could be considered "in the implementation of the resolution".

Though India's reply had come within a week and was in the affirmative, Pakistan after hesitating for more than three weeks answered in the negative. Intimating his country's view, which amounted to a rejection of the proposal, Sir M. Zafrullah Khan informed the Commission on September 6, that 'Azad Kashmir' was a necessary party to any settlement, and 'Azad Kashmir' Government alone had the authority to issue cease-fire order on her forces. It was queer that the Pakistan Military Command who, according to its own admission, had an over-all control of the 'Azad Kashmir' forces should plead its incapacity to discipline them.

The Commission put up with Pakistan's non-co-operative attitude and withdrew its cease-fire proposal, declaring that while the Government of India had "accepted it, being animated by the sincere desire to promote the cause of peace and thus to uphold the principle and prestige of the United Nations", Pakistan's acceptance being conditional, "immediate effectuation of its cease-fire proposal of August 13 is not to be envisaged".

Part I (B) of the resolution had made it mandatory on both Governments "to refrain from taking any measures that might augment the military potential of the forces under their control". But at that time Pakistan was, in the words of the London

Observer, "out to establish its position," wherefore she continued to deploy her regular troops in Baltistan, and Capt. Buhra-ud-din was racing down the Indus towards Ladakh. This was also the period when the loose strings of the 'Azad Kashmir' administration were collected, and a formal Government was established with the help of 'foreign' experts and under the aegis of the Pakistan Government. Therefore Pakistan's repeated rejections of the Commission's overtures—the July request for no material alteration of the situation, and the August cease-fire proposal—were merely a ruse to gain time for the *fait accompli*.

With the withdrawal of the cease-fire proposal India was released from her voluntary restraint. And our readers are already aware of the progress of the subsequent Indian offensive. The death of Quaid-i-Azam had also left Pakistan weak. So by December, her leaders squealed and cried out that she could hold on no longer.

The whole of the Middle East was now in flames. Count Folke Bernadotte, the United Nations mediator in Palestine, was assassinated in Jerusalem on September 17, while a joint U.K.-U.S.A. 'Conciliation Resolution,' passed by the United Nations General Assembly on December 11, made Israel a reality, giving rise to a strong current of hatred for the Anglo-Americans in the Arab-Egyptian world. In Iran, the communist infiltration burst out as the pro-Soviet Tudeh activity, endangering the British-owned oil-fields. Pakistan's military defeat in Kashmir would not only have frustrated the Anglo-American design on the State but also allowed the growing *mullah*-communist alliance sufficient gun-powder to blow off the last and the most stable Muslim bastion against the Soviet expansion.

To avoid this catastrophe, the Commission resumed its 'cease-fire' parleys. Alfonso Lozano of Colombia, its chairman, and Eric Colban of U. S., the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, met Nehru on December 20 and 22, and, surprisingly, all the assurances sought by him were readily given. The substance of these assurances

was later reproduced as an 'aide-memoire'. Yet, while the Indian Prime Minister was getting whatever he wanted, the Pakistan Foreign Minister, too, received contradictory promises—verbal, as well as in writing. And, would anybody believe that the Commission did not inform either party what assurances had been given to the other? But, that's exactly what that body did. For instance, India was promised—without Pakistan being informed—that "there should be large scale disarming of 'Azad Kashmir' forces", and that the sovereignty of the Kashmir Government would be restored over the 'northern' area after Pakistan had evacuated it; yet, simultaneously, Pakistan was assured—without India being told—that the cease-fire resolution "does not contemplate the disarmament or disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces", and that the areas under the occupation of the 'Azad Kashmir' forces would be administered by the local authority, an euphemism for the 'Azad Kashmir' Government.

Thus a credulous India was duped into a 'cease-fire' agreement, and fighting in Kashmir stopped from one minute before mid-night of January 1, 1949. It was followed by the acceptance of the Commission's resolution of January 5, 1949, on the "free and impartial plebiscite";* and with the approval of the two countries, Admiral Chester Nimitz of the U. S. Navy was nominated the Plebiscite Administrator, to function when normal conditions had been restored.

The present U.S. Secretary of State had once written that an "intangible asset of the United Nations is its capacity to expose hypocrisy". † It could be said, as an inverted parody, that the tangible liability of the United Nations Kashmir Commission was its capacity to perpetrate hypocrisy. For hardly had the hallelujahs for the cease-fire were over, than the evil result of the Commission's horse-dealing came into sight—while India insisted on the fulfilment of the promises given her and confirmed in the 'aide-memoire', Pakistan did not

* Appendix VIII.

† John Foster Dulles; *War or Peace*.

consider herself bound to them. The Kashmir dispute thus reached an impasse.

Let us now pause and look back at the international scene, in order properly to comprehend the impact on the Kashmir impasse of the Anglo-American designs to 'contain' Russia, and Russia's refusal to be contained. We have already referred to the Act of Capultepec, and the Truman Doctrine with its Marshall Plan corollary. The next step on these lines was taken at Rio De Janeiro on September 2, 1947, through the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance—better known as the Rio Pact—which bound the two Americas for a joint action in the event of internal or external aggression.

The growth of the Communist parties in France and Italy during 1947-48, the capitulation of Czechoslovakia in February 1948, and the Soviet blockade of Berlin in the spring of 1948, made U. S. policy-makers alive to the fact that the Atlantic Ocean moat was too narrow for safety. So they embarked upon a wider regional defence, to include the countries of Western Europe. Finally, a North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949, between United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg), Ireland, Norway, Denmark, Italy and Portugal, embodying the pledge—'one for all, all for one'. This system of mutual defence, known as NATO, was subsequently extended to Greece and Turkey also.

Geographically, the Muslim 'strip' abutted upon the NATO region. It, however, did not constitute an equally impassable barrier to communist expansion, partly for the disjointed 'nationalisms' in this area, and in the main due to the failure of the British statesmanship in Egypt, Iran and many Arab countries. Even then Islam was expected to constitute a dependable factor in resisting the 'godless creed', as long as Pakistan—the largest Muslim power with a first class army—remained an ally.

In the Far East, the reverses suffered in the early stages of the Japanese war had taught the Americans the geo-political

lesson that, to be effective, the Pacific defence ought to be shifted nearer the Asiatic mainland. But after having sunk billions of dollars down Chiang Kai-Shek's bottomless drain in the three post-war years, President Truman reversed the Roosevelt-Marshall plan for the absorption of the Chinese Communism within the Kuo-Min-tang nationalism, and ended in scuttling the Chinese mainland altogether. By the end of 1948, Japan and Formosa, linking with the British colony of Malaya, had become the eastern line of defence, and an advance post against Communism.

Thus, by 1949, two sweeping arcs had been erected to 'contain' Communism—one from Norway to Pakistan, and the second from Japan to Malaya. India was the only 'missing link'—a yet unplugged hole. Moreover, her foreign policy was enigmatic and unreliable. While, on one hand, Nehru was wooing Anglo-American capital,* and openly clashing with the Indian Communists, for which his government was labelled a 'lackey' of the West; on the other, he was lashing out against the vestiges of colonialism—"no imperialist power can stay in Asia", he had declared when the Dutch went back on their promise to the Indonesians, and then went on to put them on the dock before the Inter-Asian Conference at New Delhi on January 20-23, 1949. This unpredictable stand, or—as Nehru called it—the policy to judge each issue on its own merit, was, in the eyes of the Western democracies, dangerous obscurantism, when a peaceful co-existence with Communism had become illusory.

We now come back to the subject of our study—the State of Jammu and Kashmir—which forms a rainbow over India and Pakistan. This important bastion was not safe in the

* Making a policy statement in the Constituent Assembly on April 6, 1949, he said, "Indian capital needs to be supplemented by foreign capital not only because our national savings will not be enough for the rapid development of the country on the scale we wish, but also because in many cases scientific, technical and industrial knowledge and capital equipment can best be secured along with foreign capital"; and referring specially to the British trade interests, he assured them that "there is and will still be considerable scope for the investment of British capital in India."

hands of the visionary Nehru; but he refused to be bundled off either. The way out of this impasse was to carve a sizeable chunk of the State on the west and north, contiguous to Soviet Asia, and to place it in more reliable hands. 'Azad Kashmir' was that area; but with Pakistan herself rocking from a 'military conspiracy', greater safety lay in a combined Pakistan and Anglo-American control over that region. And that exactly was the design of the UNCIP when it duped India into a 'cease-fire', because Sec. A3 of the proposed Truce Agreement had provided that "the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities *under the surveillance of the Commission*". * (Italics mine)

Then all sorts of pressures were put on India to hustle her into the 'truce agreement'. While the United States held out her surplus food and capital as a 'bribe', the Commission threatened that its proposal was "final", and if "unreserved acceptance" was not given within a week the matter would be reported back to the Security Council. However, Nehru stiffened his back, and demanded a settlement on the question of the 'Azad-Kashmir' here and now, whereupon the Commission meekly decided to resume the negotiations.

The stock of the Commission had touched the bottom. Then Dr. Lozano resigned suddenly, and was replaced by Mr. Samper. The 'revised' Commission veered its sails, and setting its face against further parleys "to fill the gap between the points of view of India and Pakistan," it dallied with the idea of 'arbitration'

* This was to be the first step towards an ultimate partition of the State on religious basis. If we are to believe the British professions, such partition had been, and still is, the only solution to the Kashmir problem in their and the American eyes.

"It was already clear enough when I visited Kashmir nine months ago that the only possible solution was partition"—Kingslay Martin, in the *New Statesman and Nation*, December 3, 1948.

"The sensible course for both sides [India and Pakistan] might be to accept some partition of the country as inevitable and to give the United Nations Commission a free hand to arrange the preliminaries fairly".—*The Times*, December 3, 1948.

over the interpretation of the disputed points in the proposed 'truce agreement'. The United States delegate, Robert Macatee was the most insistent advocate of this proposal ; and the Anglo-Americans were loudly tipping Admiral Nimitz for the post. If the advent of Nimitz as the Plebiscite Administrator in an indefinite future was unwelcome to the Soviet bloc, his arrival as the Arbitrator in the near future was alarming. Dr. Chyle of Czechoslovakia suddenly bestirred himself—what he had been doing till then in furtherance of the settlement of the dispute is not known. He opposed Macatee's suggestion ; and, in its place, proposed a joint meeting of the representatives of India and Pakistan on the ministerial level. This proposal was accepted by the Commission—the American delegate abstaining. But, paradoxically, the same sitting of the Commission approved Macatee's proposal as well.

Much hope was pinned on the projected joint meeting—the first of its kind after more than a year ; but when everything was fixed—date, venue and the names of the delegates—it was suddenly and mysteriously called off by the Commission, much to the "disappointment and astonishment" of the two countries.

The obstacle in the way of Mr. Macatee thus removed, he raced along with his hobbyhorse. He prepared a secret memorandum on 'Arbitration', of which the salient Paragraph 5 read as follows :-

"1. The two Governments agree

- (a) That they will submit to arbitration the differences existing between them concerning all questions raised by regarding the implementation of Part II of the August Resolution, the arbitrator to decide these questions according to equity, and his decision to be binding on both parties ;
- (b) That the arbitration will terminate once the truce terms are decided upon ;
- (c) That Admiral Nimitz will be arbitrator ;
- (d) That the procedure of the arbitration will be worked out subsequently ;

(e) Since the procedure of arbitration will be limited to the conclusion of truce, the Commission will continue in the exercise of its functions. Upon an arbitral, the Commission will undertake the tasks assigned to it under the truce and under the resolution of January 5, 1949.

2. With reference to paragraph 1 (d) above, the Commission considers that it would be inappropriate, in advance of approval by the parties of the proposed course of action and of the person of the arbitrator, to seek to define the exact procedure to be followed".

The main purpose behind the proposal was to allow to enter the American admiral the State through the backdoor, if the front remained closed due to the non-agreement of the two disputants.

The secret proposal found a mysterious way abroad, and a garbled version of it was splashed prominently across the Anglo-American newspapers. Under Dr. Chyle's pressure, the Commission cabled a personal protest to the Chairman of the Security Council, who then was Jacob Malik of U.S.S.R., and requested investigation into the 'leak'. The incriminatory telegram was received by one Mr. Cordel, an American member of the U. N. Secretarial staff, who, with no authority to intercept a personal message to the Chairman, suppressed it. It was after a month that he passed it on to Sir Alexander Cadogan,* who had replaced M. Malik by then. The gallant British knight was besides himself in rage—not on his errant subordinate, but at the Commission's impropriety in addressing a communication to the Chairman direct. The ways of gods are inscrutable indeed!

Much more reprehensible was the transmission of the proposal to the British High Commissioners in New Delhi and Karachi, before it had actually been placed in the hands of

* Sir Alexander Cadogan was a member of the Simon Commission which toured India in 1927-28. Perhaps he still bore on his soul the scars of its ignominious boycott by the Indians.

the two governments concerned. The British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, called a meeting of the two High Commissioners, at which the British Ambassador to U. S. was also present. Thus the Governments of U. K. and U. S. A. were in full knowledge of the secret memorandum even before it was presented to India and Pakistan on August 29, 1949.

The Commission's reference was immediately backed by President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee, who sent personal appeals to the two Government on August 31, commending acceptance of the arbitration move. This "serious intervention" in a dispute, which was under the direct mediation of the United Nations, is a sad testimony to the scant respect some countries pay to that organization.

Pakistan, now at par with India—politically and militarily—accepted the Truman-Attlee appeal; and followed it up by officially intimating the Commission on September 7, her agreement to the arbitration suggestion. It was, however, left to India to restore U. N.' S prestige, by rejecting the competence of anybody—howsoever 'big'—to disregard the "appropriate organs to the United Nations". As for the proposal itself, India discovered many booby-traps in it; for instance, the Arbitrator was given freedom "to determine the points on which he should arbitrate", or "the exact procedure to be followed" by him in performing his function was not defined—both novel and unprecedented suggestions. So, on September 8, she announced her rejection of the arbitration proposal.

John Foster Dulles says that "one purpose of the United Nations is to be a 'centre for hamonizing'.....by developing, informally, fellowship among those whose differences otherwise separate them." The Kashmir Commission, whose motive genius was a representative of Mr. Dulles' country, had, on the contrary, become a focus of disharmony because of its pussillanimity and for making diplomatic practice synonymous with horse-dealing. That at least was the feeling in India and Kashmir, when the UNCIP finally retired to Geneva on September 25, to report its failure to the Security Council.

The Indian annoyance was aggravated by the *franc tireur* activity of the Commission's Military Adviser, Lt-General Delvoie of U. S. Army. On September 28, he removed seven boxes, containing jewellery and gold, belonging to Prince and Begum A. R. Effendi who had earlier 'evacuated' to Pakistan, from a 'foreign' bank in Srinagar to Rawalpindi. His action constituted a serious breach of diplomatic privilege, for the removal was done in a U.N. charter plane without the permission of the State Government. On a protest from the Government of India, Lt-General Delvoie was 'fired' by the Commission. Since then this valiant American soldier is time and again sniping at India.

Despite Nehru's westward slant, betrayed by his repeated invitations to the American capital,* the public opinion in that country was increasingly hardening against the Congressional approval to President Truman's Food Aid recommendation unless India as a bargain yielded on her 'neutral' stand. Indo-American relations worsened after the rise of the Red Star in the Chinese sky. Nehru had been quick to realize the reality of the change and—much to the chagrin of the American administration—hailed it. And the reality was that after a lapse of centuries, China was at last united under a stable central administration; and that not only Sino-Indian cultural relations dated back longer than two millennia, but the two countries had, even to-day, more than a thousand mile of common frontier.

Then, as a result of some wire-pulling in the chancelleries at New Delhi and Washington, Nehru received an invitation to visit the United States as President Truman's guest. He described it as his 'Discovery of America' tour; others called it a journey with a 'beggar's bowl'. There, he made great efforts to arrest

* In elaborating his policy statement of April 6, Nehru told the special correspondent of the *New York Times*, on August 21; "As to key industries, despite the previous plan for State ownership—for which many Congress leaders still clamor—we've done nothing about them, and we are putting off consideration for at least ten years"; and then added significantly: "Obviously, we do not want Communism in India."

the growing Indo-American drift. He went so far as to redefine his 'neutrality'—in his address to the American Congress on October 15—to mean that "where freedom is menaced, or justice threatened, or where aggression takes place, we cannot be, and shall not be neutral". In the context this remark was made, it appeared to sound, at least to the 'opposite camp', as Nehru's good-bye to 'neutrality'. Even then it was not unequivocal enough to the Anglo-American ears. The net result of Nehru's trip was far from a success; for, while international Communism was so much antagonized as to become a cause of a violent flare-up between India and Pakistan during February-March 1950, he neither could win the American confidence, if the majority report of the United Nations Commission published on December 12, 1949, were taken as a guide. *

In fact, the majority report had made certain recommendations more damaging to India than the worst clauses of the Security Council resolution appointing the Commission itself. For instance, the Council had made a distinction between Pakistan and India, inasmuch as it had asked for the complete withdrawal of the Pakistani forces, while India was allowed to retain hers to a 'minimum strength'. The Commission, on the contrary, eliminated this distinction altogether. Again, the Council had recognized the sovereignty of the Kashmir Government over the State territory as a whole—including 'northern areas'—by asking for a total withdrawal of all tribesmen and Pakistani nationals. The report qualified this sovereignty as regards the 'occupied' territory, because "the entry of Indian forces", according to it, "would almost inevitably lead to a renewal of hostilities". † The last recommendation was

* Signed by all the members of the Commission, with the exception of Dr. Chyle who submitted a single member minority report separately.

† Here is another case of 'Might is right'. Because of Pakistan's threats, the Council was advised to allow that country to retain something on which it had no legal right. And, by advising India "in these circumstances, to be willing to waive this claim", Sir Alexander Cadogan had, a few days later, underwritten the failure of the United Nations as an instrument to enforce international morality.

for the replacement of the five-men Commission by a single 'mediator', authorized to "settle eventually by arbitration" "all unresolved issues"—the obvious motive being the removal of the undesirable Communist member.

The Security Council assembled on December 16 to consider the report. A day later, Dr. Chyle threw a bomb-shell by presenting his own. He charged his colleagues for committing many errors of omission and commission in course of their negotiations, some of which we ourselves have pointed out, and of making the Commission "an instrument of policy of certain Great Powers". In the end, he recommended the appointment of a "new mediatory organ", to be composed of all the eleven members of the Security Council. One fails to understand how he could hope that an eleven-nation commission would be "really independent and untrammelled by outside influence," more than the five-member one. It was rather a ruse to have two communist 'fingers' in the rehashed Commission pie, whereas there would be none in the single mediator proposal.

The Security Council was at a quandry with two contradictory reports on its hands. The president, General A. G. L. MacNaughton of Canada tried his hand to "find a mutually satisfactory way of dealing with the Kashmir problem"; but soon retired. Yet in his report he tried to tie fresh knots to the already tangled Kashmiri skein; for, while the integrity of the State forces had never been disputed in the past, he was the first to put them at par with the 'Azad' forces by demanding their simultaneous and synchronized reduction, disarming and disbandment.* But the most controversial proposal was the one for holding a 'regional' plebiscite in

* One wonders if this partisan recommendation was a 'trade discount' on the large purchases of arms and ammunition, then being secretly made from Canada by Pakistan. Even U.S. was then so discriminatory between India and Pakistan in the matter of supply of the military equipment that the Indian Ambassador, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, had to lodge a formal protest with Washington.

the Valley only—as opposed to an ‘overall’ plebiscite—with the predominantly Hindu and Muslim areas going over, without the formality of a referendum, respectively to India and Pakistan. In cold reasoning, it was the old British ‘conjurer’s trick’ of dividing the country.

It is alleged that the abortive MacNaughton proposals were backed by economic sanctions, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, then Deputy Prime Minister of Kashmir, disclosing on March 8, 1950, that “the Anglo-Americans have threatened India with stopping petrol and many other commodities she is getting from them.” India would, nevertheless, not touch the proposals with a pair of tongs, and Gen. MacNaughton had soon to withdraw behind the screen without an applause even.

After Gen. MacNaughton’s failure the Security Council passed a ‘four-power’ (Cuba, Norway, U.K. and U.S.A.) resolution on February 24, calling upon India and Pakistan “to prepare and execute within a period of five months a programme of demilitization” on the basis of MacNaughton proposals, “*or such modification of those principles as may be mutually agreed upon*”. (Italics mine) It further adopted to replace the Kashmir Commission by a U.N. Representative to “assist” the two countries in the preparation and implementation of the programme for ‘demilitarization’. It may be pointed out that the Security Council had extracted from the MacNaughton report only that recommendation which referred to the ‘demilitarization’ of the State including in its scope the State forces also—and not the one which pertained to a ‘regional’ plebiscite.

Both India and Pakistan accepted the resolution on March 14, but again with diametrically opposed ‘reservations’—Pakistan : because “it is based on the MacNaughton proposals”; India : on the assurance embodied in the resolution, and reiterated by the British delegate Sir Terence Shone, that those proposals were “without prejudice” to India’s rights or claims, and could be modified. Even then the Security Council hurried to select the U.N. Representative. The inevitable Admiral Nimitz was

again the hot favourite—but India would not have him. Then the name of Dr. Ralph Bunche*, a Nehru's 'friend', was linked with the Admiral's as an under-study—the butter however would not make the stale bread more wholesome. Final choice fell on Sir Owen Dixon, an Australian High Court Judge. †

Dixon started his negotiations on May 27. He had already been 'briefed' by the Anglo-American press on the partition of the State on MacNaughton basis with a 'neutralized' coalition in the Valley during the plebiscite. ‡ But before the negotiations were one month old an international convulsion completely altered the world picture.

On June 25, North Koreans crossed the 38th. Parallel, obviously with the backing of Soviet Russia and China. Before the Security Council could pronounce a judgement, the United States had ordered Gen. MacArthur to resist the North Koreans. Later, the same day, the Council had branded the 'invasion' as an act of aggression, following two days after by a second recommending the members to "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area." India, with her anti-war tradition, declined to send any fighting force, but despatched a fully-equipped ambulance unit instead. This half-hearted co-operation exasperated the United States, already

* After Count Bernadotte's assassination, Dr. Bunche, the American Negro leader, was appointed U.N. Mediator in Palestine. His successful negotiations leading to a permanent armistice between Israel and the Arab States had won for him a wide-spread repute, and the Nobel Prize for Peace.

† Coming from a country, whose Labour Government had a record of friendly collaboration with India, particularly on the Indonesian issue, and himself possessing a reputation of fair-mindedness associated with the legal profession, Dixon was more acceptable to India. His past collaborations with the U.S. were, however, not remembered—he had acted as his Government's representative at Washington during two war-years and had also been attached to the MacArthur administration in Japan for some time.

‡ "Could it [the Valley] not be left for the time as a neutralised entity ruled by a coalition of Sheikh Abdullah and Mr. Ghulam Abbas, Head of the Azad Kashmir Muslim Conference?" (*Manchester Guardian*, May 3, 1950.)

annoyed with India's "neutrality" and her advocacy for a U.N.O. seat to Communist China. And it became maddening when Nehru forwarded personal appeals to M. Stalin and Mr. Dean Acheson on July 12, "to exert your great authority and influence" for the achievement of "peace and preservation of U.N.O. solidarity"—here was, so to say, a puny arrogating to himself the role of an arbitrator between the two Giants.

With the two power blocs now engaged in a 'shooting war', a mere U.N.O. surveillance of the Kashmir bastion was insufficient; a direct U.N. control was the need of the hour. So Dixon went beyond the Security Council directives and proposed a sort of U.N. Administration in Jammu and Kashmir.* For the 'northern areas', he suggested the appointment of a Political Agent directly under the United Nations. In the rest of the Pakistan-occupied territory, a U.N. officer was to be attached with every District Magistrate, having supervisory

* The dubious nature of this recommendation may be judged from the fate of Trieste. The port along with its hinterland is predominantly Slav, though there is a Latin concentration in the town. Yugo-Slavia seized it from Italy after the world war, but was pushed out by the Allied Army. Marshal Tito was in the Soviet bloc then, and the Italian communists were riding the high tide; so to salve the Latin sentiment and to win votes for Signor de Gasperi's Christian Democrats, the Western democracies declared on March 20, 1948, that the "whole of Trieste" would be returned to Italy. Then Tito broke off from the Cominform, and as a reward the Anglo-Americans split the disputed territory into two—Zone A, consisting of the port and its immediate western neighbourhood, to be administered by them; and Zone B, the hinterland, to go to Yugo-Slavia. However, by 1952 Tito's breach with U.S.S.R. was complete, and thereafter his stock fell; the Italians, on the other hand, rose after that country had joined NATO, till the Occupying Powers in Zone A started behaving as 'trustees' for Italy. Then in the 1953 General Elections, the Christian Democrats received a severe jolting; whereupon, to arrest a further swing to the 'left,' the Anglo-Americans announced on October 8 last their intention to hand over Zone A to Italy—without consulting Yugo-Slavia, or the people of Trieste, or U.N.O. even.

Read in the context of the Indian and Pakistani claims on Kashmir, who could guarantee that if the proposed U.N. (*sic*, U.K.-U.S.A.) Administration had been allowed to function, it would not have one day handed over the whole State to that country which was then more helpful in the anti-Communist crusade?

powers only. But for the area under the Abdullah Government, not only did he suggest the appointment of similar U. N. officers, but gave them arbitrary powers also for "observation, inspection, remonstrance and report", as well as for issue of legal warrants and arrest and detention.

The 33-month old negotiations by the Security Council and its organs had become one long fantasy. First, the U.K. and U. S. delegations had reduced India and Pakistan to the same level; then the UNCIP manoeuvred an equality between the State Administration and 'Azad Kashmir'; later MacNaughton proposed parity between the State militia and the 'Azad' forces; and now Dixon had assigned a relatively superior status to 'Azad Kashmir' and Pakistan.

Paradoxically, India was now in an even sounder bargaining position. She had started receiving dividends for her 'neutrality', through a general let up in the subversive activities of the Indian communists despite a disconcerting rise in the 'cost of living' following the Korean inflation. She could even talk openly about 'American Imperialism', as her official delegation did at the Lucknow meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations in September. And there was the satisfied feeling of a vicarious moral victory in the resemblance of the Korean drama with the Kashmir story, South Korea and the United States playing the role of Kashmir State and India, and North Korea and Russia of the tribal raiders and Pakistan. India could, therefore, categorically reject the Dixon formula; "so far as the Government of India are concerned," Nehru could thunder, "it is absolutely impossible for them to accept it, whatever the consequences. There the matter ends."

And the matter ended, so far as Sir Owen Dixon was concerned, when he reported failure to the Security Council on September 27. We may gloss over the many slants against India which were interspersed between the pages of his report, but a mention must be made of how he let his judicial insight be clouded by diplomatic considerations. While in one breath he admitted that "when the frontiers of the State of Jammu and

Kashmir were crossed on, I believe, October 20, 1947, by hostile elements it was contrary to International Law, and that when in May 1948, as I believe, units of the regular Pakistan forces moved into the territory of the State that too was inconsistent with International Law"; in the next, he was of the opinion "that if there is any chance of settling the dispute over Kashmir by agreement between India and Pakistan, it now lies in partition, and in some means of allocating the Valley, rather than in an overall plebiscite". He ended his report with the recommendation that the Security Council should stop its mediatory activity and leave the matter to the two disputants.

After the shift of the political centre of gravity from Europe to Asia following MacArthur's counter-offensive on September 15, Nehru's 'non-involvement' policy fetched yet more dividends—from the Communist bloc, of course. India's stature rose when Mao Tse-Tung allowed himself to be persuaded to suspend military action in Tibet, and to agree to settle the sovereignty question by peaceful negotiation instead. And when, despite India's warning about the possibility of the Chinese intervention, MacArthur crossed the 38th. Parallel in the reverse direction and bombed the Yalu installations on the Sino-Korean border, and the subsequent events vindicated her, the non-Communist countries noted that the Indian political insight was factually correct while the U. N. military intelligence was woefully wrong. On the other hand, India's stock in the United States fell when she built up an Asian solidarity against the use of the Atom Bomb, which President Truman was contemplating upon after the Chinese 'peasant-soldiers' had started rolling the mighty U. S. forces down the Korean peninsula, putting them to a disgrace which somebody remarked they had not suffered since the flight of the "Battle of Bull Run" in 1861. And when MacArthur itched to extend the war to China proper, the Indian ambassador, Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, startled the Americans in a television programme on December 31, by stating that "war was a greater threat to India than Communist domination in Asia".

Then Britain tried her hands to 'sort out' Kashmir at the Commonwealth Premiers' Conference in London in January 1951. As Pakistan had declined to withdraw from Kashmir, and as Mr. Nehru would also not do so because of Indian's responsibility for the State's defences, should he not leave that charge to a Commonwealth 'security force'—Australia and New Zealand having very kindly consented in advance to supply the required contingents? Or, if that were unacceptable, why not, for the sake of impartiality, leave the defence to the Plebiscite Administrator with an authority to raise 'local levies', or, alternatively, permit him to call Pakistan for 'joint policing' with India? But as these proposals were patently inconsistent with the Security Council resolution of April 21, 1948, and the UNCIP's 'cease fire' proposal of August 13, 1948, as clarified by the 'aide-memoire'; and because the induction of an international 'police force' would have automatically opened the doors of Kashmir to the Communists also, Mr. Nehru refused to oblige; and the matter was allowed to drop.

The Security Council assembled in February 1951, to consider the Dixon Report. Meanwhile a new factor had come into prominence—the loss of faith of the Kashmiris in the processes of the U.N.O. organs. The outcome of this disillusionment was the decision of the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference to convoke a Constituent Assembly to determine the State's future. Thereupon, Sir M. Zafrullah Khan sent a panic-stricken communication to Lake Success, taking exception to that resolution. Curiously U. K. and U. S. A. wanted so much to oblige Pakistan that a Council meeting was convened even without a proper notice, and with scant respect to the procedural details.

The intensity of the Anglo-American displeasure with India—particularly, on her Korean 'neutrality'—was reflected in the draft resolution jointly submitted by their delegations to the Security Council on February 21, 1951, which incorporated practically every obnoxious proposal from the Kashmir Commission, Gen. MacNaughton, Sir Owen Dixon, and the Commonwealth Premiers' Conference. The resolution also declared that "any action that

assembly [proposed Kashmir Constituent Assembly] might attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliation of the entire State or any part thereof" would not be binding on the Security Council. Pakistan readily accepted the draft resolution ; but India was "wholly unable" to do so, even in face of the American House of Representatives' 'filibuster' over the 190-million dollar Food Aid bill.

On March 22, the draft was refurbished to make it look more attractive*. But the improvement was only superficial, because the sponsors had admitted that arbitration was still "the most effective way of moving forward towards a settlement",† and that the new U. N. Representative—who was to replace Sir Owen Dixon—should not disregard the efforts and experiences of General MacNaughton and Sir Owen Dixon. ‡

India's case was forcefully elaborated by Nehru on March 28 in the Indian Parliament. "The resolution now proposed in the Security Council", he said, "does not flow from the resolution of August 13, 1948, but is a new proposition, unilaterally produced. This new resolution and the arguments advanced in support of it by the U. K. and U. S.A. delegations put forward a fantastic and an entirely new theory that Kashmir is a kind of 'no-man's land' where the sovereignty was undetermined... Kashmir is juridically and politically an integral part of the State of India and at no time has the U. N. Commission or the Security Council challenged this fact". He told pointedly that "the accession took place when India was still a Dominion of the Commonwealth and the act of accession was accepted on behalf of the Crown by the then Governor-General"; and added : "Apart from accession it has to be remembered that India to-day is a continuing entity taking over all the rights and

* Appendix IX.

† The British delegate, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, proposing the revised resolution, on March 22, 1951.

‡ The U.S. delegate, Mr. Earnst Gross, seconding the resolution on March 23, 1951.

liabilities that rested in the old India. Thus irrespective of accession we would have an obligation to protect the people of Kashmir from aggression." Despite Nehru's logic, the amended resolution was passed on March 30, by 8 votes to nil—U. S. S. R. and Yugo-Slavia abstaining, and India, being a party in dispute, did not vote. Russian neutrality should be considered in context of the Communists' persistent advice to India and Pakistan "to arrive at a just and peaceful and democratic solution *minus* the intervention of imperialism.....[on the basis] that a plebiscite be held under a Commission of the five Big Powers, including the Soviet Union and People's China."* How a mere change in the plebiscite agency could help the two disputants arrive at an agreed solution might be clear only to those who swear by the communist logic; to the lay mind, this proposal was only a means to neutralize the American domination in the single member Plebiscite Administration.

Kashmir was much exercised by this resolution; Abdullah called it "vicious" and "humiliating". Nehru was still more defiant, when he said at Srinagar on April 2 that "India had not accepted the Anglo-American resolution and would face all the consequences flowing from that stand".

Three years back, Nehru had thundered against the six-nations' resolution; he not only welcomed the UNCIP which flowed from it, but also persuaded Kashmir to do so. This time he thundered again; and, likewise, not only welcomed the new Mediator, Dr. Frank Graham, but flew to Srinagar to inveigle the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference into receiving him "with all courtesy". Nehru's co-operative attitude was, perhaps, induced by the high reputation which Dr. Graham was bringing with him—the halo of a successful mediator in the Dutch-Indonesian tangle two years back.

Though the summer of 1951 was marked by a renewed threat of war between India and Pakistan—luckily averted again—there was a peculiar lack of urgency in the Anglo-

* Rajbans Krishan : *Kashmir and the Conspiracy against Peace.*

American camp for the solution of the Indo-Pakistan imbroglio—while the Soviets never were in a hurry. Far more important and consequential problems were keeping the Western democracies busy after the Chinese had intervened in Korea. U. S. policy of 'containment of Communism' *at any cost* had involved her in not only the Korean 'hot' war, but also a global 'cold' war right round the Communist fringe, the aggressive thrusts of which were the gradual forging of a chain of regional defences from NATO at one end to a militarized Japan at the other, each link being oiled and greased by Marshall Aid, or Mutual Security Agreement, or Technical Aid Fund.* Great Britain, in spite of a Labour Government and its radically socialistic experiment at home, had not given up her colonial bias; her imperial policy was keeping her hands full with 'emergencies' in Malaya, Iran, Egypt and other Far and Near-east countries, and her brain buzzing with the prospects of new empires in the Equatorial and Capricorn Africas.† And

* NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization); EDC (European Defence Community); MEDO (Middle East Defence Organization); ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and United States); Pacific Pact, embryonic at present but ultimately to bind the nations of the Pacific area like NATO—"if the free nations of Asia, particularly India and Pakistan, want some new security association with us, and take the initiative", John Foster Dulles puts in suggestively, "then consideration may well be given to a Pacific Pact..."; and Japan—U.S. and U.K. have sponsored a Peace Treaty with Japan which provides continued occupation of Ryuku and Bonin islands by U.S. and stationing of U.S. forces in Japan for her defence. The process of adding more links in the "steel chain" round U.S.S.R. goes on—only on September 26 last, had U.S.A. signed a 20-year defence agreement with the totalitarian Spain, by which the latter country has placed certain air and naval bases at the disposal of U.S.A. in exchange of a large arms aid. And a fortnight later, R. G. Casey, Foreign Minister of Australia, heralded the birth of a new defence agency ANZAM, by which Great Britain is to be linked with ANZUS through Malaya.

† The empire-building is being carried on under the cover of Federalism—Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda comprising the Federation of Equatorial Africa; and Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and the 'protectorates' of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland forming the Federation of Capricorn Africa.

than there was a growing estrangement between these two Leviathans themselves—non-sharing of the Atom Bomb secrets; Britain's refusal to join EDC; mutual bickerings over NATO appointments; Britain's disinclination to name China an "aggressor" *; and disagreement over East-West trade.

Hands-tied by the mandatory clauses of the Anglo-American resolution, feet-bound by the policy to go slow, Dr. Graham commenced his task by listing 12 points of disagreement. By September 7, 1951, agreement could be reached on 8; but further progress was held up on the remaining four—(i) Procedure of 'demilitarization'; (ii) Period of its completion; (iii) Quantum and character of the forces to be retained on either side of the 'cease-fire' line at the end of 'demilitarization'; and (iv) Time of induction of the Plebiscite Administrator. So he went back to the Security Council on October 15, and on November 10 was allowed a second chance to narrow the areas of difference.

But before Dr. Graham had arrived at his post of duty again the balance in the sub-continent was disturbed. First, the publication of the correspondence between India and U. S. over the Japanese Peace Treaty disclosed that in trying to be legalistic *par excellence*, Nehru had advocated the return of Formosa to China, and of the Kurile Islands and South Sakhalin to Russia, much to the United States' "regrets". Then, in October, an assassin's bullets deprived Pakistan of her strong Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali; and though his successor, Khwaja Nazim-ud-din, was more 'pliable', for some time the situation in the country remained delicate. In consideration of these facts, whatever be the respective merits of India and Pakistan, and however fair-minded Dr. Graham might have been, he could not appear to favour a country openly pleading the cause of the "enemy", and thereby so to disappoint the other as to shatter its already weakened fabric. So Dr. Graham wanted to mark time

* British Government have not joined with the U.S. Administration in naming Communist China an "aggressor", though they "would agree in condemning Chinese intervention in support of an aggression".

by reviving the proposal for a U. N. surveillance of Kashmir, which would appear impartial to both. This idea found prominence in his resumed negotiations; and also in the 'tentative' plan for demilitarization which his Military Adviser, General Devers, discussed with the two governments on the military level. Understandably, the basic difference in the points of view of the disputants remained unresolved—Pakistan claiming the right to retain her forces on parity basis; India denying such right to an 'aggressor' and asserting her sole responsibility for the 'security' of the State. So Dr. Graham intimated his second failure to the Security Council on December 9.

Nevertheless, the second Graham report made an interesting reading. It transpired that at one stage he had even revived the proposal for the induction of U. N. forces in the State "as long as the U. N., in consultation with the Governments of India and Pakistan, deems necessary", and had also suggested increase in the U.N. military observer team "in the necessary numbers which it would be deemed appropriate by the U.N."* The Government of India rejected those proposals as they were likely to "give rise to gravest apprehensions and misgivings in the minds of local population." And truly did the president of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly, Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq, sound his countrymen's alarm, when he said at the annual session of the Kashmir Carpenters Union at Anantnag, that the Graham negotiations were meant to demonstrate the apparent impossibility of an *agreed* solution and thus prepare ground for an *imposed* solution—an independent Kashmir under

* At present there are 60 U.N. observers, including 24 on the Indian side of the 'cease-fire' line and 18 on the Pakistani side, with 9 each posted at the Head-Quarters located at Srinagar and Rawalpindi. They comprise of Australians, Canadians, Dutch, Norwegian and Americans, with General Nimmo at the head. To keep them at their posts, U.N.O. has to spend more than 30 lakh rupees every year, i. e., more than fifty thousand per person. The cock-a-hoop way they tear up and down the State, their jeeps bearing U.N.O. emblems and flying U.N.O. flags, suggests they have come to stay. And the partisan behaviour they exhibited during the Abdullah episode last summer has put their impartiality under a cloud.

U. N. trusteeship. Another seamy side of these negotiations was the dishonourable way Gen. Devers discussed different demilitarization plans with India and Pakistan, and thus tried to bring the two countries to an agreement by a mere sleight of hand.*

As there was no material change in the world picture during the second Graham negotiations, the Security Council debate on his Report was perfunctory. But suddenly the proceedings were enlivened by a bomb-shell from the Soviet representative. It may be remembered that, five years back, the Communists had canvassed for a 'sovereign' Kashmir, so that they might easily fill in the vacuum left by Britain. Since then, Soviet Russia had maintained a discreet silence over the Indo-Pakistan dispute and had consistently abstained from voting in the Security Council. Non-Russian Communists, like Dr. Chyle, had sometimes unsealed their lips, but it was only to denounce U.K. and U.S.A. ; any positive suggestions coming from them, like the re-constitution of the Kashmir Commission with the representatives of all the members of the Security Council or the replacement of the single Plebiscite Administrator by a commission of five Big Powers, were meant only to further self-interest. So, when the question of the induction of U.N. forces in Kashmir came up, Jacob Malik broke the four-year old silence. On January 17, 1952, he accused the Anglo-American bloc of an 'imperialistic attitude' towards Kashmir, with an intention to turn it into a 'trust territory' to be used as an 'armed base' against Soviet Russia. He also charged that the Anglo-American "plans deprive the Kashmir people of the right of self-determination. They attempt to substitute the right of self-determination with Anglo-American dictates".

* The 'tentative' plan of General Devers was not reproduced with the Graham Report. It was published more a than month later on January 22, 1952, on the special request of Pakistan. India immediately challenged the authenticity of the published version, and revealed that a materially different plan was handed over to her military representatives during discussions at Geneva on November 29, 1951.

Much of M. Malik's vituperation was, of course, the usual Soviet rhetoric, for he did not suggest any alternate plan to settle the Kashmir problem. On the other hand, he performed a great feat of word-eating, for he first hailed the existing Kashmir Constituent Assembly, but when Sir M. Zafrullah Khan challenged him, he turned turtle and said that he meant a different assembly "elected by the Kashmir people in a democratic way". Nevertheless, the few remarks appreciative of Abdullah's party, which he allowed himself, were sufficiently indicative of a coming change in the Communist attitude towards Kashmir.

After M. Malik's fireworks, the Security Council decided on January 31, 1952, to give Dr. Graham a yet another chance. But his third round went the way of the second; and he reported failure to the Security Council on April 22, 1952. But, as he felt that progress was still possible, and the Council having no alternative in view, his request to be allowed to continue was readily granted.

The period covered by Dr. Graham's second and third attempts was marked by a series of reverses to the Anglo-American strategy of building a ring-fence defence against Communism in Asia. It started a year back when large cracks had developed in the chain of Middle East defences, particularly with the advent of the bitterly anti-British Dr. Mossadiq in Iran after the murder of General Razmara on March 7, 1951, and the assassination of the zealous pro-British King Abdullah of Jordan on July 20, 1951. To these worries was now added another, that of the vulnerability of the Himalayan defence. Firstly, the Buddhist lama Bakula's 'regional autonomy' demand was interpreted as the first step towards Ladakh's ultimate linkage with 'communized' Tibet. Secondly, the political rumblings in Nepal, and the renewed disruptive activity on the Assam-Burma border, were regarded as the signs of a communist ferment in the Himalayan region. Moreover, with the absorption of Tibet by China, and since the Dalai Lama is still regarded by the Buddhist sects living on the Himalayan fringe as their spiritual head, it was feared that:

the Communism would use Buddhism as a lever to influence the politics of that region. This Anglo-American nervousness was indirectly echoed in Dr. Graham's importunity for an early induction of Admiral Nimitz, for Kashmir formed the 'linchpin' of the Himalayan defence ; "I deem it necessary", he told the Security Council, "that the Plebiscite Administrator-designate be associated with me in studies and consideration of common problems."

The fourth round began in June 1952. In his third report, Graham had emphasized the prime necessity for the removal of the obstacle on the quantum and the character of the forces to be retained after demilitarization. So on July 16, he presented to the two Governments a formula, giving brackets of figures within which discussion might proceed :-

On Pakistani side—Withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident in Kashmir, and withdrawal of Pakistan troops. Large scale disbandment and disarmament of the 'Azad Kashmir' forces. At the end of the period of demilitarization there shall be an armed civil force ranging from 3,000 to 6,000, taken out of the Pakistan High Command and officered by neutral and local officers under the surveillance of the United Nations.

On Indian side—The bulk of the Indian forces to be withdrawn. Further withdrawals to bring the Indian armed forces within a range of 12,000 to 18,000 including State armed forces.

A conference of the representatives of the two Governments at the ministerial level was held in Geneva, under Dr. Graham's auspices, from August 26 to September 10, where the above formula was discussed. During the talks—on September 4—Dr. Graham introduced an alternative principle, viz, the establishment of the criteria which would serve as a guide to determine the number and character of the forces. He himself proposed the following criteria :-

For Pakistan—"The minimum number required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement with due regard to the freedom of plebiscite."

For India—"The minimum number required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite."

There was an implied admission of a lower status for Pakistan both in the proposal to remove the remaining 'Azad' forces from her control (July 15 formula) and in the conception that India was solely responsible for the security of the State (September 4 criteria). This position was not acceptable to Pakistan for obvious reasons ; nor would India allow any armed forces to remain on the Pakistan side—a position hardly squaring with her admitted responsibility for the security of the State. Dr. Graham had, therefore, to admit defeat, but not before he had made one more attempt to bring Admiral Nimitz into Kashmir "at the earliest possible date," which he interpreted as the 'last day of the period of demilitarization,' though in accordance to the January 5, 1949, resolution the Plebiscite Administrator was to be inducted only after the process of demilitarization was complete and "the Commission [now replaced by the U.N. Representative] is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been restored."

The second half of 1952 was even more disastrous to the Anglo-American position in the Muslim world than 1951. On July 23, General Neguib's military coup drove King Farouk out in exile, and with the departure of the corrupt royal court and the banning of an equally corrupt party politics went Great Britain's opportunity for intrigues in Egypt. Then, in September, a friendly Cabinet and a President tumbled in Lebanon. Two months later, Communist-inspired 'peace-partisans' threw Iraq into turmoil. In neighbouring Iran, the continued deadlock over the oil nationalization issue kept the anti-British pot simmering, which even Averill Harriman, President Truman's special representative, could not cool. But the most serious set-back was the assassination of Liaquat Ali in October, which revealed the clay-feet of the most dependable Muslim ally.

At the same time, the Communist bloc had started a high-pressure drive to win over the Muslim faith, in which anti-semitism

was freely practised. Iran was cajoled with an offer of increased trade, a set-off against the virtual Anglo-American boycott ; and Afghanistan's friendship was sought by a minor adjustment of the common boundary along the Oxus, and the offer of technical aid and experts for her development projects. And an All-Muslim organization was set up in Chinese Turkistan to realize the old dream of uniting all the national groups having the same Tartar blood.

Things were complicated further by the emergence of an Arab-Asian Group in U.N.O., a sort of consultative body comprising most of the Arab countries and some Asian—including India and Pakistan, which would often come into open conflict with the Western democracies. In a sense, even the 'red' challenge was less threatening than a united front in Asia ; for if the latter were allowed to establish itself, then the vast raw material resources and consumer-goods market were likely to go out of the Anglo-American sphere, and the capacity to fight Communism correspondingly reduced.

Appeasement of Pakistan was the stone with which the Anglo-Americans hoped to kill three birds—to restore their prestige in the largest Muslim State, to pull away sixty million from joining the opposite camp, and to break the Asian solidarity. These extraneous considerations determined the proceedings of the Security Council which met in November to discuss the fourth Graham Report.

Pakistan's price for co-operation was Kashmir ; and she declared it, by resorting to the stock-in-trade method of wild accusations against India. Thereby, Prime Minister Nazim-ud-din tried not only to divert his people's attention from the growing economic distress, but also to hoodwink the world that his country was straining on the leash over Kashmir. Thereupon, U. K. and U.S.A. submitted a joint resolution on November 5, urging India and Pakistan to enter into direct negotiations at U.N. headquarters in order to reach an agreement on demilitarization on the basis of Dr. Graham's July 15 figures, bearing in mind the principles of his September 4 criteria.

A time limit of 30 days, from the date of adoption of the resolution, was given to the two parties to accept or reject it. There was not much of a chance for this proposal, especially when the patient Dr. Graham himself could not carry it through; moreover, the sponsors themselves had made it look more repulsive at the second sight, by interpolating many deviationary suggestions in their introductory speeches. For instance, the July 15 formula had envisaged an armed *civil* force on Pakistan side and an armed *military* force on the Indian side, but Sir Gladwyn Jebb declared that Britain never thought that such a difference in status "was consistent with a really free plebiscite". And he also revived the ghost of the "neutral" force. It is unprecedented in parliamentary procedure to submit a resolution, and then to hedge or qualify it, or otherwise to ditch it in the back; but how often have we seen honest practice made an exception to the rule in U.N.O. discussions over the Kashmir issue.

Indian opinion was vehemently opposed to the resolution and to the sponsors' introductory remarks. There was even a talk to revert to the original complaint about Pakistan's international obligation to withdraw the tribal nationals and her armed personnel from the State—in other words, indirectly naming Pakistan an 'aggressor', which Sir Owen Dixon had materially admitted. But Mrs. Pandit, who was leading the Indian delegation to the Security Council, spoke in a gentler key when she rejected the resolution on December 8; her concluding remarks were: "We are always, as hitherto, willing to extend our co-operation to, and indeed to explore ourselves, every avenue which may lead to a peaceful solution of the problem."

Pakistan, it may be remembered, had also rejected the Graham suggestions; but with its undesirable parts now excised by the assurances and explanations given by the sponsors, Sir M. Zafrullah Khan announced on December 16 his willingness to accept the resolution, with the proviso that the talks should be carried on under the auspices of the

U. N. Representative. The resolution was amended accordingly, and finally approved on December 23—Russia alone abstained from voting. *

Just prior to the passage of the resolution the sponsors made some more startling pronouncements. Sir Gladwyn Jebb said, "To sift and evaluate facts and apportion responsibility for the events leading up to the outbreak of fighting in Kashmir" would not help towards a solution; and his U.S. colleague, John C. Ross declared that it was "undesirable, unnecessary and unconstructive" to go back into the history of the Kashmir case. To set at naught all compulsions of history was an extraordinary attitude, especially when it was taken in a responsible organization by the responsible representatives of those responsible countries. And that also, after the Government of India had taken a grave step to compromise their international reputation. On December 1, India had introduced in the Political Committee of the United Nations General Assembly a resolution aiming at the removal of the 'prisoners-of-war' obstacle bogging the peace-talks in Korea. It is believed that the People's Republic of China had definitely, and U.S.S.R. probably, given a general consent to the proposals; a very large number of the U.N.O. members had also expressed their approval. But when the United States refused to accept the resolution without some serious alterations, its sponsor V. K. Krishna Menon, instead of withdrawing it, not only incorporated the American amendment but carried the revised resolution through in spite of the Communist denunciations and rejection.

Nehru was touring South India when the Anglo-American resolution on Kashmir was passed; he declared in a press conference at Trivandrum on December 28: "We have loyally co-operated with Security Council and the United Nations in this matter and we regret very greatly that, in spite of the co-operation, we have been treated in a cavalier way which has no regard

* It was typical of the Soviet 'neutrality' on the Indo-Pakistan dispute; though the Russian representative, M. Zorin, allowed himself the usual luxury of an attack on U. S. and U. K.

for facts or reality. It passes my comprehension how any person can justify parts of the Anglo-American resolution now passed by the Security Council. As we have stated: 'We do not accept it, we are not going to act under its compulsion.' " Had Nehru picked up a handful of the 'monazite sand' from the Travancore sea-shore and felt the hidden energy within the fissible material, he could have comprehended that, in an all-out race for the Atom Bombs, the *soi-disant* non-cavalier treatment, which he had expected to earn by his loyalty, had a very high price. *

The persistent communist propaganda to win over the Middle East countries, and the failure of the British diplomacy in that region, made the United States policy-makers and geopoliticians acutely conscious of the necessity for an early establishment of MEDO. "The Mohammadan faith", it is their belief, "has proved a difficult barrier to the Communist ideology and Communist methods of action.....A special attention to Islamic relations is, therefore, not only necessary for the *defensive* point of view of holding further communist advance. It offers also minor *offensive* possibilities". † (Italics mine) This 'special attention'—apart from the American intervention in the Anglo-Egyptian and Anglo-Iranian tangles—was behind the persistent kite-flying on Pakistan's admission to MEDO, and the visits of many responsible U. S. service staff to that country, particularly since the beginning of this year. ‡

* The Government of India have banned the export or sale of ores containing fissible material to any foreign country at any price.

† James Burnham: *The Coming Defeat of Communism*. (It is worth a mention that this quotation appears in the English edition of the book, and has been deleted in its reprint in India.)

‡ "The New York Times said that U. S. State Department were planning to build up Pakistan's military strength and include her in the West's defence system. Such a build up contemplated the location of U. S. airfields in Pakistan. This move appeared to be part of a new foreign aid policy in which there would be a shift in emphasis from Europe to Asia with Pakistan being allotted a strategic geographical position." (Press Trust of India report, appearing in *The Statesman* of January 12, 1953.)

Besides other U. S. Defence Department officials, Vice-Admiral Wright,

Such was the international background, when Dr. Graham resumed his negotiations with India and Pakistan; and noting India's objection to the Anglo-American resolution he decided to ignore its directives. A meeting at the ministerial level was held at Geneva in February. But he had nothing new to offer, except some minor concession here and there. Naturally, neither party was satisfied, and once more he had to return empty-handed to the Security Council, on March 27.

It is amusing how pathetically impatient Dr. Graham had now become for the induction of Admiral Nimitz. Whereas in his earlier attempts he had observed that "as we sought to remove many obstacles, surmount boulders and to narrow, and more precisely define, the areas of the remaining differences, the one on the issue of the number and character of the forces is still deep"; he had now made the major discovery that "the difference over definite numbers, important as it is, looms less large than the difference between inducting and non-inducting the Plebiscite Administrator in office". And under his pressure as well as "in the interests of agreement", the Government of India resiled from their original position that in accordance with January 5, 1949, agreement such induction could be timed only after peaceful conditions had been restored, and even agreed to time it "on the last day of the period of demilitarization provided it was completed according to plan and was exhaustive".

While reporting failure, Dr. Graham had remarked that no agreement could be reached because the "basic differences in the approach of the Governments of India and Pakistan to the Kashmir dispute.....reflected in their differing interpretation

Commander of East Atlantic and Mediterranean fleet, with an operational area from U. K. to the Bay of Bengal, came to Pakistan in the last week of January and visited Army Head-quarters at Rawalpindi and the Khyber Pass. He told at a press conference at Karachi: "You only have to look at the map to realize Pakistan's strategic importance." The Admiral was repeating what Mr. Jinnah told Miss Bourke-White more than five years back.

of the assurances and elucidations given by UNCIP with respect to the resolutions of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949"; and had added that "he has been prepared at all times to receive any suggestion from the parties for the settlement of the dispute".

As regards the first point, Dr. Graham should have known even at an early stage of his negotiation, that the 'basic difference' in the dispute was the differing conception of India and Pakistan as regards their 'status' in the State of Jammu and Kashmir; that from the determination of that claim flowed an agreement on the 'nature of the responsibilities' of each government after demilitarization; and that from the determination of their respective responsibilities sprung their 'obligations' under the Security Council's two resolutions. Yet, instead of tackling the hard core of the dispute, he kept on nibbling away at the peripheral areas—the twelve points on his list—and thus foredoomed his failure.

The hint that the U.N. Representative was prepared to consider 'any suggestion' from the parties—even proposals not arising from the Security Council resolutions—was an indirect invitation to the two countries to come to an agreed solution by direct negotiations without U.N. mediation. And a long correspondence between Pakistan and India initiated by Khwaja Najim-ud-din had also reached such a stage that arrangements were in hand for direct talks between the two Prime Ministers sometime in the end of April at Karachi. In the meantime, however, Nazim-ud-din had become *persona non-grata* to the United States. First he gave up the MEDO idea after strong Indian protests, and then showed attraction for Nehru's 'Third Area' thesis,* more dangerous than the

* Nehru defined the 'Third Area' in the Indian Parliament on February 16 this year, as an association of as many countries as possible who did not wish to encourage any tendency towards war, and who wished to work for peace but without lining up with any power bloc. 'Third Area' idea was opposed to the 'Third Bloc' slogan raised by many 'neutral' countries or groups of people; and was particularly attractive to the Asian countries who wanted to steer clear

Arab-Asian alliance. Moreover, he had an independence of outlook born from the maturity in political experience, and was likely to evolve, in the company of the 'independent' Nehru, a solution to the Kashmir problem not exactly in line with the Anglo-American thought. Such misapprehensions were behind the mystifying change in the political set-up in Pakistan on April 17, which was brought about, as narrated in the previous chapter, with the dismissal of Nazim-ud-din and the advent of a resilient Mohammad Ali.

The significance of the present Kashmir and Indo-Pakistan politics can be appreciated only in the context of the series of cataclysmic events which brought about, in the first quarter of the current year, a radical transformation in the tactics of the two Power blocs. First, Eisenhower's installation in Washington on January 20 represented, in more senses than one, the end of the 'Roosevelt-Truman era'; in effect, the United States passed over from the 'Containment' to the 'Liberation' phase. This imparted, in the words of Joseph W. Martin, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, "a refreshing toughness, a firmness about the American foreign policy". The chief architect of this new policy was John Foster Dulles, the Republican Secretary of State; and the aim was to 'roll the iron curtain back'.

Then M. Stalin passed away on March 5; and his successor M. Malenkov came out with a 'peace' gesture. In his very first pronouncement, the new Soviet leader said: "Our policy is one of co-operation between two different systems—Capitalism and Socialism"; later elaborating it in the Supreme Soviet on March 15, that "any country in the world which has the interests of peace at heart including U.S.A. can rest assured of the firm peace policy of the Soviet Union". Soon windows started opening on the 'iron curtain'. Whether it was the shock

of both the Anglo-American and the Russian blocs. Significantly, the Burmese Defence Minister, U. Ba Swe, suggested on May 1, a 'neutral third area' for Burma, India and Indonesia.

from Stalin's death, or it was merely a change of tactics, or the emergence of a genuine spirit of co-operation—international Communism showed signs of peaceful intentions.*

Then, on March 31, Chou En-lai, the prime minister of Communist China, made another peace offensive and announced, evidently with Moscow's concurrence, the virtual acceptance of the Indian formula on the Korean 'war-prisoners' which the Communists had rejected four months earlier. This unexpected success of the Indian foreign policy focussed light on, and was the vindication of, India's 'non-alignment' stand; and in that respect helped Nehru's salesmanship of the 'Third Area' thesis, as well as the consolidation of the Arab-Asian solidarity. But it also appeared to set at naught the American effort to build up an offensive potential in that area; wherefore Dulles told a Congressional Committee on April 12 that the situation in the Middle East and South-east Asia was "quite precarious and the drift is dangerously unfavourable to us", and that U.S.A. might have to try develop some fresh policies with them.†

While U.S.A. was gestating a new policy, Mr. Adlai Stevenson came out on an extensive Asian tour; he did not take long to

* The famous biographer of Stalin, Issac Deutcher predicted in his book, *Russia after Stalin*, that on the passing away of the Dictator there would be a battle within Russia, between the "diehards"—who held that war between a united capitalist world and the Communist bloc was "inevitable", and the "reformists"—who took the view that an accommodation between the two camps was still possible. The elevation of Malenkov represented, so to say, a victory of the "reformers".

† Yet in the ultimate analysis the 'fresh policy' is the same which the British had practised in Asia for the last two centuries, viz. mixing up Politics with Religion. That was what John Foster Dulles meant when he wrote: "The religions of the East are deeply rooted and have many precious values. Their spiritual beliefs cannot be reconciled with Communist atheism and materialism. That creates a common bond between us, and our task is to find it and develop it". (John F. Dulles: *War or Peace*). Since Mr. Dulles wrote the above three years back, that 'bond' has been found and developed in the subterranean link between international capital and militant communalism both in India and Pakistan, instances of which the readers must have observed in our narration.

notice that "perhaps the greatest area of concentration will be India"—and, concomitantly, Pakistan and Kashmir. He himself acted on this realization when he visited Kashmir and was reported to have had direct political talks with Sheikh Abdullah, though that amounted to a breach of diplomatic etiquette. That 'interference', and Nazim-ud-din's engineered fall, laid the pattern of the future American policy towards the countries bordering the Communist bloc—the first stage in the 'liberation' offensive.

This policy was developed further, when accompanied by the Mutual Security Fund Administrator Harold Stassen, Dulles made a whirlwind tour of the Asian countries, including India and Pakistan, last May. As a result of this 'on the spot' study, MEDO was relegated to a long-term possibility, and was substituted by a plan of separate 'defence alliances' on a short term measure, a series of stop-gap arms-aid to individual Arab-Asian Governments in return of a promise to support the American-dominated U.N. and other Western Powers in any emergency involving a clash with Communism, and also to accept American military missions. And India and Pakistan were "tactfully but firmly" told that it is not possible to think about U. S. aid to them unless they made up their differences—of course, on the American lines.*

Meanwhile, Soviet Russia too had re-oriented her policy. Immediately after Stalin's death, she unleashed a series of diplomatic moves ostensibly designed to reassure her Asian neighbours, in which Turkey, Egypt, Israel, Iran and Afghanistan received a piece each of the goodwill cake. Towards Pakistan, Russia has been consistently neutral though the Communists have been trying to 'white-ant' the political structure from within. As for India, they have changed their tactics so many times that any prediction is hazardous;

* A Congressional mission, that toured India and Pakistan recently, put this matter more frankly—"it is not in keeping with basic concepts of our assistance programmes to supply aid to two neighbouring countries, whose failure to reach a settlement on the international problems between them increases their need for U. S. aid and reduces the effectiveness of such aid within each country."

currently, however, while Soviet Russia and People's China are appreciative of the Government of India, their local 'agents' are busy organizing 'democratic fronts' and 'left-wing unity', and are, in general, undermining the basic economic policies of the very same government.

We have referred to the growing American interest in the sub-continent, and have noted its likeness to the old British strategy to utilize this area for her own imperial policy.* We have also narrated in the previous chapters the first out-comes of this supererogation in the politics of Pakistan and—more blatant—in Kashmir. After Dr. Graham gave up mediation and the two countries set to resolve their dispute themselves, American pressure on them increased all the more. The 'technical aid' was reduced considerably not only on the plea that the Indo-Pakistan differences were not allowing it to be used "in the most effective way", but also on the ground that the U. S. taxpayer could not be asked to underwrite an "over-ambitious" Indian Five Year Plan. Lately, there has been an increasing talk for the substitution of the Government grants by private capital investment, for which the entrepreneur demands such stringent assurances which if accepted—the slide-down has started with the three oil refineries—would make India mortgage her fiscal freedom for long years to come. Moreover, if capital is a tool to dabble in the internal politics of a country, it is more effective when in private hands.†

* General Sir William Morgan, one time Supreme Allied Commander in the Central Mediterranean, and subsequently Chairman of the British Research Policy Committee on Guided Missile, candidly admitted: "We cannot lose that [Middle East] oil. If there is a showdown we will have to find something from somewhere to go and sort it out. In old days we just sent up an Indian brigade. We cannot do that now and India and Pakistan are so busy arguing with each other that they have no men for anything else. That is the main reason for sorting out Kashmir. We must get Pakistan and probably Indian help too." (Italics mine). Obviously, U.S. also does not want to 'lose' that oil to Russia.

† It is significant that a Latin American leader, José Figueres—the President of Costa Rica—had issued a warning against U.S. capital investment in his country. ("We don't want foreign investment"—*The New Leader*, August 31, 1953)

Against this background we return to the third Kashmiri 'current,' which appeared to flow towards the Ocean of Peace when Nehru and Ali met in Karachi in the last week of July. But Kashmir was the proverbial bread on which the two cats had been kept fighting; wherefore, no sooner the settlement machinery moved, down came the monkey-wrench to halt it. In this context the Abdullah episode of the last autumn fits the jigsaw eminently; inasmuch as an independent Valley under U.N.O.'s wing was to become a permanent apple of Indo-Pakistani discord and a cockpit for foreign intrigues, the U. S. diplomacy, by winning over the Sheikh on that point, sought to perpetuate the American hold on the State. Then, not to be left behind, the Communists too rushed to the scene and—as narrated earlier—attempted to play their own fiddle; only when the Sheikh declined to have any truck with them, did they start accusing him as an American 'stooge' *a la Beria*. Only a last minute dramatic action by the undaunted Sadar-i-Riasat cut through that web of international intrigues. According to the new Prime Minister, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, if that action were not taken, the history of Korea would have been repeated in Kashmir; as he said at Kulgam on October 13, "if Kashmir had been declared independent, the sinister designs of the Anglo-American bloc would have borne fruit and the security of India and Pakistan imperilled for ever."

Then finding that the bomb had misfired, and the vision of the U. S.-dominated Valley poised against a vital Sino-Russian salient 'gone with the wind', the United States tried to undo the Indo-Pakistan good relations established at Karachi, by giving wide currency to wild and false anti-Indian reports on the events following Abdullah's fall.* More seeds of discord

* The *New York Times*, reputed to be truthful and the least anti-Indian in its coverage, reported that the Sheikh was dismissed by the 'Hindu ruler', though it certainly was aware that Mr. Karan Singh is the 'elected Head' of the State. Not content with such a palpable misrepresentation, it came out with an editorial on August 14, entitled 'India, Pakistan and Kashmir', wherein it falsely stated that the pro-Abdullah demonstrators "have been fired on by Indian police and troops," despite a categorical denial by the Indian Government. It

were sown by her agents colluding and openly instigating pro-Pakistani elements in Kashmir. *

As a result of the above activities, Pakistan was so worked up as again to talk of *jehad* against India and a 'police action' in Kashmir. Then came Mohammad Ali's dash to Delhi and his talks with Nehru in the third week of August, followed by an official communique announcing a limited agreement on the Kashmir dispute. † On the whole the two countries appeared to make some progress; for instance (i) India agreed to a time-table for the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator; (ii) Pakistan agreed to his "formal appointment and induction into office by the Jammu and Kashmir Government"—virtually an acceptance of that Government's sovereignty over the whole State, including Pakistan-held areas; and (iii) the two countries agreed that the 'preliminary issues,' to be settled prior to the plebiscite, were to be considered directly by them for which "committees of military and other experts should be appointed to advise the Prime Ministers."

The above agreement was in many respects a call for 'wiping the slate clean'; and *prima facie* it looked as if the United Nations would be bye-passed by the two countries. That was interpreted in some quarters as a rebuff to the United Nations and a loss of

also made propaganda for the Sheikh by stating that the reformed Government of Kashmir "is not an instrument of the popular will" though it knew that Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, not the Sheikh, had the confidence of the party, and in the past, when its new protege was not towing the American line, it had itself declared that the Abdullah administration was not an instrument of popular will. Moreover, it had only a few months earlier hailed Nazim-ud-din's dismissal under similar circumstances as 'constitutional'.

The *New Leader* of August 31, in an editorial entitled 'Pistol Politics', said that "Sheikh Abdullah was quickly overturned by an Indian-inspired coup when his views began to displease Nehru."

* Kashmir Government have been reported to have sent to the Government of India a list of the U.S. and British 'agents', directly implicated in the disturbances in Kashmir during August; but, for aught anybody knows, Nehru has done hardly anything in the matter.

† Appendix X

the opportunity to interfere in the affairs of the sub-continent. It has already been noticed that the Anglo-American bloc, more than the Communist, did not like a settlement outside the U.N.O. organs, and which did not conform to the various proposals sponsored by them.* Accordingly, while *Pravda* hailed the Nehru-Ali agreement, the Anglo-American spokesmen were, on the whole, ill at ease.

The United States was unhappy, particularly because it transpired that the appointment of Admiral Nimitz as the Plebiscite Administrator was likely to be rescinded, and the revised choice might fall on an Asian, probably a distinguished Burmese.† Ever since U.N.O. was seised of the Kashmir dispute, India and Pakistan had been subjected to all sorts of pressures to agree to the induction of the American admiral, because once he joined that post the assumption of quasi-sovereign powers by him was not a difficult transition. So, if Kashmir were now to be made 'out of bounds' to him, then all the labours of UNCIP, General MacNaughton, Sir Owen Dixon, and for the last two years by Dr. Frank Graham himself, would go to nothing. It is not surprising, therefore, that though Mr. Mohammad Ali could obtain a grudging endorsement from his Cabinet, Pakistan was soon seen not only to flout the terms of the agreement but also to undo its spirit; and the familiar obstacle on the 'preliminary issues' was back at its place even before the military and other experts, whose appointment had been agreed upon by the two Prime Ministers, had met.‡ Yet we should not blame

* Introducing¹ the joint Anglo-American resolution in the Security Council on November 5, 1952, Sir Gladwyn Jebb had declared: "Of course the British Government have in a sense closed their minds to the possibility of a settlement of the problem on lines different from those which we have up to now considered in the Security Council."

† On August 14 last, at a function organized in Rangoon to celebrate Pakistan Independence Day, the Burmese Prime Minister, U. Nu, remarked significantly that his country was prepared to exert her utmost to help resolve Indo-Pakistan differences.

‡ First, Mr. Ali declared that he was still undecided on the replacement of Admiral Nimitz; and when it became known that the latter was contemplating resignation as he was not acceptable to India, Pakistan and 'Azad Kashmir'

Mr. Mohammad Ali for this recantation, except insofar as he has let his country become a victim to the new variety of totalitarianism in the United States, which we may call 'Unilateralism' and whose symptom is the conviction that America always is right.*

Great Britain, the partner of the United States, is playing a more subtle game. While she steam-rolls Indian interests in her colonies and lends tacit support to Malanism, she also makes amends by upholding India on many international matters. Certain British quarters even suggest to assign the Chinese seat in the Security Council to India—thus to tempt her with a Big Power status—allowing ordinary U. N. memberships both to Red China and independent Formosa. Behind this discovery of a new love towards India, while the old prejudice on Kashmir still remains, is the pragmatic Englishman's apprehension about the likely results of his trans-Atlantic cousin's cavalier treatment of a sensitive people, as also an attempt to save his own

pathetically clamoured for his retention. Then Mr. Ali said that the Plebiscite Administrator would be appointed, not by the existing Kashmir Government but by another "established by the free will of the people of that State"; yet, as that 'free will' itself was to be determined through a plebiscite, it appears that the Pakistan Prime Minister is merely going round and round the mulberry bush.

* A recent exhibition of this megalomania was the undignified way the United States successfully barred India's entry in the Korean Political Conference. Among those who voted against the Indian candidature were U.S.A. herself, and a long list of 17 Latin American States, and only three non-American powers—KMT China, Greece and Pakistan. It was depressing to see Pakistan sit in opposition to all Muslim, and practically all Asian, countries—but food has become a political commodity with which U.S.A. tries to buy diplomatic concessions. (Food crisis in Pakistan is again deepening—wheat crop acreage this year was 9.5 million against 10.2 of last year, and the yield was 2.4 million tons against 3.2 million tons; meanwhile population is increasing.) Despite American opposition India secured a majority of six votes in the U.N. Political Committee, but as there was hardly any chance for the necessary two-third majority in the General Assembly, she decided to withdraw. Thereupon the American delegate, Senator Lodge, complemented her decision as "generous and statesmenlike"; yet, the way the United States had 'bloc-voted', she herself forfeited any claim for either of the two adjectives.

Commonwealth. Yet on all vital matters, Great Britain 'rubber-stamps' the United States' policies. *

On the other hand, U.S.S.R. is developing a new technique to win over the non-Communist countries. The national communist parties are gradually going into the background and their place is being filled in by a trade union solidarity. The aim is to infiltrate and capture all non-communist trade unions, and then to make them a weapon for the advancement of Communism. Simultaneously, the Cominform—the central agency controlling the activities of the communist parties in the non-Communist countries—is going into liquidation, and its function being taken over by the Soviet-controlled and Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions (W.F.T.U.). Once the labour unions in a country are 'captured', its non-Communist leaders will be 'liquidated', and flood-gates opened to Communism. This master plan was given a final shape recently (October 22) at the third Congress of W.F.T.U. at Vienna.

With the passage of time it becomes clearer that the Korean war did not end, as it was first thought, in a stalemate. In fact, the Communist bloc has scored a great psychological victory, because with the differences mounting between the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission under Indian chairmanship, and the U.N. Command, the rift between the non-Communist Asian countries and the United States widens daily. With Nehru's challenge to the American unilateral policies in the Far East—Asians would not allow to be pushed about, he had said—the Indo-U.S. relations have reached a critical stage; so much so that the sober *New York Times* has very recently recorded: "India's attitude on many, if not all, international issues is much closer to that of the Communist countries than to that of the democracies,...(and) virtually identical

* There has been some talk, and some visible demonstrations too, of differences between Great Britain and the United States. Nevertheless, leaving the two peripheral phenomena aside—Bevanism and McCarthyism—the basic fact must not be overlooked that overwhelming proportions of the peoples of the two countries are fully aware of the fact that they sail in the same boat.

with that of the Soviet Union".* This set-back, despite the personal contacts made by Mr. Stevenson and Mr. Dulles last spring, is being balanced by a re-wooing of Pakistan to the revised MEDO plan; Mr. John Foster Dulles, and Admiral Arthur Redford of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, it has been semi-officially declared, "are interested in the desire of Pakistan to join the Middle East Defence command that would help plug the gap left by India's neutrality towards Communists of Russia and China. The U.S.A. would be expected to pick up a check for about 250 million annually in arms for Pakistan Army."† The explosive consequences of this *balance* strategy, particularly on the Indo-Pakistan relationship and indirectly on Kashmir can be well-imagined.


So, if we accept that the present 'cold war' between the two blocs is the continuation of the pristine struggle between Great Britain and Russia, with the former yielding leadership to the United States, and that the prize is not the possession of Asia alone but that of the world, then we can also appreciate that the Anglo-American game in the State of Jammu and Kashmir remains the same as prompted the East India Company to issue a directive to the Governor-General, Lord Auckland, on June 25, 1836, "to raise a timely barrier against the impending encroachments of Russian influence"—only its extent is now colossal because the 'encroachments' are global too. Yet two factors have lately appeared, which may alter the 'sphere of influence' politics, and may still save the world from a war of attrition—the knowledge that the Atom Bomb will annihilate the victor and the vanquished alike, and an independent India's honest efforts to push the gladiators apart.

Thus the third Kashmiri 'current' still flows on; but in which direction? Towards the Ocean of Peace, if the two power blocs

* Thomas J. Hamilton's report from the United Nations Headquarters on October 4, 1953.

† The official *U. S. News and World Report*, dated October 8, 1953.


realize that the H-Bomb has posed two alternatives before the Humanity—total annihilation or peaceful co-existence. Towards another Whirlpool, if one bloc continues to believe in its self appointed divine mission to 'defend' the non-Communist countries and to 'liberate' the satellite ones, and the other does not give up its dogmatic belief on Stalin's thesis of the inevitability of the "frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois States."



"BEAUTY"


The people are as beautiful as their country.

← BLOSSOMS
AND
THORN




"POVERTY"

But their life is hard till the end.



SHEIKH MOHAMMAD ABDULLAH
 "I hold that the sovereignty resides in the people."

← MILESTONES



BAKSHI GHULAM MOHAMMAD
 "The hand we have given in the
 hands of India shall remain there."

"CROSSROADS"



Jawaharlal Nehru inspecting Leh whence caravans lead off for Sinkiang and Tibet.

QUEEN OF LADAKH



Queen mother of Ladakh with the ruler (right) and his brother (left). Ladakh, or the "Little Tibet", was conquered from Tibet by Zorawar Singh in 1841 A.D. Past history and kinship pulls the Ladakhis towards the land of Dalai Lama.

LADAKHI BAND




A Ladakhi musical band in the traditional Tibetan dresses.



Thousands have Pathan strain in their blood. Religion and kinship pulls them towards Pakistan and 'Azad Kashmir'.

SHAH-I-HAMADAN MOSQUE



Built in 1395 A.D. it is the symbol of mixed culture, with a Saracen minaret, Buddhist hanging bells and Hindu walls.

THE OCEAN OF PEACE

I still recollect my tired companion, unable further to trek the Kashmiri stream, turn sharply and rasp at our guide: "Where does this blasted river end?" My reader's irascibility would be manifold than my friend's, for I have led him along the tortuous course of not one but three 'currents'. Surely I hear him shout: "Where do these blasted 'currents' end?" ; to which I answer: "In an 'ocean of peace', if.....". But that 'if' depends upon many factors—ponderable and imponderable.

Sufficient has been said in the foregoing pages to show that the Kashmir riddle is not one problem, but an interplay of three, each of which could, and should, be evaluated and resolved separately. Of course, a right solution of one problem might lessen the intractability of the others; and vice versa. We have also noticed that each problem is itself a tangle of many minor issues which too need separate solutions. In any case, to seek and to strive for a single 'open sesame' for the Ali Baba's cave is to court a failure and concomitant disappointment. Bearing this in mind, we shall try to indicate the lines on which this triple problem may be tackled.

FIRST CURRENT

A peaceful course for this 'current' is dependent ultimately upon three relative equations :-

- (i) Administration — People.
- (ii) India — Kashmir.
- (iii) Pakistan — Azad Kashmir.

We shall analyze each relationship separately so that we may all the better be equipped to comprehend this problem in its entirety.

(i) *Administration—People :-*

The first fundamental fact to be remembered in this connection is that the people of Jammu and Kashmir form neither one distinct 'nation'—as professed by the National Conference leaders,* nor an integral part of one Muslim nation—as claimed by the Pakistani spokesmen. They are, in fact, a typical example of a 'plural society' comprising of more than one element or social group, living side by side and yet not completely merged into one. Common history, accidents of geography and a comity of interests have generated powerful cohesive forces. Yet, simultaneously, ethnic and cultural differences, parochial loyalties, and extra-territorial pressures have tended to pull them apart. Much of the social disorder in the State is attributable to the clash between these two sets of conflicting forces.

The second fundamental is that the inhabitants of Jammu and Kashmir are no strange beings with their own special laws of social dynamics. They are ordinary men, like any living in India or Pakistan, and like them occasionally inspired by revolutionary fervour or infected by communal fever—though, due to certain historical and geographical reasons, they are a little more tolerant and a little less bigoted.

The third fundamental is that the subjects of Jammu and Kashmir are one of the most exploited particles of humanity, living even to-day at a near-slavery level. In that State, more than anywhere else, Man lives by bread alone—90% of them at least, if not all. To them freedom is co-terminous with a little less toil, a little more food, and a little better shelter. Marxism, as such, makes little sense to them—except, perhaps, to a small section of the intelligentsia. Nevertheless, poverty and indigence make the State, as other similarly placed Asian countries, a happy-hunting ground to the communists.

The above three basic factors can help us understand many

* Sheikh Abdullah's autonomy move has been interpreted, by Jammu people in general and Parishad leaders in particular, as a desire to create a 'third' nation of Kashmiris, distinct from India and Pakistan.

inexplicables in the Kashmir situation. Take, for instance, the National Conference hold on the mass mind. Six years back, that party's star was at its zenith ; a plebiscite taken then would surely have gone against Pakistan—perhaps not so much for India, as for the Conference. To-day, if there is a perceptible shift of the popular opinion in favour of Pakistan, it is not so much away from India, as from the Conference. Time was when the hopes of the people—the Pandit and the Buddhist, the Dogra and the Muslim—were crystallized in Sheikh Abdullah as the embodiment of the 'New Kashmir'. To-day, many Pandits are disgruntled, though they sensibly make no noise about it ; the Buddhists cast expectant looks at India, and an occasional one at Tibet ; and the Jammu people have shown that they could be driven to a 'national suicide'. As for the Muslim, whoever promises him more *shali* (Kashmiri word for rice) per rupee secures his allegiance. Take a State subject off his guard, and more often than not he would talk nostalgically of the Dogra rule, when rice was so much cheaper. He little understands the argument that inflation is a world problem ; nor is a lecture on Keynesian economics an answer to the grouse that the popular support in the struggle against the the Ruling dynasty had been purchased on false promises. Why is that so ?

The reason is that S. M. Abdullah had failed to take full measure of the three fundamentals. Repeated caustic attacks on the Dogras, and the step-motherly attitude towards the Buddhists, have kept parochialism alive ; repeated 'alarums and excursions' against Hindu revivalism have given pleasure to the communalist and the Pakistanis only.

Again it is so, because the social and economic reforms of the Abdullah Government—however admirable on paper—have been carried out without a proper regard for the three fundamentals ; for instance, the excellent land-legislation has raised parochial antagonism in Jammu and cultural fears in Ladakh. The well-intentioned attempt to discourage denominationalism in education has alienated the minority community.

The use of party-machinery, as a liaison between the administration and the masses, has unwittingly created a new class of local tycoons. The zeal to cut away the halter of feudalism and capitalism, without at the same time carrying out a drive for 'Agricos' and 'Induscos', has bound the tiller and the artisan with the shackles of the bureaucratic co-operatives. And, finally, the replacement of the Dynastic rule by a monolithic Governmental structure, howsoever benevolent the new rulers and howsoever self-sacrificing the party leaders may be, is not conducive to the growth of Democracy.

It, nevertheless, does not mean that the Kashmir Government and the leaders cannot recover their lost popularity. But they can do so only if they measure every act and legislation with the yardstick of the three fundamentals. On our part we venture to outline a programme which, if carried out, will bring about a greater harmony between the Administration and the people.

(1) Sheikh Abdullah had dominated the scene so much and so long that his removal has created a dangerous psychological void. While the National Conference cannot be said to have completely absorbed the shock and, on the other hand, has developed dichotomic tendencies,* the vacuum is being filled in by a moulting Praja Parishad; and the communists will certainly not lag behind. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad should, therefore, seize the initiative by making his Cabinet more broad-based, and by overhauling the party machinery †—no day will be too soon for this transformation.

(2) To revitalize the masses, all restrictions imposed on

* Maulana Mohammed Saeed Masoodi, the General Secretary of the National Conference since 1939 when it had metamorphosed itself from the Muslim Conference, and universally acclaimed as the brain behind the party organization, was removed from his post on October 21 last, because he advocated the release of Sheikh Abdullah.

† The General Council of the National Conference decided on October 21 to bring about "a desirable change in the present set-up" of the party. It is hoped that the planned re-constitution of the Conference would not merely end in a 'witch-hunting' of the opponents, but would lead to a healthy re-orientation like the transformation of the Muslim Conference into the National Conference in 1939.

the political parties, due both to the 'war emergency' and to the Parishad agitation, should be reviewed and those not required now withdrawn. However necessary Sheikh Abdullah's arrest might have been last August, his continued incarceration does not help the popular cause—even Nehru had hoped that it was a 'temporary phase'. It is time to take a bold risk by releasing the Sheikh and, even if he declines to rehabilitate himself along the 'New Kashmir' ideals, to allow him to preach his own provided he does not transgress the constitutional line.

(3) For the success of Democracy, it is necessary to invent an opposition party, as Kamal Atatürk had done, when one is non-existent. Kashmir sorely lacks a healthy opposition to-day; the Praja Parishad and the other *soi-disant* 'All Kashmir' bodies being too narrow in outlook. Moreover, it is advisable to balance these parties on the Right by building one on the Left. So, G. M. Sadiq—the 'socialist soul' of the New Kashmir—should come out of the National Conference and form a democratic responsible opposition.* That will not weaken the Conference; but, paradoxically, help it to combat the reactionary propaganda of the Right parties.

(4) With the formation of a new effective party, and the removal of restrictions on others, the present monolithic Constituent Assembly will become an anachronism. Fresh elections should then be arranged on the basis of adult franchise and joint electorate; and to avoid any subsequent allegation about malpractices, Kashmir Government may obtain the loan of Mr. Sukumar Sen, Election Commissioner, Government of India, to conduct the elections.†

* Mr. Sadiq is the president of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly. If he decides to form a truly socialist opposition, he will have to relinquish that post. In that case, it can be given to Sardar Budh Singh, a veteran National Conference worker and an ex-president; or to Maulana Masoodi, the 'dismissed' General Secretary, if he accepts it.

† Mr. Sen's impartiality and qualifications have received international recognition, when the British, Egyptian and Sudanese authorities agreed to his appointment as the Election Commissioner in Sudan, under the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of February 12 this year.

(5) The Wazir Committee has done some useful spade work ; and the Bakshi Government has announced certain stop-gap ameliorative measures. To carry that good work forward, a high-power Commission, of proven independence and highest integrity, should be set up charged to investigate how far the past administrative activities had failed to conform to the 'New Kashmir' ideals, and so to overhaul the machinery of reforms that those already carried out, or are about to be carried out, do not remain ends in themselves.

(6) The new Constituent Assembly should fix a very short-dated target to complete the task of constitution-making. That will eliminate, to a great extent, the crippling uncertainty about the State's political future. As the question of granting 'cultural' autonomy to certain regions has now been conceded, the new Constituent Assembly should take a dispassionate decision on its quantum, safeguarding that decentralization does not lead to an ultimate de-linking or dismemberment of the State itself.

(ii) *India-Kashmir :-*

Here again are three basic factors which can be ignored only at the peril of an amicable adjustment of the differences that have time to time disturbed this relationship.

The first fundamental fact is that the Indo-Kashmir nexus is not of a statutory but of a contractual nature, and cannot be unilaterally altered. The Indian Constitution does not, *ipso facto*, apply to the State, but by virtue of the Instrument of Accession. Of course the Delhi Agreement of July 1952 determines certain statutory arrangements between the two countries ; but beyond them the State is an entity in itself. It is argued that India has 'bought' some extra-contractual rights by shedding her blood in the defence of the State. But if you rush to the aid of a maiden in distress, you do so in a spirit of chivalry—that evil or aggression does not triumph—and surely not to bind the damsel into a wedlock. Even if, fortunately, the lady becomes amorous, should your addresses be pressed so hard that she be driven to mistake the valiant for the villain ?

The second fundamental is that India has still a long way to go to become completely secular—the communal rashes burst out too often to allow complacency. Neither has the National Conference of Jammu and Kashmir rid itself of the poison, as it was demonstrated recently during the Abdullah episode. This incapacity to see the beam in one's own eye, while looking for the mote in the other's, has been bedevilling the Indo-Kashmir relations even now.

Thirdly, Kashmir's strategic value surpasses her economic viability. Therefore, though the State has vast agricultural and industrial potentials; yet for many years to come whoever couples with Kashmir must accept it as a fiscal liability.

Bearing these fundamentals in mind, we suggest the following steps in order to place this relationship on a better and happier foundation.

(1) Kashmir's desire for autonomy arises mainly from the fear that a complete merger with India—or for that matter, with Pakistan—would end in her cultural annihilation and economic subservience. It is justifiably so, because a number of the statutes in the Indian Constitution go counter to the State's social legislations. Therefore, Nehru should continue to resist all pressure-tactics designed unilaterally to alter India's legal or contractual position; though, if the Kashmir Constituent Assembly decided to transfer more of the residuary powers, he should not refuse to accept them. Mahatma Gandhi had always advocated decentralization of power; in his concept of the Free India, "the All-India Panchayat shall be a voluntary federation of the Provinces and States, with the *largest* measure of local autonomy for the federating units".* (*Italics mine*). By conceding to Kashmir 'the largest measure of local autonomy' not only will India take the first step towards making Gandhiji's dream a reality on an all-India basis, but will also set in motion a process leading to the much needed decentralization in other spheres.

* S. N. Agarwala: *Gandhian Constitution for Free India*

(2) Kashmir has not yet developed an administrative cadre of requisite modern efficiency. India's assistance in this sphere, when asked for voluntarily and rendered unconditionally, will bring the two countries much nearer to each other than any number of paper resolutions in the Kashmir Constituent Assembly and articles in the Indian Constitution can do. A common man in the State wants a dependable and sympathetic administration, and feels its absence to-day. If India could fill that vacuum, she would have gone a long way in bringing Kashmir closer to her.

(3) So long sectarianism, under whatever nomenclature it goes, thrives in India, it is the duty of the Indian Government to protect the State from it. But the way Hindu revivalism was recently allowed to make the Indian soil a spring-board for intervention in Kashmir showed that the Government of India was not sufficiently resolute in carrying out its obligations. That should not happen again. As a *quid pro quo*, Kashmir Government may be persuaded, till the last vestige of communalism had vanished from the State, to appoint regional 'Minority Boards' as set up under the Nehru-Liaquat Pact.

(4) Logistics is becoming increasingly important both in peace and war—even at the expense of the laws of Economics. Therefore, the development of communications within the State should be given the utmost priority, with the following programme as a basic minimum :—

- (a) Construction of the Bannihal tunnel to be expedited ;
- (b) Survey, and construction if feasible, of a rail-link between Pathankot and Jammu ;
- (c) Development of the bridle-track, connecting Kulu in the eastern Punjab (I) with Ladakh, into an all-weather motorable road ;
- (d) Broadening of the Zoji-la road, so that Ladakh becomes approachable from the Valley all the year round, and its re-opening to civilian traffic ;
- (e) 'Air-taxis' to inter-connect the capital, the district towns, and the 'tourist-spots.'

A Kashmiri land-army should be raised to construct the roads

and the aerodromes under the supervision of the Indian Army, thus providing some gainful employment to the semi-idle State subjects. India should not begrudge the cost, because increased mobility will permit a reduction in the forward-line troops, and a corresponding cut in her own Defence Budget.

(5) The Delhi Agreement had left the details of the financial integration of the State to future negotiation. As a preliminary to the re-opening of the subject, the two Governments should agree to the removal of the customs barrier ; the loss in the State revenue to be made up by a Sales Tax, and even by a subvention from the Government of India. Simultaneously, the State should scrap its Five Year Plan, as it has failed to stir the mass mind, and appoint a joint Indo-Kashmir Commission to draft a more dynamic plan *de novo*. The State should approach the new plan on its own strength ; India should approach it on the basis of 'Trade, not Aid'—'Trade' will of course include traffic in 'know-how'. The Commission should also investigate the extent of the 'financial integration.' As the chief cause of indigence in the State is the under- and unemployment forced by the snow-bound winter, they have to be fought by bringing the work itself to the labourer rather than to make him go out to seek it. Therefore the Commission should avoid the 'Big Project mentality' and concentrate on co-operative handicraft and cottage industries on the lines of the 'community development projects'.

(iii) *Pakistan = Azad Kashmir :-*

Once again three basic factors evaluate this relationship. The first is the virtual 'black-out' in 'Azad Kashmir'. Pakistani papers, too, are silent, except for an occasional reference to a 'head' rolling down and another bobbing up. Azad Radio is, of course, regularly on the air, but more with invectives against the Kashmir Government than with factual news.

The second fact, emerging from piecing out the news dribblets, is that Democracy had been the main casualty in 'Azad Kashmir'. No elected government functions there—not even a monolithic one. And worse still is the double-distilled autocracy in which

Pakistan overlords the feudal barons, and they, in turn, overlord the populace.

And the third is that 'Azad Kashmir' has not been recognized as a district constituent unit of Pakistan—not even having the semi-autonomous status of a Native State under Paramountcy. As for a representation in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, 'Azad Kashmir' simply does not exist.

From the above fundamentals, two propositions emerge :-

(1) A fact-finding mission should go to 'Azad Kashmir', and report on the conditions existing there. In this matter, Mr. Prem Nath Bazaz can make a positive contribution if he persuades his lieutenants, now externed in Pakistan, to take the initiative.

(2) Pakistan should take concrete steps to restore political democracy in the 'occupied' area by establishing a unitary responsible government there, and by transferring to it the administration of the 'northern areas' as well. Without this, no amount of sponsorship by Pakistan or the Anglo-American bloc can bestow on 'Azad Kashmir' anything more than an ectoplasmic existence, or to endow its spokesmen with more than a ventriloquist voice.

SECOND CURRENT

As we leave the local plane, and view the Kashmir scene from the sub-continental, it loses its immensity somewhat and appears merely as a part of the larger edifice—important of course, but a cornice after all. Nevertheless, as a reduction in stress anywhere in the structure lessens stresses everywhere, more attention should be bestowed on the basic differences between India and Pakistan, and not merely on their manifestations like the Kashmir dispute.

Here again we meet some fundamental facts, the first being that the Hindu-Muslim antagonism, as such, has not been an indelible feature in the political life of the people; the first struggle for independence in 1857-58, the Khilafat movement,

and the Simon Commission boycott, are instances of joint assaults upon the citadel of Imperialism. It was the foreign ruler who, for his own advantage, engineered the split; so much so that during his last years the fury of the communal riots increased in an inverse ratio to the days left for his departure. While Communism had also made tactical alliances with sectarianism from time to time, the latter receives by far the larger quantum of moral and material aid from the *haut finance*—local and international.

The second fundamental to be remembered is that the Kashmir dispute is not a single lock barring the Indo-Pakistan friendship, but is, in fact, one of the many unhappy outcomes of a clash between the divergent political philosophies of the two countries. It is, therefore, a wishful thinking to believe that with the settlement of the Kashmir dispute all Indo-Pakistani differences will automatically be resolved, and fatuous to talk that a final agreement on Kashmir should not be aimed at until all other disputes have been settled.

Another fundamental is that while India and Pakistan have talked at cross-purposes on many major issues, there have been many occasions when direct talks have led to satisfactory agreements. It is only the 'mutual suspicion' which bars the way; for as Nehru declared after his talks with Mr. Mohammad Ali in July this year, "if the approach is a friendly one... every little step we take forward becomes an element in solving the second problem, and every problem solved helps in the solution of the second and third problems".

Certain facts emerge from the recognition of the above basic factors. We venture to state them, in the hope that action taken on these lines would ultimately help resolve the most tangled of the knots—the Kashmir issue.

(1) The political philosophy of India is Secular Democracy—at least that is the ideal of the Indian Constitution; in practice, however, neither secularism nor a democratic way of life has been firmly established. But as communalism had itself been and still is a tool in the hands of the vested interests,

even with all the defeats inflicted over it the crucial second battle has yet to fought—the one against Feudalism-cum-Capitalism now linked with international diplomacy. Therefore, Nehru will have to wage a two-front battle if he has to redeem the pledge he took with Gandhiji's corpse as his witness: "Our duty is to complete the work started by him and to establish the India of his ideal. In India we must give equal rights to all persons, irrespective of their religion, and we must have to extend to the rest of the world that lesson of equality of all men".

(2) Pakistan also talks of Democracy, but couples it with Muslim hegemony—evidently a contradictory position, when every seventh citizen is a non-Muslim. And how can a State be democratic when its 'headship' is sought to be restricted to one religious group alone? * As already observed the forces of disruption, arising from mixing religion with politics, are now 'white-anting' Muslim solidarity itself, otherwise there should have been no reactionary Jamait-Islamia, no coup d'etats and political assassinations, no disagreement over the Basic Principles, no Ahmediya agitation, and what is more pertinent to our subject-matter—no fear of a solution in Kashmir other than the one which satisfies only communal emotion. †

(3) Till now economic self-sufficiency had been pressed forward with a vengeance both in India and Pakistan, verging on a fiscal war between the two. However, the two countries are slowly realizing that prosperity cannot be attained in isolation. This belated knowledge should now be translated into a

* The Basic Principles Committee of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly recommended on December 22, 1952, that a Muslim alone could be the 'Head of the State' in Pakistan.

† It is strange that even responsible Pakistani leaders think only of the Muslim population of the State, as if no non-Muslim exists there. Referring to the Kashmiri Muslim alone, Mr. Mohammad Ali, broadcast on September 1 this year: "Their sorrow is our sorrow, their suffering our suffering, their hardship ours".

'co-prosperity zone'.* That need not effect the political integrity of either State, because it is being increasingly accepted that a complementary economy does not premise a political union; as instances to the point, we have the Schuman Plan, and the more radical Chile-Argentina 'economic Union.'†

(4) Mutual suspicion created by the very act of fission in 1947 gave birth to militant ideas like 'Akhand Bharat' and the 'Muslim re-conquest' of India. Nehru's 'No War declaration' has not been found acceptable by Liaquat Ali and Khwaja Nazim-ud-din. However, things have changed in Pakistan since then, and Mr. Mohammad Ali is sympathetic towards Nehru's fresh proposal for a consultative system between the two countries, which is an improvement over the 'No War declaration' because it has a positive content. This matter should be pursued energetically.

(5) We now come to the central theme of our book—Kashmir. As the greatest volume of emotion has been raised on this particular issue, it would be better to go slow over it till the general climate improves and the chain of solutions of other problems lengthens. After all, a sort of undeclared settlement by stalemate already exists. To undo it in either party's favour, while both eye each other with apprehension tinged with hostility, will involve large migrations of the population, and thereby give birth to more problems and deeper emotions. The two Prime Ministers have recently reiterated that the "most feasible method of ascertaining the wishes of the people was by a fair and impartial plebiscite", yet that plebiscite remains bogged for non-agreement over the "preliminary issues". Nevertheless, if a correct perspective of the Kashmir problem has been

* S. N. Shivapuri : Co-prosperity Zone in *Jute-Joint-Stock Companies Journal*—Independence Number, August 15, 1953.

† On February 21, 1953, Chile and Argentina agreed to co-ordinate production and foster industrialization through mutual contribution of capital and other resources, to eliminate Custom duty and other measures that hinder trade. Other South American States have been invited to join this 'economic Union'.

taken it would be seen that the final solution on the sub-continental plane hinged on a settlement on the international.

THIRD CURRENT

Here we soar to such eerie heights that Kashmir appears hardly more than a pin-point, and the sub-continent a mere landscape. Yet as we survey the wonderous scene certain basic truths loom prominent.

The first of these is that 'Ideas' do not just wither away; instead they wage bitter struggles for survival, and die only when the climate which nurtured them changes. Ceaserism did not disappear till Christianity had swept away the slave-system, but Rome was 'burnt' in the bargain. Feudalism vanished in the West only when the Divine Right was taken away from the European Sovereigns, but in the process many royal heads were chopped and civil wars fought; and, though retreating in the East also, it fights a bitter rear-guard action. Correspondingly, Imperialism still thrives, despite 'Four Freedoms' and U.N.O., for the circumstances which gave birth to it—industrial expansion in the West and economic stagnation in the East—still persist.

The second truth is that, like Proteus, Imperialism takes on different shapes in different times at different places. The oldest type—Colonial—has withdrawn from some areas, yet its will to survive is seen in Malaya, Indo-China, New Guinea, Iran, and almost all Africa. Next came the Totalitarian kind, and wherever it goes there is 'darkness at noon'.* The latest is the Dollar variety—'unilateralism' its philosophy, autarky its social set-up, and technocracy its practice; it guarantees 'individual freedom', but so long as that freedom conforms to the American specifications.†

* *Darkness at Noon* is the title of the admirable book by Arthur Koestler, describing conditions in a communist State.

† An example of what Clement Attlee called the "tendencies towards intolerance" was Eisenhower's refusal to a 'Big Four' meeting, proposed by Churchill last May and representing almost the combined wish of the Allied

The third truth is that the three Colossi are waging a global struggle for the possession of the world soul; but it is not a triangular contest, for the 'Dollar' and the 'Colonial' have ganged together. In this alliance there is a *quid pro quo*; the former has underwritten the reactionary policies of the latter who, in exchange, has surrendered a quantum of its independence and sovereignty. Even if 'Bevanism,' and Labour's ten-year 'austerity programme' to become independent of the dollar-area trade, represent a permanent rift between Great Britain and the United States, as long as Totalitarianism is a common danger, the two countries will continue to keep together, at the worst like the hunters of Snark about whom Lewis Carroll remarked that "purely from nervousness, not from goodwill, they marched together shoulder to shoulder."

And the fourth truth is that power politics has crippled U.N.O. with the same paralysis as afflicted its predecessor, the League of Nations. Its members treat it with contumely, so much so as to suggest "re-writing of the Charter which is due for renewal in 1954 or 1955, and for a renovation of the whole United Nations organisation"*; while others mutilate its spirit by an excessive use of veto-rights. It is futile to ask, who killed Cock Robin? The fact is that the United Nations are too much of Dis-United Nations today.

Certain consequences flow from the above facts, and for the

bloc. It also betrays the hardening of the 'empire idea' already cast in America some years back—according to the British journal the *New Statesman and Nation*, "1951 might well be remembered in history as the first year of the American Empire."

* This hint, initially dropped by John F. Dulles in 1950, in his book, *War or Peace*, has been officially confirmed by him on August 26 this year, after he became the U. S. Secretary of State. Addressing the American Bar Association at Boston, he listed three "serious inadequacies" of the Charter for which the U.N. had not met all the expectations of the United States. He, however, cleverly did not name what is the most serious inadequacy in the American eye—the 'unanimity principle'—and which has been acting as the main obstacle to the U. S. steam-roller levelling all opposition in the Security Council.

preservation of Peace and the advancement of Civilization they must be faced boldly.

(1) Nehru has often said that the Commonwealth is a freemason's club in which each member retains his independence of action and freedom to quit. Nonetheless, there are certain norms of conduct in every club; and even for the most open-minded person his freedom of action is an insufficient compensation for the loss of respectability in consorting with a suspect, and the ease to come out hardly a valid argument to remain within. The continued Commonwealth association, without a catalogue of concomitant benefits, and when it is seen that the principal member still pursues imperial policies,* is definitely harmful to India. She had roared at the Dutch in Indonesia and yelled at the French in Tunisia, but whimpers at the British in Malaya and Africa. Nehru will be truly 'neutral' only when he has discarded the 'Commonwealth mentality'. The symbolic act of dissociation may even induce Pakistan to follow suit. And when the last apron strings of the 'third party' have been cut away, then only can the two countries enter the era of joint collaboration, untrammelled by outside interference.

(2) Peace can be won only through the liquidation of all imperialist systems, and not merely by evolving a formula for their 'co-existence'. That would come about only when the climate breeding the Imperialist Idea—the under-development of large areas of the world—had changed. Meanwhile, the least that can be done is to keep the gladiators apart, and for that Nehru's 'Third Area' idea is much superior to 'Neutralism', or the 'Third Force' proposal. In a nascent form it already exists from Egypt to China. India, Nepal, Burma and Indonesia often consult each other, and Pakistan is also slowly realizing that "the interests of both countries demand the largest possible measure

* The most recent exhibition of the imperialistic activity was the way the Governor of British Guiana suspended the Constitution of the colony and dismissed Dr. Jagan's popular government on October 9, while cowing the protesting masses into submission by a display of British troops and warships.

of co-operation between them". But a more positive content should be given to this ideology before it can become really effective, and in that context the Gandhian technique or *Sarvodaya* is the correct approach.

(3) India cannot herself step into that 'area' so long the existence of her Government hangs upon the success of a development Plan which, in its turn, depends upon 'aid' from one warring bloc*. And when we notice the international cartels joining hands with the minor cartels in the sub-continent, and the latter linking themselves with the communal coteries, we realize that the invitation to the 'foreign capital' is an infanticide of the 'third area' itself.

(4) As regards the subject-matter of this book, sufficient has been written to show how Kashmir has been sucked into the vortex of power-politics. No good has come out—or is likely to come out in the future—from the Indian reference to U.N.O.; neither can the case be withdrawn now. Nevertheless, the direct Nehru-Ali talks have shifted the emphasis from the international to the sub-continental plane. That perspective must be

* The recipients of the 'foreign aid' declare that it comes without any political strings; and the unwary masses take this statement at its face value. India signed a Technical Co-operation Agreement with the United States on January 5, 1952, as a part of the 'Point Four Programme.' We have been told that there are no political commitments to it. A little scrutiny of its objectives, and of the statutory obligations arising therefrom, will disabuse this complacency. The objectives of the agreement are declared to be (i) promoting and accelerating development of India; and (ii) promoting international understanding and goodwill, maintaining world peace and undertaking such action as the two governments may mutually agree upon to eliminate causes for international tension. Obviously, objective (ii) is nothing but political; and coupled to it is the fact that the U.S. Director of the Technical Co-operation Administration, whose acceptance by India is obligatory, can veto any development scheme, and he and his staff enjoy diplomatic immunity and privileges. That shows how far India has mortgaged her freedom of political action, and allowed entry in the country to potential trouble shooters (*a la affair Abdullah*). And, finally, behind the aid is the Maclaren Act, demanding that it should be denied to those countries which sent 'strategic' material to the Communist States, but leaving the definition of a 'strategic' material to the American political lexicographers only.

maintained, despite the pressure on the Security Council to pick up the thread again from where it has been left by Dr. Graham.

(5) Nevertheless, India can take a positive step. In the ultimate analysis the Indo-Pakistan dispute on Kashmir centres on the differing conceptions of the two countries on their 'status' and 'responsibilities' in the State. Let this matter be submitted to the highest forum of appeal, the International Court of Justice. The Anglo-American resolution, passed by the Security Council on March 30, 1951, had provided for the reference of "all outstanding points of difference" to an arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators appointed by the President of the Court. Let the main point of the difference be submitted, not to an arbitration, but to a legal decision of the full bench of the Court.

In our explorations of the three 'currents' in Kashmir, we have postulated certain fundamentals and have suggested the imperatives springing therefrom. To pursue them to their logical conclusions, whatever be the cost, was our mission when we started on the Kashmir journey. We have now reached the vantage ground whence we see a glimmer of the Ocean wherein the three 'currents' appear to rest. We lay no claims of expert knowledge to assert that it may not turn out to be a mirage or an aberration. Nonetheless, we must push on. Whether we scale the last height before we descend on the Ocean, or an avalanche sweeps us away, is a question-mark on the face of future. Yet the attempt will be worth making ; and it will be a high adventure. While, all the time, the mountain-daughter keeps us calling, and in her refrain is *The Grim Saga*.

POSTSCRIPT

December 12, 1953.

Fifty days have passed since the preceding pages were written, during which much has happened having an important bearing on the flow of the three 'currents'. We now propose to give a *resumé* of the events salient to our subject-matter.

FIRST CURRENT

Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad has continued to sweep the cobwebs of distrust and frustration in the State. We had already mentioned that he started by announcing certain ameliorative measures; that process has been continued—for instance, not only compulsory procurement of *Shali* (rice) was given up, but large quantities were imported from India; custom-duty on salt, as well as on medicines of Indian manufacture, was abolished; and education was made free. The Wazir Committee report, which Sheikh Abdullah had pigeon-holed, was published, and steps taken to implement its recommendations. As a cumulative result, the economic condition of the masses has definitely improved.

The relation between the Administration and the people has been placed on a firmer foundation. Under Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad's inspiration, a labour convention has set up a committee on October 30, to prepare a charter of labour demands which he has promised in advance he would "unhesitatingly accept." And the businessmen have been assured that not only their capital is sacrosanct, but that the custom-duty and other trade restrictions will gradually be removed. Meanwhile, the Cabinet itself has been made broad-based by the inclusion of Ghulam Mohammed Sadiq, the leader of the National Conference 'left-wing'; and homogeneous by the appointment of

two deputies from the previously unrepresented regions—Major Piare Singh from Jammu and Kushok Bakula from Ladakh.

Yet the most heartening achievement has been the partial dissipation of the crippling uncertainty about the State's relations with India. The reconstituted Cabinet has given a directive to the Constituent Assembly to go ahead with the unimplemented clauses of the Delhi Agreement; and negotiations have been re-started to allow India to bore the Bannihal tunnel—an offer made by the Government of India but not availed of by the Sheikh. We had mentioned the taking over of the State's Telegraph and Telephones Department by the Government of India. Another step to bring the State closer to India has now been taken with the liberalization of the rules for the recruitment of Kashmiri Muslims to all the three wings of the Indian defence services, with the ultimate aim to incorporate the State militia in the Indian Army.*

Thus, on the whole, the first 'current' seems to have moved towards the Ocean of Peace. Nevertheless, two factors may yet thwart the desired consummation. The first is that the continued 'leftist tendencies' of the Kashmir Government are increasingly becoming a target of violent attacks from those who fail to distinguish 'pink' from 'red'—the critics range from the extreme Right having subterranean link with foreign capital and the former colleagues of the Sheikh who do not find the new set-up to their taste, to the Praja Socialist Party recently befuddled by its leaders' indecision whether to join with the Congress to attack the Communists or to help the Communists to defeat the Congress.

The second factor is Kashmir's reassertion of her autonomy; Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad has reiterated on October 25, in a convention of the National Conference workers at Anantnag, his "firm determination to oppose and resist all attempts at snatching away the the internal autonomy of the Kashmiri people and merging the State with India." It may again rake

* 'Azad Kashmir' forces have, from the beginning, been a constituent unit of the Pakistan Army.

the Praja Parishad, and also cause another 'outside' interference by Hindu revivalist forces.

Having drawn attention to the dangers ahead arising from anti-Communism and Communalism, we must admit that we leave the local plane with a hope verging on optimism.

SECOND CURRENT

We had noticed Pakistan's hedging on the Nehru-Ali agreement even before its ink had dried. Mr. Ali's 'qualified withdrawal' of his promise to Mr. Nehru on the nationality of the Plebiscite Administrator has been followed by the indefinite postponement of the Burmese Prime Minister, Thakin Nu's visit, originally arranged, for the last week of October ostensibly to persuade Pakistan to accept a Burmese national for that office. Then, the 'absence' of the two highest personalities of Pakistan—the Prime Minister fell sick and the Governor-General went away on a foreign tour—has been utilized by interested circles in that country to create fresh hurdles in the implementation of the August agreement, so much so that the Indo-Pakistan talks on the exchange of 'enclaves', resumption of rail-traffic, and the 'evacuee-property', have proved inconclusive. Though Mr. Ali has after all agreed to the appointment of the expert committees to advise the two Prime Ministers on the 'preliminary issues' prior to the induction of the Plebiscite Administrator, and thus has kept the initiative for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute within the sub-continent, yet in the period under review two developments in Pakistan have shifted the balance of the Indo-Pakistan relations from trust to mistrust.

First was Pakistan's decision, announced on October 31, to become an 'Islamic Republic'. While the desire for a republican status reflected a progressive outlook, the emphasis on Islam showed that the Pakistani statesmen had not given up the medieval practice of painting politics with a religious colour*—

* Kasim Gulek, Secretary-General of the People's Republican Party of Turkey, said on November 8: "Pakistan is trying what we tried for 500 years,

or, are they afraid of the Minotaur's return whose previous victims have been Liaquat Ali, Sir M. Zafrullah Khan, and Khwaja Nazim-ud-din. * Thus Pakistan has not only gone back on the Nehru-Liaquat Ali pact which had assured the minority "complete equality of citizenship, irrespective of religion", but has incorporated clauses in her Constitution which tend to create two classes of citizens—Muslim and *Kaffir*. It is no wonder, therefore, that this religious version of 'Apartheid' has driven the Pakistani Hindus to feel that they formed a sub-nation, and must have a homeland of their own. † The evil reaction of this feeling on the people of India, where, it must be remembered, Secularism is yet to be firmly established, can be well imagined.

The second was the disclosure that Pakistan was negotiating with the United States for military 'aid', or an 'agreement', or a 'pact'. Perhaps Pakistan has discovered in it only a means to lessen the burden of her defence expenditure—70% of the total budget—with arms-aid from U.S.A., either as a grant or in exchange of air bases. While we shall discuss the matter in a greater detail when we reach the international plane, we may mention that its reaction in India and Kashmir has been sharp. Nehru has warned that the Pakistan-U.S. deal

and gave up...to become modern, secular, go-ahead State. As a religious State, Pakistan has no place in the modern world."

As regards the desire to adhere to the Shariat, it may be remembered that Kamal Atatürk had repealed those laws by the Swiss civil code in 1926; moreover, their strict application would require Pakistanis to shut their banks, to share their incomes with the poor, to cut off the thieves' right hands, and to stone the adulterers to death.

* Raja Gazanfar Ali Khan, Pakistan's High Commissioner to India, said on November 14: "The way the Pakistan Constitution is being drafted to suit individual interests is most deplorable and is the negation of the very principles on which Pakistan was established."

† It is a corollary of the 'two-nation' theory, when non-Muslims—even non-conformist Muslims and Ahmediyas—are debarred from the 'Headship of State'; their personal laws made to conform to Shariat; and, by making the propagation of Islam a governmental activity, they are made to feel that their faith itself is inferior.

will "have very far-reaching consequences in the whole structure of things in South-Asia"; and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad has declared in a National Conference convention at Pulwara on November 22 that "America may arm Pakistan or help her in any other way, but Kashmir will never form part of Pakistan. Whether the conspiracy against Kashmir comes in the form of MEDO, or a Pakistan-U.S.A. military alliance, the game of Kashmir's enemies will be foiled ultimately." •

As we leave the sub-continental plane, we note with regret that the second 'current', which was moving towards the Ocean after the two Nehru-Ali meetings last summer, appears to have changed its direction now, but, with the two Power bloc relationship not improving during this period, to hope for a betterment in the Indo-Pakistan relationship is an unwarranted optimism.

THIRD CURRENT

In the period under review, U.S.A. has intensified her 'Liberation' mission. Not only is she planning to form "free armies" of the satellite nations under their own officers and flags and attached to NATO, but has gone over from partisanship between nations phase to partisanship between the political parties of a nation—direct interference in the elections in Western Germany and Phillipines ; and, of course, the subterranean link with the political and communal organizations in India and Pakistan.

We have noticed the continued American interest in Pakistan even after the relegation of MEDO to a 'future possibility'.

* In this context the strategic importance of Gilgit again looms large, for being within 100-air miles of U.S.S.R., its aerodrome will be the first to be taken over by the Americans. As Gilgit is juridically a part of India by virtue of the Maharaja's Instrument of Accession, and India has not relinquished her claim though it remains 'occupied' by Pakistan, it is appropriate for the Government of India to make a *démarche* that its lease to any 'foreign' country will be contrary to international law, and will be construed by her as an unfriendly act both on the part of the lessor and of the lessee.

That officiousness has increased, as seen in the unannounced four-day visit of the seven-men Armed Services Committee of the United States in October, followed by the arrival of the deputy chief of the U. S. military mission in Turkey. Then came the trip of the Pakistan C-in-C and Defence Secretary to Istanbul, and their subsequent visit to Washington. The significance of these goings-on was revealed in the first week of November; the *New York Times* wrote editorially on November 5: "Thus far efforts to make some headway on a regional defence arrangement for Middle East defence have not prospered. It is possible, however, that more can be done at this stage with a bilateral arrangement with a single potentially strong country such as Pakistan than with a group of weaker States. Eventually a regional defence pattern may be evolved, but a start can be made in the case of Pakistan, such as has already been made in the case of Turkey".

The fact that the Pakistan Government formally released this editorial to the Press, and her Governor-General was then meeting President Eisenhower, showed it was in keeping with her point of view. Though it has officially been stated, both by U.S.A. and Pakistan, that no "inter-Governmental negotiations" were in progress for the grant of military bases in Pakistan, it has also been admitted that "informal discussions" have taken place. The dangerous implications of a military alliance on the Turkish model could be understood if it were realized that in case any NATO power got involved in hostilities, war would automatically be brought to South Asia. Naturally, Soviet Union and People's China, the Arab nations and Nepal, and India and Kashmir, have protested against the reported move. Yet U.S.A.'s mind is so much made up that her Vice-President, Mr. David Nixon, made a unilateral declaration in Karachi on December 7, that his country would protect Pakistan against "forces working for its destruction". But who is the protential 'destroyer'—Russia or India? This revealing statement was sufficient to provoke Nehru to announce that India must increase her armed strength.—But who will supply

the arms—America or Russia? In any case, by this move the U.S.A. policy-makers have spiked Nehru's 'Third Area' plan.

The period under review is also marked by the hardening of the imperialist attitude. Among many instances of the process are the U. S. decision to put a 'news-blanket' over her own colony, Puerto Rico; the European colonial powers' defiance of the U. N. Trusteeship Committee; the undignified removal of the Kabaka (king) from the Uganda province of Buganda and the bestial Mau Mau killings.

But the worst feature is the greater consolidation of Unilateralism in the United States. More and more it seems that the Eisenhower Administration is now a prisoner of the 'Maks'.* Though the Bermuda conference in the first week of this month was meant to unruffle British and French susceptibilities against the American unilateral policies, yet the "extraordinarily anaemic" communique issued after the conclusion of the 'Big Three' talks suggests that many vital differences still remain.

In the Communist bloc, the pattern of behaviour is somewhat ambivalent; while the "summer thaw" continues—with more windows opening on the Iron Curtain, and Russia's sudden decision to join the International Labour Organization; the "freezing" has started again at some places—the exasperating wrangles on the Korean talks and M. Vishinsky's vituperations. The former may partly be accountable to a stirring of freedom-consciousness in the "satellite" countries and the necessity to increase the Russian standard of living. The latter is certainly a reaction to the 'Liberation' programme.

Soviet Russia is also trying to counter-balance the American nosing is. Asian countries, by trade pacts with Iran, Afghanistan

* McCarthy, with his excesses over the investigations of un-American activities.

Macmohan Act, which tries to put a stop to the East-West trade.

Maclaren Act, which denies aid to countries sending 'strategic' materials to the Communist countries.

McCormick, with his chain of rabidly anti-Communist papers.

and India ; and M. Benedictov (the new Russian ambassador is more affable than his predecessor, M. Novikov) has declared his Government's desire to "help" India with machinery and technical 'know-how' ; yet the real nature of the Russian interest in India will be revealed after the forthcoming Indian Communist Party conference at Madurai in the last week of this month. The arrival of Mr. Harry Pollitt, General Secretary of the British Communist Party, as a delegate indicates, that Communism will now engage itself more with trade-union solidarity (as decided by W.F.T.U. at Vienna last October) than with militancy ; this swing will also check the Indian Communist's independent tendencies on the Chinese model, and keep him subservient to Russian Communism like the British comrade. On the other hand, Russia's relations with Pakistan have deteriorated ; so the Communists are becoming restive in that country and are trying to form a 'united front' against the ruling party in East Bengal—the Achilles heel of Pakistan.

Nevertheless, in the otherwise darkening international sky, a ray of hope has appeared in the agreement over a 'Big Four' meeting at the Foreign Ministers level in Berlin, which will take place after 4½ years, and may yet be followed by another 'Big Four' meeting at the highest level (as advocated by Churchill), or by a 'Big Five' meeting, including People's China (as proposed by Russia). However, as the *London Times* has rightly pointed out "the next few months will be decisive in setting the policies of world powers. In Europe and Asia there is a testing time ahead, more severe and more exacting than the world has known for many years."

Eisenhower has started the first round of this 'test' with his historic speech to the U.N. General Assembly on December 9, in which he proposed a plan for the peaceful development of atomic energy and a 'world industrial uranium bank'. Yet a closer scrutiny of his speech reveals that it is a piece of psychological strategy only, for he has coupled his profession of peace by the admission that "large programme of warning and defence system" will be accelerated and expanded (Is U.S.-

Pakistan pact a pointer ?) ; while his atomic plan is a foil to the earlier Soviet "package proposal" for atomic energy control and banning of atomic weapons.

The next few months will, therefore, show whether the third 'current' makes a move towards the Ocean, or not. Nevertheless, it can be said with certainty that the first and the second can find rest in that destination, if and only when their third sister joins them there.

—FINIS—

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APPENDIX I

The Kashmiri language is derived basically from the ancient Prakrita, the colloquial form of Sanskrit as found in the classical literature like Uttar Charita of Bhavabhuti. Many words retain their primitive Sanskrit forms, for instance :-

<i>Kashmiri</i>	<i>Sanskrit</i>	<i>English</i>
Nar	Nar	Male
Bab	Bab	Father
Tal	Tal	Below
Kan	Kan	Ear
Nunn	Nuun	Salt
Zal	Jal	Water
Mal	Mal	Dirt
Poush	Pushpa	Flower
Kath	Kath	Word
Santaun	Santaan	Descendent
Rath	Rakt	Blood
Karam	Karma	Action
Modur	Madhur	Sweet

The modern Kashmiri has evolved through the modification of Sanskrit by the languages of the alien rulers of the country ; and of those foreigners who came in commercial and cultural intercourse in the State. The Arabic and Persian came with the Afghans and Moghuls ; the Punjabi from Sikhs and the Dogri from Dogras ; Urdu and Hindi from the peoples of the Indo-Gangetic plains ; the Turki and Tibetan with the caravans from across the north and north-eastern borders. Thus the Kashmiri language displays as much of an eclectic growth and capacity of tolerant absorption, as the social life of the Kashmiri people itself.

APPENDIX II

Letter from the Maharaja of Kashmir to Lord Louis Mountbatten, the Governor-General of India, announcing his desire for the the accession of his State to the Indian Union :-

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have to inform your Excellency that a grave emergency has arisen in my State and request the immediate assistance of your Government.

As your Excellency is aware, the State of Jammu and Kashmir has not acceded to either the Dominion of India or to Pakistan. Geographically my State is contiguous to both the Dominions. It has vital economic and cultural links with both of them. Besides, my State has a common boundry with Russia and China. In the external relation, the Dominions of India and Pakistan cannot ignore this fact.

I wanted to take time to decide to which Dominion I should accede or whether it is not in the best interest of both the Dominions and of my State to stand independent—of course, with friendly and cordial relations with both. I accordingly, approached the Dominion of India and Pakistan to enter into a stand-still agreement with my State. The Pakistan Government accepted this agreement. The Dominion of India desired further discussions with representatives of my Government. I could not arrange this in view of the developments indicated below. In fact, the Pakistan Government, under the stand-still agreement, are operating the post and telegraph system inside the State.

Though we have got a stand-still agreement with the Pakistan Government, that Government permitted steady and increasing strangulation of supplies like food, salt and petrol to my State.

Afridis, soldiers in plain clothes and desperadoes armed with modern weapons, have been allowed to infiltrate into the State, at first in the Poonch area then in Sialkot and finally in mass in the area adjoining Hazara district, on the Ramkote side. The result has been that the limited number of troops at the disposal of the State had to be dispersed and thus had to face the enemy at several points simultaneously, so that it has become difficult to stop the wanton destruction of life and property and looting. The Mahora power-house, which supplies the electric current to the whole of Srinagar, has been burnt. The number of women who have been kidnapped and raped makes my heart bleed. The wild forces thus let loose on the State are marching with the aim of capturing Srinagar, the summer capital of my Government, as a first step to over-running the whole State,

The mass infiltration of tribesmen drawn from distant areas of the N.W.F.P. coming regularly in motor trucks and using the Naushehra-Muzaffarabad road and fully armed with upto date weapons cannot possibly be done without the knowledge of the Provincial Government of the N.W.F.P. and the Government of Pakistan. In spite of repeated appeals made by my Government, no attempt has been made to check these raiders or stop them from coming to my State. In fact both Pakistan Radio and the Press have reported these occurrences. Pakistan Radio even put out a story that a Provisional Government has been set up in Kashmir. The people of my State, both Muslims and Non-Muslims, generally have taken no part at all in this destruction.

With the conditions obtaining at present in my State and the great emergency of the situation as it exists, I have no option but to ask for help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally they cannot send the help asked for by me without my State acceding to the Dominion of India. I have accordingly decided to do so and I attach the Instrument of Accession for acceptance by your Government. The other alternative is to leave my State and my people to free-booters. On this basis no civilized Government can exist or be maintained. This alternative I will

never accept so long as I am the Ruler of the State and I have life to defend my country.

I may also inform your Excellency's Government that it is my intention at once to set up an Interim Government and ask Sheikh Abdullah to carry the responsibilities in this emergency with my Prime Minister.

If my State has to be saved, immediate assistance must be available at Srinagar. Mr. Menon is fully aware of the gravity of the situation and he will explain to you, if further explanation is needed.

In haste and with kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,

Hari Singh.

The Palace, Jammu.

October, 26, 1947.

APPENDIX III

Letter from Lord Louis Mountbatten, the Governor-General of India, accepting Kashmir's accession 'provisionally' :-

Government House,
New Delhi, October 27, 1947.

My dear Maharaja Sahib,

Your Highness' letter, dated October 26, has been delivered to me by Mr. V. P. Menon. In the special circumstances mentioned by your Highness, my Government have decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. Consistently with their policy that in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State. It is my Government's wish that as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people. Meanwhile, in response to Your Highness' appeal for military aid, action has been taken to-day to send troops of the Indian Army to Kashmir to help your own forces to defend your territory and to protect the lives, property and honour of your people.

My Government and I note with satisfaction that your Highness has decided to invite Sheikh Abdullah to form an Interim Government to work with your Prime Minister.

With kind regards,

I remain,

Yours very sincerely,
Mountbatten of Burma.

APPENDIX IV

Extract of the memorandum submitted by India, on December 31, 1947, to the President of the Security Council, in accordance with Article 35 of the United Nations Charter :-

"Such a situation now exists between India and Pakistan owing to the aid which invaders, consisting of nationals of Pakistan and of tribesmen from territory adjoining Pakistan on the North West, are drawing for operations against Jammu and Kashmir, which has acceded to the Dominion of India and is a part of India. The Government of India requests the Security Council to call upon Pakistan to put an end immediatly to giving such assistance, which is an act of aggression against India. If Pakistan does not do so, the Government of India may be compelled in self-defence to enter Pakistan territory in order to take military action against the invaders. The matter is therefore of extreme urgency and calls for avoiding a breach of international peace.

"The facts point out indisputably to the conclusion :—

- (a) That the invaders are allowed transit across Pakistan territory ;
- (b) That they are allowed to use Pakistan territory as a base of operations ;
- (c) That they include Pakistan nationals ;
- (d) That they draw much of their military equipment, transport, and supplies (including Petrol) from Pakistan ;
- (e) The Pakistan officers are training, guiding and otherwise actively helping them. There is no source other than Pakistan from which they could obtain such quantities of modern military equipment.

"The Government of India has asked the Pakistan Government to deny the invaders facilities which constitute an act of aggression and hostility against India, but without any response. The last occasion on which this request was made was on December 22, 1947. No reply to this letter has yet been received in spite of telegraphic reminder sent on December 26, 1947.

"In order that the objective of expelling the invader from Indian territory and preventing him from launching fresh attacks should be quickly achieved, Indian troops would have to enter Pakistan territory. Only thus could the invaders be denied the use of bases and cut off from their sources of supplies and reinforcements in Pakistan.

"Since the aid which the invaders are receiving from Pakistan is an act of aggression against India, the Government of India are entitled, in international law, to send their armed forces across Pakistan territory for dealing effectively with the invaders.

"It, therefore, feels justified in requesting the Council to ask the Government of Pakistan :—

1. To prevent Pakistan personnel, military and civil, participating in or assisting the invasion of Jammu and Kashmir State ;
2. To call upon other Pakistan nationals to desist from taking any part in the fighting in Jammu and Kashmir State ; and
3. To deny the invaders :—
 - (a) Access to and use of its territory for operations against Kashmir ;
 - (b) Military and other supplies ; and
 - (c) All other kinds of aid that might tend to prolong the present struggle".

APPENDIX V

Article 370 of the Indian Constitution :-

"1. Notwithstanding anything in the Constitution :-

(a) The provisions of Article 258 shall not apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir ;

(b) The power of Parliament to make laws for the said State shall be limited to—

(i) Those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent list which, in consultation with the Government of the State, are declared by the President to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the accession of the State to the Dominion of Indian as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for that State ; and

(ii) such other matters in the said Lists as, with the concurrence of the Government of the State, the President may by order specify.

*Explanation :—*For the purposes of this Article, the Government of the State means the person for the time being recognized by the President as the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers for the time being in office under the Maharaja's Proclamation dated the 5th day of March 1948 ;

(c) The provisions of the article 1 and of this article shall apply in relation to that State ;

(d) Such of the other provisions of the Constitution shall apply in relation to the State subject to such exceptions and notification as the President may by order specify ;

Provided that no such order which relates to the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession

of the State referred to in paragraph (i) of subclause (b) shall be issued except in consultation with the Government of the State ;

Provided further that no such order which relates to matters other than those referred to in the last preceding proviso shall be issued except with the concurrence of that Government.

2. If the concurrence of the Government of the State referred to in paragraph (ii) of sub-clause (b) of clause 1 or in the second proviso to sub-clause (d) of that clause be given before the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of framing the constitution of the State is convened, it shall be placed before such assembly for such decision as it may take thereon.

3. Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provision of this Article, the President may, by public notification, declare that this Article shall cease to be operative or shall be operative only with such exceptions and modifications and from such date as he may specify ;

Provided that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State referred to in clause 2 shall be necessary before the President issues such a notification."

APPENDIX VI

Resolution submitted jointly by Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, United Kingdom, and United States on April 17, and adopted by Security Council on April 21, 1948 :-

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

Having considered the complaint of the Government of India concerning the dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir, having heard the representative of India in support of that complaint and the reply and counter-complaints of the representative of Pakistan,

Being strongly of the opinion that the early restoration of peace and order in Jammu and Kashmir is essential and that India and Pakistan should do their utmost to bring about a cessation of all fighting.

Noting with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite,

Considering that the continuation of the dispute is likely to endanger international peace and security ;

Reaffirms the Council's resolution of January 17,

Resolves that the membership of the Commission established by the resolution of the Council of January 20, 1948, shall be increased to five and shall include in addition to the membership mentioned in that resolution, representative of — and — * and that if the membership of the Commission has not been completed within ten days from the date of the adoption of this resolution that President of the Council may designate such other Member or Members of the United Nations as are required to complete the membership of five,

* To be decided later.

Instructs the Commission to proceed at once to the Indian subcontinent and there place its good offices and mediation at the disposal of the Governments of India and Pakistan with a view to facilitating the taking of the necessary measures, both with respect to the restoration of peace and order and to the holding of a plebiscite, by the two Governments, acting in co-operation with one another and with the Commission, and further instructs the Commission to keep the Council informed of the action taken under the resolution, and to this end,

Recommends to the Government of India and Pakistan the following measures as those which in the opinion of the Council are appropriate to bring about a cessation of the fighting and to create proper conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan.

A. Restoration of Peace and Order.

1. The Government of Pakistan should undertake to use its best endeavours :

(a) To secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purposes of fighting and to prevent any furnishing of material aid to those fighting in the State ;

(b) To make known to all concerned that the measures indicated in this and the following paragraphs provide full freedom to all subjects of the State, regardless of creed, caste, or party, to express their views and to vote on the question of the accession of the State, and that therefore they should co-operate in the maintenance of peace and order.

2. The Government of India should :

(a) When it is established to the satisfaction of the Commission set up in accordance with the Council's resolution of January 20 that the tribesmen are withdrawing and that arrangements for the cessation of the fighting have become effective, put into operation in consultation with the Commission a plan for withdrawing their own forces from Jammu and Kashmir and reducing

them progressively to the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order ;

(b) Make known that the withdrawal is taking place in stages and announce the completion of each stage ;

(c) When the Indian forces shall have been reduced to the minimum strength mentioned in (a) above, arrange in consultation with the Commission for the stationing of the remaining forces to be carried out in accordance with the following principles :

(i) That the presence of troops should not afford any intimidation or appearance of intimidation to the inhabitants of the State,

(ii) That as small a number as possible should be retained in forward areas,

(iii) That any reserve of troops which may be included in the total strength should be located within their present base area.

3. The Government of India should agree that until such time as the plebiscite administration referred to below finds it necessary to exercise the powers of direction and supervision over the State forces and police provided for in paragraph 1 they will be held in areas to be agreed upon with the Plebiscite Administrator.

4. After the plan referred to in paragraph 2 (a) above has been put into operation, personnel recruited locally in each district should so far as possible be utilized for the re-establishment and maintenance of law and order with due regard to protection of minorities, subject to such additional requirements as may be specified by the Plebiscite Administration referred to in Paragraph 7.

5. If these local forces should be found to be inadequate, the Commission should arrange for the use of such forces of either Dominion as it deems effective for the purpose of pacification, subject to the agreement of both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan.

B. *Plebiscite.*

6. The Government of India should undertake to ensure

that the Government of the State invite the major political groups to designate responsible representatives to share equitably and fully in the conduct of the administration at the ministerial level, while the plebiscite is being prepared and carried out.

7. The Government of India should undertake that there will be established in Jammu and Kashmir a Plebiscite Administration to hold a plebiscite as soon as possible on the question of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan.

8. The Government of India should undertake that there will be delegated by the State to the Plebiscite Administration such powers as the latter considers necessary for holding a fair and impartial plebiscite including, for that purpose only, the direction and supervision of the State forces and police.

9. The Government of India should at the request of the Plebiscite Administration make available from the Indian forces such assistance as the Plebiscite Administration may require for the performance of its functions.

10. (a) The Government of India should agree that a nominee of the Secretary-General of the United Nations will be appointed to the Plebiscite Administrator.

(b) The Plebiscite Administrator, acting as an officer of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, should have authority to nominate his assistants and other subordinates and to draft regulations governing the plebiscite. Such nominees should be formally promulgated by the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

(c) The Government of India should undertake that the Government of Jammu and Kashmir will appoint fully qualified persons nominated by the Plebiscite Administrator to act as special magistrates within the State judicial system to hear cases which in the opinion of the Plebiscite Administrator have a serious bearing on the preparation for and the conduct of a free and impartial plebiscite.

(d) The terms of service of the Administrator should form the subject of a separate negotiation between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Government of India.

The Administrator should fix the terms of service for his assistants and subordinates.

(e) The Administrator should have the right to communicate direct with the Government of the State and with Commission of the Security Council and, through the Commission, with the Security Council, with the Governments of India and Pakistan and with their representatives with the Commission. It would be his duty to bring to the notice of any or all of the foregoing (as he in his discretion may decide) any circumstances arising which may tend, in his opinion, to interfere with the freedom of the plebiscite.

11. The Government of India should undertake to prevent and to give full support to the Administrator and his staff in preventing any threat, coercion or intimidation, bribery or other undue influence on the voters in the plebiscite, and the Government of India should publicly announce and should cause the Government of the State to announce this undertaking as an international obligation binding on all public authorities and officials in Jammu and Kashmir.

12. The Government of India should themselves and through the Government of the State declare and make known that all subjects of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, regardless of creed, caste, or party, will be safe and free in expressing their views and in voting on the question of the accession of the State and that there will be freedom of the press, speech, and assembly and freedom of travel in the State, including freedom of lawful entry and exit.

13. The Government of India should use and should ensure that the Government of the State also use their best endeavours to effect withdrawal from the State of all Indian nationals other than those who are normally resident therein or who on or since August 15, 1947, have entered it for a lawful purpose.

14. The Government of India should ensure that the Government of the State release all political prisoners and take all possible steps so that :

(a) all citizens of the State who have left it on account of

disturbances are invited, and are free to return to their homes and to exercise there rights as such citizens ;

(b) there is no victimization ;

(c) minorities in all parts of the State are accorded adequate protection.

15. The Commission of the Security Council should at the end of the plebiscite certify to the Council whether the plebiscite has or has not been really free and impartial.

C. General Provisions.

16. The Governments of India and Pakistan should each be invited to nominate a representative to be attached to the Commission for such assistance as it may require in the performance of its task.

17. The Commission should establish in Jammu and Kashmir such observers as it may require for any of the proceedings in pursuance of the measures indicated in the foregoing paragraphs.

18. The Security Council Commission should carry out the tasks assigned to it herein.

APPENDIX VII

Resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan at its fortieth meeting on August 13, 1948, in Karachi :-

"The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan having given careful consideration to the points of view expressed by the representatives of India and Pakistan regarding the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and being of the opinion that the prompt cessation of hostilities and the correction of conditions, the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security, are essential to implementation of its endeavours to assist the Governments of India and Pakistan in effecting a final settlement of the situation ;

Resolves to submit simultaneously to the Governments of India and Pakistan, the following proposal :-

PART I

Cease-Fire Order

- A. The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that their respective High Commands will issue separately and simultaneously a cease-fire order to apply to all forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir as of the earliest practical date or dates to be mutually agreed upon within four days after these proposals have been accepted by both Governments.
- B. The High Commands of the Indian and Pakistan forces agree to refrain from taking any measures that might augment the Military potential of the forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

(For the purpose of these proposals "forces under their control" shall be considered to include all forces, organised and

un-organised, fighting or participating in hostilities on their respective sides.)

C. The Commanders-in-Chief of the forces of India and Pakistan shall promptly confer regarding any necessary local changes in present dispositions which may facilitate the cease-fire.

D. In its discretion and as the Commission may find practicable, the Commission will appoint Military Observers who under the authority of the Commission and with the co-operation of both Commands will supervise the observance of the Cease-fire order.

E. The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan agree to appeal to their respective peoples to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations.

PART II

Truce Agreement

Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in Part I, both Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their representatives and the Commission.

A. 1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.

2. The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting.

3. Pending a final solution the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.

B. 1. When the Commission shall have notified the Government

of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in Part II A. 2. hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.

2. Pending the acceptance of the conditions for final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire those forces of its Army which in agreement with the Commission are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order. The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems necessary.

3. The Government of India will undertake to ensure that the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will take all measures within their power to make it publicly known that peace, law and order will be safeguarded and that all human and political rights will be guaranteed.

C. Upon signature, the full text of the Truce Agreement or a communique containing the principles thereof, as agreed upon between the two Governments and the Commission, will be made public.

PART III

Plebiscite.

The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that end, upon acceptance of the truce agreement, both Governments agree to enter into consultations with the Commission, to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expression will be assured."

APPENDIX. VIII

Resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on January 5, 1949.

"A. The Commission reaffirms its resolution of 13th August 1948.

B. The Governments of India and Pakistan simultaneously accept supplementary to this resolution the following principles :-

1. The question of accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite.

2. A plebiscite will be held when it shall be found by the Commission that the cease-fire and the truce arrangements set forth in Parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13th August 1948, have been carried out and the arrangements for the plebiscite completed.

3. (a) The Secretary-General of the United Nations will, in agreement with the Commission, nominate a Plebiscite Administrator who will be a personality of high international standing and commanding general confidence. He will be formally appointed to office by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir.

(b) The Plebiscite Administrator shall derive from the State of Jammu and Kashmir the powers he considers necessary for organising and conducting the plebiscite and for ensuring the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite.

(c) The Plebiscite Administrator shall have authority to appoint such staff of assistants and observers as he may require.

4. (a) After implementation of Parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of August 13, 1948, and when the

Commission is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been restored in the State, the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine in consultation with the Government of India, the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces, such disposal to be with due regard to the safety of State and the freedom of the plebiscite.

(b) As regard to the territory referred to in A. 3 of Part II of the resolution of 13th August, final disposal of the armed forces in that territory will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authorities.

5. All Civil and Military authorities within the State and the principle political elements of the State will be required to co-operate with the Plebiscite Administrator in the preparation for and the holding of the plebiscite.

6. (a) All citizens of the State who have left it on account of the disturbances will be invited and be free to return and exercise all their rights as such citizens. For the purpose of facilitating repatriation there shall be appointed two Commissions, one composed of nominees of India and other of the nominees of Pakistan. The Commissions shall operate under the direction of the Plebiscite Administrator. The Government of India and Pakistan and all authorities within the State of Jammu and Kashmir will collaborate with the Plebiscite Administrator in putting this provision into effect.

(b) All persons (other than citizens of the State), who on or since 15th August 1947 have entered it for other than lawful purpose, shall be required to leave the State.

7. All authorities within the State of Jammu and Kashmir will undertake to ensure, in collaboration with the Plebiscite Administrator, that :—

(a) There is no threat, coercion or intimidation, bribery or other undue influence on the voters in the plebiscite ;

(b) No restrictions are placed on legitimate political activity throughout the State. All subjects of the State, regardless of creed, caste or party, shall be safe and free in

expressing their views and in voting on the question of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan. There shall be freedom of travel in the State, including freedom of lawful entry and exit ;

(c) All political prisoners are released ;

(d) Minorities in all parts of the State are accorded adequate protection ; and

(e) There is no victimization.

8. The Plebiscite Administrator may refer to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan problems on which he may require assistance, and the Commission may in its discretion call upon the Plebiscite Administrator to carry out on its behalf any of the responsibilities with which it has been entrusted.

9. At the conclusion of the plebiscite, the Plebiscite Administrator shall report the result thereof to the Commission and the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. The Commission shall then certify to the Security Council whether the plebiscite has or has not been free and impartial.

10. Upon the signature of the truce agreement, the details of the foregoing proposals will be elaborated in the consultations envisaged in Part I and Part II of the Commission's resolution of 13th August 1948. The Plebiscite Administrator will be fully associated in these consultations."

APPENDIX IX

The Anglo-U.S. resolution moved on March 22, and adopted by the Security Council on March 30, 1951 :-

"Having received and noted the report of Sir Owen Dixon, the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, on his mission initiated by the Security Council resolution of March 14, 1950 ;

"Observing that the Governments of India and Pakistan have accepted the provisions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949, and of the Security Council resolution of March 14, 1950, and have reaffirmed their desire that the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations ;

"Observing that on October 27, 1950, the General Council of the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference adopted a resolution recommending the convening of a Constituent Assembly for the purpose of determining the shape and affiliations of the State of Jammu and Kashmir ; observing further from statements of responsible authorities that action is proposed to convene such a Constituent Assembly and that the area from which such a Constituent Assembly would be elected is only a part of the whole territory of Jammu and Kashmir ;

"Reminding the Governments and authorities concerned of the principles embodied in the Security Council resolutions of April 21, 1948, June 3, 1948, and March 14, 1950, and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949, that the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices

of the United Nations ; affirming that the convening of a Constituent Assembly as recommended by the General Council of the All-Jammu and Kashmir National Conference and any action that assembly might attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliation of the entire State or any part thereof would not constitute disposition of the State in accordance with the above principle ;

"Declaring its belief that it is the duty of the Security Council in carrying out its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security to aid the parties to reach an amicable solution of the Kashmir dispute and that a prompt settlement of this dispute is of vital importance to the maintenance of international peace and security ;

"Observing from Sir Owen Dixon's report that the main points of difference preventing agreement between the parties were :

'(a) The procedure for and the extent of demilitarisation of the State preparatory to the holding of a plebscite, and

'(b) The degree of control over the exercise of the functions of Government in the State necessary to ensure a free and fair plebscite' ;

The Security Council :-

(1) Accepts, in compliance with his request, Sir Owen Dixon's resignation and expresses its gratitude to Sir Owen for the great ability and devotion with which he carried out his mission ;

(2) Decides to appoint a United Nations representative for India and Pakistan in succession to Sir Owen Dixon ;

(3) Instructs the United Nations representative to proceed to the sub-continent and, after consultation with the Government of India and Pakistan, to effect the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949 ;

(4) Calls upon the parties to co-operate with the United Nations representative to the fullest degree in effecting the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir ;

(5) Instructs the United Nations representative to report to the Security Council within three months from the date of his arrival on the sub-continent.

If at the time of this report he has not effected demilitarisation in accordance with the paragraph three above, or obtained the agreement of the parties to a plan for effecting such demilitarisation, the United Nations representative shall report to the Security Council those points of difference between the parties in regard to the interpretation and execution of the agreed resolutions of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949, which he considers must be resolved to enable demilitarisation to be carried out.

(6) Calls upon the parties, in the event of their discussions with the United Nations representative failing in his opinion to result in full agreement, to accept arbitration upon all outstanding points of differences, such arbitration to be carried out by an arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators, to be appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice in consultation with the parties ;

(7) Decides that the Military Observer group shall continue to supervise the cease-fire in the State ;

(8) Requests the Governments of India and Pakistan to ensure that their agreement regarding the cease-fire shall continue to be faithfully observed and calls upon them to take all possible measures to ensure the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations and to refrain from any action likely to prejudice a just and peaceful settlement ;

(9) Requests the Secretary-General to provide the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan with such services and facilities as may be necessary in carrying out the terms of the resolution."

APPENDIX X

Extract from the communique issued on August 20, 1953, after the conclusion of talks between Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru and Mr. Mohammad Ali, at New Delhi :-

"The Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India held several meetings on August 17, 18, 19 and 20 in New Delhi. These talks were in continuation of the talks they had in Karachi three weeks earlier. Kashmir and other problems outstanding between the two countries were discussed fully and frankly. Both the Prime Ministers were actuated by a firm resolve to settle these problems as early as possible, peacefully and co-operatively to the mutual advantage of both countries.

"The Kashmir dispute was especially discussed at some length. It was their firm opinion that this should be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State, with a view to promoting their well-being and causing the least disturbance to the life of the people of the State. The most feasible method of ascertaining the wishes of the people was by fair and impartial plebiscite. Such a plebiscite had been proposed and agreed to some years ago. Progress, however, could not be made because of lack of agreement in regard to certain preliminary issues. The Prime Ministers agreed that these preliminary issues should be considered by them directly in order to arrive at agreements in regard to them. These agreements would have to be given effect to and the next step would be the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator.

"In order to fix some kind of provisional time-table, it was decided that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed by the end of April 1954. Previous to that date, the preliminary issues referred to above should be decided and action in implementation thereof should be taken. With this purpose in view,

committees of military and other experts should be appointed to advise the Prime Ministers. On the Plebiscite Administrator's formal appointment and induction into office by the Jammu and Kashmir Government, he will examine the situation and report upon it. He will then make such proposals as he thinks proper for preparations to be made for the holding of a fair and impartial plebiscite in the entire State, and take such other steps as may be considered necessary therefor."

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